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PSYCHOLOGIA:

OR, AN

Account of the Nature OF THE Rational S O U L.

In Two Parts.

THE FIRST,

Being an ESSAY towards establishing the receiv'd Doctrine, of an *Immaterial and consequently Immortal Substance*, united to Human Body, upon sufficient Grounds of Reason.

THE SECOND,

A VINDICATION of that receiv'd and establish'd Doctrine, against a late Book, call'd, *Second Thoughts*, &c. wherein all the Authors pretended Demonstrations to the Contrary, as well *Philosophical* and *Rational*, as *Scriptural*, are fully refuted; together with Occasional Remarks on his Way of Reasoning. To which is annex'd, A brief Confutation of his whole *Hypothesis*.

By JOHN BROUGHTON, M. A.
Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Marlborough.

L O N D O N :

Printed by W. B. for T. Bennet, at the half Moon in St. Paul's Church-yard; and A. Bosvile, at the Dial and Bible against the South-East end of St. Dunstan's Church, in Fleetstreet. 1703.

TO HIS GRACE

JOHN

Duke of *Marlborough*,

Captain General of all Her
Majesty's Forces, Knight of
the most noble Order of
the Garter, and One of Her
Majesty's most Honourable
Privy Council.

May it please Your Grace,

THAT I presume to affix
Your great Name to a
Discourse, which I am sensible
A 2 falls

DEDICATION.

falls much short of its Title ; but in hopes that the Title will recommend the Discourse to Your Grace's Countenance and Protection.

*My Lord, the Immortality of the Soul, is not only the Common Principle of natural and reveal'd Religion ; but has given Rise to all those great Actions, which make the most agreeable Figure in ancient History. Cowardice, or Prostituted Honour was the evil Genius that haunted the Atheistic Commander, thro' all his Successes : But the Vertuous Hero always enterpris'd upon this noble Principle, which never fail'd him in the last Extremity ; but where-
ever*

DEDICATION.

ever entertain'd (especially in a great Mind) added Wisdom to every Debate, Firmness to the best Resolution, and a becoming Regularity to Valour it self. Indeed the Lustre of it is every where charming to our untaught Reason, and we cannot but admire something in the fatal Misapplications of a Cato and a Brutus.

But, my Lord, it must be confess'd the Principle was shamefully deserted by the greatest Pretenders to it, amongst the Grecians and Romans. Their chief Characters were rais'd upon a boundless Ambition, supported by Oppression and Rapine, and finish'd with Blasphemy.

Whe-

DEDICATION.

Whether this was a mistaken, or only a counterfeit View of Immortality in them, sure the Christian Hero can neither pretend a doubtful Light, nor an uncertain Way. He has plainly before him the shortest way to Glory, both mark't out and fenc'd by a Divine Hand. And if he is not guided by the Light afforded Him, he must shut his Eyes against it.

Christianity having laid this solid Foundation for Magnanimity, as well as all other Vertues, it cannot but occasion an unusual Horror in our Minds, when, at the same time, we behold such an One, who wou'd be esteem'd both
Hero-

DEDICATION.

Heroical, and most Christian, busied in the Scene of Injustice, Oppression and Murther; and there carrying on a Resolution as strong, and a Desire as impetuous, as if the Way lay only through Blood and Desolation, to that calm and peaceful Happiness, which is the only Happiness that can be Immortal.

I am fully persuaded the Immortality of the Soul wou'd but ill suit the Complexion of such an Hero, if he must be so stil'd; and that nothing cou'd force it to Address to Him, as it does now to Your Grace, but the mercenary Pen of a thorough-pac'd shameless Flatterer, who is equally regard-
less

DEDICATION.

less of Truth and Merit; and, as occasion serves, can either fasten upon him a meritorious Action, or make the worst of Actions meritorious.

But, my Lord, as to my self, I know every Englishman, who has any Remains of Native Virtue, or the Love of his Country (which no Nation ever wanted, and none can indulge on better Grounds than the English) will free me from this Imputation. And, if there be any Thing which we will not divide upon, we shall never dispute Your Grace's being at the Head of a Righteous Cause, and in the very Gap, where Tyranny, push'd on by Ambition,

DEDICATION.

bition, and guarded both by Force and Fraud, has made its Inroad upon the Liberties of Europe.

But since it has pleas'd the Divine Providence to give, and to continue so great Success to the Sword of Justice and Honour, in the Hands of Your Grace (engag'd in the greatest and best Design of many Nations, by the wise Choice of Him who began it, and with the highest Approbation of Her for whom, we hope, is reserv'd the Glory of finishing it) I shou'd expect more than a bare Vindication of this Address, from the true Englishman, were I permitted to touch upon that Subject, in a Dedication, which
a *must*

DEDICATION.

must be reserv'd as the proper Attempt of History.

But if I must not use this Plea, because it is so much above me, yet give me leave, my Lord, to mention another, which good Manners will better allow me to Speak to, and which, I know, will have from Your Grace, a more favourable Hearing. What I have written upon this Subject, as I believe it perfectly agreeable to Christianity, so it is in Defence of an avowed Principle and Doctrine of the Church of England; whose Authority is herein oppos'd, and rejected by One that wou'd be thought of Her Communion: But as it is Her own Vindication

DEDICATION.

dication, that she has hitherto met with such Treatment, only from those who make an unworthy Part of Her; so it is the Satisfaction and Support of all Her true Sons, that God has bless'd and honour'd Her with the best Friends upon Earth, in the most seasonable Conjunction, when she wants no sort of Enemies.

She has a solicitous Nursing Mother, who has brought to that high Charge the best Qualification of having been a faithful Member; and She wants not many such as Your Grace at the Helm, who, as true Members, are best inclin'd, and as chief Members,

DEDICATION.

are best fitted to assert, and maintain Her primitive Piety, and Her truly Christian Constitution.

This pleasing Thought, my Lord, has transported me into that Confidence, which now appears in my offering to Your Grace, the best Tribute my poor Stock will afford to the present Exigency of this combated Church and Religion. I am sensible how much the Mite will be improv'd, by the Acceptance of One, so highly concern'd in the Inseparable Interest of Church and State.

And that He who over-rules all, may long continue Your Grace, the Life and Spirit of the Confederate Arms ; and after a late
ap-

DEDICATION.

*applauded Exit, reward you with
that Immortal Honour which
Fame pretends to give, and Re-
ligion only can bestow, in the
true Philosophic and Christian
Sense, is the Dutiful and Earnest
Prayer of,*

My most Honour'd Lord,

Your Grace's most devoted

humble Servant,

JOHN BROUGHTON.

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THE PREFACE.

THE Book and the Design, which gave Occasion to these Papers, are so well known to those who have troubl'd themselves to know any thing of them, that I have no Occasion to prepossess the Reader with any Opinion concerning them, in Order to his more favourable Acceptance of my own Work.

But I think my self oblig'd to give him some Account of what I have attempted, and what I may presume to have done; the rather because through frequent

The P R E F A C E.

Interruptions, it happens that this Discourse appears in the Cause after several others, who may be suppos'd to have done sufficient Execution. And indeed I have no Design by this, to charge theirs with Insufficiency; but of those I have seen, which are suppos'd the most Considerable; some are only Answers to Second Thoughts, others but Answers in Part, and none of them have endeavour'd to build upon the same Foundation of Reason, which, I think, is at the Bottom of all the chief Arguments in this Book.

As to the first of these, I was very sensible that a just Answer to Second Thoughts, wou'd not therefore be a just Discourse on the Subject: and the Reader will find in the Second Part, that the Author seldom leads us to the Merits of the Cause; He either plays upon the Out-works of it, and there desists; or when his Objections seem to be driven Home, they are indeed only level'd at

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THE P R E F A C E.

the Weakness of Human Understanding, which cannot be suppos'd to maintain this Argument, where it fails in all others. And as to those who have only answer'd him in Part, viz. From Scripture, and have given up the Cause as indefensible by the Succors of Reason, I must confess I cannot, in this Case, approve of the Design, tho' I do not deny they have come up to it. If Estibius Pfychaethes, the Nominal Author of Second Thoughts, has made any Profelytes in a coming Age, I am of Opinion the greatest Part of them will be ready to compound at this Rate; and then rejecting the Scripture Authority does the Business at once. But tho' they always find this a Task too hard for them, then especially when they set most in earnest about it; yet I believe they find it the more easy of the Two, to deny, and to live by the Denial of the plainest Authority, than to stifle the Witness of their Mind, and to get rid of such connate and natural Notions,
which,

THE P R E F A C E.

which, as lying nearer to them, will sometimes press harder upon them. But as I think it is evident that God has guarded his Revelation of a Future State, with Expectations Natural, and highly agreeable to what he has Reveal'd; so I cannot find upon what Ground this Expectation cou'd be maintain'd, besides the Immortality of the Soul, which, accordingly, I look upon to be of no little Moment, as an Article of Natural Religion; and since Natural Religion is founded upon Natural Reason, I have made it my Chief Business, in the First Part, to give a Reason of this Hope that is in us.

It is indeed but one Reason, that runs thro' the greatest Part of the Essay; but I need not apologize for that, if I have made it conclusive. However, I may without Vanity say I have carry'd it farther than where I found it; and I cannot, upon the most deliberate Review, but believe it will conclude at last. The Reason,

THE P R E F A C E.

Reason, in short, is the *αὐτοκίνητον*, or self-moving Power of the Soul; exerting it self in all the Operations of Thought, and Spontaneous Motion. This, it's true, is an Argument of old Date; and I like it the better for that. It appear'd to me an Advantage to the Notion, that all the best esteem'd Philosophers of old, Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and many more, differing amongst themselves in all other Notions, and most of them whimsical and without Ground, upon the Subject, shou'd yet unanimously center in this. I cannot but suppose they were led to it, and dwelt upon it by the same Reason, which will, I presume, incline any Man that believes God has created Spirit as well as Body. For in Consequence of this, he will find it highly reasonable, to suppose that Spirit is the Principle of Life and Sensation; and Body of Mechanism and Local Motion. As therefore Spirit is, in its Nature,

The P R E F A C E.

*Nature, utterly incapable of Local Motion, either from Trusion, or Suction, and of any Mechanical Affection, or Modification ; so it is highly reasonable to conclude that Body is as incapable, on the other Hand, of Life and Sensation. For by what other Essential Character can we distinguish these two, if they are two distinct Species of Beings ? I grant, what Mr. Lock contends for, that 'tis possible to conceive a Spirit destituted of the Operation of Thought, and barely, in his own Term, as an unsolid Substance ; but it is sufficient that we place the Distinction upon the Capacity, and Incapacity of Thought ; for the other [of solid and unsolid] is no way serviceable to us ; because we did not come by the Knowledge of Spirit, as really existing, by our Idea of something unsolid, but only by our Idea of something that thinks ; So that our Idea of an unsolid Substance, is not form'd from the Contem-
plation*

The P R E F A C E.

plation of any thing without us, as that of Solidity is ; but is a bare Hypothesis to solve the Phenomenon of Thought. But now if a solid Substance be possibly capable of this Faculty of Thought, then there is no necessity to recur to the Hypothesis of an unsolid Substance, to solve that Phenomenon ; and since entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, what is this but to introduce universal Corporealism ? Which is neither better nor worse than Atheism. Which Consideration may serve to pull off the Mask this Notion, I do not say the Author of it, wears ; and to shew that he who makes both Body and Spirit Think and Live, does but comply with a Vulgar Mode of Speech, but really destroys the Distinction, and in effect ascribes all to Body.

*And this is my Reason for dwelling so long upon this one Point, as also for sending my Thoughts into the World
after*

THE PREFACE.

after others upon the Subject; but which have only, so far as I can judge, transiently touch'd upon this Point.

*In the Second Part of this Work, I have given Estibius a thorough Examination; not omitting any one Consideration that he himself has thought material, and all in his own Method. 'Tis likely the Reader may blame us both for this, and me especially for answering an impertinent Objection; but some of these Objections have given me Occasion to State several Controversies relating to the Subject anew, and to vindicate them from his Misrepresentations, which, with some, do the Work of Objections. If there are any that come not under either Denomination, the Reader will believe I have had my share in the Mortification; and he will be more ready to excuse me, when I have shew'd him how this Controvertist manages himself, and where his Play chiefly lies; which is in retreating from Covert to Covert, and
back*

The P R E F A C E.

back again in a Round. This he will frequently find him doing, when the Subject was only under his own Hands; and I am persuaded a Man of this Kidney will never yield so long as he has the least hold. And therefore I was the more willing to shew my Respects to the least Argument he offer'd, tho' I have been as short as was consistent with my Design. This is all I shall Preface to the Reader in General.

But because its possible Estibius may be one of my Readers, and what will be satisfactory to all others, may not be so to him; I must beg leave to address myself, in few Words, to him in Particular.

You see, Sir, I have attempted what You say has not been hitherto attempted, a thorough Examination of Your Second Thoughts. As to the Style, in which I have treated You, I cannot say it will be every where grateful: but it's not unlikely I shou'd fail in that, when I
con'd

THE P R E F A C E.

could not possibly tell what Style You expected; for in an Advertisement affix'd to Your Book, You forbid Your Answerer a Jestings Style, as that which You will pass by with Scorn and Contempt; but when Mr. Turner, observing Your Directions, plainly and seriously tells You, of obtruding on our

Saviour a meaning never intended,
Far. Th.
p. 54. ed, all the Answer You give him

is, away with your Grave Reprimand; so that I find You are resolv'd to be in an Opposite Humour, as well as an Opposite Argument, with Your Adversary. If he jests, You are full of stiff Scorn; and if he's Grave, You can Laugh at him for it. And therefore not knowing in which Temper these Papers may find You, whether Magisterial or Witty, I have not confin'd my self to either.

The next thing I am to account to You for, is, that I have sometimes fall'n in with the common Opinion in charging
upon

THE PREFACE.

upon Second Thoughts, Atheism, or so. This I must confess the Course of my Argument has led me to, more than once; but, if I have not sufficiently done it already, I here once for all, distinguish both between Your Person and Your Opinion, and between Your Opinion and the Consequence of it; so long as You disown the Consequence, I make it none of Your Opinion, and when you have not seen the Fault of your Opinion, I do not lay the Fault at Your Door. But perhaps it may be of use, in Order to your Vindication, to lay before You some of the Grounds of this Suspicion, in all of Your Readers, I have ever met with; and they are such as these,

First, they find You maintaining a downright Atheistic Principle, when You lay it down for an Axiom, *materiale non potest agere in immateriale, neque immateriale in materiale.* Whereas on the Contrary all Theists must maintain this for an Axiom, That there is no Motion of Matter in the Universe, but what
b proceed-

The P R E F A C E.

proceeded, as a real Effect, from the Acting of an Immaterial Agent upon it. They find You endeavouring, but they think ineffectually, to avoid the Consequence, when You say, to the

Fa. Th.
p. 134.

Objection, that God acts upon Matter, We ought here to talk Philosophy, and not Divinity to explain our Philosophy. For they can see no Reason why this Proposition, Motion was originally communicated to Matter by something Immaterial ; or this, God Acts upon all the Parts of the Material World, shou'd be reckon'd only Divinity and not Philosophy too ; so that Your Opposing Philosophy and Divinity in this Place, does with them rather increase, than remove the Suspicion. Nor are they satisfy'd with Your farther Answer, That the Modus of his Omnipotence Acting upon Second Causes is Mysterious and Unconceivable, for the Axiom excludes the Possibility, which is much more than not conceiving

THE P R E F A C E.

ceiving the Modus of his Acting on Matter. It is, if it be true, an Eternal Truth; and that concludes the Divine Nature it self. It is, if it be an Axiom, the Reverse of a Contradiction or Impossibility; and that is no Object of Omnipotent Power. Now as this very Axiom of Yours was the Grand Pillar of the Democratic Atheism, so You have insisted more upon it, than any one Thing in Your Book; and indeed it is at the Bottom of all Your darling Arguments. Which has left, a scurvy Scruple upon the Reader (who knows by what covert-steps Athiestic Tenents always stole into the World) which all You have hitherto declar'd of Your Faith, has not clear'd up.

Others have altogether disregarded Your assurance upon the Faith of a Christian that You write with an Honest Design, &c. For they think ^{Ep. Ded.} You have us'd the Scripture very unlike one that has Faith in it. In-

The P R E F A C E.

stances of this kind are very numerous, the Reader must only taste of them here. Behold (says our Saviour at his appearance to his Disciples after his Resurrection) my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my Self; handle me and see, for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones, as ye see me have, St. Luke 24. 39. Plainly implying (says
Pag. 83. Estibius) That what was visible to the Eye, and an Object of the Touch, being two of the Exterior Senses, was more capable of being understood, than a Spirit; whose Nature and Essence was properly the Object of the Understanding only. I will not put a Comment upon this Paraphrase; because, as I said, most Readers are already persuaded You are not in Earnest with the Scripture, tho' they do think You in earnest when in the same Page, You declare an Indifference to any Author, whether he is able or not, to turn and wrest the Scriptures.
Such

THE P R E F A C E.

Such another Instance is the Difficulty of Dislodging a Spirit, if there were any such in Human Body, which You propose as an Objection; since in fact it is so easily dislodg'd. And this Difficulty You prove from the Disciples complaining of it [when they cou'd not eject Evil Spirits] tho' they had an Pag. 108. Immediate Miraculous Power given them to eject Spirits and Devils. I do not say this has convinc'd any that You are able, but it has convinc'd some that You have attempted to turn and wrest the Scriptures. If this Method of interpreting Scripture is allowable, I am sure there is nothing so ridiculous, absurd or impious, but what the Scripture may be brought to Countenance; and then indeed every Man, of what Opinion soever, has just Pretensions to the Faith of a Christian.

Next to Your Treatment of Scripture, the Christian Reader has resented the Usage You have given the Primitive
b 2 Fathers;

THE P R E F A C E.

Fathers ; for finding them unanimously against You, in believing the Soul survives the Body, Your Business is, in many Parts of Your Book, to disgrace their Memory, by a Character of Ignorance below what was ever given to Monkish Writer, You doubt not but

Pag. 256. their Ignorance was equivalent

to their Piety. So that You seem resolv'd we shall gain nothing by extolling their Piety ; and to prove this, You are bold to make St. Paul mean, when he says, the times of this Ignorance God winked at, the Primitive times succeeding our Saviour. The best

Ibid. Character you allow them at last

is, that their Ignorance was pardonable in nice Points of Religion.

I don't suppose any one wou'd be offended, if Estibius did indeed understand the nice Points of Religion, better than all the Primitive Fathers ; but that which cannot but offend the Christian, that knows any thing of the Antiquity of

THE P R E F A C E.

of Christianity, is the notorious Falsehood of the Imputation: And sure he can have no great Opinion of the End, which such Means are imploy'd to gain.

These, Sir, I believe are some Reasons for the Reception this Honest Design of Yours has met with in the World; not to insist upon many incidental Occasions, such as your high Characters of Hobs, Lucretius, and others of that strain; and Your making an English Clergyman, and a Prejudic'd Zealot terms convertible; and, as if that were not broad enough, they are declar'd in the Title to Farther Thoughts, to have a Zeal, but not according to Knowledge. I cannot question Your Knowledge, or Your Prospect where some of this Dirt will light, but methinks its a little unreasonable You shou'd complain that other Men have Eyes and Understanding too.

The P R E F A C E.

Having taken upon me to give Estius some Sentiments of his present Work, I shall make bold to add a Caution or two with regard to his future Performance, if he designs any such, as an Answer to this. Not that I pretend to prescribe Rules to him, who has set none, that I can approve of, to himself; but I may offer Reason, where I know I must submit it.

First then, I think it high time for him to drop the old Cry of Prejudice, which is a Battery always ready to be play'd against any Opinion, especially if it is held by the generality of Mankind; and I am sure is as good an Answer to Second Thoughts, as it is an Argument for them: And yet this, besides a whole Chapter on Purpose, makes no inconsiderable Part of his Work. But I fear he did not consider, while he spent so many Words to remove Prejudice, what a considerable one he created against his own Design; for such monstrous Excrescencies,

THE P R E F A C E.

creascencies, in the Off-spring of the Brain, can be no great Credit to the Parent.

In the next Place, I hope we have done with the Controversy about Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, and Invocation of Saints. These I am sure are wide of the Mark, and touch not the Merits of the Cause, as it lies between him and me, or rather him and a Reform'd Country. I must confess I cannot see what Service he cou'd ever expect from this Argument, unless he imagin'd, a Foundation must be ruin'd with a Superstructure; because it does hold vice versa.

*To as little purpose will it be to quote Authorities, especially from Heathens, against this Heathenish Invention; and from Poets in a Metaphysical Argument, against Philosophers: For here at last he can only shew his Learning, at the Expence of his Judgment; and I doubt not but a larger Collection of
ancient*

THE PREFACE.

ancient Authorities might be made, to prove that the Sun, Moon, and Stars have Souls, than ever he will make to prove that Man has none. However I may demand fair Dealing with Authorities, and that he wou'd not any more bring Aristotle over by making him say Man when he said only Male; or quote the Authority of Sennertus on his side, who solemnly retracted that
Sennert. Hypom. 4. c. 10. very Opinion of the Generation of Human Soul.

There is another thing which, in Reason, I may expect from him; and that is, that he thoroughly acquaint himself with the Grounds of his Adversaries Opinion, before he undertakes to confute it. This is as necessary, as it is a Reasonable Request; for hitherto he has not conceiv'd Cogitation to be a Ground or Foundation of Immateriality; and yet I have shewn it
Pag. 245. has been the Foundation of Immateriality, ever since that had any Foundation with Philosophers; and I
hope

THE P R E F A C E.

hope I have prov'd it to be a Foundation, which Prejudice and Purgatory will never overturn.

Here therefore is new Work cut out for him ; and this being the chief Argument of my First Part, I expect his Rejoynder will confute the several Notions advanc'd in that ; and tho' I cannot promise him success in such an Undertaking, yet I will be bold to say, for his Encouragement, that following the Train of Thoughts in that Essay, he will come nearer, than ever he was yet, to his own Purpose. And I request it of him, when he's let into the Merits of the Cause, that he wou'd keep there, or be silent ; and not, as his way is throughout this Book, touch upon an Argument, and immediately fly off ; not unlike the Dogs from drinking at the River Nile, for fear of being Caught.

As to the Scripture part of the Controversy, I am sure the Laws of Dispute and just Discourse, will require him to reconcile his Tenent with the
Doctrin

THE P R E F A C E.

Doctrines of Rewards and Punishments in another World ; especially since I insist upon it that they are irreconcilable, before he repeats as he has done so often, those literal Expressions of the Dead not being, not knowing, nor praising God ; these I can assure him will give me no trouble ; for I don't think repeating a weak Argument without any Improvement, to be repeating the Blow ; but only to expose the wretched remaining Inclination of a repuls'd Adversary. When he has attempted to reconcile his Doctrine to Religion in general ; I may be inclin'd to consider again the Expressions of Scripture relating to the Point. But I shall not be confin'd to the bare Etymon of the Words Soul and Spirit ; having so fully expos'd the Weakness of that pretended Criticism, I now expect Estibius will give the Bible as fair an hearing as he wou'd do Galen or Hypocrates.

This

The P R E F A C E.

This is all I presume to say to Estibius; I have nothing to say to Dr. C——. For tho' I am as hearty an Enemy as he can wish for, to his Opinions, if these are his; yet to his Person I wish no otherwise than I do to every Reader,

——*Ut sit Mens sana in Corpore sano.*

ERRATA.

E Pist. Ded. page last, line 5. for *Philosyphic* read *Philosophic*.
Page 21. line 5. for *is* read *in*. p. 90. l. 21. dele. *That*.
p. 101. l. 30. for *stretch* r. *strength*. p. 183. l. 18. after *was*
insert *not*. Ibid. l. 19. after *state* insert *the*. p. 220. l. 13. af-
ter *as* insert *the*. p. 253. l. 21. for *Body* r. *Bodies*. p. 263.
for *Scornum*. r. *Somnium*. p. 276. l. 22. for *where* r. *when*. p.
277. l. 23. after *to* insert *be*. p. 298. l. 2. for *in* r. *is*. p. 306.
l. 5. for *wherever* r. *whenever*. p. 309. l. 6. after *pray* insert
God. p. 312. l. 20. for *when* r. *wherein*. p. 313. l. 28. for *was*
r. *were*. p. 329. l. 22. for *türe* r. *true*. p. 365. l. 20. after
that insert *of*. p. 371. l. 25. for *ong* r. *long*. p. 378. l. 1. for
Ninth r. *Tenth*. p. 383. l. 8. for *then* r. *tho'*. p. 393. l. 5. for
Enmities r. *Enmity*.

PSYCHOLOGIA:

PART I.

BEING AN

ESSAY

Towards Establishing the Receiv'd Doctrine

OF AN

Immaterial, and Consequently

Immortal Spirit,

United to

HUMAN BODY,

Upon sufficient Grounds of

REASON.

Οὗτοι ἔγωγε ὦ παῖδες, εἰδὲ τὸτο πάποισι ἐπέειπλν,
ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἕως μὲν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ἢ ζῇ ὅταν
ᾗ τέττε ἀποθνήσκῃ τέθνηκεν. Ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ
σώματα ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χερόνῃ ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα
παρέχεσθαι. *Πενοφ. Κύριε παῖδες. Bib. η.*

ADVERTISEMENT.

MΑΞΙΜΟΥ ΤΥΡΡΙΟΥ λόγος. Maximi Tyrii
Dissertationes. Ex Interpretatione Danielis
Heinsii. Recensuit & Notulis illustravit Joannes
Davisius, Coll. Regin. apud Cantabr. Socius.
Cantabrigiæ, Impensis Alex. Bosvile Bibl. Londin.
ad insigne Horologii & Bibliorum in vico vulgo
vocato *Fleetstreet*.

A N
E S S A Y
Concerning the
N A T U R E
O F
H U M A N S O U L.

S E C T. I.

*Some Terms intended to be us'd, ex-
plain'd.*

TH O' I shall not affect to express my
self in *Terms* unintelligible to any
competent Reader of the following
Essay; yet, to avoid Ambiguity as much as
possible, I shall here *define*, or if you will,
describe the chief of them.

B

The

An Essay concerning

The first is that of *Substance*, by which I mean *That, to us, unknown Nature, upon which all that we do know of the Nature of anything depends, as to its Being; and which is, as to its Essence in general, independent on every thing but God.*

The next is *Attribute*, by which is to be understood, absolutely, *all that belongs to a Substance, and is not the Substance it self; or, all of the Substance that falls under our Knowledge and Apprehension:* but when taken relatively to other things appertaining to a Substance, is *that which constitutes the specifick Essence of it, according to our Denomination of its Essence.* Thus by some *Extension*, by others *impenetrable Extension* is call'd the *Attribute of Body*, as distinguishing it specifically from things *immaterial.* I add *according to our Denomination of its Essence*, because, whether that *Attribute* flows immediately from its *Essence* or not, (which perhaps is only known to the Creator) it is sufficient if to it we can reduce, as to their Fountain-head, all the other specific *Attributes*, which we do apprehend to belong unto it.

Property I understand in a larger Sense than *Attribute* relatively consider'd, and in a more restrain'd Sense than *Attribute* taken absolutely; viz. *Any Attribute belonging to the specific Essence of a Substance, whether deriving from*

from it immediately, or from some other Attribute.

And by *Mode*, or *Quality* is meant a *Property*, which gives some peculiar *Denomination* to the *Substance*.

Human Soul, the Subject of our Enquiry, it is sufficient at present to define thus, a *finite Spirit* so closely united by the *Will* and *Power* of its *Creator*, to an *organical terrestrial Body* as to compose one entire *Nature* and *Person*. It is sufficient here to define the *Soul* as it is in this *State*, because our *Knowledge* of what it is now, is the only *Foundation* of our *Knowledge*, (so far as the *Light of Nature* guides) of what it will be in another.

There is yet another *Term* which needs explanation, and that because its different *Acceptations* has caus'd *Opposition*, where there was no *Contradiction*: It is the word *Idea*, which some understand, according to the *Etimon* of it, barely to signify, *those Impressions* which by the *Presence* of *sensible Objects*, or the *Power* of *Memory*, are made on the *Imagination*. Others take it in the *Cartesian* Sense, for the *immediate Object* of our *Thoughts*, while we do think; let that *Object* be of what *Nature* it will, or however it is represented to the *Mind*; and in this sense we have an *Idea* of whatever we can believe possibly, or actually true.

I shall take it in this last Sense, tho' others have been censur'd for so using it; and justly too, if, in the main, they extend it to all *knowable Truths*, and when it serves a Turn, confine it only to such as are known by *explicit Evidence*; which is a Fault obvious in a whole Sect of very modern Philosophers.

From these *Terms* thus explain'd, several Controversies arise, which yet I think it an improper Method to engage in here; it being sufficient that they are clear and intelligible; and whether they are proper Vehicles of any *Truths*, will best appear by the Application of them. This is all I think requisite to premise for the better *understanding* of what follows.

S E C T. II.

*What sort of Proof is to be expected
and insisted upon.*

I Have something to add for the better Reception of it; and that is concerning the Nature of the Proof I intend to insist upon, and it is reasonable to expect from me.

1st, I hope no Man expects to meet with what is properly call'd *sensible Proof*, in an Argument for the Existence of a Thing altogether remote from *Sense*; nor therefore,

2^{dly}, Must he expect *Mathematical Proof* in the common acceptation for *Geometrical*, as it is conversant about Things and the Relations of Things, which fall under our *Senses*; not but that there are many Propositions, and some, I hope, in these Papers, which are built upon *Axioms*, as properly stil'd, and deduc'd as demonstrably from them, as any *Proposition* in *Euclid*; but, being of an abstracted Nature, are not so easily, nor so fully assented to, by the generality of Mankind, as those *Sciences* which bring *Reason* down to *Sense*, and so are better adapted to the weakness of Human Understanding; not again that these have any Advantage of the other, in point of *Evidence*, with a Capacity susceptible of both.

And therefore, 3^{dly}, most Readers cannot hope to find such Proof here, be it of what Nature soever, as will leave no *Scruple* or *Hesitation* in their Minds.

It is one ill effect of the *Fall*, that our Understanding is more deeply immers'd in *Sense*, and so [naturally] cramp'd when it aims at intellectual Objects, that Men of strong Reasoning in other Cases, often think

we talk of we know not what, when we are got upon this *Subject*; to conquer this Difficulty, there is requisite a sound and piercing *Judgment*, frequent *Exercise*, and a very particular *Application*: Those that have not thus employ'd a considerable part of their time, I can only desire to reflect, after they have perus'd this Essay, upon what the Proof I shall bring amounts to *all together*; and to try if they can bring better, or as good Reason to the contrary; and if they cannot, whatever Difficulties they find in the *Apprehension*, the Scale of Judgment will at last turn on our side; and, to carry on the Simile, will weigh as far down, tho' not so swiftly, as if there were no opposite Weight.

4thly, As to the *Method* of proceeding in our Proof, it will be the *analitic* or *probatio à posteriori*, from the Effect to the Cause; which, tho' it is not so perfect a *Method*, nor consequently the Reasoning by it so strong as the *synthetic*, or *probatio à priori*, from the Cause to the Effect; yet it is, in its *kind*, a good and effectual *Method* of Proof; otherwise we must be sceptical in the far greatest part of *scientific* Knowledge, which leads us no otherwise to the *Cause*, than by the *Effect* which lies nearer to us; besides that all *Relation* is *reciprocal*, and we may safely follow the *Chain* of Reasoning either way; not that,

5thly, We

5thly, We pretend to lead, by this *Method*, to a full Comprehension of the *Cause*; for the *Cause* may have *Properties* which bear no *Relation* to that *Effect*; but that hereby we know something certainly of it, which is as full a Proof of its Existence, as if we knew every thing appertaining to it; for *nihili nullæ sunt proprietates*.

Lastly, It is allowed by all *Philosophers* a good Establishment of a Principle, how unknown soever in its self, if there appear a *Necessity* of recurring to it, for the Solution of some *real Phenomenon*; provided still, that that *Principle* be not in it self *absurd*, as well as *unknown*.

In this Sense I understand a thing is well prov'd, when it is prov'd as far as the *Nature* of it will permit; in any other Sense it seems a fallacious Conclusion to say, a thing is *really* prov'd, because prov'd as well as the *Nature* of it will bear; for still the Question may lye, whether the *Nature* of it will admit of sufficient Proof. If therefore we can first clear our Principle from *Absurdity*, and not only so, but bring good Arguments to prove it a Principle *in rerum natura*, and then evince the *Necessity* of recurring to it in the *Case* before us; the *Conclusion* must be admitted; and this leads me to the first Step of my intended Proof.

S E C T III.

Of Immaterial Substance in general.

THE Principle therefore upon which I build is that of *Immaterial Substance*; in which I shall distinctly consider the *Subject* and the *Predicate*.

1st, As to *Substance*; there needs no farther Proof of its Existence than the Definition of it already laid down, i. e. it is a self-evident Proposition that an *Attribute*, *Property*, *Mode*, or *Quality*, abstractedly consider'd, cannot exist of it self; and yet here is an insuperable Objection against the Existence of *Substance* to any Man that is resolv'd to maintain that *Sensation* and *Reflexion* are the Source of all our *Ideas*; that is, of all our Knowledge; for it is certain *Substance* became the Object of our Understanding, by neither of these means.

Essay on H.

Und. lib. 2.

Cap. 13. §. 19.

And accordingly, the Author of that Scheme has, very consistently, ridicul'd it; it is with him the *Indian Philosophers nescio quid*, that supports the *Tortoise*, that supports the *Elephant*, that supports the *Earth*; which is plainly to make our Notion of *Substance* not only unimaginable, but ungrounded and

and chymical. This I know is more than the Author apparently designs here, and where he repeats the Ch. 27. §. 2. Simile, which is to shew that the old Division of *Substance* and *Accident* is useless in Philosophy; but granting the Simile was introduc'd for its Elegancy only, and also that this Division of Things into *Substantiae* and *Accident* is useless in such Instances as he produces; which depend, as to their Solution, entirely upon our Knowledge of the *Accidents*; yet is not this general Division necessarily to be made in the order of Nature, before we descend to these Particulars? if not, we must allow a Self-support to *Accidents*.

A profess'd Enemy to *immaterial Substance* is so far from denying the real Existence of *Substance in general*, that he lays down *necessary Existence*, as an Spinoz. Ethic. pars 1. prop. 7. universal Property of it: I shall have occasion to undertake this Position afterward; only I observe at present, that this Doctrine was own'd on both sides, till this Moderator interpos'd, who is sometimes on one, and sometimes on the other side; and now and then against both.

But do we know nothing of *Substance*? Yes, for we can distinguish one *Substance* from another (which cannot be done without some Knowledge of both) by their known different *Accidents*, which necessarily
infer

infer a proportionable difference in the *Substances* to which they belong ; but perhaps the meaning is, we know nothing of *Substance*, taken in Distinction from, and Opposition to its own *Accidents* ; very true, and this Knowledge may not only transcend human, but all created Understanding ; but still, of the *Existence* of that, as to its Essence unknown, *Substance*, we have self-evident certainty, which, I think, cannot properly be call'd *knowing nothing of it*.

This therefore I venture to lay down as a self-evident Proposition, That *where ever there are Accidents, there is of necessity a Substance too* ; and *this*, as next to self-evident, that *from the difference we find in the Nature of Accidents, we must conclude a like difference in the Nature of those Substances to which they belong* ; for wherever a thing has its Dependence as to *Being* ; there it must have its Dependence also, as to all the *Modes of Existence*.

2dly, *Immaterial Substance* is not so much without Controversie. *Spinoza* in the forementioned Proposition giving the Divine Attribute of *necessary Existence* to *Substance in general* ; and, one Divine Attribute inferring all the rest, makes but one kind of *Substance* in the Universe, and all Diversity to be accidental.

A full

A full Confutation of this Tenet is too tedious an Undertaking here ; the Reader may find it to his Satisfaction in Dr. More. I only urge, that, according to what is said in the precedent Section, that very accidental Diversity infers a difference in the Nature of the Substances, and according to his own words, *Duæ substantiæ diversa attributa habentes, nihil inter se commune habent.* So that if there be any such thing as two different *Attributes*, there must be two distinct *Substances*.

*Duarum Athe-
ismi Spinoziani
columnarum
subversio. Mori
Op. Vol. 1.*

*Ethic. p. 1.
prop. 2.*

But that there must be, or, which is all one, must have been an *immaterial Substance* in the Universe ; that is, a Substance with Properties distinct from, and inconsistent with those that belong to *corporeal Substance* ; I shall, waving other Arguments, prove from these two Principles, 1st, *That something was from Eternity.* 2dly, *That Motion was communicated to Matter.*

The first is a Principle that needs no other to confirm it, unless by shewing the Absurdity of the contrary, as Dr. Cudworth has done with invincible Evidence in this short Sentence, *If ever there was nothing, there never cou'd have been any thing.* But this eternal Being is not Matter consider'd either in its *specific* or *generic* Nature ;

Intellect. Syst.

Nature; not in its specific Nature, for solid or fluid Bodies, as such, are not *necessarily*, and therefore cou'd not be *eternally* existent. Not in its generical Nature; for, 1st, This deify'd Matter being in one Part not conscious of the Thoughts that are in another, as we experience in our selves, wou'd not therefore be conscious of its own Thoughts, that is, wou'd not think at all; and then Man is not only *without*, but *above*, God in the World. 2^{dly}, An *eternal and necessarily existent Substance*, is no more subject to Alteration in its *Properties*, than it is in its *Nature and Essence*; the God of the Deist, as well as the Christian, must be *the same to day, yesterday and for ever*; which does infer not only Thought, but a Parity of Thought and Reason in all Beings, contrary to undoubted Experience; and on the other hand to suppose the Divine Nature thinking, but weakly in a Man, incoherently in an Ideot, and not at all in a Stone, is to suppose his *vital and moral* Perfections determin'd *ab extra*, which is to suppose in him an absolute Imperfection.

The *Second Principle* is, that *Motion was communicated to Matter*; otherwise it either mov'd from Eternity, or first began to move of its self. The first Supposition is demonstrably false from the successive and *periodical* Nature of all corporeal Motion; for
all

all the Parts of whatever is successive, were once *present*; that is, there was a *first*, or there could have been none *succeeding*; and therefore that *first* is limited on both sides; but Eternity is an unlimited Duration.

The second Supposition, *that Matter began to move it self*, is contrary to that known Law of Matter (which every one that has well consider'd the Nature of it must assent to) that it is indifferent to either state of Motion and Rest; and therefore being once in either, must persevere in it, till interrupted, or disturb'd by an external Cause; so that if Matter was ever once altogether quiescent, it never cou'd have mov'd it self.

And, from these two Absurdities shewn, it immediately follows that the *Origin of Motion* springs, of necessity, from some thing *immaterial*.

Having prov'd that there must be one *immaterial Substance*, *eternal*, and *the first Cause of Motion*, it is not incumbent upon me to prove, as a farther Confirmation of my Principle, that there are likewise *finite created immaterial Substances*; it is abundantly sufficient that there is no Contradiction in the thing, and that *immaterial*, as well as *material Substance* may be conceiv'd the Object and Effect of Divine Power; which it certainly may be, since it does not imply in its Idea any thing of absolute Perfection.

S E C T. IV.

Of Extension and Cogitation, as the Attributes of Body and Mind, and how far their different Ideas argues different Substances.

HAVING found that we come by the Knowledge of *Substance* by its *Attributes*, &c. we must follow the same Guide in our Enquiry after that *Substance* which we call *immaterial*; and here the two first Properties that offer themselves to our Consideration of human Nature, are *Extension* and *Cogitation*; that is, that our Nature is made up of a Body, and something endu'd with the Power and Faculty of *Thought*.

We need not therefore enter into the Dispute about these Terms, whether *Extension* alone, without the specific Difference of *impenetrable*, constitutes the Nature of Body; or whether *Cogitation*, as an *Operation*, can be the Essence of any *Substance*; for all that I intend is to use them as general Terms, to comprehend the several Modes and Properties of Body and Mind; which usually, how improperly soever, are reduc'd to them. For this Dispute belongs to them who enquire after the *Nature*, and not, as
I do,

I do, barely the *Existence* of Spirit and Body.

Supposing now, that our Knowledge of *Extension* proves the Existence of *corporeal Substance*, we are to enquire whether our Knowledge of *Cogitation* proves the same of *incorporeal*; and if it does, we must conclude these two *Substances*, because we find these two *Attributes*; to be united in human Nature.

Let us then examin our Ideas of *Extension* and *Cogitation*; and in the first place it is self-evident that there is no Connexion betwixt them; that is, neither *Thought* in general, nor any particular *Thought*, implies, in its Conception, any corporeal Mode, or Quality whatsoever; and so *vice versa*.

This is granted on all hands, even by *Spinoza* himself, who lays it down as an *Axiom*, *Nullas res singulares, præter corpora & cogitandi mo-* *Eth. p. 2. ax. 5.*
dos, sentimus, nec percipimus: Where he's plainly compell'd to make two *singular*, and therefore *different* things in our Conceptions of *Body* and *Cogitation*.

The point in question is, whether a difference in the *Attributes* proves a like difference of the *Substances*, to which they belong; which *Spinoza*, and since him many others deny that it does: And it must be granted that all kind of difference in *Properties*,

perties, does not argue different *Substances* : For instance, our Ideas of *Solidity* and *Colour*, are very different, and we find no immediate Connexion between them ; and yet we find them co-existent in the same *material Substance* ; nay, we find contradictory *Qualities*, v. g. *Hardness* and *Fluidity* to exist, alternately, in the same *Substance* ; and this leads us to consider where their Connexion lies, if they have any ; and we presently find their Agreement in a third thing ; we find *Extension* susceptible of *Solidity* and *Colour* at once, of *Hardness* and *Fluidity* at different times ; and being thus united in one *Attribute*, they resolve into one *Nature* and *Essence*.

But when we find any two Properties which, after a thorough Examination, are neither immediately connected themselves, nor mediately by any *third thing* ; we must conclude, by the same Rule, (and 'tis the only Rule we have in such cases) that they do appertain unto *two different Natures and Essences*.

Of this latter kind is the difference between our Idea of *Cogitation* and that of *Extension*. If we consider *Thought*, in its utmost Latitude, from the first to the last Degree of it, we have not any one Mode of *Extension* offer'd to our Minds in the whole Contemplation ; again, if we anatomize
Extension,

Extension, as far as our Thoughts can possibly carry us, we meet with nothing of *Thought* but find our selves as far from it, as when we first enter'd upon the Consideration of Matter, in one gross extended Bulk: Nor, lastly, does there result, from all the Comparison we can make of these two together, any third Thing [*Substance* or *Attribute*] in which they are united, and into which, their different Natures are clearly resolvable.

If to this it is objected, That in fact we find them united in one common *Substance* of Human Nature; I answer, besides that this is to beg the Question of him, that that wou'd prove Human Nature to be made up of Two *Substances*; if we consider Man only as an Organical Body, constituted of Particles differing in Bulk, Figure, Situation, &c. and then consider again, Whether this organiz'd Piece of Matter is more capable of connecting, as a third Thing, *Extension* and *Thought*, than any other Part of Matter in the Universe; we shall find it is not, that we can conceive; which is all I aim at here, because (as has been hinted) we are never the nearer *Thought*, for our refining upon *Matter*: By which we are led to one of these Conclusions; either that *Human Nature*, as endu'd with the Faculty of *Thought*, is to us an un-

C accountable,

accountable, unsolvable Instance in the Creation; or else another *Principle* must be fetch'd in for the Solution of it.

Now let us inquire, What has put the best Reasoners and Philosophers upon the Necessity of multiplying *Substances* in the Universe, for, *Sine necessitate Entia non sunt multiplicanda*, and we shall find this, and only this; That they met with Properties different in themselves, and not connected by any *Third Thing*, that offer'd it self to their Thoughts.

And therefore *Spinoza's* Distribution of Things into *Corpora*, & *Cogitandi Modos*, was illogical and unphilosophical. If he cou'd not, as he was conscious he cou'd not, reduce *Cogitation* to *Extension*, but was forc'd to place them in distinct and coordinate *Classes*; why did he mention the *Substance* of the one, and but the *Accident* of the other? He shou'd have said, *Extensionis & Cogitationis Modos*, or *Substantiam extensam & cogitantem*. In one Object we perceive nothing but *Extension*, and what follows that; in the other nothing but *Cogitation*, and what belongs to that; and therefore these equally conclude, if either conclude, for the Existence of their *Substances*.

Spinoza wou'd object here, That we know nothing of *Immaterial Substance*, consider'd

sider'd in it self; and I wou'd answer, No more do we of Material; and as to their *Properties*, it is granted, That we do perceive *Cogitandi Modos*.

If he shou'd farther urge, That we know not so much of them, as of those belonging to Body, and so make what is *sensible*, the highest Degree of Certainty; I need not dispute *that*; because, as I said, any the least Degree of the Knowledge of an Object, is a full Warrant to conclude for its Existence.

But *Spinoza* has plainly betray'd his own Cause; for he has unwarily laid down, and proved this Proposition, *Quæ*

res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa

Ethic. p. 1.
prop. 3.

esse non potest: From whence I argue, If there is nothing common between *Extension* and *Cogitation*, or, in his Words, between *Body* and the *Modes of Thinking*, then the one cannot be the Cause of the other; and consequently they cannot proceed from one and the same *Substance*.

But a more modern Author has offer'd another Objection against the Certainty of this Conclusion; *We have*, says he, *the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any meer material Being thinks, or no; it being im-*

possible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotence has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think.

*Lock's Essay,
Book 4. Ch. 3.
Sect. 6.*

I shall have occasion to examin thi^o Objection thoroughly in the sequel, but shall only consider it now, as it opposes what I aim at in this Section. It seems then there is a *fit Disposition* requir'd on Matter's side, as well as an omnipotent Power from without, to make it *think*. If I shou'd ask this great Thinker, in what Part of Matter, or under what Circumstances he ever found this Disposition, I cou'd not reasonably expect a prompt Answer. I am sure, that in his Ideas of *Matter* and *Thinking* there is no such thing to be found: And therefore, if he is Master of the Secret, his *Knowledge* is far larger than his *Ideas*; whereas it is true, and the Subject of this very Section, *That our Knowledge is narrower than our Ideas.*

Ibid.

But to let the Intimation of *Matter fitly disposed* pass; I am surpriz'd to find a Philosopher of no *Interest* or *Party*, that never-failing Argument against all, that are not of his Opinion, and who pleads so hard
for

Ibid.

for rational and intelligible Solutions, himself to recur to that of, *I know not but it may be*, nay, with a farther Fetch, *I know not but Omnipotence may have made it so*; and this is a Case that most other Philosophers have thought capable of being reason'd upon.

Suppose he had been talking of the *Atmosphere*, and, after several Experiments and Observations, to prove it no where 40 Miles high; shou'd come to shew how Rain proceeds from the *Condensation of Vapours* in that *Atmosphere*; but stop here, says he; *We have the Ideas of Rain and Atmosphere, but can never be certain, but that the Drops of Rain, as well as the Rays of Light, may stream from the Sun; for that Omnipotence may have so fitly disposed them, that they cannot Gravitate till within such a Distance from the Earth.* Wou'd not this Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς tend mightily to the Advancement of Science? The Case I think is very parallel, and I submit it to Judgment, Whether so great a Master of Reason wou'd not be thought, in the former Part of it, to speak like, what he so much detests, *A Man of a Party.*

I think however, the Author has here deserted his own *clear Ideas*; the chief Use of which is to distinguish Things, as *Confusion*, in our *simple Apprehension*, is the

Parent of Error in all the other *Operations of the Understanding*; but *Things* are only distinguishable by their *Properties*; and then are we confus'd, and most liable to Error, when we misplace *Properties*; which we certainly do in the Case before us, unless Omnipotence has actually exerted it self, as this Author supposes it may have done.

All which will, I hope, be of weight to a thinking Man and a Philosopher to incline his Assent to this Proposition, that *the Argument drawn from our Thinking Faculty, is a truly Rational and Philosophical, a Just and Conclusive Argument to prove an Immaterial Substance in Human Nature*; since it is deduc'd from the clearest Ideas we have of things, agreeably to the most certain Method of Philosophizing, and the true Rules of Judging in all other Cases.

S E C T. V.

Of the Repugnancy in our Ideas, between Cogitation and Extension, and how far this proves an Immaterial Substance in Human Nature.

THIS Repugnancy is a just Consequence from what is prov'd in the preceding Section; *viz.* The Difference between *Extension* and *Thought* is so wide, that there is no third Idea to unite them in one *Substance*; and this must render our Endeavours to conceive them as so united, for ever fruitless; and whatsoever we cannot conceive in created Nature, to be so much as possible, is a Repugnancy in the Nature of the Thing.

This indeed does not appear upon a first and superficial View of our Nature, by which the Generality of Mankind is deceiv'd, chiefly upon these three Accounts.

1. Finding themselves to be both *Thinking* and *Material* Beings, they judge this a good Reason, as founded upon Experience, to bring *Thought* and *Matter* into one *Substance*; but this is a plain Fallacy put upon themselves: For the Question not being, Whether they are a *thinking* and *extended*

Being; but, Whether this being of theirs is One, or a Composition of Two *Substances*; in order to determin that Point, they are first to suppose their *Material Part* alone, as taken for granted on both sides, and then conceive, if they can, how it *thinks*.

2. They are farther deceiv'd by their Experience, That Corporeal Motions naturally produce *Thought* in them; without attending to this true Observation from Nature, That one *Substance* may, at least occasionally, produce an Effect in another, which it cou'd never have produc'd by its proper and sole Efficiency: For, by this Method, the wise Author of Nature has connected the Series and Chain of Causes and Effects in the Universe.

3. They are still more egregiously impos'd upon, when they confound, as they do from their Infancy, *Motion* and *Thought* in themselves.

This they do in almost all their *Sensations*, which they either suppose to be convey'd from the Object, under the Form of *Real Qualities*; or to be pure Motions and Vellications of their own Organs: Whereas, nothing is more clear in all Philosophy, than that the *Idea*, suppose of Pain or Pleasure,

*Vide Male-
branch. de In-
quirend. Verit.
lib. 1. cap. 10.*

sure, is as really a *Thought*, as the *Idea* of Thinking is.

These Prejudices being remov'd, it is easy for any one to experience in his Mind this Repugnancy of conceiving *Extension* and *Thought*, as the Properties of one and the same Substance.

Let him, as Method requires, frame as clear and distinct an Idea as he can of each of them separately; and then let him endeavour what he can to conjoyn them; let him try to mark out an *Inch of Reason*, or an *Ell of Contemplation*; which wou'd be as easy to do, were the two Properties consistent, as to conceive a *reasoning Inch*, or *contemplating Ell of Matter*; for wherever two Properties are united in one *Substance*, they may be *reciprocally predicated*: Thus I can conceive an *extended Whiteness*, as well as a *white Extension*.

Now this Repugnancy being apparent both to Reason and Experience, let us take into Consideration again Mr. *Lock's* Refuge to the Power of God. We have already disgrac'd this Objection, as unphilosophical, and shall now endeavour to prove it absurd and mischievous.

First, It is absurd in this Place to recur to that Power. Were it only to suppose the Faculty of *Thinking* preserv'd in Human Body, while alive, by a perpetual
Miracle,

Miracle, it wou'd not sound well in the Mouth of a Philosopher : But this Supposition is of a much larger extent ; for we can conceive that one *Spirit*, especially the *Spirit of God*, may communicate Thoughts and Words to another ; and so may teach, in a Moment, what wou'd naturally cost many Years learning, nay what cou'd never be naturally learnt ; as Prophecy : We can also imagin the Laws of Gravitation suspended in one Place, by the Power that made them ; so that, *there*, Iron shall swim on the Water ; and there is no difficulty in supposing that the Creator can recapacitate *senseless Matter* for a reunion with *spiritual Substance*. In all these Cases we clearly apprehend, that the Subject is *capable*, and the Power *sufficient* ; which two are the only Prerequisites to any Operation.

But, in the Case before us, we have only the bare Notion of Omnipotence to help us out ; and, if that may be apply'd without ever attending to the Capacity of the Subject, it may, and ought to be equally apply'd in all Cases ; and so wou'd make all, or rather nothing miraculous, and exclude every other Conclusion drawn from our Reasoning upon the Nature of Things.

Secondly, From this Notion of the Repugnancy, this Refuge will appear to be very mischievous.

I think

I think none but a *Sceptic* will deny the Great Mischief of *Scepticism*, which at once defeats the best Means, and the best End of Human Nature; and I am of Opinion, this one Notion of Mr. *Lock's* has no little Tendency that Way.

Des Cartes lays it down for an Axiom, *Nec alia sunt quæ à Deo fieri non posse dicuntur, quam quod repugnantiam involvunt in conceptu, hoc est, quæ non sunt intelligibilia.*

Ep. Partis
primæ, p. 114.

So that what is not possible any Way to be conceiv'd, argues as much a Repugnancy in Conception, as what is contradictory: Not that this is any Prejudice to the Belief of Things that are above our Conception, upon an Authority which we do conceive to be sufficient; but that, in our own Reasoning upon Things, we must reject, as Falshood, what is impossible to be understood, as Truth: For indeed the very Nature of a Contradiction lyes in this, That it is a thing impossible to be conceiv'd.

Whoever breaks in upon this Rule, destroys the only *Criterion* we have of Truth, which must consist in a clear and distinct *Perception*, or, with a late Author, *Conception*, of it; that is, it must be the Object of our Understanding, tho' not

*Medicina
Ment. Pars 2.
p. 42.*

not of our Imagination; and if this Rule ever fails us in one Instance, there can be no Reason given why it shou'd hold in any: Whereas, if, according to the *Cartesian Principles*, the Veracity of God is concern'd, it can, like that, never fail us: But to wave all circular Proof, as indeed all pretended Proof must be in this Case, I say, That as every particular Science has its *First Principles* and *Axioms* upon which it is built; so this is the *First Principle* and *Axiom* of all Sciences, *the Truth of our Faculties*. To deny this, in any one Instance, is in effect to deny it in all; which does not indeed lead us to Universal Scepticism, (for that is Nonsense and Contradiction, to deny *all Truth*, and at the same time to believe one's own Assertion to be *true*;) but it leaves us nothing of certainty, excepting this one thing, that *God may have deceiv'd us*: A weak Principle, God knows, for the Reasonable Faculty, the Perfection and Happiness of Human Nature, to rest upon. That the Author foresaw this Consequence, I am as far from believing, as I am that he can disprove it.

In the mean time I conclude, that *Cognition* and *Extension* are found, upon the Comparison, to be inconsistent and incompatible in one and the same *Substance*;
and

and that this their Inconsistency in one, is as full an Evidence of their appertaining to two *Substances*, as demonstrative Knowledge will bear. But for the farther clearing of this Point, we will particularly consider, Whether *Cogitation* in it self does not require an *Immaterial Subject*; and next, Whether a *Physically extended Substance* is in it self capable of *Cogitation*. This indeed is already absolutely determin'd by our comparing the two Properties together; but will receive farther Light, by comparing the Property in dispute, with each of those Subjects that lay claim to it.

S E C T. VI.

Of Cogitation, (as in Man) requiring an Immaterial Substance.

FIRST then, Let us compare our Faculty of *Cogitation* with an *Immaterial Substance*, (the Principle establish'd *Seçt. III.*) and see whether it does not properly belong unto it.

'Tis certain, all our *Ideas* are conversant about *Things*, and the *Relations of Things*.

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1. As to *Things*, we are said to gain the Idea of them three several ways: First, By the Operation of our *pure Intellect*; which, without the Mediation of our Senses, any farther than they are generally requisite to all our *Thoughts*, receives, or frames the Ideas of *Universals*, of *Spiritual Substance*, and especially of *the absolutely Perfect Being*. 2. By the Power of our *Imagination*; which recals the Ideas of Material Objects, that once acted upon us. And, 3. By *Sensation*, when a Material Object acts, as present, upon us.

I know the first of these Ways will be utterly rejected by my Adversaries, and the second will be reduc'd, by them, to the last Head, with the addition only of *Reflexion* to *Sensation*: Therefore, tho' I have mention'd the first, as capable of Proof, and worthy of Consideration; and the second, as believing the Power of *Reflexion* to be an *Immaterial Operation*; yet to be as short, and to prevent Cavil as much as can, I shall only insist upon the last, viz. *Sensation*, as a sort of *Thought* belonging to Man; which, if it requires an *Immaterial Substance*, does *à fortiori*, conclude for all his other superior *Thoughts*.

That *Sensation* is properly a *Thought*, has been observ'd before; and that it cannot be either in the Object, or in the Organ of Sense,

Sense, if any one that has thought upon it can doubt, he may receive abundant Satisfaction from the forementioned Author.

*Malbr. l. 1.
c. 11, & 12.*

It must therefore precisely consist in that *Idea* which is raised in us; which *Idea*, tho' it is not to be described in Words, (so far remote is it from any Material Impression) yet it is something real within us; for we can as perfectly distinguish the several Kinds of it, as those of any other Nature.

After this considered, to say that we know nothing of *Thought*, is to say we know nothing of any thing; for to be *conscious* of a Thing, is the highest Degree of the Knowledge of that Thing; it is next to, if not the same with, *Intuitive* Knowledge. Mr. *Lock* does not say this, but he says what is tantamount, *We know not wherein Thinking consists*. I ask then, Wherein Extension consists? And all the Answer I can expect is, That it consists in having *Partes extra Partes*: But, besides that, according to this Definition, I can have no *Idea* of the Omnipresence of God; and so it offends against that Rule, *Debet cum definito reciprocari*; it offends also against another, *viz. Debet constare ex Attributis prioribus & notioribus natura*; for I can

*Essay, lib. 4.
cap. 3. sect. 6.*

have

have no clearer Idea of the Part, than I have of the whole of an *extended Mass*, without the precedent *Idea* of *Extension*: And therefore to demand wherein such simple Ideas consist, is the same thing, as to demand a Proof of First Principles; so that this Piece of Ignorance is no Reason at all

Ibid.

why God can, if he pleases, *superadd* to Matter the Faculty of *Thinking*; of which, more afterward.

But to return, and to prove that this *Idea* of *Sensation* does, of it self, discover something *Immaterial* in us; let us observe how it is impress'd upon us, in that Instance of our drawing near a Fire; which by degrees warms us, and so gives us the sense of Pleasure, 'till continu'd, heats us excessively, and then gives Pain. It is certain that both these, as Mechanical Motions in our Organ, differ only in Degree; and it is as certain that the two *Ideas* differ as *Contraries*, and do, as the *Logicians* speak, *se mutuo tollere*. In this Case, when the Idea of Pain begins, that of Pleasure is utterly extinct. But how Motion communicated from the same Object, upon the same Organ, and in the same manner, excepting only the least Degree of Celerity added, shou'd produce *Ideas* so perfectly contradictory to each other, as the one to make us happy, the other unhappy, antecedently to

to our Reasoning upon them; is a *Mechanical Mystery* indeed: For, allowing that one Part of Matter can strike an *Idea* into another, because we have not yet directly prov'd the Contrary, yet, according to that Hypothesis, it ought to be done in a Mechanical Way; and then it wou'd follow, That we shou'd live and dye either altogether in Pleasure, or altogether in Pain. Our Reason and Experience might distinguish the Degrees, and so make us avoid what will be finally noxious to us; but the bare *Ideas* of Sensation cou'd give us no Warning, nor be of any Use to this Purpose.

But now the Supposition of an *Immaterial Substance* united to our *Material*, and so united, as to be affected with all the various Motions the other receives; and so affected, as upon a certain Degree of disorderly Motions in the Body, to be perfectly loosen'd and disunited from it, will rationally account for the wide Difference of our *Sensations*. No wonder if that which is agreeable to the Natural Motions of our Body causes Pleasure in our Mind, so closely and personally joyn'd with it; and that Motion which, in a higher degree, will cause a Separation, causes an uneasy Sense in a lower; and makes, as it were, a new *Modification* of the Mind, attending always

in its inferior Faculties, to its well-being and continuance in this State.

But perhaps Arguments of this nature will not seem so conclusive to every Reader, (the Mind being not only (as Mr. *Malebranche* observes) by the Primitive Fall weakn'd and stupify'd as to the Knowledge of Intellectual Beings; but, in consequence of that, as to the knowledge of it Self too.) We will turn the Prospect, and argue from what is imaginable and intelligible, even to the Atheistic Philosopher.

S E C T. VII.

Of Physically extended Substance, as in its Nature utterly incapable of Thought.

WHETHER the Specific Effence of Body (so far as we apprehend of it,) consist in *Extension* generically understood, or in *Extension* modify'd by *impenetrability*, is, (as I have already said) a thing indifferent to the Argument in hand; because our Idea of *Corporeal Extension* is nevertheless clear, whether we can determin that any thing *incorporeal* is *extended* or not: Our Business then is to consult this Idea,
and

and I think it will offer something to us inconsistent with the Power of *Thought*.

1. Whereas we do not find either Motion or Rest, as opposite States, included in this Idea, nor one more than the other consequent upon it; from hence we collect, that it is perfectly indifferent to both; as it is to all other inconsistent Qualities, which alternately it is capable of; for instance, to a square or round Figure. And from this Indifferency follows this Law of Nature, *Every body will continue in the State it is once put, [whether of Motion or Rest] 'till disturb'd by some External Cause*; for if any Change proceeded from it self, it wou'd have a Tendency, and therefore not an Indifferency, to that State into which it remov'd: Thus it is certain a Body in Rest, wou'd never move but by an *Impellent Cause*; and a Body in Motion wou'd never rest without an *Interruption*. Now it is plain that all the Changes incident to a Body, proceed from the interchange of these States, either Motion for Rest, or Rest for Motion; and from hence again it follows that all the Changes, and Qualities arising from thence, proceed from External Causes; which discovers to us the *Passive Nature of Matter*; that is, it can exert no Operation, nor any way possibly modify it self.

Perhaps this Chain will not appear so strong to some, it seeming to suppose we know more of the Nature of Matter than really we do; and yet I will venture to say, it is form'd of *Axiomatical* and *Self-evident Truth*: For, as all our Knowledge is conversant about Things and their Relations, so I conceive those *Axioms*, upon which our Knowledge is built, are of two sorts; *Axioms of Things*, and *Axioms of their Relations*; or, if you will, *Axioms of Properties*, either *absolutely*, or *relatively* consider'd. This will appear to be a good Division, by an Instance of each; *Quæ eidem tertio conveniunt, inter se conveniunt*, is an *Axiom* which barely concerns the Relation of Things; as all other *Geometrical Axioms* do. But besides these, there are *Axioms*, as properly so call'd, of another kind, *v. g. Corpus extenditur in longum, latum, & profundum*; is an Idea of Body convey'd to us, not by any intermediate Idea, but arises from our first Contemplation of it; and therefore is a self-evident Truth.

Again, as we frame *Axioms* of the Relations of Things depending on each other, so we may of the Things themselves: Thus, having setled our first Idea of Matter, this is another *Axiom* concerning it; *Corpus quiescens non movetur de loco, nisi ab*
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alio corpore detrudatur: And this, depending so immediately on our first Idea of Matter, is, in its kind, self-evident too; that is, it stands in need of no Proof, as that, upon which it depends, neither needs, nor is capable of Proof. Hence it is, that to such *Reductitious Axioms* we give as full, and as ready an Assent as to those which I call *Primitive*.

Now tho' the *Relations of Things* make up the greatest part of our Knowledge, as being more extensive than the Knowledge of *Things in themselves*; yet those *Axioms*, or Properties which immediately discover themselves, upon our Contemplation of the *simple Nature of Things*, are as infallible, and depend as immediately, as any other, upon that grand *Axiom* of all, that *our Faculties are true*. For I shou'd be equally deceiv'd by my Creator, in the very Foundation of my Reasoning, if a *Property*, which my *first* Idea of an Object discover'd to me, were not really inherent in that Object; as if those two Things which agree in one third, did yet, in the same respect, disagree between themselves.

And therefore how narrow soever our Knowledge may be, or how great our Ignorance of the *Properties* which the Almighty has bestowed upon Matter; yet our Knowledge must of necessity be *adequate*

to the Object in our *first* Idea of it; or otherwise we are immediately deceiv'd by the Author of our Nature, who represents it to us. And 'tis plain, we may sufficiently understand a Principle in it self, tho' we are ignorant of many just Consequences from it, and tho' we may err in our Deductions; 'tis in this exuberant variety of Relations and Qualities, that our Reason is bewilder'd and lost; but, all this while, our first Apprehensions are as just and infallible, as the Author of our Beings.

By such certain Evidence as this, we come to know the *Passive Nature of Matter*; and I have dwelt the longer upon it, because it is of very great Moment in the present Enquiry: For there needs not much Labour to prove that a *Substance*, with this Essential Property, is utterly incapable of *Thought*, such as we experience in our selves.

As an Effect of our *Thinking Faculty*, we are conscious of *Spontaneous Motion* in our selves, which is a Motion neither rais'd, nor determin'd *Mechanically*; it is not rais'd like the Motion of a Clock or Watch, either by Elasticity, or Gravity; but we think to move, and immediately upon that Thought we do move, we check or retard that Motion at pleasure; and, in short, both move and rest from our selves; which
necessa-

necessarily inferrs the Power of Motion within our selves: And this is a Power absolutely inconsistent with the *Passive Nature of Matter*, as before explain'd and prov'd.

So that our Principle of Motion is plainly a Self-active Principle; and if we consider our *Thoughts* more abstractedly, we shall find all the several Modes of *Thinking*, such as *apprehending, willing, desiring, and judging*, independent, in the *Power*; however they may be determin'd in the *Manner*, of exerting themselves upon any created external Agent; and therefore undoubtedly independent upon Matter and Motion. Therefore so long as our *first* Idea of Matter includes in it a *Passive Nature*, it includes also an utter Incapacity of *Thought*.

2. There is another Property of Matter resulting from our first Contemplation of it; which renders it incapable of *Thought*, and that is, *Divisibility*.

It must be granted, That our Idea of Matter came in by our Senses; and it is certain, our Senses can offer no Extension to our Minds but what is *Figurate*, and therefore *compounded*, and therefore *resolvable*: So that *Atoms*, strictly and Philosophically speaking, are inconsistent with our *first* Idea of Matter; and, for that Reason, can never be admitted, whatever more

remote Absurdities attend the contrary Doctrine; which may prove our Idea of Matter incompleat, but not self-contradictory: For it is not clear, that an infinite Division, in the positive sence of the Word, with its Train of Absurdities, follows from hence, That our Senses have given us an *Idea of Corporeal Extension*, to the *Divisibility* of which we can fix no Bounds.

But among the Corpuscularian Philosophers, both Ancient and Modern, some have their *Atoms*, so call'd, because they terminate *Generation* and *Corruption*; call'd also *Minima Physica*, so small, that they are indivisible by Natural Agents, tho' not Omnipotent Power.

Let us first examin the Nature of Body according to this Hypothesis: We find then Two Properties belonging to these *Atoms*. 1. That all Bodies are *resolvable* into them, because *compounded* of them. 2. That they are all absolutely *Homogeneous*; all *Heterogeneity* of Bodies arising from a different Physical Composition, which is not predicable of these *last* Particles.

From hence it follows, That if any Part of Matter, as such, had in it a *Capacity of Thought*, then all Matter has the same: This will be easily granted, if we reflect, that these *Atoms* are *Homogeneous*, and that there is nothing, really and intrinsically,
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beside these, in any Physical Composition: But all the *Diversity* of it arises from the different Texture, Situation and Motion or Rest of these Particles; which clear Notion in Physics, has long since deservedly exploded out of the Philosophic World, all *Real Qualities* and *Substantial Forms*. Now I take it for granted that all Matter, as such, does not actually *think*; let us then enquire how it comes to *think*, as compounded in the Body of Man; tho', in its Intrinsic Nature, as we have seen, utterly devoid of *Thought*.

'Tis plain, according to this Doctrin, That the *Power of Thought* must be lodg'd in one, or more of these *Monads*.

If in one, we must suppose this *Monad* to have been created of a different Nature from the rest; or else the rest wou'd think too, (and whatever Properties are in simple and uncompounded Matter, can never be lost and extinct, in all the Changes it undergoes, so that we shou'd have a vital and self-conscious Universe) and if this *Monad* was created of such a different Nature from the rest, as to have the Power or Quality of *Thought*, we must affirm of it, as we do of the rest, that it cou'd never lose this Power thro' all the possible variety and alteration of *Second Matter*: Nothing but Annihilation, or, which is equal, the
Power

Power of the Creator changing its Original Nature and Constitution, cou'd divest it of *Thought*; and then, in what Part of the Universe soever, it wou'd *think* and be *self-conscious*; which, in sense and reality, is the same thing with an *Immaterial Substance* united to Human Body: Or, however, is to make Man at once *material* and *immortal* in his Individual Nature; whereas all *Corporealists* disown the latter, as inconsistent with the former.

Besides, it is impossible to conceive such a fix'd, as well as *thinking*, *Monad* of Matter, in any one Part of Human Body; when all of it, in its most Essential Parts, is under a perpetual Flux and Alteration.

Again, as to the Motion it must be suppos'd to communicate to the rest of the Body, this must be done either by moving about its own *Center*, or *progressively*: The first indeed seems the only conceivable Way of its Motion, in order to receive, as we do, the same Impressions a second time from the same Object: But then it is impossible to conceive how, by moving in this manner like a Star in its Vortex, it shou'd communicate those Motions *quaquaversum*, which are obvious, and each Moment perform'd in our Bodies; and which require a Principle with a Power in it, at the same time, of communicating Motion every Way; where-

whereas 'tis impossible to conceive in Body, a Power of communicating Motion to any more, than one determinate Point at once.

If its Motion be suppos'd to be *progressive*, so that it moves, the Animal Spirits suppose, by impulse; being, by unconceivable Degrees less than the least Pore in our Body, it wou'd find none, or no effectual Resistance; and so, instead of communicating Motion to it, wou'd, by its own Rectileal, as its Natural Motion, pervade and desert the Body.

These are some of the Impossibilities and Absurdities attending the Supposition of *Thought in one Particle of the Body*; the other Supposition, which places it in a Collection or Combination of these Monads, in the Brain or some Ventricle of it, is attended with these, and some Consequences, of the like nature, peculiar to it self.

It makes not One, but a Multitude of Percipient and Intelligent Agents within us; which, like so many Senators, must debate and propose their several Sentiments, before they can be concluded by one, and that shall commence an *Human Thought*: For it is as absurd to suppose that one Monad can be conscious, without Communication, of the Thoughts of another, as to suppose the same in two or more Men. But I need not labour to prove that this
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is inconsistent with the Manner of our receiving Impressions, and forming *Ideas*, nor expose this senceless Supposition any farther.

But there is another Sort of *Corpuscularians*, who differ from the former in this, that they own no Physically Indivisible Parts of Matter; but, tho' as *Corpuscularians*, they differ, in this; yet as *Corporealists* they do not: For this Dispute lyes only between one and a farther Extent of Power confessedly *Mechanical*; and therefore they are justly chargeable with all the Consequences that attend the other *Hypothesis*; adding only this, that their *Thought* must be both figurate and divisible: For, fixing no Limits to the Division of Matter, neither can they limit the Division of its Qualities; for if the least possible Body (pardon the absurdity of the Expression) is divisible into two less Bodies; then, so is the least possible Quality too: For instance the Whiteness of it, is, with the Body, divisible into two less Whitenesses; and tho' a Circle does not divide into two Circles, nor a Square into two Squares, yet as Figures in general they divide one into two; which shews us that there is no Coporeal Property but what is divisible, with the Body, it belongs to: And therefore 'till the Instrument is invented, so fine
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as in reality to split a *Thought*, I think we must be forc'd to take up this with Conclusion, that *Physically extended Substance*, is, in its own nature, utterly incapable of *Human Thought*.

S E C T. VIII.

*That Cogitation cannot be superadded
to Matter.*

I N the preceding Section we have proved that, according to our first, and therefore clearest Idea of *Matter*, it is both devoid and incapable of *Thought*; which might, reasonably, prevent any farther Dispute upon this Point when 'tis consider'd that, according to that infallible Maxim, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*; no external Cause can act upon the Subject, beyond the Capacity of it: But, notwithstanding this, our Idea of Motion, and of the Qualities producible by it in Bodies, is so very different from our Idea of Matter, and seems to discover in it such a vast Capacity, beyond what *that* wou'd afford us; and, especially, such is our Venerable Notion of
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the Creative and Omnipotent Power, that when we consider these abstractedly from Matter, we are driven back from our Conclusion, and still kept in Doubt, whether there may not be some, to us unknown, Capacity of *Thought* in Matter; and whether it has not pleas'd the Almighty to bestow the *Faculty* of it upon some Corporeal Systems. If therefore it is possible that this *Faculty* shou'd be superadded to Matter, it is possible to be done but one or other of these three Ways: 1. *Motion*; 2. *Generation*; or 3. *Omnipotence*; and a distinct Confutation of these will answer the Title of this Section.

I. Let us consider, Whether *Perception* and *Cogitation* can arise upon Matter, by the help of *Motion* only.

I think it, with Mr. L. of good use in Philosophy, to know what Words can, and what cannot be defin'd; and I am perswaded also that, of the latter Sort only, are the *Names* of our *Simple Ideas*, of which *Motion* is one: If any Man shou'd ask me what *Motion* is, the best Answer I cou'd give him, wou'd be to bid him consult a *Moving Body*; not that the Idea of *Motion* is too *obscure*, but too *perspicuous* to be illustrated by the Intervention of any other.

Essay, lib. 3.
c. 4. §. 4, &c.

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The Idea of *Motion* being thus clear, and the same to every Man, we have the greater Hopes of being able thoroughly to comprehend the Effects of it in Bodies moving; for that *Motion* it self is not *Thought*, every one must grant that reflects upon them as two different *Simple Ideas*, and understands that the Difference between any *Two Simple Ideas* is Essential and Eternal: And as *Motion* it self cannot, so neither can the *Communication* of it be, possibly, conceiv'd to be *Thought*; Whatever Difficulties to our Apprehension this Communication carries, as to the Manner of it, thus much is clear, That every Body operates on another by *Contact* only; and if this *Contact* were *Thought*, the most coherent Bodies wou'd have the greatest Share of it, and so there wou'd be most *Thought* where there is least *Motion*.

All we have to do then, is to inquire into the Effects in the Body mov'd, subsequent upon the *Contact* with another, and the *Motion* receiv'd from it. And here, tho' I cannot enumerate all the Effects producible in Bodies by *Motion*, yet thus much I clearly conceive, that they all depend upon, and are resolvable into this one, viz. *Change of Place*: Thus if the *Motion* impress'd upon a Body moves the *whole* of it, without causing any Internal Commotion of its
Parts

Parts, the Body receives no Alteration but what a different Situation, that is a different *Place* gives it: If the Internal Parts are put in Motion, all the Alteration the Body then receives, is nothing else but their *changing Place* with one another; or *changing Place*, so as to leave the Body; or lastly, forcing other Particles of Matter to *change their Place*, so as to come to it.

What other Effects of *Texture*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Hardness*, &c. follow upon this, shall be consider'd by and by; in the mean time *Change of Place* being the immediate, and only proper Effect of *Motion*, I desire any Man to conceive it barely possible, if he can; that a Body shou'd *think* because it is in one Place, and be *senseless* because it is in another. I desire this may be well consider'd; a Body in Motion seems indeed to be, so far, active; but, upon Examination, all its seeming Activity will be found to be nothing else but a *Passive Removal*; and whatever *New Qualities* it gains, they are all entirely owing to its *New Place*: But now the Notion of *Place*, whether conceiv'd as a Part of the *Infinite Immaterial Extension*, (call'd a Part only from the External Denomination of Bodies in it) or only as a *Modus* and Denomination of *Material Extension*; is however one of those *Simple Ideas* which, as such, must be

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always

always the *same* : And therefore (not to demand what *Place*, has to do with *Thought*) I only urge this as an impossibility, That a Body shou'd *Think*, by virtue of being in one *Place*, and not in *another*.

If we carry this Notion along with us, it will easily appear as impossible for any particular *Motion*, as for *Motion in general* to graft on Matter this Property : To talk of a *determinate Course*, a *peculiarly modified Chanel*, *Action* or *Reaction*, *Per- cussion* or *Repercussion* of Animal Spirits, being able to do the Feat, is equal Non- sense as to imagin a Stone tumbling down an Hill, and a Wave Rolling on the Sea, the one in *terrible*, the other in *tumultuous Thoughts*; for what really happens to the former, which is *change of Place*, happens to the latter, and no more; the different Dimensions of their Parts, with the different Determinations of their *Motions*, is no Ex- ception to this, that they all do nothing really but change *Place*; and therefore *Motion alone* is not, really, capable of pro- ducing *Thought* in a Body moving.

2. The next Refuge is to *Generation*, that is, that *Thought* is *generable*, and so *cor- ruptible*, in Bodies, as other Qualities are : We are only concern'd immediately with the supposed *Generation of Thought*, but

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if that be absurd, so must be the *Corruption* of it too.

This Notion, together with that already confuted, makes up the two oldest *Forms of Atheism*, to prove nothing but Matter in the Universe; viz. the *Hylopathian* or *Anaximandrian*, and *Atomic* or *Democritic*; the former asserting that *Thought* has its being, as other Corporeal Qualities have, by *Corporeal Generation*, and so is corrupted and destroy'd as they are; and the latter, that 'tis nothing else but a determinate, tho' they knew not what, *Motion of Atoms*.

Now the Reason why these two Sects differ'd from each other in Hypothesis, tho' in Principle they were the same, was this; neither cou'd imagin the other's Hypothesis wou'd serve the Design; the *Hylopathian*, not being able to conceive that Matter and Motion cou'd *think*, Philosophiz'd by *Real Qualities*, and plac'd *Thought* amongst them; the *Atomic*, finding the Absurdity of that Fiction of *Real Qualities*, recurs to the Principle of Matter and Motion, more accountable indeed in it self, but never the better fitted to solve the *Phænomenon*.

The former is indeed absurd enough in it self, for the most stupid Atheist to stand by; thus to multiply Beings without necessity, and contrary to sense; to suppose a Train of *Abstracted Qualities* and Substantial

stantial Forms, as it were hovering over a Body, to take possession of it, upon such and such Motions; as it was not the Opinion of the oldest, so it has been rejected by all the modern Atheists, and need not be elaborately confuted to the least Proficient, now-a-days, in the School of Science.

But still it must be confess'd, that our Idea of these *Qualities*, resulting from *Motion* in Bodies, is something very different from our Idea of *Motion* in it self; and therefore, notwithstanding what has been said upon that Topic, it may, at first sight, be judg'd a Refuge for our Adversaries.

But let us recollect, that there is nothing really happens to Body, or the Parts of Body, in its alteration, but *change of Place*; and that, consequently, all the new *Qualities* it puts on, must depend upon *that*; and then we shall gain the Reason why our Idea of these *Resulting Qualities*, is so different from that of *Motion* from whence they result, *viz.* That one is, in some sense, a *real*, the other only a *relative Change*. Change of Place, tho' it makes no Alteration in the Nature of Matter, yet, if we suppose but one Monad of Matter created, we can frame still a determinate *Idea* of its *Motion*, and the *changing of its Place*; so that this Operation upon it is so far *real*, that it

not depend upon the being of any other Body; whereas all the other *Qualities* of *Texture*, *Figure*, *Colour*, &c. are altogether *relative* to other Bodies; and, tho' *Real Ideas* in our Minds, are nothing real in the Bodies, but owe their Original to the Comparison of one Body with another. This is a sufficient Reason why their *Ideas* shou'd be different from that of *Motion* or *Place*; and if it be ask'd, Why they are such as they are? I answer, It is as absurd to ask a *Reason*, as a *Definition* of a *simple Idea*.

But whether *Motion* belong to a Class superior to all other Corporeal *Qualities*, or not; this is certain, they are all, taken together, *relative*, and as such, are not possible Causes or Constituents of *Thought*: What! That a Fluid shou'd rather *think* than a hard, a small than a great, a white than a black Body? This is more absurd, if any thing can be more absurd, than to place *Thought* in the Original Frame and Constitution of Matter. Besides, that if this cou'd produce; it cou'd never continue *Thought*, as it is continu'd in Human Nature.

3. I come to consider the most Modern Objection, tho' I confess it looks but like an Old-fashion'd one, which recurr's to the Power of Omnipotence, to evade the Necessity of owning an *Immaterial Substance* in Human Nature. 'Tis

'Tis true, this Refuge will not cover the Atheist, as destroying in Supposition, what he advances in Design; yet I cannot but think it so far an *Apparatus* to Atheism, that I shou'd be loth to dispute with an Atheist, and maintain, at the same time, this as an avowed Principle of mine, That Matter may *think*: For who knows then, but, granting something Eternal, this something may be Matter with *Thought*, tho' not superadded, yet eternally inherent in it. It's true, Mr. L. has substantially prov'd, that the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter; but then, as 'tis plain from the Nature of his Argument, and what he expressly says at the Introduction of it, by Matter he means only *incognitive* Matter; and to this purpose are his second Thoughts upon this Subject: *Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being where it has its Source, 'tis visible must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in so great a Part of the particular Parcels of Matter is a Demonstration, that the First Being, from whom Perception and Knowledge is inseparable, is not Matter.* Which I humbly conceive, proves not that Perception is not, or may not be essential to some Parts of Matter; but only that those Parts, to which

*Essay, lib. 4.
cap. 10.*

Ibid. §. 9.

it is not essential, as we find it is not to some of them, cannot be that one Eternal Being: For I think there is no more Reason to conclude that, because it is not essential to some, it is not therefore essential to any Part of Matter; than there is that, because it is not actually in some, is not therefore actually in any Parcel of it; which is an Inference he must deny, since our Ignorance in this Point, may equally defeat our concluding against essential, as well as actual Properties, for we understand the former no otherwise, than by our Knowledge of the latter: So that, according this way of arguing, all the *incogitative*, and all the *accidentally cogitative Parts of Matter* in the Universe, may possibly have been produc'd by another *eternally and essentially cogitative*

*Essay, B. 4.
ch. 10. sect. 14,
&c.*

Material Being. I must not conceal it, that the Author brings several Arguments to prove that this Eternal Being is not Material; *First, because every Particle of Matter is not cogitative*; and he thinks it would be a hard Task to make out a *Cogitative Being out of Incogitative Particles*: True, but not out of *essentially Cogitative Matter*; which by your Objection is become possible, as we have seen. And besides this, says the Atheist, your so much extoll'd Ignorance
of

of the Properties of Matter, will never warrant you to assert, that all Matter is *Homogeneous*; that is, that the Almighty has conferr'd the same Properties upon every Particle in the Universe, and that all the Variety there is, depends entirely upon their own Operations; for then he has either conferr'd *Thought* upon all, or no Parts of Matter; and what then becomes of the *System of Matter fitly disposed* to Think. Thus far the Atheist keeps his Hold; and I think it is no Credit to any Argument a Man can bring, that it destroys, an otherwise unanswerable Argument of his own. But does not Mr. L. drive him from this Hold too, when he proceeds to prove, from manifest Absurdities following, That neither *one Particle alone, nor any System of Matter, either in motion or rest, can be conceiv'd to be this Eternal Wisdom?* Ibid.

'Tis to be fear'd, that no such Argument is conclusive for him in particular, who holds it possible for Matter to Think? For when the Possibility of the Thing is once really granted in Principle, these Absurdities following upon it, will quickly resolve into so many unconceivable Ways of Omnipotence exerting it self; especially, when the Atheist retorts upon him, as well he may, That it is equally unconceivable and absurd, which yet he

grants possible, *That any one Particle, or any System of Matter* belonging to his own Body shou'd Think for one Moment, as his Corporeal Deity, from Eternity. Thus the Atheist is furnish'd with an Argument to maintain the Possibility of his Corporeal Deity; which I am confident he will thank any Man to grant him; and this Author in particular, because it disables his own Arguments; which, had he not done it himself, wou'd have been too hard a Task for all his Adversaries Skill.

But if they shou'd gain no real Advantage by this Concession, because still the Supposition of a GOD, Eternal, and the Creator of all things, seems to remain untouched; yet, as Mr. L. very well observes,

they letting slide out of their
 Ibid. sect. 13. *Minds, or the Discourse, the Demonstration whereby an eternal knowing Being was proved necessary to exist; wou'd argue all to be Matter, and so deny a GOD; The Danger of granting these Men what, over and above, it is absurd to grant to any Man, is to me a good Warrant why I shou'd, if with Reason I can, deny the general Possibility of Matter's Thinking.*

Having endeavour'd to prove, here and elsewhere, what I believe of the Ill Tendency of this Objection, I shall, I hope,
 be

be excus'd if I bestow, more than what may seem a Proportionable Part of this Discourse, in a thorough Examination of it, with regard to what I have advanc'd on this Argument.

The sense and meaning of the Objection I take to consist in one of these two things: Either, 1. *That Thought may be one of the many, to us unknown, Properties which Omnipotence has bestow'd upon Matter.* Or, 2. *That there may be in Matter a Capacity of Thought, when-ever it pleases Omnipotence to conferr it; tho' it does not lye within the Compass of our Apprehension.*

In the first Sense, the Objection is too weak to deserve that Name; for it is a Weakness in an Objection to prove too much, as this does, if it proves any thing; viz. That all Matter, as such, does *actually Think*: An Assertion too wild in it self to merit a sober Confutation. Nor will the Old Refuge of an *Occult Quality* serve the Turn; as if this wanted only to be excited in the Substance of any Body: For *Thought, and Self-consciousness, and Perception*, are not Dormant Principles in any Body; unless this *Thought* in Matter, be of a quite different kind from what we understand by that Word; as indeed Matter it self, when made *Thinking*, must be a far different

different Object from what is represented to us by our present *Idea* of it.

But the Second is doubtless the Sense of Mr. L. and others, *That there may be some to us unknown, Capacity of Thought in Matter; by which, when Omnipotence pleases, it is susceptible of that Faculty.* I say a *Capacity*, tho' I do not remember Mr. L. expressing himself thus, but, in looser Terms, that *Omnipotence may superadd, &c.* For I cannot suppose a Man of just Thought and Reasoning, could be content with solving an Operation, by an Appeal only to an Omnipotent Agent, without presupposing a *Capacity* in the Subject.

The Objection, as it stands here, I have met with in several Modern Writers; and, so far as I have observ'd and can recollect, is never urg'd but upon one, or more of these Reasons: 1. *That we do not know all the Properties of Matter, and therefore neither can we say that this Capacity is not one of them.* 2. *Whereas we urge, that neither Thought, nor the Capacity of it are included in our Idea of Matter, this does not hinder at all but that it may actually belong to some Systems of it.* And, 3. *Tho' we farther suppose it impossible to conceive how Matter can think, yet Omnipotence can act beyond our Conception of things.*

But

But before I undertake to answer the several Arguments in Confirmation of the Objection, it will be requisite to premise, in what Sense, and upon what Accounts we maintain, that Omnipotence cannot create *Cogitative Matter*.

Now this we do not assert absolutely, but upon Supposition of the Truth of our *Idea* in *contemplating*, and the Truth of our Faculties in *collecting* from that Idea of Matter; that is, We assert that God cannot do it, because it appears to us no less than a Contradiction that it shou'd be done. But a Contradiction being a *Non Ens*, without so much as the Possibility of Existence, is the Object of no Power, not the Divine. If then it is lawful for us, in any Case, to inquire, Whether a Thing be contradictory, or not; it is no Presumption to determin, upon Satisfaction had, whether it can be the Object of Divine Power: For he that affirms a thing to be contradictory, does virtually declare that God cannot do it. It is to be observ'd therefore, in the Case before us, that we do not deny the Power of God in Changing, if he sees fit, every *Particle of Matter* in the Universe, into so many *Thinking Immaterial Substances*; for that involves no Contradiction, that we know of; but that, so long as our Idea of *Physical Extension* and of *Cogitation*

con-

continues the same, they must remain Properties inconsistent in the same *Substance*, for the Reasons alledg'd *Seçt.* 6, and 7. and this consider'd, our Assertion may not appear so presumptuous or offensive, as it has done to some.

But, in Bar to this Assertion, it is pleaded in the first Place, *That we are, doubtless, ignorant of many Properties of Matter; one of which may be either Actual Thought, or at least a Capacity of it.*

In answer to this, let us consider upon what Accounts we do, in any Case, justly exclude such a *Property* from being of the Number belonging to such a *Subject*, and I affirm we can do this but one, or both of these Ways, *viz. Induction and Inconsistency*; as to the first, when we do fully understand all the Properties of a *Subject*, and find not the *Property* in Dispute amongst them; we are oblig'd by virtue of our *Induction* of all the Particulars, to exclude *that* from the Number, tho' it shou'd appear to be very consistent with the *Subject*: But then this is not the only Method of thus denying or excluding; For secondly, we may as safely, and must as forcibly do it in the Case of *Inconsistency*; that is, when we do know one, or more *Properties* actually belonging to the *Subject*, which are inconsistent with, and contradictory to the *Property* under

under Consideration: For instance, we do know that Matter cannot be in its Nature both *Active* and *Passive*, in one and the same Sense; that it cannot be endu'd with the Power of Self-Motion, and at the same time move only as it is moved. And this a Man will be positive in, who is not only ignorant of many real *Properties* of Matter, but of many, that perhaps fall within the Compass of better Heads. Thus again I don't know, nor, I think, does any Man, all the *Properties* of a *Triangle*; yet I will say, *It is impossible for Omnipotence to make its three Angles equal to three Right ones*; because I am not ignorant of this *Property*, nor to what *Subject* it belongs, that *There are three Angles just equal to two Right ones*. So that the Objection is rais'd upon this false Supposition, That we must have view'd, and been acquainted with the whole *Family* of *Properties* belonging to a *Subject*, before we can exclude any from being of the Number: This is indeed one, but not the only Way of doing it; so far from that, that it may be question'd whether Human Understanding is capable of pursuing this Method in any one Instance; however, it must be own'd that the other, of denying by reason of *Inconsistency*, is the more usual, as it is the better adapted Method.

This

This makes it something wonderful to me, that, of two Ways only, an inquisitive Philosopher shou'd forget the more obvious and common : Which I judge was forgot,

Essay, lib. 4.
cap. 3. sect. 6.

when Mr. L. said it *was impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas to discover, whether Omnipotence has not given Thought to some Systems of Matter, &c.* As much as to say, I not only find no Inconsistency between *Extension* and *Thought* ; but I pronounce it a thing impossible for any Man else to find it out : If this be true, this Author does know all the Properties of Matter ; for thus far I am sure, my Ignorance of them is a good Argument to prove that a *Property* given, if I don't find it actually inherent in the *Subject*, may be inconsistent with some other *Property* belonging to it, which I indeed know not, but which it is possible for another Man to discover. Therefore nothing but a perfect Knowledge of the *Subject*, and a compleat *Induction* of Particulars, which I have not yet found in that Work, and despair to find it in any other, cou'd warrant that Conclusion.

To return to the Objection ; if we have discover'd already, as I think we have done, an Inconsistency between some known *Properties* of *Material*, and others of *Cogitative*

tive Substance; our Ignorance of as many others as the Objector pleases, is no hinderance at all from our concluding peremptorily, That a *Thinking Material Substance* is a thing in *rerum natura* impossible.

2. *Whereas we say, that the Capacity of Thought is not included in our Idea of Matter*; this, says the Objector, does not prove, that no sort, or System, of Matter thinks.

Answ. We do assert, That the Capacity of Thought is not included in our Idea of Matter; and Mr. L. says, that

to make good our Assertion, viz. That Thought in Matter wou'd change the Essential Properties of it, we have no more to say,

*Reply to the
B. of Worces-
ter's Answer
to his second
Letter, p. 397.*

but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Essence of Matter: This he says is all we have to say; tho', in the very next Page, he is pleas'd, to put another, and a farther Objection into our Mouths. But how is Thought not included in the Essence of Matter? Why, in-as-much as a passive and divisible extended Bulk, gives us no Idea of Thought, either as contain'd in, or dependent upon, it. And thus much we both say, That Thought is not included in that Essence; but when we come to consider, and compare our Idea of Thought in some of its Essential Properties, with
our

our Idea of *Matter*; then, I think, we have something more to say, *viz.* That neither is it, nor can it be included in the Essence of *Matter*: For there is this real, and remarkable difference between *First* and *Secondary Properties*; that, as all these depend upon the first, so the first must diffuse it self through them all, and they can have nothing in them but what is, formally or eminently, in the first; they must agree in this, tho' they may differ from one another, as *Contraries*. To explain and apply this; if we shou'd argue, That because a *Stone* is passive in being broken, it's therefore passive in rolling down a *Hill*; there is no consequence or connexion at all in it: But he that proves it originally passive, with regard to *Motion*, rightly inferrs it must be so as well *descending*, as in being *divided*, and in every other Instance of its *Motion*: And hence it is, that finding no *Activity* included in the *first Property* of *Matter*, he concludes, that it cannot assume *Activity* in any *subordinate Quality*; and that there is no *Motion* in any *Body*, but what is communicated, either from *another Body*, or from an *Immaterial Substance*; and therefore, that *Matter* is absolutely passive. Not again, but that *Omnipotence*, having put a *Parcel* of *Matter* into motion, may con-

continue it in that State eternally; but this is eternally to move it himself: And so likewise he cannot be said to make Matter *think*, in any other sense but this, that he *thinks* in it himself; which is not, that I can collect, Mr. L's. Sense; and those, whose Sense it is, shall be consider'd by and by.

This Consideration answers all that he objects from the Variety of Qualities found in Matter, and the Excellency of some above others, as of Vegetation above bare Motion; for *Ibid.* these are all reconcilable to its first Property, and so may have a dependence upon it, tho' we know not the Manner how they depend. But when he proceeds to instance in Brutes, and then adds, *If one venture to go one Step farther, and say God may give to Matter, Thought, Reason, and Volition, as well as Sense, and Spontaneous Motion; there are Men ready to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, he is a little unfair; for these Men deny Sense and Spontaneous Motion, as well as Thought, Reason, and Volition to Matter; and therefore, instead of harkning to his Complaint of being stopt here, I must complain that he has gone a Step too far.*

The same Answer will serve to what he objects from Mr. Newton, *The Gravitation*

F tion

tion of Matter towards Matter, by Ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter; but also an unquestionable, and every where instance that he has done so. I conceive this Mutual Gravitation, however unsolvable, and therefore to be suppos'd as a Principle in *Physics*, falls much short, not only of *Thought, Reason, and Volition*; but of *Sense and Spontaneous Motion*: It does not come up to *Sense*, for then all Matter would be sensible, that is in the Visible World at least; and tho' it is *Motion*, or a tendency to it, yet that cannot be call'd *Spontaneous*; for then one Body wou'd have it, without the presence of another; which is contrary to the Supposition: So that if it has this Power given it; it has not, in that, receiv'd the Power of *Thought*. But tho' it is an Operation unaccountable, as proceeding from Matter, yet may it not be accounted for, as proceeding from some other Cause? I am sorry to find a Man of so good Understanding, inclinable to recurr to Unaccountable Powers in Matter, rather than to, what will account for them, an *Immaterial Principle*.

Thus

Thus I think I have shewn that, *Thought not being included in our Idea of Matter*, when rightly understood, proves that it is absolutely excluded from it, and cannot possibly belong unto it, as a Property does to its Subject.

3. *The last Support of this Objection is, That tho' we suppose it impossible to conceive how Matter can Think, yet Omnipotence can Act beyond our Conception of Things.*

This is the other Objection, together with his Answer, which Mr. L. proposes to himself; to which Answer I reply, That it is not only above, *Reply, p. 398.* but contrary to our Conceptions; that we not only cannot conceive how it shou'd *think*, but we do conceive that it cannot *think*.

If this were indeed, as he proposes it, the chief Objection against him, that we cannot conceive the Manner how Matter *thinks*, I must confess it wou'd little deserve that Elaborate Answer he gives it, in so many Pages; for I suppose neither can any Man conceive the Manner how an Immaterial Being *thinks*; how it turns, and applys it self from one Object to another, and receives impresd *Ideas* from them: This I am as ready to own as he, That Want of Conception is too weak an Argument, (when in weak Understandings) to stand against Fact.

But there is a wide Difference between not conceiving the Manner how a thing is done, and not conceiving that it can be done; we cannot conceive how an Immaterial Being *thinks*, but yet we conceive that it can *think*; tho' perhaps from what we know of such a Being, we shou'd never have collected the Power of *Thought* in it; but here is the Point, we are conscious of our *Thinking*, and have all the Reason in the World to believe that many other Beings are endu'd with the same Faculty: And hence, that is, from what we do perceive and know of *Thought*, we collect, That it belongs to a Subject *uniform* and *self-active* in its Nature; which is sufficient to satisfy us that such a Being can *think*, or rather is *capable of Thought*: But we are not only at a loss to conceive how Matter can *think*, but how it is possible for it to *think*; we find insuperable Objections in our way, not only against the Manner of the thing, but against the thing it self, and the bare Possibility of it; and these amounting to a Demonstration, fetch'd from such Properties as we know, inseparably belong unto Matter. Therefore, to me it looks like an elaborate piece of Trifling, to dispute hard about the Manner how a thing is done, before we are satisfy'd that it can be done; nay, when others seem to be satisfy'd to the contrary.

But

But the same Author farther explains himself by instancing in *Solidity*, and argues very artfully from thence; I shall endeavour to do his Argument right, tho', to avoid prolixity, I must epitomize it.

Reply, p. 402.

It proceeds upon this Supposition, That God has created both a solid and an unsolid Substance, each without the Power of *Self-activity*, or *Thought*; and that this is a Supposition to be made, he proves from hence, That God may put an End to any Action, or Power of Action in any of his Creatures, and yet leave that Creature in a State of Existence; and therefore he might have created the same Nature, without the Power, of which he can deprive it, without annihilating of it. The Supposition being good, he proceeds to demand a Reason why God may not superadd the Power of *Self-activity* and *Thought*, as well to the solid, as to the unsolid Substance; since *neither* can have it naturally, and without such a Superaddition, and since it is equally unconceivable how *both* enjoy and exert it.

This is the Substance of what he urges upon this Argument, and, I must think, of what can be urg'd for it; but I have several things to offer, in order to take off the plausible Disguise it wears.

1. Let it be consider'd that God has not created all Natures, or Substances so, as to be susceptible of all manner of Properties. If he has, all our Reasoning from the Nature of the Thing, is at an End; and, since we can, properly, reason no otherwise, the Old Principle is establish'd, That *God may have deceiv'd us*: But as sure as our Faculties are true, and as sure as our Creator has imparted variously differing Natures to his Creatures; so sure it is, that he has tied himself to that Rule in conferring Properties upon them; that is, has conferr'd such, and only such as are suitable to their respective Natures; so that when I say Omnipotence cannot do such a thing, I wou'd be understood to mean, and I add it here once for all, *Rebus sic stantibus*, and his own Immutability consider'd; which, I hope will not appear a presumptuous lessning of his Power, but rather a just Sense of that adorable Veracity and Goodness, which accompany'd his conferring the Rational Faculty upon me.

2. But then, How do we understand that such and such Natures are capable of such, and only such Properties? Doubtless there is a Reason for all that was produc'd by Perfect Wisdom; but then that Reason, in this Case, lyes as far beyond our Ken, as does the naked Essence of Things:

Things: Very true, and this makes it difficult, if ever possible, for us to apprehend all the Properties which any individual Nature is capable of: And therefore, as I said, Inconsistency with some known Property in the Subject, is the chief Rule, whereby we can exclude any other from being grafted, and nourish'd on the same Stock.

3. But to come nearer the Point, whereas Mr. L. when he comes to draw the Parallel between *solid* and *unsolid Substance*, instances only in *spontaneous* or *self-Motion*, tho' in most other

Reply, p. 403.

places he joyns *Thought* with it; I conceive they are, in all Cases, inseparable. A self-moving and senseless Being are contradictory Epithets. A Body always, and necessarily moving, is not self-moving; for all Necessity proceeds from External Determination: Therefore this Power, in a Body, must be such that, it can move or rest of itself; but this Power is a Will, properly so call'd; and that Will is a *Mode of Thinking*: Therefore if the Almighty has given it self-Motion, he has first, in the Order of Nature, given it *Thought*, as the only Foundation to bear it; so that the Reasons which prove Matter incapable of *Thought*, (as we have prov'd it to be, so long as it retains its own Essential Properties) prove it equally

incapable of Self-Motion. This will serve to put the Question right, which is not Whether he can give Self-Motion; but Whether he can give *Thought*, to a *solid*, as well as an *unsolid Substance*: But is there any Contradiction in that? I answer:

4. That here again is an unfair State of the Case; *Solidity* is a reductitious, not a first Property of Body; or, however, is not that first Property we make use of as a Medium, to prove the Inconsistency by; but when we trace it up, and find every *solid Substance* Physically extended, and divisible, and passive; then we clearly conceive that *such a solid Substance* is incapable of *Thought*. The only Evasion here, that I can imagin, is this; That it does not follow, because God has created one extended divisible Substance of a Passive Nature; therefore he has created all the Kind of those Substances of the like Nature. Yes, say I, it does follow; because the Connection is founded in the Reason of the Thing, which holds universally, as well as our Observation in Fact, which concludes no farther than it extends: For I have proved it both forward, and backward, from the Cause to the Effect, and from the Effect to the Cause; which, together, make the most compleat Demonstrative Evidence.

From

From all which I conclude, according to what I observ'd concerning the Regular Exercise of the Divine Power upon his Creatures, that to what *Substance* soever, for I absolutely deny it to none, Omnipotence has give the Faculty of *Thought*; he has either never given to that *Substance*, or actually taken away from it *Physical Extension*; and let the Objector take which he pleases, he comes up to all I aim at, which is the Truth of this Proposition, *Every Thinking Being is Immaterial.*

What I have said I take to be a Foundation for a full Answer, to all that Mr. *L.* has objected, upon this Head, to the late great Bishop of *Worcester*; which I shou'd not presume to do, had the World enjoy'd the Bishop longer, to have had his own more perfect Answer; or had not Mr. *L.* more avowedly and laboriously maintain'd the Objection I propose to answer, than any other Writer I know of; so that by taking the Objection from him, I have set in its best Light; and so far as I have answer'd him, I may presume to have silenc'd the Objection.

And having now proved at large, the Incapacity of Matter, either to produce, or sustain the Property of *Thought*; and also shewn the Weakness, and Insufficiency of all the best Attempts that have been made, to
super-

superinduce this Property to any *Material Substance*; I pass by a whole Train of other, both Modern and Ancient Objections, as being of less Moment than those already mention'd, and such as must stand and fall with them.

S E C T. IX.

*That it is not GOD the Supreme Spirit,
that Thinks in Human Nature.*

IT is not then, we find, our Body, or any Part of it, or any Thing belonging to it that *thinks* within us: But what if it be God himself, who contains all possible Ideas in his own Eternal Mind, that makes use of our Bodies, but as so many different Instruments, variously to display his own Intellectual, Incommunicable Faculty; and so he himself properly *thinks* in those, we suppose Cogitative Substances?

There are but very few, if any, amongst the Opposers of the Doctrine of a Human Spirit, who plainly and expressly hold this; for there are but few of that Sect, that are willing to build upon the Supposition of an Immaterial God: And yet

yet, I think, almost all of them assert and maintain what, in the Result and Consequence, amounts to thus much. If we will believe Mr. Blount, *The general Opinion of the most Inquisitive amongst the Heathens was what* *Anima Mundi, p. 105.* Bernier says the Inhabitants of Indostan believe, of the Souls Eternal Condition, that it wou'd mix with the Soul of the World again: Like Water taken out of the Ocean in a Bottle, and swims therein for a while; till, by some Accident or other, being broke, it returns back to the Sea from whence it was taken. He might as well have said the Inhabitants of Indostan, are the General, and the most Inquisitive Part of Mankind. However, this is propos'd as an Opinion fit to be receiv'd; and if, as some are apt to believe, the Soul of the World be that Author's God; it is the same Opinion we are now considering. And *Second Thoughts, passim.* for others who of late have asserted the Soul to be barely Life, and Life to be a Ray of the Divinity; these do say the very same thing.

That I may not seem to trifle with the Reader, in bestowing much Pains upon so trifling an Objection; I shall only offer these two inseparable Qualities of Human Thought, which no Man, that knows what we mean by the Word GOD, can fix upon

upon him. 1. *That they are finite, and limited* : 2. *That they are morally Pec- cable.*

1. That the Faculty of *Thought* in Man is finite and limited, I presume I need not prove; he must be of a very narrow Capacity that denies it. We are conscious that it is the inevitable Condition of our Nature, not only so long as we are ty'd down to Sense, but so long as we *think*; how far soever our Intellectual Capacity may be enlarg'd, and extended in another State, perhaps to know adequately, and fully to comprehend many Objects: Yet this we are sure of, that it can never comprehend all Objects at once; and for this, among other Reasons, that such a Capacity cou'd never lye dormant in our Nature, but wou'd be actually exerted, at all times, and upon all Objects; in as much as a Capacity of Comprehending all Objects, can meet with no Obstruction from any. And therefore, tho' it may be suppos'd (as we shall endeavour to shew) that the Laws of Union with Matter, may terminate, and bring to a narrower Compass, an Understanding finite and limited by Nature; yet as to that *First Infinite Mind*, how closely soever we suppose it united to Matter, it cannot possibly be so determin'd in its own Thoughts, as to lose its own Essential Perfection. This
wou'd

wou'd be a God communicating to his Creatures, not only Himself, but a Power over Himself; and such a Power as wou'd destroy the Foundation, both of his Knowledge and Happiness; by disabling him so far, in that Part of Matter, to which he's more intimately present, that *there* he does not comprehend his own most Perfect Fulness: So blasphemously absurd it is to imagin, *That his Thoughts are as our Thoughts*, or that *ours* are *his*. But,

2. That which renders this Notion still more impious, is, *That our Thoughts are Morally Peccable*. I might say most of them, the Tendency of our Nature consider'd, will be found *Morally Evil*. And, upon this Account, the Notion of *God thinking in us*, seems to me to be the last, and that but a poor Refuge of Infidel-Immorality.

For, as the Principles and Duties of Morality are perfectly agreeable to un-bias'd Reason, and are deeply, and apparently engrav'd on the Minds of Men; so the Connexion between Sin and Punishment, in Free Agents, becomes natural and necessary: When therefore, as in this Case, the Law is plain and positive, the Sanction just, and the Fact notorious; what Hope of Escaping has the Criminal, that cannot fly from Justice, unless this, to impeach the Judge himself of the Crime? But

But this, as it is the true Reason of advancing this Notion; so, being a very bad Reason, it is the Confutation of it. For, not to urge that this quite vacates a Future State of Punishments, unless it may be suppos'd that the Deity will finally condemn, and punish Himself; to offer Proof of that State, wou'd be too great a Digression, and I know it will not be admitted in this Argument, as a Supposition; I only desire it may be consider'd, what is obvious to Observation, That there is a great Deal of Punishment naturally consequent upon Immorality in this State: Is there not a Natural Dread, Guilt, and Self-Condernation attending the Crime of wilful and deliberate Murther? Or are the Effects of it, upon the Mind, the same with those arising from the Reflexion, that I have sav'd another Man's Life? Sure no Man ever committed the one, that cou'd entertain himself with the Remembrance of it; and few, that have been so happy, ever forgot the other. Now the Consequence upon all Immorality, must be, proportionably, the same, as it stands aggravated, in the *Circumstances*, and oppos'd, in the *Matter* of it, to the Fundamental Maxims of Truth and Justice. For which Reason the Deity, as he thinks, according to this Scheme, in all Men; so he is, in every

every Man more or less, the obstinate Author of his own Punishment and Misery: And as his Knowledge, Wisdom, and Righteousness must be suppos'd, originally, the most perfect; so the Debasing of them all in Sinful Man, is the more inexcusable, the Folly more unaccountable, the Punishment greater, and the Sufferer pitiless. These are Notions of a Deity, so abominable to a Sober Understanding; and the Authors of them have so far degraded God, that it must be confess'd they do not much aspire in Deifying themselves.

But enough has been said to explode this wild Notion, and to demonstrate that, Whatever it be that *thinks* in us, it is not the Most Perfect, and Ever-Blessed Author of our *Being*.

S E C T. X.

How far the preceding Proof gives the Soul of Man a Nature, and Essence distinct from Matter.

BUT still our Senses are a great Hindrance to our apprehending what it is that *thinks* in us; and so long as we harken entirely to them, we shall be utter Infidels, as to *Immaterial Substance*: Let us consider therefore, Whether these (in themselves) are our only, and our infallible Guide to the Truth, and Existence of Things.

In the first Place, we misapply our *Ideas of Sensation*, when, from them, we pass an *immediate* Judgment on the Nature even of sensible things without us. The only *immediate* Judgment we can safely pass, in this Case, is on our own *Sensations*; for there is no farther Scrutiny requisite, in order to judge whether an Object of Sense gives me Pleasure or Pain, than barely to attend to the Impression it makes upon me: But when I wou'd judge of the Qualities of that Object, which do not thus affect and concern my Body, if I pass my
Judg-

Judgment only from my *Sensation*, I shall be deceiv'd; as is plain in the Instances of a streight Stick, appearing crooked in the Water; and a square Tower round at a distance.

Not but that the Testimony of Sense is infallible, in its proper Place; but what I now assert is, concerning the Manner of our forming a Judgment from that Testimony; which I say is not done by bare attending to the Impression, as in the Case of Pleasure and Pain; but by the Intervention of Ideas, rais'd by *Reflexion*; or, if you will, such as are Operations of our *Pure Intellect*: For Example, I can certainly judge of the Qualities of Bread, when the Object is at a due Distance, the Medium (suppose I am to judge of it by Sight) rightly temper'd, and my Organ well dispos'd; but then it is by Reason only, that I can adjust all this: For a Man in a *Jaundies*, to whom white Bread appears yellow, is not owing to his Senses for the Distinction; as he is, when he judges that such a thing gives him Pain or Pleasure; which must be concluded Real, and distinct Sensations, for this Reason only, that he feels them so; even tho' there shou'd be no such thing existent as that Body, which he supposes gave him that Sensation. We find then that our Senses alone, wou'd bring us no

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Notice, that can certainly be depended upon, even of a Sensible Object, any farther than it concerns, and affects our own Body; and that, properly speaking, is only an Information that we have such a Sensation; so that our Abstracted Reason is the true Ground, and Foundation of the certainty even of our Sensible Evidence.

And this Consideration may serve to wean us thus far from *Sensual Credulity*, that we may be sure our Reasoning about Things is nevertheless certain, even tho' we have no Sensible Ideas of them: For if the same Operation, upon which we depend in our Reasoning about these, conclude as strongly for the Existence of Things remote from Sense, we may with equal Assurance depend upon it.

Having, therefore, evinc'd the Necessity of *Incorporeal Substance in General*, and prov'd, at large, that such only can be a *Thinking Substance*; this demonstrates that there is such a *Substance* in Human Nature: And as the Passive Qualities which we find in Matter, assure our Reason that there is a Material Substance existing without us; so the Active Powers of *Thought* do as necessarily inferr an *Immaterial Substance* within us.

The Word *Immaterial* is indeed a Negative Term; but consider it as expressing some-

Something that *thinks*, which Matter cannot do, and you will be convinc'd that, as perfect Unity, or Indivisibility of Essence is, in the Divine Nature, a greater Perfection than Divisibility wou'd be; so it must be a proportionable Perfection in that, which is not liable to Physical Division: But *Negatives* are no Perfections, tho' we may be forc'd to express some Perfections by Negative Terms. I conclude therefore, That we have as evidently discover'd *Two distinct Substances* in our Nature, as every Man discovers *One*, which is the *Material*.

S E C T. XI.

Of the Union of Soul and Body.

BUT some Philosophers have not been so much perplex'd to find *Two distinct Substances* in Human Nature, as to find out the Reason why they make but *One Nature and Person*; and this, I think, is the last Obstacle in our Way to our main Conclusion.

And here I frankly own, That when all the Philosophic Attempts that have been, or can be made, have had their utmost

G 2 Effect;

Effect; the Reason of this *Union* will resolve entirely into the sole Power, and Will of the Creator.

But do we not now recurr to Omnipotence to solve, what others esteem a Contradiction; and so we are not guilty of the same Absurdity we charg'd upon them? For they esteem it a thing in its own Nature impossible to be done, That Two Natures not only so distinct, but so contradictory, as Material and Immaterial, shou'd be thus *United*, unless by Virtue of some *Tertium quid* as a Cement; which, they clearly conceive, there cannot be in *Rerum Natura*.

In order to state this Matter aright, we must explain, so far as it is explicable, what we mean by the *Union* of Soul and Body, in the one Person of Man.

1. By this we do not understand such a confounding or blending of these two Substances, whereby they become as it were one Substance; but we maintain that, Tho' there is a reciprocal *Action* and *Passion* between them, yet each hath preserv'd its chief Properties, naturally independent on the other, and incommunicable to it. From which it follows :

2. That this is not such an Union as is indissoluble; for so long as the Substances, and their chief Properties continue, in
their

their respective Natures separate, and distinct; they are separable in all other Respects: The disannulling of that Law, whereinfoever it consists, whereby they are *united*; can affect the Properties of neither, so far as to displace it from that Rank of Being, in which it was, before the *Union* commenc'd.

3. We find that this Dissolution is brought about by Natural and Physical Causes; and therefore, that the *Union* is not such as can resist them; nay, it is in every such Dissolution, a disorder of the Corporeal System, that immediately precedes, and is the Efficient Cause of it. Notwithstanding which,

4. A farther Instance or Effect of the *Union* is this; that the Action and Passion is reciprocal; it is the Soul that moves the Body in Life, and takes her flight from it at Death: On the other hand, the Body conveys Motion to, and as variously moving, causes various Sensations in the Soul: Nor have we reason to think that the Soul can exert, during the *Union*, her most abstracted Powers, without some Use, and Influence of the Body.

5. And lastly, the highest Instance or Effect of this *Union*, is the *Vital Congruity*; by which the *Adherence* and *Sympathy* becomes *Natural*; so that a Body in rest

will as soon move of it self, as a Soul and Body *disunite*, but by External Force and Compulsion. I call it External, notwithstanding that such Motions as cause the Dissolution, may be rais'd within the Body; for so it is, with regard to that Part of the Body, be what it will, to which the Soul is immediately *united*. Thus far I hope we do not offend, in endeavouring to explain the *Union* of Soul and Body, in such Instances and Effects of it, as fall within our Knowledge. As to the *Union*, consider'd simply in it self, we confess our perfect Ignorance in the Manner of it; and, as to the Cause of it, we freely own we are able to conceive none, but the First Cause of all Things. Now we are to consider, Whether there is to be found any Contradiction; either, First, In what I have explain'd: Or, Secondly, In what I have confess'd inexplicable in this *Union*.

First, As to what I have explain'd, there is no Contradiction in any Part of it: not,

1. In this, That the *Union* does not destroy the *Distinction* of Natures. To do this might, possibly, be a Contradiction; but not to do it can be none: And so long as we maintain, That the Soul is not turn'd into Matter, nor the Body into Spirit; there is hitherto no more Contradiction

dition in this *Union*, than in supposing the Immaterial Nature of God, to be intimately, and essentially present, with all the Parts of the Material World. Nor,

2. Is it repugnant, to suppose this *Union* dissoluble; for we suppose also it had a Beginning; and, what was once effected, (the Matter continuing the same) may be undone again, by the same Power: For, as *Des Cartes* justly argues upon another Occasion; *Jam conjungat, & uniat illas [rem cogitantem & extensam] Deus quantum potest, non ideo potest se omnipotentia sua exuere, nec ideo sibi facultatem adimere ipsas sejungendi.*

Ep. p. 1.
p. 348.

3. Nor is it contradictory to give the Power of this Dissolution, to Natural and Physical Causes. I think it very absurd, if not contradictory to say, That Matter, as such, can act upon any thing, but Matter. But this is not the Point in Question; it is sufficient, that it can act upon our Bodies; and where God is suppos'd, as in this Case he is, to have united Two *Substances* with Conditions, on both sides requisite to continue that *Union*, let these Conditions be either Natural, or purely Arbitrary, the Breach of them, on either side, breaks the *Union*. But,

4. It is not perhaps so easy, to clear from Contradiction, the reciprocal Action and Passion. First, As to the

Señ. 3.

Soul's moving the Body, I have evinc'd that Matter was once mov'd by something Immaterial; and I think there needs no other Argument to clear this from Contradiction, than the Old one, *What has been, may be*: Our want of Conception is so far from proving the thing impossible, that it is no Objection at all when level'd against Fact. But the Difficulty lyes chiefly in the second thing, which is, the Power of the Body to act upon the Soul; and this may indeed seem inconsistent with our own Principle, of the *Passive Nature of Matter*: But let it be consider'd, first, That we do not say the Body acts upon the Soul by a Spontaneous Motion; we say it can communicate nothing but what it receives, and that is, only Motion; all beyond this is produc'd in the Mind: Now we confess, as we have already asserted, that we can find no Natural Connexion between Corporeal Motion, and any Operation of the Mind. (For, by the way, we suppose it more immediately united to the subtlest, and most spirituous Parts of the Body; not because they are better fitted to make Impressions on the Soul, but to convey the Motion she imparts, in the most expeditious and

and effectual Manner, to the groffer Parts.) Yet all this while, as there is nothing done in the Body that is unconceivable, so there is nothing done in the Soul that is impossible; for the Creator, who gave to the Soul a Power of moving Matter by exerting its own Will, can doubtless give it a Power to attend to Corporeal Motions; and, while it attends, can, according to the Variety of these Motions, either immediately himself, or by a Natural Power communicated to the Soul, represent to it various Ideas of Things. So that here can be no Contradiction to the *Passive Nature of Matter*, so long as we ascribe nothing of the Effect in the Soul to it, as a truly Efficient Cause; but only as an Occasion or Instrument of *Thinking*.

But why, upon such Motions, such Thoughts shou'd necessarily ensue, this we resolve entirely into the inexplicable Manner of their *Union*; still maintaining, That it is no Contradiction for a Creature to be, in some Respects, a Free Agent, and in others, under a Necessity of Nature: He that said to the Ocean, *Hither shalt thou go, and no farther*; cou'd doubtless give this Law to any of his Offspring, *Hitherto shalt thou act independently on thy Fellow-Creatures, and no farther*.

And if there be no Contradiction in this; then neither is there;

5. In the *Vital Congruity* which is perfectly agreeable to the Wisdom of the Creator, that whatever is made *Necessary*, shou'd be made *Natural* too; and that no Law of his Creation shou'd be broken, by any other Power of the Creature, besides that of its Free Will; which alone is accountable to him, for so doing: Hence that Natural Propension, which God himself has fix'd upon the Soul to adhere to the Body, is not conquerable by the most obstinate and eager Will.

But it must be confess'd all this is accountable no otherwise, than upon Supposition of the *Union*, which in it self we acknowledge to be altogether unaccountable. And how imperfect soever this Method may seem, it is the best we have, nay and is sufficient to clear our Supposition from the Charge of Contradiction; which I suppose runs thus; That there is no *Union* of Things, but by *Contact*; a Body and Spirit cannot touch together:

Tangere enim, & tangi, nisi Corpus, nulla potest res.

Lucret.

Ergo, A Body and Spirit cannot be united. When I have shewn this Argument inconclusive, I shall have prov'd the Inexplicable Part of this *Union*, to be yet within the Power of the Creator.



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The Major Proposition, *That there is no Union, but by Contact*, I might distinguish; and own this to be true in the *Union* between Bodies, but not between Body and Spirit: But that I may not seem to avoid the Force of the Argument, I absolutely deny it, and will prove the Contradictory Proposition to be true, *That there is no Union by Contact*. If this hold in the *Union* of Bodies, I suppose it will hold universally: This, therefore, is what I shall prove.

Thus much I grant, that where-ever there is *Union* of Bodies, there is *Contact*; but I assert they are not united by this *Contact*; that those Operations they exert as *united*, they cou'd not possibly exert only as *touching*; and therefore *Contact* is not the Cause of *Union*.

The Operation I instance in is, That of a Body in Motion, moving another larger than it self, in Surface and Bulk, and putting it into a Rectilineal Motion; which we see the Bo-

dy A (supposing the Degrees of its Celerity more than compensating for the Excess of Bulk



in B

in B quiescent) may effect upon B. Upon which, I assert, 1. That the whole Body B moves as an *united* Body: But, 2. That it cou'd not [all of it] move by virtue of the *Contact* of its Parts; therefore *Contact* does not *unite* the Parts of it.

In order to demonstrate these Two Propositions, I lay down Four Axioms with regard to Corporeal Motion, which, upon very little Consideration must be admitted as such.

1. That every Body in Motion, had an Impellent Cause from without.


2. That every Body, or Aggregate of Bodies, impelling another, communicates Motion by *Contact* only.

3. That all Motion is naturally Rectilinear. And,

4. That all Motion is continu'd in the same Line in which it is receiv'd.


A, moving towards pq , and finding B in its Way, moves it to pi ; communicating of its own Motion to B, by *Contact*, according to *Ax. 2.* from the Line cd to ef ; and so thro' all the intermediate Lines to no , according to *Ax. 3.* and 4. whereby we conceive how that Part of B call'd $enof$, moves towards pq . But here's another Part of B call'd $fogh$ which moves towards qi , or else the whole wou'd not move towards pi . But whence has this

this Part *fogh* its Motion? Not from it self, *Ax. 1.* not immediately from A, which



touches it no where, *Ax. 2.* Therefore it must have it from *enof*, which has it first from A; and by virtue of its Union with which, *fogh* moves towards *qi*. This is the first Thing I asserted we are to consider. 2. Whether this Motion can be effected by Contact only. And I will demonstrate, 1. That the Part *enof*, can communicate by its Contact no Motion to *fogh*. 2. If it cou'd, yet this Part wou'd not move to *qi*, as we find it does. First, *enof* can communicate by its Contact no Motion in this Case to *fogh*. For being able to communicate nothing but what it receiv'd from A, *Ax. 1.* and receiving that only at the Line *ef*; and *ef* pressing directly thro' all the intermediate Lines upon

no, Ax. 3, and 4. there cannot be the least Degree of Motion communicated from



enof to *fohg*; for this wou'd be a tendency in *enof* to *ml*, according to Ax. 4. which yet it cou'd not have from A, according to the same *Axiom*. Secondly, If there cou'd be a Communication of Motion this Way, yet the Part *fohg* wou'd not move, as it does, to *qi*; for it cou'd receive no Motion from *enof*, but by the Line *fo*, Ax. 2. and that cou'd be communicated no other Ways, than to *gh*, Ax. 4. and that cou'd tend no otherwise, than to *ml*, by the same *Axiom*. Therefore the Part *fohg* cou'd not move at all; or if it cou'd, yet not to *qi*. Q. E. D.

From the preceding Demonstration it appears, That if *Contact* caus'd the *Union* of the Parts of Matter, no Part of it cou'd
move,

move, as we plainly see, it does; only by adhering to the rest, when 'tis no way impell'd by the Mover: So that here is something in this *Union*, not only above, but contrary to the Laws of *Motion*; that Part of the Body moves, which, according to the First Part of the Demonstration, shou'd rest.

But here I must not forget the Old Objection. Here's an Operation in Fact, contradictory to what we apprehend of some, known Properties of Matter: Why then must *Thinking Matter* be a Contradiction, because it is contrary to what we apprehend of others? The Fallacy of this Argument will appear, by distinguishing the Word *Union*: If, by it, is meant *Mechanical Union*, or *Union* from a *Mechanical Cause*, I own it may be as impossible, as that Matter can *think*: But if we understand it as a Fact only, from some Cause or other, there's no Consequence in it to the Power of *Thinking* in Matter; but, as an *Immaterial Being* only *thinks*; so an *Immaterial Being* may be the only sufficient Cause to *unite* (as they are united) the Parts of Matter.

To return; I have fully prov'd, That *Contact* does not unite, in a proper Sense, the Parts that are united in any Body; and altho' we cannot conceive them *united*, with-

without conceiving them, at the same time, touching each other; yet their *Contiguity* or *Juxta-position*, and their *Continuity* or *Union*, must be two different Effects; as proceeding from different Causes; the one from Motion, the other from something above the Power of Motion. And, therefore, it is very possible that some Substances (I don't say Corporeal) may be *united* without touching one another in this Sense: For, wherever the one acts *dependently* on the other, there is an *Union*; so that if we own the Power of moving Matter inherent in some *Immaterial Substance*, (as I have prov'd we must of necessity own) we have, in Fact, an *Union*, in some Degree, of these *Two Substances*: And, as to that Instance of the *Union* between Human Soul and Body, in which the Soul it self is affected, I say the Application is, on both sides equally, unimaginable; we can no more conceive the Manner how an *Immaterial Agent* moves a *Body*, than we can how, upon *Corporeal Motion*, *Thoughts* arise in the *Soul*; and if the one has been actually done, the other, for ought we know of it, cannot be impossible.

Thus I have clearly disproved the Proposition which I deny'd, *viz. That there is no Union of Things, but by Contact*; having demonstrated that, Even that particular
Union,

Union, which gives Umbrage to the Objection, is not made by *Contact*.

But perhaps the *Union of Bodies* is still Mechanically solvable, tho' not by *Contact* only, yet by *Rest* superadded to it, as some; or the *Pressure of the Atmosphere*, as others contend.

But granting that either, or both of these come up to a full Solution; nevertheless the Sensual Prejudice of *Contact* is remov'd; which these Additional Suppositions prove, is not able to solve the *Phænomenon*: And indeed if *Contact* alone were sufficient, there cou'd be no Reason given, why all Bodies, of what Superficies soever, did not in some degree *unite* upon Touch, as Iron doth with the *Magnet*.

But the Addition of *Rest* and *Pressure* may, perhaps, seem to be only subservient to *Contact* in this *Union*; the latter to bring the Parts together, and the former to continue their *Juxta-position*: Let us therefore examin their Capacity, as Causes to produce this Effect: And of them both I may pronounce, That they are already demonstrated equally incapable, with *Contact*; as will easily appear by recollecting, that That Part of the Body *B* in *Rest*, which has no Motion communicated to it by *A*, according to this Supposition, moves of it self: And as to the *Pressure of the*
H *Atmo-*

Atmosphere : Is it possible, for that to make a Body move, without being it self the Impellent Cause? Which it cannot be in the Progressive Motion of Bodies, because it is suppos'd to *unite* the Parts of them by an equal Pressure on all sides; and it is clear, that this Pressure must move that Part of the Body *B* which is not mov'd by *A*, if it *unites* the Parts of *B*; for by virtue of *Union* they move together: Or can the Pressure be such an Impellent Cause, as to make a Body continue Motion in a different Line from that, in which it was receiv'd?

Again, as to *Rest* uniting the Parts of Matter, *Des Cartes* very dexterously avoids the insuperable Difficulty attending it, by telling us we can imagin no other Cement but *Rest*; and then putting the Question,

Princ. Phil.
l. 2. §. 55.

Quid enim est Glutinum illud? non Substantia, quia cum Particulæ istæ sint Substantiæ, nulla ratio est cur per aliam Substantiam potius, quam per se ipsas jungerentur, &c. For it may be very difficult to imagin what Substance, besides themselves, can *unite* them; (tho' by the way, the Power of *Uniting* is involv'd in the Power of *Moving* Matter, and therefore we are not so much at a Loss for another Substance.) and yet it may be impossible to conceive, that they can *unite* them-

themselves by *Rest*. An heap of Sand may be as perfectly at *Rest*, as a piece of Marble; but the Parts do not alike cohere: It's true, the Air may be always in Motion, in the Interstices left by the Globules of Sand; but so is that, or subtler Matter, in the Pores of Marble; and while there is no such Motion in the other, as to change the Place and Situation of one Grain, with respect to another, the Sand is as much at *Rest*, and ought to be as *coherent*, as the Marble.

The *Pressure of the Atmosphere*, is still a weaker Subterfuge: For what is it that so *unites* the Parts of this *Elastical Fluid*? Are all Bodies in the Universe that are *united*, surrounded with an Atmosphere? And what then surrounds *that*, to make its Particles act with united Force upon them? Or is this only design'd for a Piece of Sublunary Philosophy? Truly it will not bear carrying any farther.

And now I think it appears, that this *Union* is above all *Mechanical Solution*. I desire the Consequence of this may be consider'd: If we cannot conceive how *Material Substances*, which lye nearest to our Understanding, tho' not level with it, are *united*; in vain do we endeavour to conceive, or complain for want of Conception, how an *Immaterial Substance* is

united to Material. There are but Three Sorts of *Union* we can suppose of *Substances*; that of *Two Material*, that of *Two Immaterial Substances*, or lastly the *Union between both*; and if we do not comprehend the first, which yet we find to be Matter of Fact; our not being able to comprehend either of the other, is no Objection to Arguments in themselves conclusive for their *Union*. We have some Idea of *Substances separately in Action*; of *Material*, in the *Action of Motion*; and of *Immaterial*, in the *Action of Thought*; but we have no Idea of any *Substance in Action*, purely by its Dependence on another *Created Substance*. Our Faculties, in their utmost Extent, fall short of this Knowledge; our Creator having conceal'd from us the Dependence of *Substances* on each other, as much as he has done the Dependence of them all on Himself.

By considering this, we are prepar'd to answer that Objection, so much in the Mouth of our Adversaries: *Material cannot obstruct the Operations of Immaterial Substance; how then comes it to pass, that our Thoughts depend so much upon the Temperament of our Bodies?* That the Soul, as other things *Immaterial*, can move and penetrate the Body, we grant; but that it shou'd, therefore, exert its Operations, with-

without any Obstruction from the Body, we see no Reason : For this is the same thing as to say, it *thinks*, without any Instrumental Assistance of the Body, which we do not suppose it does in this State ; and if such *determinate Corporeal Motions*, do necessarily precede, or accompany such *determinate Thoughts*, no wonder there is a fit Disposition requir'd, in those Parts of the Body, in order to perform their own Motions. The Soul may very possibly have an Original Power in it self to *think*, independently on all Matter ; tho' many of the most considerable Ancient Philosophers held a *Corporeal Vehicle*, necessary to the Operations of all *Created Spirits* ; so far were they from esteeming the *Union* of Soul and Body an Absurdity : But be that as it has pleas'd God ; we are sure that our selves do not *Think*, as *Immaterial Beings* only ; but as *Immaterial Beings*, *united* to a Part of the Material World : And therefore a Quality, which belongs only to one Part of our Nature, and cou'd never affect the other, separately consider'd, may affect our whole Nature ; which is now become *One*, so far as it is constituted and compounded of them both.

And now I hope we have, without venturing beyond our Stretch, which wou'd have render'd our Endeavours ineffectual

to this Purpose, remov'd this last Obstacle in our Way to the Conclusion we aim at, which is this; That *Human Nature is, and must be constituted of an Immaterial, together with a Material Substance.*

S E C T. XII.

Of the Immortal Nature of the Soul, as a Consequence of its Immaterial and Substantial Nature.

THE *Immortality* of the Soul of Man, is a Subject that will admit of great Variety of Proof; but I shall confine myself to that Argument, which has been the Subject of the preceding *Sections*; having design'd to keep, as close as I cou'd, to this one Point; and being thus limited to one Argument, I must use the Word *Immortal* in a limited Sense.

By the Soul's *Immortality* then, I do not understand, I. A Future State of Rewards and Punishments, as the last Determination of Providence upon Mankind. For this is properly the *Immortality brought to Light by the Gospel*; and what the glimmering Light of Nature discover'd of this State,

was

was by Considerations remote, from the Argument in hand. Nor, 2. Do I understand here by *Immortality*, a State of Eternal Duration, in the same Individual Essence; which State depends, as well upon the Preserving Power of the Creator, as, what we are now upon, the Nature of the Soul. But I understand *Immortality* in this Place, as oppos'd to, and exclusive of what we now call *Mortality*, by which our Bodies lose their Individual Essence, and mix with the common Parent of Terrestrial Bodies: Whereas we assert, That the Soul, whatever Change it undergoes by Death, with regard to the State and Condition of it, will continue the same *Individual Self-conscious Substance*. And,

1. We may be sure it does not undergo *Annihilation*, as all Corporeal Properties, which cannot shift and change their Subject, may be said to undergo, when they leave the Body: But we have prov'd the Soul to be a *Substance*, and we find no Annihilation even of Corporeal *Substance*, by Death: And in this Sense, both Soul and Body may be said to be *Immortal*; as all *First Matter*, or Matter in its *Generical Nature*, must be; in Opposition to the Power of Created Agents. But,

2. They differ in this, That the Soul, and not the Body, will subsist in its

Individual and *Specific* Nature; that it will continue after Death the *same*, tho' not properly an *Human Soul*: And this a very little Reflexion will make plain to us: For, whereas all Corruption, or Change of Identity in Bodies, must arise from *Divisibility*, and that again from *Local Motion*; neither of these can fall upon an *Immaterial Substance*: Had it been capable of *Divisibility*, it had been, according to our Argument, incapable of *Thought*; and it is equally incapable of *Local Motion*, as that is a Consequent of Solidity: And therefore, in what Sense soever it may be said to Move, it can in no Sense be said to be Moved, or Thrust out of its Place, by the Intervention of Bodies.

3. They farther differ in this, That the Soul only after the Dissolution shall retain the Faculty of *Thought*: For if by being conscious of this Faculty in our selves, and by perceiving it incompatible with Matter, we come to know thus much of the Nature of our Souls: Then this Faculty, as it does not belong to our Body, so neither can it be the Result of *Union* between our Body and Soul; however, it may be determin'd by that Union, and the Will of him that caus'd it, in the Manner of its Operation; because it has its Foundation altogether in the Separate Nature of the Soul.

Soul. So that the Body may be call'd an Occasion of the Soul's *Thinking*, after a Determinate Manner; but cannot in the least contribute towards, or diminish from its Inherent and Original Faculty of *Thought*: Which we shall be farther assur'd of, by considering our Spontaneous Motion, as it is not only owing to our Souls, but is the sole and proper Operation of them; the Parts of our Body being no more able to contribute any thing as an Efficient Cause towards their own Motion, than those of any other Body in the Universe. Our Soul therefore cou'd not move the Body, now they are *united*, unless it had in it self a Power to move Matter, antecedent to that *Union*; and this Power being not communicated as Bodies communicate Motion to each other, by a necessary Impulse on the one Part, and Resistance on the other; but by an Act of Volition, which is an Act of *Thinking*: It is a demonstrative Argument that the Soul, after the departure out of this, is naturally capacitated to inform another *Vehicle*; or to be *reunited* to this, upon restoring those Laws and Conditions in it, which being broken, caused the Dissolution.

But here let us stop; for our Argument will carry us no farther: What shall become of our Souls in the next State, entirely depends

depends upon the Appointment of him that plac'd them in *this*; and how far that Appointment has been made known to us, we do not propose to consider in this Place; but have now carry'd our Enquiry as far as we aim'd, which was to follow the Soul in a State of *Numerical Existence*, and *Self-consciousness*, beyond the Grave.

S E C T. XIII.

That the Immaterial and Substantial Nature of the Soul, is the best Foundation for the Moral and Christian Immortality of it; together with a short Account of the Consistency of these Doctrins with Reason, and each other.

I HAVE now finish'd, in as small a compass as I cou'd, my principal Design, in this Essay; but it may not be improper to add to it, by way of Conclusion, something concerning the Connexion between Reason and Religion in this Point; or, how far what has been said, will be a good Foundation, whereon to build the
Moral

Moral and Christian Immortality of the Soul; and having attempted to carry the Argument so far, there I shall leave it.

I. As to the *Moral Immortality*, by which I mean that Expectation of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments in general, which many had from the Light of unassisted Reason; this was doubtless rais'd upon an antecedent Belief of an *Immaterial* and *Substantial* Soul: And, accordingly, both *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and all the greatest Philosophers, who disputed for the Reality of that State, disputed for this Doctrine too, and went upon the Supposition of it.

Nor is it easy to imagin how they cou'd account for the former, without the latter; for seeing Life utterly extinct, and the Body turn'd to Dust; and knowing nothing of the Resurrection, and Revivification of it; they were oblig'd to assert a Surviving Part of Man, and not only that, but, in order to be punish'd or rewarded, a Part, most properly, Himself; which cou'd be no other Part but that, which had been the Seat of all his *Thoughts*, in which they knew the Morality of all his Actions consisted; and that must be an Immaterial Part of him; they not being able to conceive any Part of his Body, but what, by Death, lost its Numerical Nature, and ceas'd to be the Part of a Man.

And

And as this Doctrin is highly agreeable to the Belief of those, who upon other Considerations, expected a Future State of Retribution; so is it to the Christian Faith; for this, making the *Resurrection* to be a *Reunion of the Soul and Body*, and the Soul (which is the Seat of Life, when united to it) to have surviv'd in the Intermediate State; makes the *Immortality*, brought to *Light by the Gospel*, clear and intelligible; whereas the Supposition that our Body *thinks and lives*, &c. makes the Intermediate State, a State of perfect *Annihilation*, Death making a full End of the Person; But I think this State of *Annihilation* is such an *Hiatus*, in the System of the Creation, as cou'd never be left unfill'd-up by Him that made all Things in *Number, Weight, and Measure*; and whose Attributes of *Justice and Mercy*, as they have their *Proper Objects*, so it can never be suppos'd that *Omnipotence* will suffer them to lose their *Due Objects*, in such a Sense, that they cannot be recover'd without a new Creation of the Person, (for as such, he has undergone *Annihilation*) which I cannot possibly conceive to be the *same* Person; but another Person (as well as another Creation superinduc'd) to suffer for the Crimes, or be rewarded for the Obedience of one that, by Death, escap'd Justice, or lost his Title to Mercy.

So

So that an Heathen Philosopher might admit the *Proposition*, That *Matter Thinks*, with more Colour than the Christian can; for he might, possibly, tho' not rationally, have suppos'd a Spirituous and Self-conscious Part separated by Death, from the grosser Parts of the Body: But this is not consonant to the Christian Doctrin, which teaches us, That our Body, without exception of any Volatil Parts of it, shall lye in the Grave and Rottenness, until the *Last Day*; and, accordingly, terms it our *Mortal Body*; which, if it *thinks*, draws this Consequence immediately after it, That Man is *wholly Mortal*: And if a Christian cannot, as we have seen he cannot consistently, admit of *this*, neither can he of *the other*.

And yet it must not be deny'd, That some of the Fathers of the Christian Church, held our Souls to be *Material*, and of themselves corruptible, but made Immortal by the Will of GOD; but neither were there any Number that held this, nor is their Error chargeable, as it is in some Moderns; for still they all of them held the Immortality of the Soul, and the Resurrection of the Body, as two distinct Articles: For which Reason, a late Adversary to Christianity wou'd seem to throw all his

*Second
Thoughts, Ep.
Ded. &c.*

Dirē

Dirt upon them, doubtless foreseeing where some of it will light.

This therefore is an Argument of great Moment, and shou'd have been well consider'd by all the Patrons and Abettors of that Principle, *the Possibility of thinking Matter*: But yet I shall not urge it farther here, because I shall have Occasion to say what I can, in Vindication of Man's *Immortality* in another Part.

This is sufficient to shew with what Reason we contend, as Christians, so earnestly for an *Immaterial Substance* united to our Body; as also how firm and solid a Foundation the Belief of this lays, for the Belief of a Future State, as it stands reveal'd to us in the Gospel. But I cannot dismiss my Subject, without officiously bespeaking the Reader's farther Consideration, of what the Light of Reason suggests to him, in Proof of the *Moral*, and in Confirmation of the *Christian Immortality*. And I shall only offer such Hints as may deserve, and will need his own Thoughts upon them.

As to the Belief of *A Future State of Retribution in General*, I suppose him (that I may not go too far out of my Way) to believe both a GOD, and the Relation he stands in to Him, as his Creator and Preserver: Let him then reflect and
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consider, 1. Whether he is not conscious to himself, that he is a *Free-Agent*; and withal, Whether this Internal and Self-consciousness, is not an Invincible Proof of the Thing; tho' he may not be able to reconcile it with more remote, and obscure Considerations, to prove him determin'd *ab Extra*. 2. He may reflect also, That he is a *Moral Agent*; that is, a Being endu'd with the Knowledge of Good and Evil, as they are immutably and eternally so; and that, he having a Power to act according to the Measures either of Good or Evil, his Actions, relating to those Measures, receive the Denomination of being *Morally Good* or *Evil*. 3. He will find himself, in Consequence of this, an *Accountable Agent*; being not only, in common with all Creatures, under the Preserving Power of the Creator; but having a Rule of Action, deriv'd from the very Nature of God, who is Essential Righteousness; and lastly, having a Natural Power of Conformity or Disobedience to that Rule; from whence it is that, upon his doing Evil, *Sin lies at his Door*, and Guilt naturally cleaves to him. And indeed, had not the Creator design'd that the Happiness or Misery of Human Nature, shou'd have a Retrospect upon our Actions, and depend, in great Measure, on the Quality of them, there cou'd be no Account given

given of the Reflexion of our Conscience, as being an Effect of Reason so natural to us, that very few Men can quite rid themselves of it, by the most Unnatural Force.

4. I propose it to his Consideration, Whether it is not highly Reasonable to suppose, that a Creature, thus naturally Accountable, shall be *Actually call'd to an Account*, by his Omnipotent, and All-wise Governour; and whether he will not so Account with him, that every Accountable Action from his Creation, shall have its due Influence on his State and Condition. If we cannot suppose this, we must suppose that Omniscient Wisdom and Power has made Man, quite otherwise, in the very Frame and Constitution of his Nature, than God intends to deal with him.

5. And lastly, let him then look abroad into his whole *Kind*, or but *in Se descendere*, and consider whether Mankind, is in the general, accounted with in this State; or whether the Happiness or Misery incident to him here, appears to his Reason like the Sentence of *The Searcher of Hearts*. I dare say no Man that considers well the Course of Things amongst Men, and at the same time believes a watchful and impartial Providence over them, can believe that ever any Man receiv'd from the Hands of Providence, his *last* Retribution in this Life: For,

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whatever Connexion may be found between that Good or Evil which is *Moral*, and that which is *Natural*; which doubtless is much greater than what is obvious to ordinary Observation; yet if the Chain is broken in any one Link, and there is the least Deviation, in any the least Instance, from the Eternal Rule of Justice; then, to him that believes a God, and has right Apprehensions of his Nature, this brings a Necessity of inferring *A Future State of Retribution*, to that Person who has not had it in this; and (since it falls out so, in many Instances, with every Man) to all Mankind.

I see nothing in these Particulars but what might have been, nay and what has been discover'd by the Light of Nature only; which sometimes puts me to a Stand for a Reason, why this State was not so universally believ'd, or positively asserted, by those of the Heathens, that held the Being of a GOD, and had bright Notions of Morality: And I know no Reason for it but this; That, whereas this Argument depends upon an Antecedent Knowledge, first of the Divine Nature, next of our own, and lastly of the Chief Happiness belonging to our Nature; Religion, as generally taught amongst them, was overrun with Errors and Misapprehensions, in
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all these Respects. And it must be confess'd, that the Notions of a lazy or licentious Deity, an haughty and self-sufficient Virtue, or of an imaginary and chymical Happiness, where entertain'd, will effectually destroy the Belief of a Future State. But as to the Modern Disciples of Natural Religion, who seldom venture to maintain any of these Absurdities of their Predecessors, how many soever they advance of their own; I never expect to hear from them, the true Reason why they reject, as many of them do, the Doctrin of a *Future State of Retribution*.

Next we are to enquire, Whether Reason will afford us any thing, in Confirmation of the *Christian Immortality* of the Soul; that is, how far it is agreeable to Reason since discover'd, tho' it cou'd never have been discover'd by Reason.

As to the *Nature* of the Happiness or Misery belonging to that State, I only make this general Remark upon it: That, as we find all that is Morally Good or Evil in us, while in this State of *Probation*, to consist in a Conformity, or Averfation to the Divine Nature, and Life; so it is highly reasonable to suppose that, what can be naturally good or evil to us in the State of *Retribution*, consists, as to the Foundation of it, in perfectly enjoying, or
utterly

utterly abandoning of God; which, if there were no other, is a sufficient Account of *Heaven* and *Hell*.

But besides this, there are two other things considerable in the *Christian Immortality*; they are, *Our Entrance upon it*, and *Our Continuance in it*.

I. The Scripture-account of our *Entrance on that State* makes it wholly Miraculous, and so above *Reason*; but yet with an apparent Tendency, in *Reason*, to promote the chief Design, and serve the best Purposes of *this Immortality*. It begins, we are told, with a *Resurrection of our Bodies*, in order, [say we] to be reunited to our *Souls*: And, if we consider what Connexion the Gospel has made between the two States; (it has made this a Probation for the other, and that the Consummation of our Labour in this; in so

much, that they are express'd by one and the same Phrase, *The Kingdom of God*) nothing can be more agreeable to this

S. Mark, c. i.
v. 15. compar'd with
2 Thes. c. i. v. 5.

Connexion of Two Worlds, than that the Inhabitant of both, (*of a Reasonable Soul, and Human Flesh subsisting*) shou'd be remov'd the same entire Person, from one, to the other.

Had Men always gone out of the World by a *Translation*; tho' it had not

been known whither, nor to what Purpose they went; there had been no Objection left to the Arguments that Reason offer'd the Heathens, for the Reality of a Future State; which therefore, had the Case been so, wou'd have gain'd a much more general Belief than we find it did amongst them: Whereas, to us, the Breach that Death makes upon our Nature, is perfectly heal'd, by our Resurrection and Revivification: So that Christianity comes to confirm, and heighten our Rational Expectation of that State; which therefore does, reciprocally, confirm the Christian Doctrin concerning it.

We are told indeed, that *Flesh and Blood* (such as it is now) *cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*; but we understand, from the Tenor of the Promise, in that and other Places, That, however our Bodies will be *glorify'd*, to become capable of *Celestial Glory*; they shall not be so far chang'd as to lose their *Identity*, but our Souls shall have the same, tho' refin'd Vehicles or Instruments of Thought and Sensation: Not that the Body, which of it self is no *Agent*, can be dealt with as a *Free Agent*; but that the Soul, having been, by Union with it, determin'd and modify'd in its own Operations, is most capable of an

Exact

1 Ep. Cor.
c. 15. v. 50.

Exact Retribution, when plac'd, as near as possible, *in Statu quo*: For, possibly, we cannot conceive how widely different an *Unbodied Spirit*, if any such were created, must be, in its Faculties and Operations, from a *Spirit Incorporate*. However, we cannot well conceive it endu'd with Memory and Recollection, such as extends to a Former State; (for Memory is not solvable, either by Corporeal Impressions only, or without these, but is a proper Result of the *Union*) and yet it is very agreeable to Reason that a Moral Agent, under the Sense of Happiness or Misery, shou'd be conscious of those Facts, at least in general, upon which the Present Condition of it depends: And, accordingly, we find *Dives* bid to *Remember* (as an Addition to his Punishment, as well as a Vindication of the Sentence) *that in his life time he had received his good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things*; which we cannot dispute but that *Lazarus* also, to his greater comfort in *Abraham's bosom*, cou'd remember himself.

St. Luke, c. 16.
v. 25.

But the *Reunion* will still appear more reasonable, if we reflect that, How far so ever the Rewards of Virtue may transcend the Pleasures of Sense, (such Souls being capable of much higher Pleasures; and this

is a good Reason for the Promise and Appointment of their Celestial Body) yet it is a Piece of Natural Justice, that Corporeal Pleasures in Excess, shou'd be rewarded with Corporeal Pain; that the same Instruments Men us'd in their Crimes, shou'd become the Instruments of their Punishment; and that, in which they vitiously delighted, be made the Efficient Cause of their Grief and Misery.

Lastly, it is no insignificant Reason, in Confirmation of this Doctrin, that it is most admirably fitted to serve the Purpose of God, in the Revelation of it; for by this the Promises and Threatnings of the Gospel are render'd as effectual, as by any Motives they can be; the Completion of them being made perfectly intelligible, and most sensibly affecting to every Capacity. Thus is the Doctrin of a Resurrection of our Bodies, and Reunion of Body and Soul, highly agreeable to the Natural Notions and Apprehensions we have of a Future State.

Upon the Resurrection follows, in the Christian Account, *A General Judgment, and Sentence on Mankind*; which is a Doctrin that establishes and improves, to the highest Degree, that Natural Notion, upon which is founded our Expectation of a Future State; viz. Of the Impartial Justice
and

and Equity of Providence. If the General Supposition of this State, will account for the seeming Irregularities in the Present: It must be more satisfactory to have an Assurance from himself, that *The Judge of all the Earth will do Right*; and not only so, but that Heaven and Earth shall be made sensible of, and bear Testimony to *His doing Right*. The Beauty of Providence must then appear in its Native Lustre, when the Last Determination of it, shall be given in the Face of the World; when there will be no more Room for Faith, as there will be no farther Use of it; when all the Anxious Scruples that have exercis'd Good Men, and all Vain Hopes that have deluded the Wicked, shall be blown off at once, and every individual Person shall carry with him, into his Unchangeable State, (as a Proper Ingredient either of his Happiness or Misery there) a full Conviction, and a just Sense of an Unerring and Impartial Justice and Righteousness, extended to every proper Object of the Divine Providence. And thus we find the First Thing considerable in the Christian Immortality is clearly accountable to our Reason, and falls in exactly with our Natural Notions of a GOD, a Providence, and a Future State.

2. The other Thing we are to consider, is *our Continuance* in that State; which, we are told, will be to all Eternity.

That it is reasonable to suppose a Creature made capable of Eternal Duration, by the Frame and Constitution of its Nature, as is the Human Soul, shou'd be dealt with accordingly, and enjoy the preserving Power of the Creator for ever, in its individual Subsistency; will I presume be easily granted me, by those that believe *Nature*, or rather, *the God of Nature never did any thing in vain*; nor, therefore gave a *Capacity*, but what he will *fill*.

But that which is most considerable here, and peculiar to the Christian Immortality, is the Great Design of our Creator to make all Mankind *eternally happy*; of which none shall fall short, but those who have obstinately incapacitated themselves for the Enjoyment of it. How far this is agreeable to our *Reason*, as well as our *Interest*, will appear when we have consider'd,

1. *What is the Proper and Adequate Happiness of Human Nature.*

2. *What Ground of Reason we have to hope for this Happiness.*

I. In order to determin, what is *the Proper and Adequate Happiness of Human Nature*; we must consider, 1. *What Faculty of it is to be gratify'd*; and,
2. *What*

2. What *Gratification* that Faculty requires.

I. The *Faculty* to be gratify'd, when we speak of *the Proper and Adequate Happiness of our Nature*, is doubtless the highest and most excellent *Faculty*, whatever that be, belonging to it. For I consider that our *Faculties* rise proportionably, and as they rise, are enlarg'd for the Reception of Happiness, somewhat like, tho' much beyond what is call'd *Geometrical Progression increas'd*; as 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, &c. in which the last Number exceeds all the rest put together, so that we may suppose all the rest gratify'd to the last Degree; yet if we suppose the Highest left with a craving Emptiness, we may pronounce the Creature miserable in the main: It remains then, that we point out that which is the *highest and most excellent Faculty* of Human Nature; and it is, very obviously, the *Rational Faculty*; not only as the Seat and Center of all Human Happiness is *Thought* and *Reason*, still, even when misapply'd; but as it is the *Supreme Faculty*, and that which plac'd us in the Rank of Beings which we possess. Thus supposing, tho' not approving the usual Division of *Life*, into *Vigetative*, *Sensitive* and *Rational*; if a Brute is in all the Perfection of *Vigetation*, but has lost his *Sense*, or is affected with
Sensible

Sensible Pain; he wants the proper *Good* of his Nature, and is as far miserable, as the *Evil* of it can make him: And thus again, if a Man has both *Vigitation*, as his Body requires it, and a whole Life of the most exquisite *sensible* Happiness; yet if his *Reason* is left ungratify'd; that is, unsatisfy'd with the Sense of his Present Condition, or the Prospect of his Future; in him, it must be own'd the *Brute* is happy, but the *Man is miserable*; and therefore, the Creature is miserable in the main.

From hence I confess it follows, That a Man is really happy, while he thinks himself so, tho' in the Condition which a sound Judgment wou'd esteem and feel to be miserable: But notwithstanding this, we have reason to pronounce him miserable in it, because we have reason to believe he will be finally of another Judgment, and for ever condemn himself, or so long at least as to out-balance his short-liv'd Self-applause. To which we may add, That he cannot, however, be so happy as that Man, who has form'd his Judgment of Happiness upon more Rational Grounds; for he has the *highest Faculty*, gratify'd in an *higher Degree*, which makes his Happiness more compleat; and in this, as I conceive, consists all Moral Good or Evil, as it regards the Condition of Human Nature,

Nature. Understanding now what *Faculty* is to be gratify'd by the Adequate Happiness of Human Nature, we are to consider,

2. What *Gratification* that Faculty requires. And this Consideration might lead us to inquire into the *Nature* and *Kind*, of the Adequate Happiness of Man: Which Enquiry wou'd soon be at an End, when we consider'd that every Faculty is best *gratify'd* with those Pleasures and Satisfaction which are naturally most agreeable to it; and, therefore, that the Rational Faculty can properly be said to receive no *Gratification*, but what will stand the severest Test of unbiass'd Reason; so that he who makes his *Inclination* only, the *Reason* of his Actions, is so far an *Irrational* Agent. And this one Notion, if closely follow'd, wou'd be of no small Use, to discover *the Proper and Adequate Happiness of Human Nature*, thro' all the Variety of Objects, in which we aim at it; as also to give us some Light into our more perfect Happiness in Reversion.

But we are at present only considering the *Duration* of our Happiness in that State, with regard to which I assert that, Whereinsoever *the Adequate Happiness of Man* consists, it cannot be so call'd, without the Addition of *Eternal Duration*. And to
make

make this Assertion Good, I desire but Two Things to be granted me, for the Concession of which, I need not be oblig'd to any Man: The First is, That we are conscious of a Capacity in our Nature to enjoy an Happiness without End: The Second, That our Nature craves, and our Reason aspires after, all the Happiness we are capable of Enjoying: And from these Two it is as easy, as it is a just Consequence, That we cannot be *Compleatly*, without being *Eternally* Happy.

Suppose there were as much Happiness in this Life, as we Christians say there might have been, but Death were still our Fate; Wou'd not this one Abatement of it, draw a dismal Veil over the whole Scene? Wou'd not Reason proclaim our want of the Crown and Consummation of Happiness? Which concluding, at what Distance soever, wou'd upbraid our Reason in the Fruition of it; and cause the Fear of Death to increase, in Proportion with the Happiness of Life.

If it be objected, We shou'd then never be compleatly happy, since our Happiness must, with our Being, be successive; and therefore can never be properly *eternal*. I own the Consequence as to This Life, (and that I think is no weak Presumption for another;) but, as to the Future Life, tho'
God

God only, in the strictest Sense, *inhabiteth Eternity*; yet our Happiness shall be commensurate to our Capacity, and then we are compleatly happy; which we cannot be without an infallible Assurance, that our Condition is *unchangeable*, as that it is *happy*. This is the *last* Effort of the Rational Nature, which can never be at perfect Rest, or fix the whole Weight of its Desires and Propensions, but on an *Eternal Good*.

We now understand, in some Measure, what is the *Proper and Adequate Happiness of Human Nature*, by being directed to the right Faculty, and the proper Gratification of it. We are to inquire, in order to be convinc'd that the Christian Immortality is agreeable to Reason.

II. What Ground of Reason we have to hope for the Attainment of this Happiness. And here again I suppose, as I have done all along, our Belief of a God; and I am sure it follows from the true Belief of him, that he is our most Powerful, Wise, and Beneficent Creator; who, consider'd only as our Creator, will place us in no State, but for our Advantage; and who is dispos'd to impart to us, finally, all the Good he has made us capable of receiving, and that must be of *Eternal Duration*.

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Without this Prospect, it is certain the *Span* of our Lives here, wou'd be so far from affording us all the Good we want, that it cou'd not properly be said to afford us any, when balanc'd, as it must be, with the Evil brought along with it. And as for a Future State with a full End to it, tho' Men are very inclinable to take up with a present Enjoyment in this State, (as an Effect of an Impair'd Understanding, to the Eyes of which, the Truth of Things lessens by *Distance of Time*, as other Objects do to their bodily Eyes, by *Distance of Place*) yet in that other State we must suppose their Prospect will inlarge with their Faculties; and as they will be sensible of more exquisite Happiness, so they must be more exquisitely sensible of their Loss in the Conclusion of it; which wou'd not only impair, but, I am apt to think, destroy the Happiness of Heaven it self.

To conclude this Argument, that Eternal Happiness is design'd for us, we find an Assurance, besides that of God's own Word, built upon the Contemplation of his own Nature and Attributes, which is, to me, the most convincing of all our Reasoning; for if he has given us any certain Knowledge, by duly employing our Faculty of Reason, surely he has not deceiv'd us in (that which, as it is of the highest Importance,
so

so a Failure in it wou'd prove the most egregious Deceit) the Knowldge of Himself. So just and convincing to Gentile as well as Jew, is the Argument urg'd, by our Blessed Redeemer, (understanding it with a particular Regard to the *Life and Immortality* which He brought to Light) *Ye believe in God, believe also in Me.*

As to *Eternal Death* or *Misery*, which we also find threatned in the Gospel, it must be own'd, That there have been hot Disputes about That, and great and good Men engag'd on both Sides, and also that the Controversy has turn'd upon the same Principle we make Use of in the Argument of *Eternal Happiness*, viz. *The Divine Nature and Attributes*; with which one Party contends that *Eternal Misery* (in the strict and Scholastic Sense of the Word *Eternal*, which the other holds to be Scripture-Doctrin) is utterly inconsistent.

But we are not concern'd here to enter on the Retail of this Dispute. Both Sides take for granted, and urge as their own Principle, the Justice, and Righteousness of the Divine Nature; and both, in consequence, must own that no Man shall be more miserable in Another State, than he has render'd himself, by his Demeanure, in This: For this is the Character of God, ingraven on our Souls by Himself; and
still

still more legible in the Revelation he has vouchsaf'd us, the whole Design of which, falls in with that Expression of the Prophet, deliver'd with the highest Affe-
 ration, and in the most Pathetic Manner;

As I live, saith the Lord God, I
 Ezek. c. 23. *have no pleasure in the death*
 v. 11. *of the wicked, but that the*

wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways: for why will ye dye, O house of Israel? With such Tender-
 ness and Solitude, does he endeavour to remove from the Minds of Men, those Fatal Misapprehensions, which represent him only in the *Act*, and not the *Design* of his Creation; and which render him-
 self *Implacable*, or his Government *Arbi-
 trary*.

The Question then coming to this, Whe-
 ther a State of Final Impenitence here, shall justly expose the Sinner to Eternal Misery? (Which, by the way, I take to be a Que-
 stion that Natural Reason cou'd never have determin'd on either Side; and therefore
 no Reason from the Nature of the Thing, ought to be of weight in Opposition to
 the Scripture-Determination, if that is once clear and positive) we are no farther oblig'd to answer it in this Place, than to
 say, That the Divine Mercy will be ex-
 tended as far as is possible; which is, to
 all

all Capable Objects : And that all those who shall, upon Tryal be found to be Objects of Justice only, and not of Mercy, cannot be reach'd by it; but have destroy'd themselves, even while they were daily forewarn'd of their Danger and Destruction; with this Merciful Intention in God, that they shou'd *Work out their Salvation, with Fear and Trembling.*

All which is a Demonstration, to those that believe the Scripture, of the Falshood of Two very Dangerous Positions: 1. That GOD devotes any Man, or Part of Mankind, to Destruction, for the meer Completion of his own Will, or the Exercise of his Unbounded Power: 2. That he suffers any Sinner, for want of necessary Precaution and Assistance, to run headlong into his Destruction. Both which Tenents are not only attended with this intolerable Consequence, That they deface the true, and most amiable Character of *Reveal'd Religion*; but they strike at the Foundation of all *Natural Religion*, while they render the *Christian Immortality* disagreeable, nay abominable to our best Apprehensions of GOD, our Selves, and the Relation we stand in to Him.

But I think the Hints already given, are sufficient to convince a sincere Inquirer, That the Christian Revelation of a Future
K State,

State, however misunderstood by Weak and Prejudic'd Minds, is in its self highly becoming, and worthy of the Character and Authority it bears with all Believers. And this shews us the perfect Harmony of Reason and Religion, so far as we are capable of carrying on the Comparison; and to demand farther Satisfaction, is to anticipate our Expectations of what shall be reveal'd to us there, and is indeed an unprofitable piece of Presumption.

Here therefore I shall, as I promis'd, leave the Argument; having follow'd, as closely as I cou'd, and without multiplying Topics, that Train of Thoughts which induc'd me to believe,

1. That Human Nature is a *Constitution*, arising from the *Union* of a *Spiritual*, with a *Material Substance*.

2. That this *Spiritual Substance* must remain *numerically* the same, notwithstanding the Dissolution; which, in the Course of Nature, destroys the *Numerical Essence* of the *Body*.

3. That at the End of This, our Human Soul enters upon a *New State* of *Activity* and *Vital Perception*.

4. That it is most agreeable to Reason, and our best Notions of a Deity, that this Succeeding State shall have regard to the Present; and be our Consummate Happiness
or

or Misery; especially as it stands reveal'd to us, in the Gospel of our Blessed Redeemer.

If what I have said, upon each of these Propositions, amounts to Proof; I shall not think it any great Omission, that I have pass'd by several other Conclusive Arguments: All that I aim at is, to gain my Point with an impartial and competent Judge; and, in order to that, having advanc'd my Plea by the best Arguments I was furnish'd with; I think it Deference to the Judgment of those I appeal to, and no Prejudice to my Cause, here to submit it.

But possibly it may be expected I shou'd now turn my self to answer the Objections, and obviate the Cavils of my Adversaries; and this I must confess opens a large Field of Controversy, still to be beaten over: For this Doctrin of Human Soul has had, and now has I find, more Enemies than any one Principle of Philosophy or Religion. The *Atheistic Tribe*, tho' differing with it self in many Particulars, is intirely engag'd with its utmost Force against us in this Point: And these, tho' inconsiderable in themselves, become more formidable when joyn'd by a very large Body of the *Deists*; who, admitting a God, but not his Judgments, are but too nearly concern'd

K 2

cern'd to subvert, if possible, the true Foundation of Rewards, and Punishments: And these again are reinforc'd by all that labour under the Prejudice of a *Sensual Credulity*, who are no contemptible Number. And, besides all these, I cannot look upon them otherwise, than as Enemies to the Cause; who, (with what Intention, I will not presume to determin) give it up as indefensible by all the Succors that Reason can possibly afford. And lastly, they wou'd be esteem'd considerable Enemies to it, who begin to Fight under Christian Colours, and endeavour to turn our best Weapons upon our selves; so that we are attach'd on all Sides, and no hopeful Method against us is left unattempted.

Some of these Objectors have been examin'd in the Course of this Argument; and as for the rest, they are all put together (as well as the Skill of the Compiler wou'd suffer) by the chief Patron of the last Sort of Adversaries; and therefore, tho' we may not have much reason to be dismay'd with the Appearance of this Champion; no not when he pretends to come to us, *In the Name of the Lord of Hosts*: Yet if we are so happy as to repell those Forces he has been pleas'd to put himself at the Head of, (for they are almost at any Man's Command) we may
presume

presume to have done Execution. But to do this effectually, wou'd make a very unnatural Excrescence in this; on which Account, I have reserv'd it for an entire Discourse.

But that this may not appear so very imperfect, for want of something of that Nature, I only add, That there is this double Advantage, arising from a Thing once substantially prov'd. 1. That when well examin'd and apply'd, a Master of the Proof will find himself ready furnish'd with an apposite Answer to most Objections that can be fairly level'd against him. 2. That it will command the Continuance of his Assent, notwithstanding some Objections, which may be really to him insuperable; especially in that Case, where a *Difficulty of Conception*, is mistaken for a *Direct Objection*. Which is the Case of most Arguments on the wrong Side of the Question; for it is egregiously absurd, for a Man to with-hold his Assent from what he does apprehend, for the sake of what he does not apprehend; the former is all he has to depend upon, for his Knowledge and his Happiness too; and it is undoubtedly what he may depend upon, That whatever is True, is, to a competent Understanding, most *evidently* and *unquestionably* so: And therefore he resolves the latter into his own

Inability of Apprehension, not into any real *Want of Evidence in the Subject*; and, so long as he finds himself groping in the Dark, in his best Researches; he rests satisfy'd, as becomes him, where-ever he can lay hold of it, with the *preponderating Evidence*.

T H E E N D.

PSYCHOLOGIA:

PART II.

BEING A VINDICATION OF

The receiv'd and estabish'd Doctrin concerning

Human Soul,

That it is of an *Immaterial* and *Substantial* Nature;

AGAINST

A Late Book, call'd

Second Thoughts, &c.

WHEREIN

All the Author's Pretended Demonstrations to the contrary, as well *Philosophical* and *Rational*, as *Scriptural*, are fully refuted; together with Occasional Remarks on his Way of Reasoning. To which is annex'd, a brief Confutation of his whole *Hypothesis*.

It is an assured Truth, and a Conclusion of Experience, That a little or superficial Knowledge of Philosophy may incline the Mind of Man to Atheism; but a farther proceeding therein, doth bring the Mind back again to Religion. Lord Bacon, Adv. of Learning, Book I.

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A
VINDICATION
Of the Nature of
HUMAN SOUL:
AGAINST
A Book call'd *Second Thoughts*, &c.

C H A P. I.

*Observations on his two first Chapters;
the one, concerning the Prejudices of
Education in Matters of Religion;
the other, of the True Grounds and
Foundation of Belief.*

A Large Porch becomes only a proportionable Building, and a long *Apparatus* a great Work. Our Author therefore, having threaten'd us with *Demonstration* in the Title-Page, and happily begun it in the Epistle Dedicatory; (in which

which New Method, he seems to have appropriated to himself the Character of *Juvenal*, Sat. 1.

Scriptus & in tergo, nec dum finitus Orestes.)

After this we have a very solemn and pompous Introduction, of above Fifty Pages; and divided into Two Chapters, both which may I think, be call'd Introductory; unless either *Prejudice of Education*, or the *Grounds of Belief*, are immediately concern'd in the Dispute about Human Soul; which they being not, in my humble Conception, I have not honour'd my Observations upon them with the Title of Two distinct Chapters.

The first thing he conceives necessary to be done, before he treats of *Human Soul*, is to remove *Innate Prejudice*; that is,
 Pag. 1. as he explains, or rather confounds
 Pag. 2. himself, *Prejudice contracted by Education*, from a *Parent, Tutor or Master*, nay perhaps a *Nurse*. Now I, (who am resolv'd to grant him all I can, apprehending I cannot grant him much) do declare that one quarter of what he has Learnedly urged upon this Head, wou'd have convinc'd me, that the removing of *Prejudice* against a Design, is often the more difficult Part of the Undertaking; and I farther acknowledge, That an Introduction of this Nature, fits his Design

Design very well; there being no contemptible Part of Mankind, besides the Old Fathers, strongly prejudic'd against his Opinion; and, had it been penn'd with more exactness, wou'd have serv'd as a General Introduction to all the Learned Works of *Spinoza*, *Hobbs*, *Blount*, *Le Clerc*, *L--k*, and *Toland*.

Prejudice, or the General Sense of Mankind, is a sort of Rubbish, which such Architects must remove, before they can build altogether upon their own Foundation; our Author therefore has begun at the right End, and 'tis Pity he cou'd not make clean Work of it.

He sets down Two Principal Causes of Prejudice : 1. *The strong Impressions of Education* : 2. *The Opinion every Man covets to be esteem'd Wise, &c.* As to the First, I think no Man will have the Face to deny, that the *strong Impressions, made by Education*, cause the *Prejudice contracted by Education*; for that is what was to be accounted for in this Chapter. Pag. 3.

But the Second is not so very evident, much less is it *Identically* evident; for I find the *Opinion Men covet of being Wise*, no Friend to the Principles of their Education; but on the contrary inclines them to By-Paths, purely because Pag. 10.

because the Road is beaten; and gives them a *Prejudice* to many Opinions, for no other Reason, but because they were not first their *own*. It's true an Opinion, especially an extravagant Opinion of a Man's own Wisdom, is apt to make him stiff and tenacious in all his other Opinions, and sometimes Proof against Demonstration: But these are not the Opinions imbib'd during his Infancy and Education; or however are not consider'd by him as such, but as the Work of his mature and deliberate Reasoning, as the Effects of his extraordinary Skill and Judgment; and in short, as his *Second Thoughts*. So that all the Pains bestow'd upon this Topic, are not only to no Purpose, but to what the Laborer must judge, a very bad one. For this Consideration wou'd be apt to make a singular Man in his Opinions, reflect, Whether his great Strength has really carry'd him beyond the rest of Mankind; or his greater Weakness bewilder'd him.

Having laid down these Two Causes of *the Prejudice of Education*, he proceeds to

Pag. 15. apply them to Matters of Religion. But sure he cannot imagin

these are the only Causes of *Religious Prejudice* in Mankind, that is, of all their Misapprehensions and Errors in Religion: If he does, I am content to inform him of

Two

Two others, which he may use as he thinks proper; and they are, *Lust* and *Pride*.

As for *Lust*, or a Depravity in Morals, that is not always owing to a Bad Education, but sometimes to a Temper that will abuse the Best: And need I tell him, This is one Cause of the Prejudices Men entertain in Matters of Religion? Possibly it did not escape Observation, but was let slip in Point of Prudence. I don't say our Doctor prescribes only to those that have taken the *Preparatory Dose*; but he must give me leave to reckon amongst the Number of those that *think they have no Souls*, those that think they have *none to be sav'd*: Such Men, I'm confident, will not disown their Obligations to him: They have sometimes perhaps, in a Melancholy Mood, lookt upon themselves as Criminals under Sentence, and not knowing how soon they may Suffer; and therefore he can at no time be an unacceptable Messenger, that brings them so long a Reprieve, tho' it be not *Sine Die*; for who knows, but the next kind Friend may come fraught with a full Pardon. I must confess, the Spreading of some Opinions of late wou'd be very unaccountable, if it were not observ'd what had spread it self before, to make Way for them.

I make

I make bold to add to our Author's Reasons of *Religious Prejudice*, another, and that is *Pride*, when it swells the Understanding beyond its Natural Stretch. Repeated Offers of Relief, under their naked and deplorable Condition, are Affronts to Men of this Complexion: If these are the *old*, they have Sense and Skill enough to coyn *new* Articles of Religion, to shew you that their Knowledge actually reaches to Heaven; as well as others have done New Doctrins of Practice, that they might the more easily get thither.

If he will accept of this Supplement, I will freely own, That Prejudice has a very bad Sense, even as bad as that which

he puts upon it, in the In-
Pag. 20.

stance of the Martyrdom of King *Charles* the First. I cannot tell whether King-killing was Taught, at that Time o'Day, by *Fathers, Tutors, and Nurses*; but this I am confident of, That *the Desire of being thought wise*, wou'd have put no Man upon that Execrable Attempt; unless Worldly Wisdom is included in our Author's Notion of Wisdom. But possibly this Instance was pickt out to compliment his *Patrons*, to whom he Dedicates, the Clergy of the Church of *England*: And doubtless they can offer no less than their *Protection*

in

in Return; which I dare venture to promise him, as soon as the Church of England has reform'd all those Solemn Offices of her Liturgy, in which the Reverse of his Doctrin is expressly taught and asserted; for 'till then he's without the *Pale* of this Church, and must, I doubt, seek for Protection elsewhere.

However I don't wonder that, having this Instance in his Eye, he shou'd first make *Prejudice* the same Thing with Sin.

A Prejudice, says he, so nurtur'd, &c. cannot probably ever be remov'd, but by the same Means as our Saviour said Mountains may be, viz. by Faith; I mean, Faith infus'd, &c. This I grant is true, of the Prejudices from Lust and Pride; but I hope we have some Impressions from our Fathers, Tutors and Nurses; nay and from our Desire of being thought Wise too, which the Christian Faith is not concern'd to remove.

Pag. 18.

But if the *Prejudices* he desires the unbiass'd Reader to set aside, be only such as are Opposite to Christianity; for such only the Christian Faith is concern'd to remove; and if, when they are set aside, his Doctrin shall be, as he prophesies of it, universally own'd and taught, by the most Learned

Pag. 23.

Pag. 24.

Part of Mankind: Then have our Fathers, Tutors,

Tutors, Nurse and Church, been all hitherto Antichristian, and the Time is certainly come, when the *Son of Man shall not find Faith upon Earth*, unless it be to be found amongst Infidels; for of those that deny the Immortality of the Soul, there are yet I understand, but few that believe the Gospel.

A Charge that runs thus high, had need be back'd with *Demonstration*; but if he does believe the Main of his Reasoning in this Book, to be demonstrative, I am not surpriz'd at the *Boldness* of the Charge, for that is a Natural Consequence of *Blindness*.

Having thus censur'd and condemn'd all his Adversaries, as Men that believe, in the most Important Articles, upon the false Foundation of *Prejudice*; it is reasonable to expect from such a Reformer, the true Ground and Foundation of Belief; and in order to that, we have this

Ch. 2. p. 25. Proposition laid down, and no

way to be deny'd; that a due Representation of the Object, or Thing rightly circumstantiated, to the Senses and Understanding, is the true Ground or Foundation of Belief. I shou'd be so very glad to meet with a full Answer to *Pilate's Question, What is Truth?* that I must inquire of this Undertaker to answer it, What he means

means by *Senses*? If he means by them the *Perceptive Faculty*, as when we say a thing is agreeable to *Sense* and *Reason*; then the Term is redundant, being the same with *Understanding*; and the whole amounts to this Discovery, That our Knowledge of Truth, consists in our Understanding of it: But if he takes *Senses* in the common Acceptation, for the Instruments and Conveyancers of our Sensations, then, How is this Proposition *no ways to be deny'd*? A Man of Skill in his Argument will never take a Thing for granted, that every one, that knows any thing of the Matter, knows to be a controverted Point; for if all Truth must be represented to our *Senses*, before it is represented to the *Understanding*, as he ex-

Pag. 32.

plains himself; then we have no Ideas, but what came in by our *Senses*.

We are told in Scripture, *He that cometh to God*, that is, becomes

Heb. 11. 6.

a Christian, *must believe that he is*; but according to our Author's Account of Truth, it will be impossible for any Man believe this Truth, that *God is*: For nothing of the Idea of God ever came in by the *Senses*, or was by them convey'd to the *Understanding*, as it represents him to be an *Immaterial*, and an *absolutely perfect Being*. The *Senses* are undoubtedly passive,

L

and

and therefore can convey nothing but what they receive; but there is nothing, besides Figurate and Finite Body, the proper Object of our Senses; nor therefore can they convey to the Understanding, any other than Sensible Impressions. I must confess this General Account of Truth, suits well with what our Author intends to deliver as such; but I fear it carries him too far, even to exclude out of the Number of the Objects of our Understanding, the Being of God. Nor will his quitting Reason, and submitting to Revelation for the Knowledge of God's Existence, (tho' I cannot give up so much of that Cause) be any Refuge; for by this Account, it is impossible for God to reveal this Truth to

Pag. 33. us, that *He is*; *Considering*, says our Author, *the bare Philosophical Reason, and Connexion of Thoughts*, I do not see how it is possible to obtrude a forcible Belief on the Understanding. Which is not only a true Consequence upon what he had said, but it is moreover an indisputable Truth, that *a Man cannot believe what he will*; for then the Understanding wou'd follow the Dictate of the Will, contrary to what we are conscious of in the forming our Judgment of Things. But now here is nothing of the Idea of God impress'd upon our *Senses*, nor by them convey'd to the

the *Understanding*, nor therefore, in his Words, *that Connexion of Thoughts*, without which it is impossible to believe any thing. This I cou'd not pass by unobserv'd, because, tho' it is not possible to obtrude a *Forcible Belief* on the *Understanding*, yet it is very possible to obtrude upon it *Falshood*, under the Disguise of *Truth*; and possible it is, that some Readers may believe that Proposition *no ways to be deny'd*, which is indeed no ways to be admitted.

After this Stumble in the Threshold, he stumbles strangely on Two Reasons (for I am sure they lay not in his Way) of Mens disputing about Truth, and being unable to comprehend it: They

are, *our Want of an Adequate* Pag. 27.
Notion of Infinity, and the *thick Veil* which the School-Men have drawn over it by their *obscure Words*. He brings an Instance of the former, in the Dispute about *Discrete Quantity*, or Numbers, whether

Infinite, or *not*; and both sides Pag. 26.
of the Question, he says, are prov'd by the same *Medium*, viz. The *Perpetual Addition* that Number is capable of. But this is only a little Spurt of *Scepticism*; for both Parts are not prov'd by the same *Medium*, nor is Human Reason reduc'd to a *quidlibet ex quolibet*, as this Notion supposes it is: The

Capacity of Addition substantially proves the Subject to be Finite; but the *Perpetuity of this Capacity* does not prove it to be Infinite, in the proper and positive Sense of the Word; unless I must judge every thing Infinite, that I know no End of. So that there is no Proof at all on this side of the Question; but on the other side, if *the Capacity of Addition* proves a Thing Finite, then *the Perpetuity of that Capacity* proves it *perpetually* Finite.

This, I think, is an Answer to the *Philosophical Riddle*; for it surpasses my Imagination, for what other Reason it was propos'd, but to shew the Author's Dexterity in Dispute, that he can puzzle, as well as convince his Reader. For my part, I esteem our being *unable to comprehend Infinity*, as no Cause of our Errors, in Subjects of a Finite Nature; such as is, I must tell him, the Subject we ought to be upon.

But I must confess it is just such a Reason, as that which is coupl'd with it, *the obscure Words of the School-Men*: Is their Authority so Universal at this Time o' Day, that their Obscure Words must make one, out of two General Reasons, of all the Errors incident to Mankind? I am of Opinion, they rather want an Advocate to defend what they have truly advanc'd, than an Enemy

Enemy to their Errors. But they were of *Romish Church*, and the *Romish Church* believes the Separate-Existence of the Soul; and this is reason enough to reject all they have said in the Gross; as if a Man that is erroneous in this, must forfeit his Title to Truth upon all Subjects.

What he says here against the Practice of the Church of *Rome*, *Pa. 30, &c.* I pass by, as being unconcern'd in that Controversy, any farther than to vindicate our Doctrin from those Ill Consequences they have drawn from it; and these I shall consider as they fall in my Way; but for all the other Reflexions he has occasionally made upon that Church, I must intreat him to accept this one general Acknowledgment for his Zeal in the Protestant Cause, and that I may have Leave to pass them by, as unconcerning the Matter in debate between him and me.

As little am I concern'd to oppose what is advanc'd to *Pag. 46.* in order to prove, that Morality and Divinity are Subjects of such Difficulty, that Men have been Erroneous in their Tenents relating to them; if the Reader has Patience to consult and reflect upon all he has said; especially as his Tenent is surprizingly prov'd from an Address of the University of *Oxford* to King *Charles* the Second; in which

it seems they rejected this Principle, *Sui-ipsius conservatio, est primaria lex naturæ*: Because they declar'd it unlawful, under the Pretence of that, to Murther the King, and Subvert the Government: He will, I am confident, think I have said all I am oblig'd to say on that Subject, when I have said,

Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis

Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo.

Perf. Sat. 5.

But I am concern'd to consider, Whether the Doctrin of Human Soul be one of the Vulgar Errors that have crept into Divi-

Pag. 47.

nity; and all the Proof offer'd in this Place, is, 1. *That it is an Heathenish Notion*; and, 2. *Continu'd in the Church of Rome, for Interest and Gain.*

I suppose he looks upon *Heathenish*, as a very frightful Word; and so it may prove to some sort of Readers, those that have been frighted out, of the plainest Duties of Morality, by that Scare-Crow, *an Heathenish Religion*: And I am very sure, the Argument is equally cogent in both Cases; and therefore, 'till the Author thinks fit to level it against *both*; it will do Execution on *neither*.

The Cry of *Popish and Superstitious*, is calculated for the very same Meridian; and by the way, if *Second Thoughts* will admit
of

of better, I advise him, in the next Edition of his Book to leave out that Instance of Prejudice, in the *Martyrdom of our King*; which is, I can tell him, no obliging Instance, to those that are most likely to be taken with these Arguments. I know *Purgatory* cannot stand without the *Separate Existence* of the Soul; and I am persuaded that Church has abus'd, for the very same End and Purpose, the Merits of my Redeemer too; but I thank God, that does not shake my Belief and Trust in them.

In order to prove it an *Heathenish Invention*, we have one Quotation out of *Seneca, Epist. 89. Vere mihi persuadeo, Animam in Cælum, è quo erat, rediisse.* And I must needs say, had he stopt here, he had fully prov'd his Point, That this Doctrin was then *Heathenish*: But he cannot forbear his Learned Criticisms *Ibid.* and Comments, whatever Mischief they do him, *Which Opinion or Belief is much to be admir'd, (says he) that Seneca, by the meer Light of Nature, shou'd comprehend such a Notion of the Soul.* Why? I thought it had been an *Heathenish Notion*, and that it sprang from their Observation, That Good Men dy'd oft unrewarded in this *Ibid.* Life, and Bad Men unpunish'd:

What is *Heathenish*, and what is the *Light of Nature*, if this Saying, and this Reasoning

be not, I confess, I am yet to learn. It follows, *Tho' perhaps he might, and*
 Ibid. *'tis believ'd he did read the Bible, and from thence have that Idea of the Soul's being separate, and existing in Heaven.* What? Is the Soul's *Separate Existence* a Doctrin so consonant to the Scripture, that such an unprejudic'd Interpreter of the Sense of it, as *Seneca* must be suppos'd to be, shou'd find it there, tho' he had no Antecedent Idea of it? The Argument then amounts to this Demonstration, *It is not a Scripture-Doctrin, but an Heathenish Invention; for the Heathens borrow'd it from the Scripture.* Thus some Good-natur'd Disputants will grant you any one Point, in order to gain another, and so *vice versa*; 'till they have both granted, and deny'd all you say.

One wou'd imagin such an Argument makes no wonderful Progress in a Subject; and yet, to our Astonishment, in the very next Page we are got to the End of our Work:

Pag. 48. *Wherefore upon the Whole, I make these following Inferences, are his Words; Inferences! From what Premisses, I beseech you? Why, The Premisses are contain'd in the following Papers, and in the Interim, I conclude: 1. That the Philosophers Account of the Soul, is not clear enough to convince us of its Existence; for Aristotle's Definition is not; and you are bound, at least*
 in

in one University, to stand to that. 2. From what shall be said, it now follows,

That our Notion of Life and Soul *Pag. 49.*
being the same; is so clearly and undeniably prov'd, that you cannot, if you wou'd, disbelieve it. 3. From the Arguments hereafter urg'd, it is a Consequence at present, That since the Heathens, and Plato the chief of them, held an Immaterial Soul of Man; and that their Doctrin was transmitted, nobody knew how, to the Primitive Church, which was ignorant enough to be guided, in such an Important Article, by the Heathen Philosophers; and lastly, since the Church of Rome gets God knows what by it; it is demonstratively false: This is the Sense of his Inferences, and sure an ordinary Reader must be out of Breath with following an Author, that can leap over all his Premisses at one Jump, and begin with Conclusions.

C H A P. II.

Observations on his Third Chapter ; wherein he pretends to Prove , that The Notion of Human Soul , as held by the greatest Philosophers , and their Opinions of its Original , are unsatisfactory : Together with an Answer to all that is here objected to our Doctrin.

WE are now advanc'd 51 Pages in my Author's Book , but not one Step in the Argument ; this Chapter indeed begins with mentioning *the Nature of the Soul*, which might put us in some Hopes of being now at last let into the Subject ; but the very next Paragraph discovers a large Heap of Rubbish still in our Way. The Design of this Chapter was, to expose the Account, which the Philosophers on our Side, have given of the *Nature and Original* of the Soul : In order to which, it had been but common Prudence to have conceal'd the most Ridiculous Opinions on his own Side ; such as the *Stoic's* Notion , that the Soul is an hot fiery Blast ; Cleanthes making

Pag. 52.

Ibid.

making it an *hot Complexion*; Dinarchus's *Harmony of the Four Elements*; and lastly, Democritus, (*that* Pag. 53.
ancient and excellent Philosopher; Pag. 54.
yes doubtless! for he gives Name to a whole Clan of Atheists) *compounding it of round Atoms*. I dare say, no Reader of this Chapter can forbear ranking these amongst the insufficient Accounts he meets with in it; or can imagin, at first sight, they are propos'd by the Author with any other Design; and yet they all center in his own Tenent of the *Materiality of the Soul*; and we are told he cou'd make it appear, *to be very consonant to the Principles of Reason and Philosophy*, *that* Pag. 55.
some of the foremention'd Definitions or Descriptions of Human Soul, are not so frivolous and idle, as our Psycomuthists imagin; but it seems, he has reserv'd *that* Ibid.
Work for some other Chapters; he shou'd have said; for some other *Book*, for I don't find in this, which of these Opinions are his; and tho' he insists but on *some of them*, yet he prudently forbears being particular: And now if you shou'd imagin it consistent with *Reason and Philosophy*, that the Supposition of an *hot fiery Blast*, or *hot Complexion*, cou'd not withstand a good Gale of Wind; or however, cou'd never last an Hundred Years; These, it may be reply'd,
are

are not *the some of them* we are bound to defend; but we can still retire to the *Harmony of the Four Elements*; and if you press us hard for an Explication of our Meaning in that Expression, imagining nothing that has no Meaning to be agreeable to *Reason* and *Philosophy*; rather than be at that trouble, we'll offer you the *round*

Vide Essay, sect. 7. *Atoms*: And if you shou'd demonstrate, that the power of

Thought cannot be lodg'd either in one or more of these *Atoms*; we can retire decently to *some* of the former Opinions. Here therefore I must confess my self unable to confute this Author's *Reason* and *Philosophy*; for,

Quo teneam nodo mutantem Protea vultum?

However, he's willing to declare in general, That the Soul is a *Power*, not *Substance*; and all the Proof offer'd at here, is from *Juvenal* and *Virgil*; the first in these Lines,

————— *Separat hoc nos*

A grege mutuorum, atque adeo venerabile soli

Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces;

Atque exercendis, capiendisq; artibus apti,

Sensum à cœlesti demissum traximus arce,

Cujus egent prona, & terram spectantia. Mundi

Principio indulsit communis conditor illis

Tantum animas. Nobis animum quoque. —

Juv. Sat. 15.

He

He might have taken some other Occasion to let us know he had read *Juvenal*, for that is all the Service this Quotation can do him: The Poet indeed does not assert the *Soul* to be a *Substance*, nor do I remember that he any where distinguishes between *Substance* and *Accident*, and so far he's agreeable to our Author's *Poetical Philosophy*; but is not his Account of its *Celestial Original*, as consistent with the Supposition of its being a *Substance*, as that of its being a *Power*? I know this Philosopher sometimes terms the *Soul* to be a *Ray of the Divinity*, that our Lives come from, and center in God: But must therefore all that say, *the Soul comes from God*, be of his Opinion as to the Nature of it? If so, I hope we are all agreed. But it were well if this Passage from *Juvenal* would do him neither good nor harm. It is a Consequence of his Opinion, and what he frequently owns, That *Life and Soul are the same thing*: I ask then, Are the Brutes alive? If they are, they have a *Soul* too, how comes it to pass then, that,

*Sensum à cœlesti demissum traximus arce,
Cujus egent prona.* —————

and again,

————— *Indulsi communis conditor illis
Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque.* —

Here

Here in my Judgment, is a Distinction inconsistent with our Author's Hypothesis: God has not only given us, according to this Account, a more perfect Life and Reason than he has done to Brutes, which is this Author's Account of it; but he has given us something, of which they are not in the least Partakers; *Sensum cujus egent prona*; he has given us quite another Principle of Action, and, as plainly as Words can express it, another Substance too, *Illis tantum Animas, nobis Animum quoque*. I know not whether he despises Commentators on Poetry, as much as he does those on Philosophy and Divinity; but one of these

*Britan.
in loc.*

wou'd have told him on the Place, *Anima ergo est qua vivimus & sentimus; Animus autem, quo intelligimus, sapimusque*. A Man that quotes

*Farther
Thoughts of
H. Soul.*

this for himself, can never after call himself a *Vitanimist*, without quitting the Character of *Intelligimus, sapimusque*; and far be it from me, to think the Author is willing to do this.

The next Proof he fetches is from *Virgil*, in these known Lines:

*Principio cælum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
Lucente inque globum lunæ, titaniaque astra.
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet:
Inde hominum, pecudumque genus. ———*

Virg. Æneid. lib. 6.

Whe-

Whether *Virgil* in these Lines design'd any Distinction between *Spiritus* and *Mens*, is no way Material; this is certain, he alludes either to the *Pythagoric* or *Platonic* Doctrin, concern-
Vide Rucum in loc.
ing the Original of the World. The former suppos'd *God himself*, intimately present with, and operating upon all the Parts of Matter, in the Universal Frame; and that the *Souls* of Men and Beasts were a *Part*, or *Particle* taken from his own Substance: The latter thought the *Anima Mundi* an *Immaterial created Substance*, subservient to God as a *Plastic Principle* of Nature; whereby all Bodies have their Formation; and that of the Substance of this *Spiritus* or *Mens*, were form'd the Human and Brutal *Souls*. I think it plain, by this Account of the *Pythagoric* and *Platonic* Doctrin, that they both held the *Soul* of Man to be of a *Substantial Nature*. And till I meet with a better Account than this, I can never believe that *Virgil*, who so plainly alludes to, and copies from these Philosophers, cou'd be any Friend to our Author's Opinion; nor because *Virgil* describes the *Soul* (as indeed Poets describe every thing else) by the *Powers* and *Operations* of it; that therefore *Virgil*, much less *Plato*, or *Pythagoras*, believ'd the *Soul* of Man to be only a *Power*.

But

But our Author seems never to have dreamt of this Account of that Passage, and I know he cannot agree to it; for he has a peculiar Talent, in commenting upon Authors, such as never Commentator before him was blest'd with. Spiritus *here,*
Pag. 56. (says he) cannot possibly be apply'd to Substantial Soul, because it relates to Inanimate Beings. (I suppose he means, *Hominum, pecudumque genus, vitæque volantium; & quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus;* for they are all the Beings it relates to) but as it is explain'd, *Gen. chap. 1.* and the Spirit of the Lord moved upon the face of the deep; made the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and great Whales, &c. which are actuated by the Power, or Spirit, of God implanted in them, call'd by *Esdras, chap. 6. vers. 41. the Spirit of the Firmament, &c.* Now this I must confess, is a new way of interpreting Authors; and may fetch a Sense out of them, that was never yet heard or thought of; when *Virgil* is interpreted by the *Scripture*, and the *Scripture* by the *Apocrypha*.

To crown all, he adds, *From which, Learned and Ancient Poets we may collect a Doctrin, better than any the latter School-Men have afforded us; viz. That the Notion of Human Soul, as I define it in the follow-*

following Chapter to be a Power, not Substance, is most consonant to the Opinion of our Forefathers.

What if we shou'd make bold to change this Term, *our Forefathers*, for one of the same Signification in another Place; let us see how it will run in the Title-Page: ----- *Demonstrating the Notion of Human Soul, as believ'd to be a Spiritual Immortal Substance, united to Human Body; to be a plain Invention of our Forefathers.* This I fear in the Title, wou'd be of no great Service to the Book. And now take the Term *Heathenish* from the Title, and place it here, it runs thus, *This Doctrin of ours, is most consonant to the Opinion of Heathenish Authors;* and this I fear in the Book, wou'd not very well answer the Title. But this is no such Inconsistency in him, for he does but treat them, as he thinks they treat his Subject, with variety of Sentiments; sometimes they are abominable *Heathens*, and at another time, they must be (with Reverence be it spoken) our Forefathers.

We come now to the Business Pag. 57.
of this Chapter, which was to shew, How unsatisfactory the Reasons of the greatest Philosophers are, concerning the Nature of the Soul; that is, how unsatisfactory *Aristotle's* Definition of it is: For that is the Ground and Foundation, on
M which

Ibid. *which the Notion or Doctrin of the Soul of Man, as it is now generally receiv'd by all the Divines in the World, is built.* Well then, he has put us on the Bear's Skin, and we must expect to be baited in it; let us try what Defence we can make in so hard a Case. We have two dangerous Posts to maintain; the one, *Anima est Actus Corporis Organici, Vitam habentis in potentia*; the other, *Id quo vivimus, sentimus, & intelligimus primo*. It is to be observ'd, we give neither of these for Definitions of a Spirit, in any other State but that of Union with a Body; and also, that the latter is not different from the former, but explanatory of it. The first Attack he makes is upon *Actus*; it is it seems the same Word Aristotle uses in his Definition of Motion; which is, *Actus Entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia*. But what! Are all the Divines in the World bound to stand by Aristotle's Definition of Motion too? Remember my Duty to the Old Gentleman; but he must excuse me, that I am of Opinion, Motion is one of those *Simple Ideas*, that ought not to be defin'd, because it cannot be illustrated by any Notion clearer than it self: And if he will but give me so much fair Play as this, I will venture to act the *Aristotelian*, and stand by my Distinction of *Actus substantialis*, and *accidentalis*; meaning by the former,

former, that which has the Power of Action lodg'd in it; and by the latter, the bare Action it self: But he objects, This is not *Aristotle's*, but his Commentators new-fangl'd Distinction, to bring the Philosopher over to his Party: What then? Was *Aristotle* of another Party before? I thought all the Divines in the World had built upon him, and I shall have occasion elsewhere to shew, that he needs no bringing over. But I must confess these Definitions, like all the rest of *Aristotle's*, run in too loose and general Terms; yet still they plainly enough declare his Opinion, That Life, and Sensation, and Understanding, were to be accounted for, upon no other besides an *Immaterial Principle*; and then it was no Strain in his Commentators, to understand him of a *Substantial Principle*. But still the Objector strives hard to prove, That *Actus Corporis Organici* must be a Corporeal Quality; and consequently corruptible with the Body, and no otherwise distinguish'd from other Corporeal Qualities, but by being the *first* or *chiefest*. To which I answer, whatever was *Aristotle's* Sense of *Actus Corporis Organici*, it cou'd not possibly be this; for in the same Discourse, he has many Arguments to prove that Matter cannot think, and this amongst the rest:

Pag. 58.

Διόπερ εἰ δὲ νῦν εἶτο (υπερῆς ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερῆς,
 ἢ εἰς ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τὴν (υπερῆς· πῶς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ
 νοήσας μέγεθος ὢν, ὅτο ἐν τῇ μορῶν αὐτῆς,
 De Anima, μορῶν ὅτι ἤτοι καὶ μέγεθος, ἢ καὶ σιγμῶν.
 lib. I. cap. 3. εἰ μὲν ἐν καὶ σιγμῶν, αὐταὶ ὅτι ἀπειροί,
 δῆλον ὡς εἰς ἐπὶ οἷον διέξεισιν· εἰ ὅτι καὶ
 μέγεθος πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσας τὸ αὐτό.

The sense and meaning of which is this; *Therefore the Mind or Intellect is not a continuous Substance; but either without Parts, or has not such as belong to Magnitude; for how, if it be Magnitude, can it understand with such Parts, whether conceived as Magnitudes or Points? If as Points, they are infinite, and there will be no end of multiplying Understandings; if as Magnitudes, each Part of that Magnitude will receive a different Impression of the same Thing.*

From which convincing Argument, it is clear that *Aristotle*, by his *Actus* could not understand a Corporeal Quality; but he must understand that indivisible, and immaterial Part of us, which *actuates* the Body, and is the Seat of *Sensation* and *Intellect*. By which I am satisfy'd, had this Author come by *Aristotle's* Definition at first hand,

Pag. 62. he wou'd not have fallen so unreasonably foul upon the Philosopher, as to trump up this absurd Meaning for his. That the *Soul is the Essence of the Body, and that, without which it wou'd have no being at all.* If this does not appear to
 the

the Reader absurd enough at first sight, he may find it elaborately exploded by our Author, with no less than Four Demonstrations. And I will farther venture to remit him thither, if he is not yet convinc'd that a *Substantial Form*, and *Forma mixti* and the *Potentia passiva*, are unserviceable Principles in *Physics*; I doubt not but when he has read from *Pag.* 57, to *Pag.* 70, upon this Subject, he will make the Author's Remark, with somewhat a different Application: *What a troublesome trifling*

Pag. 67.

Fatigue is here! But by the way we meet with something that looks as if it were design'd for an Argument, and we must not neglect any thing of that kind. We own, that the Soul has no Principles of Corruption in it; *but*

Ibid.

Estibius cannot conceive how Man, upon this Supposition, shou'd ever become corruptible. I hope *Estibius* does not mean (for I do not) the same thing by *Soul*, and by *Man*; and if not, *Man*, as such, may be liable to *Corruption*, tho' he has an *incorruptible Soul*; So that here's no Contradiction in *Terms*: But we have this farther Reason offer'd for his want of Conception in this Matter; *If an Incorruptible Being endu'd with Reason, Free-Will, and Power to act, or not to act; can bind or lock up the Principles of Corruption, so as they do not, or*

cannot act; What can force that Rational Incorruptible Being to let go its Power? &c. Truly nothing but this; that it never had such a Power, since we were conscious it had any Power over our Bodies: I suppose the Power of moving Matter was given it by God, and I suppose also that God may limit and conditionate any Power he communicates, as he sees fit: Nor is it of weight with me, to prove my Soul *Material*, that I find it has not all the Power which I can conceive an *Immaterial* Being capable of.

But the Objector is resolv'd, we shall not answer thus; we shall only affirm, That
 Pag. 68. *God ordains the Soul of every Man before Death, immediately to let those turbulent Principles loose, in order to Man's Dissolution; which he remarks, Is a pretty Notion for any whimsical Philosopher to broach; and truly to me, Estibius is the Man.*

The next thing to be consider'd after the Definition, is the Properties of the Soul; and this Method is chalk'd out for the sake of that one Expression of some Philoso-
 Pag. 70. *phers, Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte.* He immediately sets himself to confute this, as if it were the avow'd Principle of all his Adversaries; whereas many, I may say the most and the best

best of them, both Ancient and Modern, have charg'd it as an Absurdity, upon others. But to set this Matter in its true Light, I will briefly state the *Nullibists Hypothesis*, as it is call'd, from which this Expression had its rise; and then shew how they that maintain it are able to answer all that this Objector has to urge.

Amongst those that held an Immaterial Human Soul, some conceiving all Extension divisible, and consequently, every thing extended to be material; cou'd give the Soul no *determinate* and *circumscrib'd* Place in the Body; imagining *that*, as a Mode of Extension; but yet they did not hold the Soul to be, properly speaking, *no where*; for they own'd its Influence and Operation to be confin'd to the Body, and therefore to the Place in which the Body is: Now the Substance being indivisible from its own Operations, they did not therefore thrust out of the Rank of Being, Things Immaterial; but maintain'd their Real Presence, tho' according to them, they cou'd be no otherwise Present in any *circumscrib'd* and *determinate Place* than by their Operations. But finding the Human Soul present by its Operation, to every Part of the Body; and at the same time judging it incapable of being coextended with the Body, they said the Soul was *tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*.

Against this Opinion no Argument can properly be level'd, but what tends to prove that created Immaterial Substances, are capable of *Amplitude* and *Extension*; but then such an Argument can have no tendency to disprove their *Existence*. I am sensible he that can prove, 1. That whatever *is*, is extended; and 2. That whatever is *extended*, is Matter, will gain his Point. But amongst the Incorporealists, some deny the one, and some the other Proposition; therefore 'till both are prov'd, no Arguments against either can be conclusive against that Doctrin: Those Arguments especially can never gain any Ground upon it, which as far forth as they disprove the one, do confirm and establish the other.

Estibius, in order to gain his Point, argues; 1. *This Position makes the Part as big as the Whole, (as I cou'd prove) contrary to a Mathematical Axiom, Totum est majus sua Parte.* To this the *Nullibist* is ready to answer, What you cou'd prove, is not to the Purpose, but what you have prov'd; the Whole in this Axiom supposes Parts, and therefore if you suppose the Axiom applicable to the Soul, (and if it is not, you prove nothing) you suppose the Question in Dispute, and to allow you that, wou'd be as large a Con-

Concession, as to take your Word for your Proof. 2. He refers this Sentence, to the

Judgment of any considering Man, *Whether the Whole can be in the* Ibid.

Whole, and in every Part at the same time.

He should have added, *in the same Respect and Manner*; and then it is impossible, but is none of their Tenent. Tho' they do say the Soul is *tota in toto Corpore*, yet they do not say that it is immediately, and in the same manner, united to every Part of the Body; but their meaning is, the Soul does not fill the Body, as the Body does a Space, by a *Coagulum* of divisible Parts: And again, tho' they do assert the Soul to be *tota in qualibet Parte*, yet not so as to be confin'd to that Part, nor so as to shift from one, to another; yet still so as to inform every Part of the Body, it self continuing one uniform undivided Substance.

But this *Estibius* interprets to be only a *Virtual Presence*, and that is really *no Presence at all.* But in answer to Pag. 71. this, I have shewn, according to their account, that my Soul is as really *present* in this Room, as my Body; only not present *modo corporeo*; and if nothing be really *present* that is not so, I desire his Opinion of the *Omnipresence* of GOD.

The next Philosophical Saying about the Soul, he proposes to overturn, (and there=

thereby the Being of the Soul) is *infundendo creatur, & creando infunditur*; he need not be so much at a loss for the Sense of this, which is no more than what we term *Immediate Creation*; and therefore I pass by all he objects to any other Sense of it, as altogether foreign. The first thing he says, is, *Because then every Generation must be a New Creation; which is absurd.* If he means, it's absurd to suppose the Soul created immediately upon, or before its Union with the Body; he shou'd have left out the *because*, and only have said, *The Thing is absurd*; which is making short work of it. If he supposes the *Generation* of the Body to be the same thing with the *Creation* of the Soul, as he does in this and the following Page: I grant the Absurdity of it; but it did not become him to expose a Notion that borders so nearly upon his own *Hypothesis*. The next thing he urges, is, *That Abortives totally perish, as to Body and Soul too; which is unaccountable, according to this Doctrin.* And truly I think it wou'd be a very unaccountable thing, if the Author had any better Argument to prove it in fact true, than that of Job, *Why dyed I not in the Womb? &c. As an untimely birth, I had not been.* Which so plainly relates to another Subject, that I shall not pre-

presume so far upon the Reader's Judgment, as to answer it out of Place; for I shall reduce the Scriptures he scatters throughout his Book, to their proper Chapter.

The next, and the only thing he farther urges upon this Topic, is, *If the Soul be infus'd after Conception* ^{Ibid.} *perfected, &c. then the Foetus lives before the Infusion of the Soul, which is contrary to our own Hypothesis.* So that by *Conception perfected*, he means the *Foetus* being alive; and to imagin that we hold this to be antecedent to the *Union*, is a meer Dream, or something worse, of his own.

As to the *Seat of the Soul*, which he next undertakes to confute, the Difference amongst Philosophers about that (which is the only thing he urges against the Reality of it) is no better an Argument, than the Difference about the *Seat of Life*, or in what Part of the Body *Life* properly consists, is to prove a Man *not alive*: And this Controversy, I fear *Estibius* himself cannot possibly determin.

He is now come to the Hypothesis of the *Præexistence of Human Soul*, which he calls, a *Repository of Souls*, ^{Pag. 75.} *conceiv'd by some whimsical Philosophers*; such, I suppose, as *Pythagoras* and *Plato*; and against this he brings Three Objections: The

Pag. 76. The First, *That it is not to be found either in Scripture, Orthodox Fathers, or Church-Historians;* and this, I suppose proves the Whimsicalness of those Philosophers, who never heard of any of them. But if the *Scriptures* are as unconcern'd in this Doctrin, (as he supposes they are, without considering one Word of what has been alledg'd from thence in favour of it, both by Ancients and Moderns) yet is there is no absolute Necessity for an Appeal to *Scripture* in this Dispute; without which, this Negative Argument from Scripture proves just nothing; for doubtless the chief Design of *Scripture* is to give us right Apprehensions of our Present and Future State, which is the true *Saving Knowledge*, as our Final Happiness depends not upon (the Present Constitution of Things consider'd) what we *were*, but what we *are*. As to *Orthodox Fathers*, from whom he says *it does not appear there was any such Belief*, I am really asham'd to find their Silence an Argument to a Man that is deaf to all they say; and he that does but read *Estibius's* Epistle before this Book, will have no Reason to expect any Arguments built on their Authority in the Body of it. But I am really more surpriz'd to find the Silence of *Church-Historians* an Argument against such a Repository; having not yet
been

been inform'd of any *Church-Historain* from the other World; nor of any relating to this, that extends his Narration beyond the Fall, to which our Souls are supposed præexistent.

2. The next Objection runs thus : *Because such a Place or Repository of Souls præexistent, seems to restrain or limit* Ibid. *the Power of an Omnipotent Creator; as if at the first Creation God had exhausted his Power at once, and laid up the Stores of Souls, &c.* I must crave leave to let him know, what I suppose they that believe such *Stores of Souls*, wou'd say to this Argument.

First, I believe it wou'd surpass their Conception, how the Creation of all Souls at once, *restrains the Power of the Creator*, any more than a repeated Creation of them; unless whatever God has not done, *limits and restrains his Power*, in not doing of it; and then an *immediate Creation* wou'd have *limited his Power* in not creating them *præexistent*. Secondly, Had such an one read *Second Thoughts*, he wou'd have found there an Argument against *Immediate Creation*, that the *first Creation of all things by God Almighty*, mention'd Genes. chap. 2. vers. 2. *terminated the whole Business of the Creation*; and it wou'd be natural for him to inferr, either that the
Account

Account we have from *Genesis*, restrains the Power of the Creator; or that the Hypothesis of *Præexistence* does not, which *Estibius* will choose of these two, I know not, for there is self-contradiction in both.

3. The last Objection is drawn *ex absurdo*: If they did *præexist*, they must be actual
 Pag. 77. *subsisting Forms* (notably *inferred*!) as free, and as independent as we conceive *Angels* to be: (I suppose he means as independent on these Earthly Bodies; for as to any other Independency, it must proceed only from his own *independent Thought* and *Imagination*;) But this can never be admitted: For, 1. They must have had the same Office with *Angels*, and we don't read that God made them *Ministring Spirits*; no sure, for we read he made Man a little lower than the *Angels*: But is there any necessity, says the Respondent, for all *Unimbodied Spirits*, to be *Ministring Spirits*? Yes, says *Estibius*; Or else, 2. They are so many idle useless Beings in the Universe, waiting we know not why or wherefore, to be introduc'd into the *Receptacle of the Body*. Not so neither, will he return: Demonstration is very easy, if one may take for granted what he pleases; and you may as well suppose they are Idle here, because they are not in Heaven; as that
 that

that they were Idle there, because they were not on Earth. 3. *Because the Hypothesis makes the Body a Prison to the Soul, and this State her Punishment* (but Pag. 78. not excluding her Probation for the State succeeding) *for Crimes committed in the præ-existent State; and what an idle Supposition this is, he leaves all sober Men to judge.* This is all he objects; and here I doubt not but his Adversary will joyn issue with him: But 'till sober Men have brought in their Verdict, *Estibius's* Appeal to them, will be no Prejudice to the Cause he appeals against; much less to the main Cause, which does not stand and fall, either with *Præexistence*, or *immediate Creation*: For, if there be a Soul in Man, it is certain to Demonstration, it had a Beginning; tho' it be never so uncertain when it began to be.

Estibius has now done with his Pag. 79. Argument, but to shew his Reading as great, as his Reasoning is strong, he cannot pass by in Silence the Opinion of some Learned Men of later Ages; which is concerning the *Astral Spirit*; or, as he expresses it, the *Sensitive Soul*: But in the Date of this Opinion, he's a little unfortunate, unless his *later Ages* extend to the Reign of *Augustus*; for *Ovid*, historically relating the Opinions of Men in

in his, and many preceding Ages, tells us,

Terra tegit carnem, tumultum circumvolat umbra.

And besides this, it's something unlucky, that he shou'd forget his own Quotation from the Poet, who so justly has *deliver'd to us the Opinion of our Forefathers*: For there we are told,

————— *Indulsi communis conditor illis
Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque. ----*

However, the Moderns have refined upon the Notion, and *assign'd abundance of Properties to this Sensitive Soul*; and some of them I must confess whimsical enough, in *Paracelsus, Jacob Behmen, and Mr. Webster*: Here at last, 'tis odds our Author's in the right, and all I can say to him is, that I have long since learnt this Observation from *Tully*, and have had a very late Instance of the Truth of it, that *There's nothing so absurd, which some Philosophers will not maintain.*

C H A P. III.

Wherein is shewn the Insufficiency of all that he advances in his Fourth Chapter, to prove his own to be the True Notion of Human Soul.

A MAN that walks altogether out of the Way, had need tread with a little Caution, and not be regardless of the Opinion of others, who are apt to give over such Wanderers for quite lost: *Estibius* is very sensible, that if he Pag. 82. *concurr's with the Learned Mr. Hobbs, in this Opinion, that it is a very odd Notion to call any Created Being an Immaterial Substance, he shall be receiv'd with Censure and Prejudice; as if all the Censures that have been made on Mr. Hobbs, were attended with Prejudice in the Censurers: Whether this is concurring with him or not. I cannot tell; but I am sure it is declaring for the Justice of his Cause; if Prejudice be so very ill a thing as we have been given to understand it is. But* *Estibius* Chap. i. *is content to say, that the Parts of* Ibid. *Spiritual Beings are very difficult to be comprehended by our weak Understandings; and of this he makes no more doubt, than*

N that

*A Vindication of the
that there is a Sun and Moon in the Firma-
ment.*

But since he has not been pleas'd to tell us what Parts they are of a Spiritual Being, that are thus difficult to be comprehended, I must confess I am not able to guess at them: Nor has he given me any Light into that Matter, by telling me the Difficulty of them appears to his uncommon Apprehension, like the *Sun and Moon in the Firmament*. However, he can by no

Ibid. Means concurr with Dr. More, who
Pag. 83. says, *the Notion of a Spirit is as easy to be comprehended, as that of Matter;* which, says my Author, *is not at all to the Purpose: For our Enquiry is not of the Facility, but of the Verity of this Notion.* These therefore, as I said, are very unaccountable *Difficulties* attending a Notion, with respect to which, it is nothing to the Purpose to make out the *Facility* of it.

I was fully persuaded by the Title of this Chapter, [*Of the True Notion of Human Soul, &c.*] that my Author wou'd have inquir'd chiefly into the *Facility* of his, and the *Difficulty* of the contrary Notion; and I was also convinc'd that, to make the Notion of Spirit as intelligible to our Understanding, as that of a Body, which he calls here the *Facility* of it; wou'd be
very

very much to the Purpose; in Answer to the *Difficulty of comprehending the Parts of it*, when that is made an Objection: Nor can I believe Mr. *Hobbs* wou'd ever have call'd this an Impertinent Answer, but have prov'd it, as well as he cou'd, an Insufficient One. But what will not *Estibius* do, to get rid of a troublesom Objection? He will fly from the Business in Hand; nay rather than be foil'd with it, he will deny that it is the Business in Hand, when his Hand is upon it. But if it be *Estibius's* Method of maintaining *Difficulties in Comprehension*, to maintain that the clearing, and making the Notions intelligible, or as far as others that are suppos'd to be comprehended, is nothing to the Purpose: Truly I think his Enquiry is neither of the *Facility*, nor of the *Verity* of the Notion. But tho', to avoid the Force of what Dr. *More* has said, he pitches upon the *Verity* of the Notion; yet having thus clearly got rid of his Adversary, he returns within six Lines to the *Facility* of it; and objects that of our Saviour, *Luke 24. 29. Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I my* Ibid.
self, handle me and see me, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have; plainly implying (says he) that what was visible to the Eye, and an

N 2

Object

Object of the Touch, being two of the exterior Senses, was more capable of being understood, than a Spirit, whose Nature and Essence was properly the Object of the Understanding. A Comment, literally speaking; for 'tis altogether of his own devising; that our Blessed Lord shou'd, in this Appearance of his, to establish the Faith of his Disciples, Philosophically distinguish between the Evidence of *Sense* and that of *Reason*; and not offer himself to their Eyes and Hands, purely to convince them that his Promise of Rising from the Dead was fulfilled by him; (with regard to which Promise, his Bodily Presence was requisite, even tho' his Appearance in a Spiritual Manner shou'd be suppos'd an Argument more convincing in it self.) But I forbear, --- *Estibius*, I fear, will smile at this, that I shou'd argue with him as one that seriously set himself to understand the Scriptures; for he is resolv'd, I find, to carry it very even between those that do so, and those that *turn and wrest the*

Ibid. *Sense of it*: Had any other said what he [Hobbs] says our Author, did, tho' perhaps not so learned, nor so able to turn, and wrest the Sense and Meaning of the Scripture, as he was, I shou'd as soon (and therefore I presume no sooner) have assented to his Opinion, as to Mr. Hobbs.

Here,

Here, at last, is the finish'd Character of the Man that *has laid aside Prejudice*. Men of all Religions, beware only of the Papists; nay Men of no Religion, that have neither Christian nor Moral Principles, (for such they are that employ their Learning to *turn and wrest the Scriptures*) stand upon a Level with him, and have an equal Claim to his Assent. This it seems is *not to owe a Man's Religion to his Font*, nor indeed to his God.

That of the *Druids* teaching the *Immortality of the Soul*, to make better Soldiers; which is just such another Objection to that Doctrin, as it is to Christianity; that it's the Best State-Principle: And that of *Mahomet's* Sensual Paradise; which to do the Argument right, he shou'd have level'd against the Resurrection, I am content only to mention, because *Estibius*, tho' he proposes them as useful and improvable Hints, does not lay much Stress upon them; but fixes upon another Origin of our Doctrin, which he supposes was Pag. 85. from the Philosophers, who invented it as a Solution of the present unequal Dispensations of Providence. It seems then it had this Good Foundation in Mens Observations, and their Reasoning on the Appearances of Providence; nay it is granted to be farther serviceable;

Pag. 88. to be a very good Motive, or Incentive to the Obedience of Christ: But seeing it is not consonant to the Scripture, and such wicked Advantages are made of it, it is to be rejected. This is the Sense of what follows; by which I understand that the Gentlemen of the New Religion, are not so perfectly deliver'd from that hateful Monster *Prejudice*, but that now and then, they are willing to *prejudge* their own Cause; for here's a mighty Bustle and a Shew of Argument, and all depending at last on Scripture-Proof; tho' that is the intire Subject of a subsequent Chapter.

We have it's true this farther Account of the
 Pag. 87. Matter, that *the Primitive Christians* had it from the Heathens; by which if he means that, tho' a Principle amongst the Heathens, they retain'd it as agreeable to Christianity: This may be an Objection to some Understandings; but St. Paul I judge was of another Mind,
 Acts 17. c. 22. v. &c. when he turn'd the Worship of the *Athenians*, at their Altar dedicated *ἀνθρώπων Θεῷ*, into Christian: He it seems, tho' he had never been an Heathen, was not so terribly frightened as *Estibius* is, at any thing he found amongst the Heathens agreeable to Christianity, or even consistent with it: But if he means that, so far as they held this Doctrin, they
 were

were still unconverted Heathens; this brings the Matter to the Old Issue, and leaves it there too: for he has advanc'd his Notion without any the least Guard of Proof, unless that Parenthesis (*a plain plain Philosophical Term*) will pass Muster; which it will do with

Ibid.

none but those who take the Apostle without Restriction, *Beware lest any Man spoil you thro' Philosophy.*

Coloss. 2. c. 8. v.

And indeed, I'm apt to think this Text escap'd *Estibius's* Observation in this Place, for it wou'd have made an Argument of the first Rank in his Book.

All this is but introductory to the Design of this Chapter, which by the Contents of it I

From P. 82. to P. 89.

guess'd, was to explode the false, but state true *Notion of the Soul*: However, *Estibius's* Adversaries are never out of his Way, tho' he goes backward in his Subject to attack them. But now to proceed, he proposes,

Pag. 89.

1. To shew what he means by Human Soul. 2. What is meant by Life; and to inquire whether they are not meant the same, according to the true Intent of the Scriptures. 3. What is imply'd in the Word Understanding, or Mens, with the particular and principal Operation thereunto belonging; that is, Reason, or Ratiocination. To shew what he means by the

Soul, he defines it three several Ways;
 and this the first: *Afflatus originaliter insensibili Materia Divinitus infusus; quo eadem vivit, sentit, & ratiocinatur.* The Soul, says he, is a Breath originally infus'd by God into insensible Matter; by which it lives, and exerts Sense and Reason. Now that the Soul of Man is, *originaliter insensibili Materia Divinitus infusa; qua eadem vivit, sentit, & ratiocinatur*: All this I grant, and therefore shall pass by all he says upon it, tho' not so easily to be granted, as when he defines Reasoning to be, *Impetus quo unumquodque Animal, &c. ad finem obtinendum stimulat*; thus taking it for granted that Brutes have Reason, tho' I fear it wou'd puzzle him to demonstrate that they have Sense; yet this he tells us he will make appear in
 Pag. 97. *in its proper Place.* And within
 Pag. 98. twenty Lines of that, presumes he has sufficiently prov'd the very same thing. But our only Difference in the Definition, is about the Word *Afflatus*. Breath; and I suppose we differ in this, because I presume *Estibius* will grant it to be inconsistent with that *Perspicuity* requisite in every Definition, to use a figurative, and consequently ambiguous Word, as explanatory. The Question then is, in which Sense the Word *Afflatus* ought to be apply'd to the
 Human

Human Soul ; he seems to have been ignorant of this Distinction, or to have knowingly dropt it ; and in the room of it has substituted this wise one, that *the Soul is not that Breath which* Pag. 90. *belongs to the Lungs.* And having premis'd thus much as explanatory, proceeds to prove his Sense of it from Scripture, how impertinently, in this Place we have already noted, but shall attend a little to it ; *Job 33. v. 4. The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life.* Our Soul therefore owes its Original to the *Breath of God.* But is this any Reason why the Soul shou'd be call'd in a strict Sense, *Breath* ? Or if it must be strictly so call'd, because sometimes figuratively so call'd ; I conceive *Breath* is taken figuratively when apply'd to God ; and why it must not be taken so, when apply'd to the Soul, *Estibius* may perhaps conceive, but has not express'd. I was recollecting the Use of the Word in Scripture, in order to prove that it must be understood here in a Figurative Sense : When lo *Estibius* preventing me with two to one against himself, *Job 4. 9. The breath of the nostrils of the Lord shall consume the wicked ;* which in my Bible is, *By the blast of God they perish, and by the breath of his nostrils they are consumed.* Which plainly relates

relates to their Death; and from hence we may form this Definition of Death, *Mors est Afflatus sensili Materia Divinitus infusus, quo eadem insensilis redditur.* And is not here a most perfect Definition, when that which shou'd constitute the *Differentia* of it, or distinguish it from all other things, suits as well with the contrary and reverse of it? The other Text he has unluckily hit upon, is, *Psal. 33. 6. By the word of God were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth.* So that the Heavens also ought to be defin'd *Breath*; whereupon, (not to consider how clearly this explains to us the Nature of the Heavens, and what Discoveries *Estibius* might have made thereby, had he bent his Head to *Astronomy* or *Physics*) I only crave leave to be inform'd, whether the Heavens are a *Substance* or *Power*; and let him resolve me which way he pleases, I am ready to grant that the Soul is as much a *Power* as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are. In short, *Estibius* will make nothing of all the Texts he can produce to this Purpose, 'till he has inserted this amongst his other Demonstrations, That *Whatsoever is the Effect of Divine Power, (for that is the plain Sense of the Breath of GOD) is it self, in Opposition to Substance, a Power.* Thus I have consider'd
all

all that is in Dispute between him and me, in his First Definition of the Soul.

The Second Grand Definition, as he calls it, is that of Life; *Actus primarius Materiae Seminalis, originaliter afflatæ, continuatus*. Which being only a Continuation of the same ill-grounded and mistaken Notion of *Breath*. I shall have the Reader's leave in passing it over unobserv'd, to stand and fall by the former; but perhaps he has advanc'd something farther towards Proof in the Explication of this Definition, and that must not be neglected. The first Step he takes, is to shew that his Adversary's is the more intelligible Doctrin, and therefore does lessen the Power of God, in giving and preserving Life, and therefore is to be rejected; whereas his, which makes *Accidents* do such Feats, as no one cou'd imagin to be done without a *Substance*, magnifies his Power, even beyond Conception; and therefore ought to be embrac'd. This is truly the Sense of that Argument; which perhaps may startle the Reader a little, but is not so amazing, as that the Author of it shou'd elsewhere appeal to the Judgment of sober Men.

In the next place, he aims to prove, That Man propagates his Species, or in his Words, *this original Afflatus or Power in Seminal Matter,*
Pag. 78.
Pag. 104.
from

from one Generation to another : This ought to have been a little better explain'd, if it were only to salve a Contradiction to it, which we had in the preceding Page ; there 'tis said, *Life is, and can only be the Product of Omnipotent Power* : I ask therefore, Does Man propagate Life with the *Materia Seminalis*, and is the *Homunculus delitescens* therein, alive from the first Communication of it ? This I suppose *Estibius* will be asham'd to own, tho' it is the very same thing with *Propagating the Original Afflatus* : Or does the Author mean, that Man only communicates Matter fitly dispos'd to be rais'd, by Nutrimental Accretions, into an Organical Body ; and God enlivens it. This is consistent Sense ; but this does not determin whether the *Fœtus* is enliven'd from the Almighty, by a Power or a Substance : Yes, says *Estibius*,
 Pag. 102. by a Power ; for in the Case of Abortions, a Man cannot but be struck into a strange Amazement, to think what becomes of that Substantial Spiritual Being, call'd Soul, that once actuated this little Organical Mass of Matter, now it is cast out from the Womb dead ; why it did not seem too importunate to actuate such a minute Mass ; being a Noble Spiritual Substance. This indeed wou'd look something like an Objection in the Mouth of an Atheist, and
 has

has in it much of that bold Spirit, which will admit of a Reason for nothing, without a Reason for every thing : But I am only oblig'd to answer *Estibius*, and to him I say, that as it is his Objection, it gives no Preference to his *Hypothesis* ; but is equally conclusive , if at all conclusive, against *Life* and *Soul*, *Power* and *Substance*. The Query, as he puts it, is this , What becomes of the Rational Soul, and how came it hither on so trifling an Errand ? Let us turn it upon himself ; What becomes of the Life of this Abortive ; and why did God exert his Omnipotence upon it to so little Purpose ? If he answers, *The Life of it centers again in God* ; so say we, *The Spirit returns to God that gave it* ; and we have no more reason to conclude any Creature of God's to be *useless*, for being remov'd from any one *State of Activity*, than we have to believe his Power *vacated*, when in any one Instance it is *suspended*. And as for the little Purpose to which such a Creature liv'd, our Case is the same ; since he attributes all the Noble Properties to Life, which we do to a Living Soul ; but with this Difference, that whereas the Objection wou'd make us bring down an Immaterial Being, to too little Purpose ; it charges him with making God himself as it were weaving *Penelope's*
Web

Web with his own Hand; working, and immediately undoing his own Work. The Truth is, whether as a *Power* or a *Substance*, the Abortive liv'd and dy'd by Divine Appointment; and he that will not believe a Providence, until he's able to trace thro' all its Windings; must for ever want one Essential Qualification of a true Believer in God, which is *Implicit Faith*; and therefore if it were *possible*, it wou'd be *in vain* to give such a Man Satisfaction. But I must needs say, the Objection ill becomes him that owns either *Life*, or *Soul* to proceed from God.

The next thing offer'd for Argument, (for I suppose the Discourse about *Blood*, *Serum* and *Lympha* is not) is, the Power of the Soul; which according to us, might

Operate as freely and rationally in
Pag. 107. *Mad-Men and Fools*. But to this

I think I have fully answer'd, *Part 1. Sect. 9.* and shall not repeat. Of kin to this, is the next Difficulty he starts, *That*

Ibid. *this Immaterial Substance shou'd be driven out of its Ancient Habitation, by so many little, trivial and inconsiderable Causes, &c.* Under Favour, I suppose instead of *Ancient Habitation*, he shou'd have said, *Ancient Title to inhabit there*; for a *Title* I judge is better, and more tenable for being *Ancient*, but not an *Habitation*.

But

But then what Real Title the Soul has, how Ancient soever her Possession may have been, I know not; I take her to be a Tenant at Will, and those we know very trivial Causes sometimes turn out. But to give some Colour to this faint Argument, he urges farther, *When a Spirit has* Pag. 108.
taken Possession a long time in other Cases, we find it a great Difficulty to dispossess him; insomuch that our Saviour's Disciples complain'd of it; tho' they had an immediate Miraculous Power given them, to eject Spirits and Devils. Here, all the Charity I have, will not suffer me to think *Estibius* so indifferent, as to any Author's turning and wresting the Scripture, as he lately profess'd to be: But if he was really, tho' I cannot imagin it, serious in the Application of this Scripture, I desire his Farther Thoughts upon it, in Answer to Two short Queries; 1. Whether the Disciples did really exert a *Miraculous Power*; and yet by reason of the Deficiency of that, were not able to cast out the Devil? 2. Whether, in Case this *Demoniac* had been struck with a *Sulphureous Blast of Lightning*, which is one of *Estibius's* trivial Causes, it wou'd not have drove out *Life* and *Devil* together? And if it wou'd, then is it not more difficult to dispossess an Evil Spirit, than the Spirit of a Man;
and

and the same trivial Cause dislodging the former, makes the Wonder cease, as to the Departure of the latter.

This is all I can find said upon this Second Definition, that will bear Examination, without leaving our Subject; unless we will hearken to the Old Cry, Immaterial Substance *may pierce thro' and*
 Pag. 111. *actuate any incapable Matter, without any Hindrance or Obstacle: For what shou'd hinder a Spirit's penetrating Matter?* And
 Pag. 116. *again, What Obstruction can Matter make to an Immaterial Being, which can penetrate it?* If the Repetition of this Objection, so many times, as the Reader will meet with it, throughout *Second Thoughts*, be somewhat nauseous to him, *Estibius* is excusable; for it is the Sting of most of his Objections, and he seems to use it like a reviving Cordial, to any Argument, that is expiring upon his Hands; or else he wou'd not methinks use it upon Arguments that have scarce any Relation to each other.

I shall not quarrel with him about his Third *Grand Definition* of *Mens* or Mind, which he calls, *Facultas cogitativa*
 Pag. 118. *ratiocinans*; he may use the Word *Mens*, or any other Word, in what Sense he pleases, provided he does but give Warning; upon which Condition, I am
 not

not desirous to confine him to the *Jus & norma loquendi*, (which if, as *Horace* tells us, *Uſe* commands, *Mens* ought to have the ſame Acceptation with *Anima*) my chief Buſineſs is to correct his Method of Reaſoning: But when he falls foul upon *De la Forge* and others, for confounding the Notion of *Mens* and *Anima*, he puts me in mind of the Greek Proverb, $\Delta\iota\lambda\omega\ \upsilon\phi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\delta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \delta\acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\ \kappa\upsilon\omega\alpha$. and the Latin that answers to it, *Rixatur de lana caprina*.

Now let us take a ſhort Review of theſe Grand Definitions, and find out if we can, to what Grand End or Purpoſe they ſerve. The Ancients, *Eſtibus* tells us, ſeem to be guilty of great Dotage, as to take no more Notice of Life, than to de-
Pag. 114.
 fine it to be, Id or Principium, quo vivimus; which Explication, he adds, what Inſtruction it affords to the Inquiſitive Reader, I leave all the World to judge: And truly for one, I give Judgment on *Eſtibus's* Side, That no Inſtruction is afforded from this Definition. But then methinks *Eſtibus*, who had with ſuch a piercing Judgment obſerv'd, and discover'd the Flaw in this Definition, ſhou'd himſelf have been able, in the Compaſs of 30 or 40 Pages ſpent in explaining his own Definitions, to afford us abundance of Inſtruction in this Matter: And yet I fear, upon Examination,

mination, we shall find, we have only been a little amus'd with various Prospects; but *Estibius* has really left us just where the Ancients did, which is I can assure him much worse than he found us. When he says the *Soul is Life*, we understand his Meaning; which in plain *English* is, *We live without a Soul*: But then, in order to give us a true Notion of the Soul in his Sense of it, he ought above all things, to have explain'd to us his Notion of *Life*. In the first Definition it is stil'd *Afflatus*, Breath; which as it stands there, is I am sure not in the least *instructive*: For what Connexion there is between the Ideas of *Breath* and *Life*; or what Notion *Breath*, taken in what Sense you will, gives us of *Life*, I borrow *Estibius's* Words, and leave all the World to judge: Nor has he explain'd this, in it self insignificant Term, by any other besides *Power*; but sure *Life*

Pag. 90. and *Power* are not Terms convertible; for then all *Power*, the *Power* of one Body to move another, wou'd be *Life*: Well then, it must be some determinate *Power*; and thus *Estibius* has determin'd it, *Qua eadem vivit, sentit, & ratiocinatur*. Now it is certain, and moreover *Estibius's*

Pag. 96. Opinion, that Sense, or Sensation is an Effect, or Operation of *Life*; and, I don't say it is certain, but it is his

Judg-

Judgment, that Reason is the same; for he affirms it to belong, in some Pag. 97. Degree, to every thing that has Life: So that in short, the Soul, according to him, is in effect defin'd to be, *A Power to Live*; and then the Result of all that has been said in this Explanatory Chapter, will amount to this Syllogism; *The Soul is a Power to Live; but Life and Soul. are the same thing; Ergo, Life is a Power to Live.* Now upon Comparison of these two Definitions, *Life is the Principle by which we Live*, and *Life is a Power to Live*, I must leave my Reader to choose which he will stick to, for I must confess, I cannot choose for him: But if he shou'd happen to be as indifferent as I am, let him not however recriminate upon *Estibius*, great Dotage; for I am confident he has explain'd his Notion as far as it wou'd bear.

And now that we have gone thro' this Chapter, we shall hardly make any thing of it, unless we look back upon the Contents; where we shall find, the Design was to have set the Author's Hypothesis *in its true Light*; and that I confess the Chapter answers. If Difficulties and Perplexities are to his Reader, as they are to *Estibius*, as clear and questionless, as *the Sun* Pag. 82. *and the Moon in the Firmament.*

After all, we find this Pompous Chapter shrunk in the Perusal, into Three Definitions; which I dare averr, in *Estibius's* his Language, neither make out the *Facility*, nor the *Verity* of his Notion. But, *implenda erat Pagina*, his Friend *Hobbs* shew'd him the Way; many Words, and an empty Shew of Learning and Elaborateness, as they are fitted for the Use of Men of that Persuasion, so they will keep them in Countenance; and perhaps gain some few Profelytes, tho' the Author may not have sufficiently consider'd his own Strength, when he prophesy'd, *It shou'd be universally entertain'd and taught.*

C H A P. IV.

Containing a full Answer to all that he has objected in his Fifth Chapter, to the Receiv'd Doctrin of Human Soul, from Philosophy.

IT is something of a Difficulty upon a Man, to be oblig'd to consider, as well what an Objector has not said, as what he has said to the Purpose; and yet this Drudgery they must undergo, that pro-

propose to answer Men of *Estibius's* Character; for it is not to be suppos'd they wou'd deal so very much as they do in Foreign and Sophisticated Ware, without Experience, or some reasonable Hopes at least, that they will pass with one sort of Men for sound Argument. This is all the Apology I have to make to my Reader, for detaining him so long from the Merits of the Cause; and for following, I hope at a good Distance, the Dance that *Estibius* has led me, thro' 124 Pages of his Book. But the Contents of this Chapter give us now some Hopes, that we have done trifling about the Question; and from nibbling at it, are come to argue in good earnest. *Philosophy* must be own'd to be a very proper Topic to argue from, upon this Subject; but to our Mortification, *Estibius* is too great a Genius to be confin'd to Topics; unless it may be judg'd a Piece of Philosophy, to set forth Pa. 126,
the Difficulty of conquering Re- C 127.
ceiv'd Opinions; and the great Prejudice, with which the Author is apprehensive he and his Work shall be receiv'd. Sure *Prejudice* sits very ill upon his Stomach, it is so often uppermost; and by his venting it in such general Terms, I can imagin nothing less than this to be his Meaning, That we must lay aside all we ever yet

believ'd or understood, in order to our understanding and believing this Author's Discoveries: And if that be the Case, it may well sit uneasy upon him; and I am persuaded, after never so many Concoctions, will prove his *Crambe* still.

From this Excursion, he leaps into another about *Aristotle's* Definition of the Soul; tho' as he says, it had
 Pag. 127. been discuss'd, Chap. 3. and from that, to a most elaborate Confutation, in the Compass of four Pages, of those that hold Three Souls; [*Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational,*] *All distinct, as to Essence and Substance.* O rem ridiculam, Cato, & jocosam!

Estibius having now diverted himself a while with running down a small Number of Philosophers, proceeds to attack the main Body of them, with the formidable Arms of *Syllogism*.

That Being whose Essential Parts are perishable, is mortal and corruptible;
 Pag. 133. But the Essential Parts of the Soul, viz. Understanding, is perishable: Ergo, The Soul it self is mortal, or corruptible.

The Major Proposition I grant, nothing can subsist without its Essentials; that is, without that by which it subsists: So that *Estibius* need not have been at the Pains to illustrate it, by Fires perishing when
 the

the Heat is destroy'd. But the *Minor* I deny, as consisting of Two Propositions, both which must be true, to support it:

1. *That the Understanding is an Essential to Human Soul*: And, 2. *That it is perishable either with, or before the Body.*

I. I deny, *That the Understanding is Essential to the Soul*; consider'd either in a Proper Sense, or in *Estibius's* Sense.

1. Not consider'd in a Proper Sense, as it is us'd to signifie that Passive Faculty of the Soul, which receives Impressions and Ideas from Objects; for as such, it is only a Mode of Cogitation; and if Cogitation it self be not Essential to the Soul, then neither is any Mode of it.

I know *Des Cartes* places the *Essence* of the Soul in *Actual Cogitation*; for this Reason I suppose, That the first Notice we have of our Souls, is from a Consciousness of Cogitation in us, as the Idea of something extended without us, is the first Notice we have of the Existence of Matter; in which Attribute of *Extension*, he accordingly places the *Essence* of Body. I am not concern'd in this latter Controversy; but granting him his Cause in this, he will never gain it in the other; for Extension is an *Attribute*, and therefore may be the *First Attribute*; but Actual Cogitation is no more than an *Operation*, which necessarily

presupposes an *Attribute*, and therefore cannot be one it self: Granting the Philosopher farther, what he asserts, in consequence of this Principle, That the Soul perpetually Thinks, this does not give it the Character of an *Essential Attribute*, any more than Perpetual Motion of the Body, cou'd be call'd the *Essence* of *that*. From which Consideration, we are oblig'd to take up with one of these Conclusions: Either, 1. That the *Essence* of the Soul does not consist in *Actual Thought*, but in the *Faculty* of it; and this will do the Objector but little Service, since a Faculty may be obstructed, or suspended in its Operation, without being destroy'd: Or we must conclude, and I think with greater Probability; 2. That this Faculty of Thinking was *superadded* to the already constituted *Essence* of an Immaterial Being, as the only Substance capable of that Faculty: And then doubtless, on whatever Substance the Almighty has conferr'd a Power or Operation, he, or sufficient Causes acting under him, can withdraw the same, leaving the Substance still in a State of *Numerical Existence*.

This Consideration proves by the way, That all our Reasoning is not from *Ideas*, when the Word is us'd in that restrain'd Sense, for the Impressions [sensible or not] which

which we receive from the Object : For 'tis plain we have no *Idea* of our Soul, as an immediate Object, besides that of *Cogitation* ; and yet our Reason forces us to suppose and believe a *Substratum* or *Substance*, in which this Faculty must exist ; and therefore our having no *Idea*, in the forementioned Sense of the Word, of any Substance , is no Objection against the Reality of its Existence.

To return , if the Understanding in this large Sense , be not so Essential, that the Soul must perish with it, much less can it be so. 2. In that vulgar, but improper Sense here, in which *Estibius* uses it , for *right Reason* , or *acting rationally* :

I wonder who ever maintain'd, Pag. 133.

That to Think rationally and consistently, was Essential to the Soul in this State ; but I humbly conceive, that *Irregular Thoughts*, are *Thoughts* still , even in Mad-Men , or Natural Fools. And supposing that there are Instances of such, who act in no Degree above Brutes, yet *Estibius* had before contended, that *Brutes have Reason and Understanding* , in the same Degree in which they have Life : Pag. 97. So that

Mad-Men and Fools are either dead, or their Understanding is not perish'd ; or lastly, *Estibius* is inconsistent with himself. And this plainly shews, that he has not prov'd his

II. Prop.

II. *Prop.* Upon which also the Truth of his *Minor* depends, *viz.* That the Understanding is perishable. I am sure his

Ibid. Instances of a *Fracture* or *Contusion* in the *Skull*, &c. fall short of Proof; for Men under *Stupor's* or *Delirium's*, have often recover'd to their Senses; and what then? Did their old Understanding perish, and Nature or the Physician infuse a new one? I do not think it in the Power of either; and *Estibius* himself often says, it is in the Power of none but God. To this Purpose, I remember a remarkable Story, which was well attested to me, of a Person that suddenly fell distracted, and continu'd so for some Years; at length coming to himself again, he cou'd remember many Passages of his Life before his Distraction; but the whole time of his Continuance in it seem'd to him then, like a great *Blank* or *Hiatus* in his Life; and he had not the least Image of any thing particular in it left on his Memory. I am apt to think it wou'd puzzle *Estibius* to prove, upon this Occasion, that Memory in Man, is solvable by Traces in his Brain alone; or to account for it, why the stronger, as well as later Impressions, in this Man's delirious State, were perfectly eraz'd, and others recover'd. But not to put him upon Solutions we can never expect from

from him, I think however we may joyn Issue with him, in his Appeal *to the common Experience of Mankind, both Physicians and Philosophers especially*; Whether according to their Observation in such Cases, the Understanding seems to be utterly perish'd and extinct, while the Person is alive; or only obstructed in its Operations. *Estibius* has not offer'd the least Argument for his Side of the Question; and there are such plain Indications to confirm the other, that I wonder a Man so tenacious of his own Opinions, shou'd ever yield to submit it to Reference.

But this Obstruction it seems, is Pag. 134. granting our Cause; as thus he proves:

That which depends on Matter in Esse, Fieri, & Operari, is corruptible or mortal: But the Soul of Man (whose Essential Part is own'd to perish, or decay with its Material Organs) depends on Matter in Esse, &c. Ergo, The Soul of Man is perishable or corruptible.

Here again I deny the *Minor Proposition*, tho' it is that which he pretends we have before granted; I appeal to all the Physicians and Philosophers in the World, whether to grant that one thing is capable of obstructing the Operations of another, proves the Dependence of the latter upon the former, both *in Esse, Fieri, & Operari*; but

but Truth I find is the best Vehicle of Falshood; and a dextrous Mixture often prevents the Distinction. Nay I think we do not so much as grant it depends on the Body *in Operari*, as he understands it, for all the Operations the Soul is capable of exerting. This I take to be his Sense, when he says, there is but one poor Refuge left, *That the Soul of Man has a particular Immateriality, which necessarily requires Material Organs to assist it in its Operations; but what is all this*, says he, *but still allowing its Dependency on Matter, as before asserted.* Here's a Piece of very gross Ignorance, or Prevarication; those that maintain such a *particular Immateriality*, do not say the Soul is perishable; but on the contrary, assert a *Necessity* upon it, as well as a *Capacity* in it, to inform *another Vehicle*, after its Departure out of *this*; and thus it's true they suppose the Soul depends, in its Operation, upon the Instrumental Assistance of some organiz'd Matter: But if this be the *Dependence before asserted* by *Estibius*, he asserted nothing to prove the Soul's Mortality: For surely there is a wide Difference between the Assertion of those, who hold a Dependence of the Soul (in its Intellectual Operations) on *some Material Vehicle*; and that of those, who hold its Dependence
on

on *this Body*. I cannot think *Estibius* drop'd the Distinction, with any Hopes his Reader wou'd take it up.

Thus we find the Dependence of the Soul, in its Operations, on this, or any Body, when rightly understood, does not at all invalidate the Existence of it, in a State of Separation from this Body.

Yes, says *Estibius*, for Operation *Ibid.* being the Essence of an active Being, (as no Man knows another to have a Soul, but by its Operations) it does depend likewise, *Quoad Esse*. Which Argument, we may observe, takes it for granted, that the Soul is an Operation, and not a Substance; and then indeed it is a true Philosophical Inference, its Dependence upon Matter *in Esse*, as well as *Operari*: But how does he prove it to be only an Operation? Because no Man knows another to have a Soul, but by its Operations. I have already said enough to this Argument, in my Answer to the first Syllogism: But let me ask *Estibius* a Question, for Information's sake, in his own Way; I suppose no Physician is so ignorant, as to doubt there is such a Fluid in Human Body, as we call *Animal Spirits*, or so credulous as to think he ever felt, heard, or saw them; How then does he know they exist? By their Operations only? By the Conveyance of Sensation,
and

and those Fermentations which they raise in the Body? Why then they are only an Operation, and not a Part of our Material Substance; they are not made, as *Estibius* from the old Philosophers phrases it, *ex Materia tanquam Principio constitutivo*; but, *ex Materiae Gremio*. And when I have had his *Second Thoughts* concerning *Animal Spirits*, demonstrating the receiv'd Notion of their being purer Parts of the Blood separated, to be a plain Heathenish Invention, &c. I shall give up this Answer, and endeavour to answer him some other Way.

But after all, we find both these Arguments, that of the Understanding perishing, and this Subtile Metaphysical Notion of Dependence *in Esse, Fieri, & Operari*, are but New Dresses put upon the Old Objection: The First is clos'd with this

Ibid. Observation; *The Understanding, or Reasoning Faculty, the Essence of a Spiritual Soul, capable undoubtedly of penetrating Matter, &c.* And he puts the chief Stress

Ibid. of the Second upon this: *For Material (as I have oft had Occasion to mention it as an Axiom of undoubted Truth) cannot hinder or controul Immaterial.* But having as oft had Occasion to say, that I have fully answer'd this Objection in my First Part; and clearly prov'd

prov'd, that whatever Difficulties may attend the conceiving Soul and Body so united, that there shall be a Reciprocal Action and Passion; they are not greater than those that attend our Conception, of another sort of unquestionable Union; and therefore they can be no Objection against other conclusive Arguments; unless we will reject what we do apprehend, only for the sake of what we do not: Having fully clear'd this great Point before, I have nothing to add to it here, or for the future, but only to point to the Reader where *Estibius's* Argument turns upon it; and I am confident he neither has, nor ever can prove such a Dependence of Human Soul on the Body, as he pretends to prove, by any *Argument* from Reason; but which depends entirely on this one mistaken Notion, of its *Esse, Fieri, & Operari*.

But this must not prevent our Examination of the next Objection, to prove the Dependence of the Soul upon the Body *in Fieri*, as well as *Esse & Operari*; which my Author has put into this Form: *That which is generated from the Seminal Principle of the Parent, depends on* Pag. 137. *Matter in Fieri, as to its Make and Original; but the Soul of Man is generated from the Seminal Principle of the Parent, therefore the*

the Soul of Man depends on Matter, &c. The Minor being the Proposition to be deny'd; he proceeds to prove it thus; If a Parent from a Seminal Principle generate Man, then he generates the Soul, as well as Body of Man; for neither Soul nor Body separately are Man; but a Parent from, &c. generates Man: Ergo, &c.

I must confess there is scarce a Novice in Philosophy, but who is furnish'd with a prompt Answer to this thredbare Objection, if his Opponent shou'd fall so low as to urge it; and yet, as it is manag'd by *Estibius*, there is something in it not unworthy our Observation. But for our better understanding of this Matter, it will be requisite to premise what we mean by *Generation*, taken both *absolutely* as to all Animals, and *relatively* to Mankind; a *due Representation of the Object*, being not only, as *Estibius* has discover'd to the World, *the Foundation of Belief*, but a Foundation for an Answer to almost all his own Objections.

All that we know of *Generation*, may be thus defin'd; *Ea Animalis actio, qua ex semine maris & femina concurrentium, simile producitur Animal.* But this it must be own'd is only a *Nominal Definition*; and however it explains the Action, yet it leaves the *Effect or Product* (which was the chief thing

thing to be explain'd) as unintelligible as before; for the Question is not how such an Organical Body was rais'd out of Seminal Matter, (in that it differs not from Vegetation,) but how it came to be enliven'd; and this I am confident it is impossible, not only to explain to our Imagination, but to convince our Reason that it cou'd ever be the Effect of any *Animal Action*: For first, it is not conceivable that the Male or Female shou'd communicate Part of their Life, with that Part of their Body call'd *Semen*; or that this *Semen* or *Animalculum delitescens* in it, is any more alive than *Plantula delitescens* in the Seed of an Herb: This I suppose is equally agreeable to Experiments, and the Reason of the Thing. Next, I say it is utterly impossible, that by the Coition of Senseless Particles, of what determinate Texture, and in what Motion soever, *Sensation* and *Life* shou'd be produc'd; we may as well suppose that a Sound shou'd raise the Sense of Hearing, in a Sonorous Body; or that Flowers shou'd be affected with their own Fragrancy: And therefore as the producing of *Sensation* and *Life* in stupid and insensible Matter, is really the bringing something out of nothing, and as such, is properly and only the Object of Creative Power; so those that believe

all Animals to be indu'd with Sense, must recur to this Principle in the *Generation* of them. *Estibius* therefore, who takes it for granted that Brutes are not Machins, has over-

Pag. 138.

shot himself a little in his *Comparative Generations*; *We shall find*, says he, *without any Contradiction of Philosophers, that an Horse generates an Horse, a Dog his likeness*; he adds indeed, *as to Matter and Form*; in which latter Term I suppose he includes Life, which I am so far from finding, that I find it impossible: But if by Form he means only the Texture, and Configuration of Material Parts, then I confess the Comparison holds, and thus far Man and Beast *generate* alike; and farther than this, neither can Act, or produce any Effect.

Next we must explain what we mean by the *Generation* of Man; and that is in short, when understood with regard to the Parent, the same with the *Generation* of all other Animals; which is, *An Organical Body, rais'd from a Seminal Principle, and enliven'd*: But when understood at large, implies the *Union of his Soul and Body*.

Now I assert, and have prov'd, that *Generation*, whether of Man or any other Animal, ought properly and Philosophically, to be understood only of the *raising*, not *enlivening* the Organical Body; being
us'd

us'd relatively to the Parent, as an Effect to its Efficient Cause ; and therefore when either *Life* or *Soul* are included, ought to be term'd *Propagation* ; to which the Parent concurs no farther than as an Occasional Cause.

So that *Estibius* himself must be forc'd to quit that Vulgar Sense, in which he uses the Word in his Syllogism, unless he can first prove that Man has a Power of communicating Life to his Offspring : I know he has asserted, that *according* Pag. 104.
to the Course of Second Causes, Man propagates this Original Afflatus or Power in Seminal Matter, from one Generation to another. And again, that *the Power of Life is in all Seminal Matter, and that that Matter wou'd always become a living Creature, did not some occasional Impediment or Obstruction intervene, which hindred the production of the same into an Animal.* Which Pag. 116,
& 117.
latter Part of the Sentence, if understood consistently with the former ; must imply, that all Seminal Matter will of it self, and by Mechanical Power enliven, when brought to Maturity. To this Purpose, *Estibius* indeed has asserted in many Places of his Book ; but he must excuse me, if the Rules of Dispute will not suffer me to be so mannerly, as to take his Word for an Argument ; and I am
P 2 sure

sure he has not offer'd, throughout his large Performance, at the least Proof of this Position. But this is not all, he has advanc'd a bold, and yet bare Assertion, against very strong Reason, and Presumption to the contrary. Cou'd he make it appear, that God did enliven the dead Mass of *Adam's* Body, without uniting the Active Principle of a Soul to it, he ought not, for this Reason, to have given *Adam* the Power of propagating this *Afflatus* to his Offspring; I have already shewn, that neither is the *Semen* alive, nor can Life possibly result from any *Coition* or *Fermentation* of it: How then did *Adam* communicate this Power? Not by his own *Semen*. Did he then Literally blow Life into *Cain*, thro' his Nostrils; as *Esti-*
Pag. 91. *binius* supposes God to have done into the Nostrils of *Adam*? It's true, he may as reasonably suppose the one as the other: But then, How will he account for the Continuance of Human Race, since that Way of getting Children has been left off?

Besides, if Man be such a curious Piece of
Pag. 123. *Mechanism*, as shews only an Almighty Power cou'd be the first and sole Artificer; viz. To make a Reasoning Engin out of dead Matter, &c. then, if the *Semen* be dead Matter at the Instance of its
 Com-

Communication or Commixture, here is still the same Almighty Power necessarily requir'd for the enlivening this *Semen*, that there was for the enlivening that Part of Matter which constituted *Adam's* Body; for the *Semen* is no nearer Life, for having an Human Shape lurking in it, than was the *Dust* from which *Adam* was taken.

Lastly, If *Adam* had the Power of Life communicated from God alone in a Supernatural Manner, it is impossible to conceive how he cou'd recommunicate the same, without losing it himself, and so dying; as 'tis fabulously related of the *Eagle* and *Pelican*, in the Production and Nourishment of his own Offspring; and this not for want of Power in God, but Capacity in *Adam*; for the Power is no less than *Creative*, or which is the same, *Miraculous*; and just thus I find it express'd by *Estibius* himself; *He that cou'd make Man,* Pag. 163.
may this whole visible World out of
nothing, and make Iron swim, contrary to
its nature, cou'd by his Word give Life to
dead, stupid, and insensible Matter. I suppose *Estibius* will not dispute it, whether the Creative Power be communicable to a Creature; and I can assure him the same is true of the Miraculous Power. In Scripture we find, that God often uses a Creature as the Instrument, or rather Sign

and Token of a Miracle; but in all such Cases the Efficiency is peculiarly his own, and nothing can unfix the Laws of the Creation, but the Immediate Power, that enacted and ratify'd them.

By all which it appears, that had *Estibius* understood the true Meaning and Extent of his own *Hypothesis*, he wou'd not have made the Objection of *Generation*; for that wou'd have led him to assert that *Life* can no more be a *Seminal Product*, than an *Immaterial Substance* can; but that the same Power which first enliven'd *Adam's* Body, must go along with all his Seminal Communications, in order to enliven every succeeding *Fœtus*: And consequently upon this, had the Syllogism been objected to him, he must have said, that Man's *generating* Man is a Figurative Expression, of the Part for the Whole. He might have farther alledg'd, that in a Controversy of this Nature, whether Life is produced immediately by God or the Parent, in which the Senses are not Judges, and much less is the Generality of Mankind; that it is highly ridiculous, and unbecoming a Philosopher, to appeal to a vulgar Expression, intended to denote no more than what is sensible in the Case: *viz.* That upon Coition of Male and Female, Man is begotten. But I am at a perfect Loss for
a Plea,

a Plea, for *Estibius's* using the Argument on his own behalf; and this in a Chapter of Philosophy, where he shou'd not have acted either the *Pedant*, or *Sophist*, in playing upon Words, and perverting the Sense of a vulgar and harmless Expression, *the Father begets the Son*, which I dare say was never calculated for a *Maxim* in Controversy. *Estibius* seems not to have smelt out any thing of this Matter, or else sure, of all his Arguments he wou'd not have honour'd this *poor Quibble*, so much beyond its deserts, as to give it the Character of being *built on a solid Foundation*. Pag. 138.

By this time I presume I may trust any Man to answer this mighty Syllogism to himself, and proceed to consider *Estibius's* Paraphrase and Illustration upon it: First, he says Man cannot be said to *generate First Matter*; and for this most profound, as well as unanswerable Reason, that it is *ingenerable*: In the next Place, inquiring into the *Generation of Second Matter*, he deals a little dishonourably with us, in forcing us to hold Three distinct Souls; one extinct upon the supervening of another; Pag. 139. or rather he deals not at all with us, unless that be a Confutation of our Opinion, to joyn with us in confuting another. Ibid.

But in the next Paragraph he seems to aim at something; to those who say a Man generates a Man, by causing the Union of Soul and Body; *What Reasoning is this,* Pag. 140. *in the name of Wonder!* replies *Estibius*, to generate an Union, which is an Accident, &c. But softly, Sir: Are not all the Changes that Matter is susceptible of, accidental to it? And reflect, I beseech you, if not in too much haste, What is *Life* according to You, but a *Power*, and what is a *Power* but an *Accident*; and how is this Accident produc'd in Human Body, in the ordinary Course, but by *Generation*? If this Reasoning be so very strange and amazing, you however ought to be no Stranger to it.

Other *Psychomuthists* say, that Man in *Generation* supplies *Materia proxima*; to which you reply, that a *New Form*, as well as *Matter*, is requisite; and to which I rejoyn, that no Matter is supply'd without Form; and in the Human Seed, some People talk of an *Homunculus delitescens*.

Here *Estibius* thinks fit to interrupt the Chain of his Reasoning, with an Authority or two; the first is from *Aristotle*, in these words; Τὸ μὲν ἀρχὴν παρέρχεται
Pag. 141. τότε εἶδ' ὅτι, καὶ τὸ ἀρχὴν τὴν κινήσεως, τὸ δὲ θεῖον τὸ ὅμα καὶ τὸ ὕλην. *That is to say,*
says

says my Author, *Man in Generation gives the Form, Image, or Beginning of Motion, [or Life;] the Female supplies Body, or Matter; plainly intimating, that between both Matter and Form, call'd Soul and Body, are supply'd.* I cannot charge *Estibius* with the Fault that *Horace* found in some Translators, who were so over-faithful to the Original, as to render word for word; for he, I must own, has taken the Liberty which *Horace* wou'd not, I conceive, allow to Translators, *quidlibet audendi*; for I can call it no less, to make *Aristotle* speak what he never meant, nay contrary to his own Meaning in abundance of Places: And to prove this, it is sufficient to observe, that *Aristotle* never speaks, throughout his Works, of the *Generation of Human Soul*; but supposing, and proving it to be of a simple uncompounded Nature, as I have clearly prov'd from him, must of necessity except the Human Soul, from being generated in common with Bodies. But to this *Estibius* replies, If *Aristotle* will contradict himself, who can help it? Are not his Words express and particular? *Man in Generation gives the Form, &c.* Very true, *Estibius*, your Words, are indeed express and particular of Human Generation. But who taught you to translate ἀπὸ τοῦ, *Man*; not your *Lexicon* I am sure,

sure, nor any approved Author; and I believe, every ordinary *Lexicon* you can consult, will tell you that it signifies the *Male*, not only of Brutes as well as Men, but, as some use it, is apply'd to Vegetables too: I think I have very good reason to send you back to School upon this Occasion, for otherwise I must call in Question your Sincerity: Had this Passage been translated, *the Male in Generation gives the Form*, the *English* Reader wou'd have quickly discover'd the Impertinence of the Quotation, and in all likelihood have guess'd right, that *Aristotle* was not speaking a word of Man or Woman in that Place. The other Quotation is out of *Sennertus*, *Literæ Sacræ testantur Deum jussisse, ut non solum Animalia alia, sed & Homo, sibi simile generaret*. Whatever was *Sennertus*'s Notion of it; it is certain, that Man's propagating his Kind, in the Language of Scripture, does not imply his Generating the Soul; for he may possibly have as much to do in this, as any other Animal has, and yet the Product of both may be enliven'd, after a different Manner, by a Superior Principle. And as to the Meaning of *Sennertus*, whether he intended hereby to derive the Human Soul *ex Traduce*, or not; for the Words are plainly open to another Construction, I am
not

not so solicitous, as to consult him: For I cannot pay that Veneration to the Authority of any one Physician in the Interpretation of Scripture, as to turn my Judgment against the almost unanimous Sense of Divines; tho' Sennertus was a Man of that comprehensive Knowledge, that his Practice ought not to countenance others, to go so very far *beyond their Last*. If *Estibius* has no better Vouchers than these two, it had been more to his Advantage to have gone smoothly on with Reasons; unless perhaps he imagin'd, that those who cou'd be convinc'd by his Reasons, were proper Persons to be guided by such Authorities as his. But to proceed.

If Man did not generate Form [Rational Soul] at the very Instant of Con-
 ception, then the Husband dying Pag. 142.
 before Organization perfected, for the Reception of the Rational Soul, doth not leave his Wife impregnated with Man, but only Animal or Animalculum; and consequently, she cou'd not bear or bring forth a Rational Creature: Ergo. This Argument, so far as I can judge, may be good, 'till we come to, and consequently; then indeed it seems to fail: But to supply that Defect, *Estibius* says, it forces his Adversaries to recur to that absurd Opinion before confuted, of
Infun-

Infundendo creatur Anima, & creando Infunditur; or, makes the Dead Generate by some Astral Spirit, &c. As to

Ibid. those that hold this latter Opinion, whether they are *Estibius's* Enemies or not, I cannot judge, nor whether any Two, to me Unintelligible Notions, are opposite or consistent: But this I observe, that *Estibius* still plays upon the Word *Generation*; as if we suppos'd the Father had not done his Part in it, till the Union of Soul and Body commences.

As to other Recourse to *Infundendo creatur, &c.* here *Estibius* has vindicated his Title-Page; for if each Member of his Argument may be allow'd to take all the rest for granted; and who shall hinder it, so long as the *Press* is open? the whole will amount to *Demonstration*. *Estibius* sends his Reader back to *Chap. 3.* But I presume my Reader to be fully satisfy'd in this Point.

The next, and last Philosophical Argument, is just such another Philosophical Sham upon his Reader; there are but Three *Hypotheses* of the Origin of Human Soul, *Immediate Creation, Præexistence, and Traduction*: The First, as he has told us before, that he had confuted it before, must be absurd; besides, the First

Pag. 143. *Creation terminated the whole Business of*

of the Creation; which as I shew'd, Chap. 2. may be alledg'd against *Immediate Creation*, but not for *Traduction*; and as to *Præ-existence* or *Infusion*, as *Estibius* terms it, that also he had confuted before; so that there remains only *Generation* or *Traduction* to be embrac'd. Thus we find *Estibius's* prolific Way of Reasoning; one Argument with him, as well as one Man can beget another; and without losing any thing of its own, impart Life and Soul to it. But not to reiterate Old Arguments, without some little Improvement, we have this farther Consideration, That either of the fore-mention'd *Hypotheses* center the whole *Business of Generation*, in the im-
mediate Power of an Omnipotent Being, without any Reference had to Second Causes: But truly I think the Argument wou'd have appear'd as well in the Old Dress; for I cannot but esteem it a very great Reference had to Second Causes, that Human Body shou'd be form'd by a Seminal Coition; and that upon such a Formation perfected, God shou'd always please to unite a Soul to it. Well, but it does not appear that God has done so; and if it be demanded of *Estibius*, how far that proves he has not done it, he has a Reference at hand; rather the contrary, as I will prove in the following Chapters:

Ibid.

Pag. 144.

Ibid.

So that the whole Stress of the present Argument lyes, partly on what has been, and partly on what shall be prov'd; and that I take to be a Demonstration, that it has no Foundation of its own.

C H A P. V.

*Containing a full Answer to all that
he has advanc'd to prove his Point
from Right Reason.*

IF Beginnings are ominous, and a Man might judge of the *Furniture* by the *Front* of a Treatise, we cou'd look for no less than an intire *System of Demonstrations* in our Author's Sixth Chapter, wherein he is to make good his Position from Right Reason: For it is introduc'd with a
Pag. 145.
 general and pompous Preface, concerning *the Dictates of Right Reason*, (I shou'd have call'd them the Principles of Science) such as that, *Two contradictory Propositions cannot be true, &c.* But let us carry this comfortable Reflexion along with us; we have felt, without much hurt, the weight and Force of his *Philosophic Arguments*, and
that

that is no small Presumption, that all his Force of Reason is resistible: For methinks *Philosophy* and *Reason*, in a Subject of this Nature, are so near a-kin, that I cannot understand by what Rules of Method, *Estibius* distinguish'd them, as Two Heads of Argument; unless indeed they do lye distinguish'd in his Head; that is, unless his *Philosophy* is *irrational*, and his *Reason* *unphilosophical*. However, we must not slight any thing he produces for Argument, especially in the *Axiomatical* Way; for *Axioms* are of common *Right*, as well as *Truth*; and any Man that thinks he has a sufficient Fund, may build upon them: Far be it therefore from me, to dispute *Estibius's* Right, in his *Dictates of Reason*; or in what he quotes from *Grotius*, in Three Propositions: 1. That the Right of Nature (as to Man) consists in the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of a Thing to the Rational Nature; with regard, he means, to the Moral Necessity, or Turpitude of it. 2. That some things there are so circumstantiated, as to become of Natural Right, because not repugnant to it; by the same Reason that an Action is call'd just, because not unjust. And lastly, That those Things also are of Natural Right, which in Reason have the Preference to their Opposites: And to these

these he adds, as a Truth of equal Clearness and Moment, his own Definition of Right Reason; which we have consider'd already, and shewn it to be ill-grounded, Chap. 3.

But our Business in this Place, is to examin the Proof, that *Estibius* has rear'd upon these Foundations, as to the Point in Hand: And the first thing he has attempted is, the *Agreeableness of the Mortality of Human Soul to a Rational Nature*: which *Proposition* he endeavours to support by this Syllogism, *That Do-*

Pag. 150. *ctrin or Belief is most agreeable to a Rational Nature, which is most easy to be comprehended and understood, as having in it more probable Grounds of Truth: But the Doctrin of the Mortality of Human Soul is more easy to be comprehended; and has in it more probable Grounds of Truth, than the Immortality: Ergo. The Minor Prop. which we deny, is compounded of Two others; which in Estibius's Language, may be term'd the Facility, and the Verity of the Notion. The only Proof offer'd at upon the First, is this; For it is more easy to be comprehended, that a Mortal Prin-*
 Pag. 151. *ciple shou'd be joyn'd to a Mortal, and both equally perishable; than that an Immortal one shou'd be joyn'd to a Mortal one, &c. according to that Notion of Union*

Union amongst the Heathens, Simile gaudet sibi simili; Angl. Birds of a Feather, flock together. But this will not stand the Test, unless he will be content to pull down another Demonstration of his own erecting; for speaking of the Honour and Power that his *Hypothesis* ascrib'd to God, it was agreeable to his *Rational Nature* to argue thus; *For to make an Immaterial Spiritual Being, whose very Notion implies Activity, to be the Principal of all* Pag. 101.
Operations in Man, is far more easily conceivable to be done, than to create an Active Power in dull, heavy, unactive Matter; by which it is enabled to perform all those Noble Operations it doth. Thus, instead of a Reflexion or Derogation to an Omnipotent Agent, &c. 'Tis true, he has taken Care that these Contradictory Arguments keep a good Distance from each other; but they cannot be at so great a Distance, as not to clash. Here are two contradictory Propositions laid down, about the Origin of Human Life and Reason; the one, *That God has infus'd that Power into Stupid Matter;* the other, *That He has joyn'd an Active Immaterial Principle to it.* Now to plead for the First of these, because more unintelligible, and above our Apprehension, and therefore more magnifying of the Power of the Creator; and again, to

Q plead

plead for the same *Proposition* because more intelligible, and easy to be conceiv'd, and so more agreeable to the Belief of a Rational Nature, is a full Contradiction *ad idem*: For it is the same *Medium*, viz. the Nature of the Thing, tho' directed to different Ends, viz. the Power of GOD, and Human Capacity; that is made both *more*, and *less* conceivable. My Advice therefore to *Estibius* is, to give up both Arguments for the future, and not to bewilder himself farther in a fruitless Reconciliation: He had better stick to his last Vindication, that in Works of such Bulk Contradictions may escape an Author; tho' I must confess it seldom happens, that so very flat and palpable Contradictions fall from the same Pen, that is employ'd only in the Prosecution of Truth, in the most prolix Work.

It is not to upbraid him with this Contradiction, which others have observ'd before me, that I have mention'd it; but for this good Purpose, to convince *Estibius*, that since both Parts of it appear'd to him with the Face of an Argument, or I charitably suppose he wou'd not have made use of both, tho' it be impossible that both shou'd be true, as we are told at the Entrance of this Chapter; Therefore, as some things are more credible for
being

being more *intelligible*; so others may be more credible, not because they are more *unintelligible*, but notwithstanding that they are so; for they may appear in different Lights, that of *Internal*, and that of *External* Evidence; and if the Light of *External* Evidence shines brighter upon one Part, than that of *Internal* Evidence does upon the Contradictory Part of the Question; the Understanding must follow the greater Light, if another of his own *Axioms* be true, that a *Man cannot believe what he will*.

But tho' this Argument is too weak to support it self, yet it may do Service, if that which is joyn'd with it prove a sound substantial Argument; for it is added, in the *Minor Proposition*, that this Doctrin of his *has in it more probable Grounds of Truth*: And I shou'd willingly subscribe, if *Estibius's* whole Work cou'd make out this one *Proposition*. But here I confine my Answer to what is here urg'd. I suppose he will not lay much Stress upon the foremention'd Proverb, *Simile gaudet sibi simili*; which he says was the Heathens Notion of Union; for that they did not make this as a Report of Fact, in the Productions of Nature, is evident from hence, that it was their Opinion, and no less generally receiv'd; that all Bodies resulted from the Com-

Q 2 position

position of jarring and contradictory Elements. But this Proverbial Argument of my Author's, undoubtedly took its rise from the Observation of a Ferment and Conflict, attending the Mixture of Heterogeneous Bodies; but still *Nature*, as well as *Art*, prescribes by a *Misce, fiat*; tho' *Estibius*, for Argument's sake, is content to be reduc'd to *Simples*.

However, Reason failing, he has the same Refuge of Scripture, which supports his Reasons, just as his Reasons do that. He has furnish'd himself with seven or eight Texts to prove, what I will never deny, that *Life*, meaning Future and Immortal, *is promis'd to the Righteous*; his

Pag. 152. Inference is, *Now what wou'd that signify to a good Christian, who has already his better Part, the Soul, alive, &c. it wou'd be no Gift to him, nor an Obligation, &c.* To which I answer: 1. An Immortal Soul is, in it self, a Superlative Gift of God to Mankind. 2. The Gift is more especially owing to that Scripture-Revelation, as it was deliver'd by the Son of God, with a Miraculous Attestation to the Truth of his Mission. 3. Life, as it is oppos'd in Scripture to Eternal Death or Misery, must chiefly relate to the Happiness of it; and that Gift, as it was not sufficiently understood, or generally be-

believ'd by the Power of Natural Reason, which GOD had given, and Man had impair'd; so it was by a *new* and full Assurance, become a *new Gift*: And especially if we consider: 4. That the forfeited Title to this Happiness, was by the Gospel, and the Author of it, restor'd and renew'd to Mankind. If *Estibius* is a Stranger to all this, he has read the Bible over to very little, if any good Purpose.

His Second Argument is to this Sense, that his Doctrin contains in it no Moral Turpitude, because it is not repugnant to the Law of God; that is, as he explains himself, to Scripture; but this, says he, *I shall not pretend to urge by farther Proof in this Place*: And I hope, where he has not anticipated his Proof, the Reader will excuse me for postponing his Objection. Pag. 153.

His next is this: *That Belief which leads us to Superstition, we cannot lawfully follow; but the Belief of a Spiritual Soul in Man leads us to Superstition, as being the true Grounds of Praying for the Dead, feigning a Purgatory, &c. Ergo.* Just, say I, as the Translation of the Bible has made some, that cou'd not otherwise have read over the whole Bible, nor have been such Heretics as they are; and just, as the

Gospel is to be rejected, because others, as well as the *Romanists*, have built upon it *Straw and Stubble*.

It follows, tho' it has gone before, as a new Argument, that that his Doctrin
 Ibid. contains neither *Contradiction*, *Im-*
possibility, nor *Improbability*: We have consider'd the two first of these in a former Part; and to those who alledge his Doctrin is improbable, he returns this, and only this Answer; *Contrary to this, I prove, because it is grounded on Philosophy, Reason and Scripture*; and consequently, a *Rational Man ought to embrace this Belief*.

Et sic redit labor æquus in orbem.

But the next Argument is insisted upon at large, from *Pag. 156*, to *Pag. 173*. which therefore I suppose he depends upon, as his strongest Reason; and even to support this, he's forc'd to encroach upon his Scripture-Proof. It is taken from the Parity, he is pleas'd to make between Man Beast in their Death; tho' he pretends to ground it on the Divine Appointment, and that on Scripture. I shall consider the particular Texts, where they ought to have been urg'd. In the interim I remark, That if there be any Scripture, which ought to be absolutely and literally understood, that Death makes as full an End of Man as
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of Brutes, (to prove which, is the full Design of his Appeal to Scripture) then they equally exclude a *Resurrection of the Body*, with the *Surviving of the Soul*. This I say is an inevitable Consequence, if they are to be understood, as they are propos'd by him, without any Restriction at all; and if he return, that they must be restrain'd in their Sense, by those other Texts which promise a Resurrection; then so must they be restrain'd by those, which either promise or suppose, the Intermediate State. By which, and many more Instances already observ'd, the Reader plainly sees in what Method *Estibius's* Arguments are drawn up: Not to *follow*, but (by a new Way of Reasoning) to *recoil* and *turn back* upon each other; and this must convince him at last, that, altogether, they *turn* upon nothing.

But *Estibius* returns to his Reason again, and argues, that the Parity of Ratiocination in them and us, concludes a Parity of Immortality; which yet Pag 159. we deny. But, 1. How does he prove that they have Ratiocination? Why from his own Definition of Reason, which the great Master of Philosophy *Estibius* (to whose Authority all the Divines in the World are as much oblig'd to submit, as they were to *Aristotle's* Authority) has extended to

unumquodque Animal. But to wave all the trifling-work about the *Specific Difference between Man and Beast*; as if the Nature of Things were ty'd to Terms of Science, and not on the contrary; and to leave these fine-spun Arguments, to prove that Brutes have *Reflex Operations* of their Mind, and do apprehend *Singularia & Materialia*, and have a Will, sometimes an obstinate one: Leaving all this to the Reader's Diversion, if he wants it, in *Second Thoughts*, I shall endeavour to give a satisfactory Answer, in few Words, to this Objection; which, I know not why, has been look'd upon by some, as the most considerable.

It is well known, that those who maintain the Immortality of Human Soul, are divided in their Opinion of the Soul of Brutes: Some thinking it purely Material, and Mechanically acted; others that they have Sensation, and in some degree, Thought; and consequently are acted by some Immaterial Substance. I think either Party may main their Ground against this Opinion: The first sort confes it to be a wonderful Instance of the Divine Workmanship, that such curious Machins, and Mimics of Human Nature, shou'd be the Result of Matter and Motion only: Nay they may grant farther, that no Man is
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so well skill'd in the Laws of Mechanism, as to account tolerably for their Actions; but then they and the Objector being agreed in this, that they are only Material Beings, the only thing remaining in dispute between them is, Whether God has made Matter think, or Brutes act so very like Thinking Beings: The one have strong Arguments on their Side, built upon the first and surest Ideas of the Subject in hand; the other have at best but what *Estibius* call, a *Conjecture of the Divine Will*, drawn from an Observation of the Actions, but no certain Knowledge of the Principle they depend upon; which is an Argument that, neither in Sense nor Manners, can stand against the former.

The other Opinion of Brutal Souls, is, that they act by a Degree of Conscioufness and Thought: And to the Objection these answer first, That they can have no Title to an Immortality, as Free and Moral Agents; being entirely govern'd by one predominant Appetite of Sense; and they presume that, tho' *Estibius* has given them their Freedom, he has not made them accountable for their Talent: The Question then turns upon their Souls surviving the Body, in a State of Numerical Existence; and as to this, the Philosopher thinks where God has been silent, he shou'd not

not say much; but he conceives it no Derogation to his Understanding, to profess his Ignorance; 1. Of their Creator's Intention towards them, as to the Continuance or Destruction of their whole Nature: And, 2. What Provision perfect Wisdom can make, or what Purposes a Creature shall serve, while continu'd in a State of Existence by Almighty Power. But this he can be positive in, That the Moral and Christian Immortality is no way concern'd in the Argument: And he is not more afraid of dying like the Beast, tho' their Souls shou'd survive the Body; than he will live like them, because they inhabit the Earth in common with him.

In short, if Brutes are Machins, the Case will admit of no Parallel; if they are not, the Parallel cannot be carry'd on to the Detriment of Man's Immortality. The first Step we follow them beyond their Death, we are out of our Depth; and, as the Light we have from Reason and Scripture, to guide us to our own Immortality, gives us not the least Prospect of theirs, but on the contrary; so neither can it be eclips'd by the Darkness of their Condition, which ought not to be interpos'd, where it is not concern'd: Besides, that every Absurdity fix'd on a Notion, requires the Objector to proceed upon as evident
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and uncontestable a *Medium* or *Principle*, as if he were to demonstrate the Truth of any *Proposition*; but he that draws an Inference from the Vital Perfections of Brutes to those of Men, infers from he knows not what Premisses. This I conceive to be a sufficient Answer to the Objection, as it ought to be propos'd, and as it bears the most colourable Pretence of an Argument; to make it appear thus, I have been forc'd to strip it of that Philosophic *Farrago*, and those ridiculous Colours *Estibius* has put upon it; for, as appearing in them, it did not seem to me to deserve a serious, or indeed, an articulate Answer.

From Pag.
164, to 173.

I am sure the Reader will not suffer me to dwell upon the next Argument, taken from Dreams; *Which*, says he, *all Philosophers conclude to proceed from the Animal Part, or Sensitive Soul of Man*; and therefore this Philosopher concludes, That there is confessedly on all hands, something besides the Rational Soul, that thinks in Man: And I beg leave of *Estibius*, to throw in my *Conclusion* too; which is, That not the grossest Ignorance, but most shameless Resolution to say what a Man pleases, nay and to make his Adversary say what he pleases, cou'd have suffer'd this Assertion to take its

Pag. 173.

its Fate in the World. I am sure all the best of the Modern Philosophers suppose it the same Soul, thinking in Dreams, and awake: However, I am glad to find the Clergy are not the only Tools, but that an old Peripatetic Notion shall, in spite of all they have so voluminuously said against it, govern *all the Philosophers*, as well as all the *Divines in the World*.

But *Estibius* proceeds to urge, That his Notion prevents many idle and frivolous

Pag. 176. Disputes about the Union of Body and Soul; and therefore is more probable, &c. To make this out, he chooses to instance in the *Hypostatic Union* of the Human and Divine Nature, in the Person of our Blessed Saviour. Now if the *Modus* of that Union be unconceivable and unintelligible, by our weak Understanding, as unquestionably it is; I presume the Grounds of it is from the inadequate Conception we have, or can form to our selves, of the Conjunction of Finite with Infinite, Material with Immaterial: But now by the Doctrin of the Psychomuthists, that Difficulty seems to be taken away, and it ceases to be a Mystery, if we allow this Conjunction of Body and Soul to be the Union of an Immortal-Immaterial Spirit to a Mortal-Material Body: Where is then the Mystery of the *Hypostatic Union*? The Union of the Soul and Body, no Man ever yet

yet allow'd to be a *Mystery of Religion*; therefore either both must be reputed so, or neither; which God forbid he former shou'd not, &c. ----- These, to do him no Wrong in an Argument he seems to set a Value upon, are his own Words: To which I answer directly, 1. Admitting we do pretend to frame an adequate Idea of the *Modus* of Union between Material and Immaterial, yet in the Union of God and Man, here is besides *that*, Infinite and Finite become one Person; which, as it is not parallel'd in the other Case, so I take it to be the *τὸ βάθος* of this Mystery. But, 2. Here again is an *Ignoratio Elenchi*, or something worse. The Union of the Soul and Body is, in a proper Sense, *Mysterious*; that is, above our Conception, as to the *Modus* of it. Our Sophist insinuates, that 'tis *no Mystery of Religion*; but here he has unawares thrown himself into his own Noose: I ask, Is it an *Article* of Religion, or not? If it is, then all the rest of the Book must be sacrific'd to the Interest of this one Argument: If it is no *Article of Religion*, what Sense is there in saying, 'tis *no Mystery of Religion*; for that includes an *Article*, and something more: And again, To what Purpose can a Man urge, where he shou'd urge Reason, that *either both or neither, must be allow'd a Mystery*

Mystery of Religion, without a Presupposition that both are Articles of Religion. I know some have thought the Union of Soul and Body, the fittest Instance to explain, not the Thing, but their own Meaning, in the *Hypostatic Union*; and, to carry on the Comparison thus far, that they are both, tho' not alike, *Mysterious*. But whether both are Articles of Religion or not, is not material to this Explication. So that this unfortunate Objection wants all the Strength that a good Argument shou'd have, and is as weak as 'tis possible for a bad one to be; some Arguments are *true*, but not *to the Purpose*; others again are *to the Purpose*, but not *true*; but this is neither *true*, nor *to the Purpose*.

But since this is his own Objection, he will give me leave to add a Remark (which he may if he will, improve) upon it: It is this, the *Hypostatic Union* is in part explain'd, and render'd possible to those that believe the Union of an Immaterial Soul and Body: And therefore, say I, to those that believe the *Hypostatic Union*, and believe it
 Ibid. to be a *Conjunction of Material and Immaterial*; the Union of both in Human Nature, is within the compass of Divine Power at least; which blows off at once
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all *Estibius's* Demonstrations to the contrary, from Reason and Philosophy.

The remaining Part of this *Chapter*, I must confess I am not able to make an Objection of it begins with a Cavil at the Old Definition of *Animal Rationale*, which my Author thinks shou'd be chang'd for *Rationabile*; I say I cannot make an Objection of this, because I am as much at liberty to embrace the Notion, as *Estibius* is; and I dare say he borrow'd it from those that maintain the same Nature of Human Soul, that I do. And as to what he wou'd puzzle us with, Promiscuous Copulations of Man and Beast; *What Souls such Productions are, whether Material or Immaterial, Rational or Brutal, or a Mixture of both*: When *Estibius* has done his Part, and inform'd me whether the Production *lives the Life* of a Man or a Brute, or between both; I may deviate so far from my Subject, as to give him my Sentiments concerning the *Soul of it*; and endeavour to vindicate, against all he can say, the Wisdom of the Creation.

C H A P. VI.

The Immortality, and, Separate Existence of the Soul, consistent with other Christian Doctrins; not repugnant to any Expressions of Scripture, but plainly countenanc'd, and necessarily suppos'd in several important Texts; and as clearly deliver'd as was requisite, or reasonable to expect: In answer to all that is objected, in his Seventh Chapter, from the Tenour of the Holy Scriptures.

IT'S an Old Observation, that *Heretics* have always pretended to learn their Errors from *Scripture*, even those that were apparently opposite to the true Design, and plainest Expressions of it: But the Practice is not so common, for Men to espouse *Atheistic* or *Deistic* Principles, and turn *Textuaries* to support them. Either therefore we are mistaken in *Estius's* Principles, or he in his Plea from *Scripture*: This we dare to averr, that
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the Immateriality of Human Soul, and of the Divine Nature went hand in hand of Old; were equally impugn'd by *Atheists*, and defended by *Theists*: And this we are sure of, that every *Atheist* must be on *Estibius's* Side of the Question; for admitting Finite created *Spirits*, he will certainly be driven to the Acknowledgment of Him who, and who only must be the *Father* of them. And this Tendency was so clearly discern'd by Mr. *Blount*, and those that writ with him; (Authors whom *Estibius* must reverence; because from them he has copy'd his best Arguments from Reason and Philosophy, particularly those to prove the Human Soul to be from Seminal Traduction) that they mention not the Scripture, as of any Authority with them; but, reversing the Decrees of *that*, give the Cause another hearing at the Bar of their own Reason. Had it ever enter'd into their Heads, that the Scripture favour'd this their darling Notion of Human Soul, so much as *Estibius* has oblig'd himself to make out in this Chapter, I am confident they wou'd have entertain'd a more favourable Opinion of the Scripture; and have concurr'd, at least in this Point, with the *most scornful and prejudic'd* Pag. 178.
Opiniators, that is, those who believe the Divine Authority of Scripture;
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for this is the Character of those, with whom *Estibius*, much like a Christian, supposes his *Scripture-Arguments* will have weight.

But whether he design'd to use, or abuse the Scripture in his Argument, he has been at the Pains to amass together abundance of what, I am sensible, will appear Proof to some Understandings; all which deserves to be as carefully consider'd, it has been collected: For if the Scripture does really countenance his Interpretation, as much as it has done that of all the best qualify'd Interpreters, for so many Hundred Years; I fear that Weakness and Deceit, wou'd but too justly be imputed to the *Lively Oracles*, which was true of the *Heathen*; that they were, in Matters of the greatest Importance, ambiguously pen'd, and capable of a double Sense. This is a Dishonour that wou'd be reflected upon the Scriptures at first Sight, by him that is brought over by *Estibius's* Arguments from thence; but when he comes to examin Particulars, he must either believe this no Authentic Interpretation, or the Text to be a meer Nose of Wax; and which, like much of the Old Philosophy, tho' it had obtain'd an Universal Authority, yet serv'd to little better Purpose, than to exercise the Commentator's Skill.

To

To take off this Stain as clearly as I am able, I shall here reduce my wandering Adversary to such a Method, as will contain all that he has objected, and give Room for a full Answer to it. What he has objected to ours, and endeavour'd to build his own Notion upon, is resolvable into these Three Particulars.

1. *The Usual, and the Grammatical Significations of the Words Soul and Spirit, in the Scriptures.*

2. *The Arguments which the Scripture-Doctrins afford us, towards a Determination in this Point; and,*

3. *The several Expressions, and Texts of Scripture, relating to it.*

I. He begins with the *Usual Significations of the Words, Soul and Spirit*; both which, he has prov'd at large, have, in Scripture, the several Significations of *Life, Living Creature, Person, Breath, Mind and Conscience*, with others more remote: And all this I must grant him, because my *Concordance*, with a small Application of Sense, wou'd convince me of it. Thus far, and no farther, his Criticisms upon the Use of the Words reach; but if Criticism be a thing subject to the Rules that Example has prescrib'd, tho' I must confess it is

*From Pag.
178, to
Pag. 198.*

not so in every Man's keeping, he must also grant me something, which, as I take it, is to the Purpose ; 1. That no one Signification of a Word excludes another, tho' never so remote, or even contradictory to it ; of which I will not so far disparage my Critic's Skill in Words, as to give him Instances in *Hebrew*, *Greek* and *Latin*.

2. That not every Sense, sometimes not the most usual Sense of a Word, is the Proper and Primary Signification of it. Therefore if *Estibius* has prov'd any thing upon this Head, he has prov'd that those enumerated by him, are all the Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*, occurring in Scripture ; and also that *Life*, which he pitches upon, is the *Proper* and *Primary*, as well as *Usual* Signification of *Soul*. As to the First, he has pretended

Pag. 177. *to select and explain the various Significations of those two Words* ; but whether he has selected or explain'd the most material, depends upon such Proof, as he has not attempted upon this Head. And without that, a Man that has consider'd the various Signification of Words, will be no more affected with this Argument, than he wou'd be, with just such another to prove, that God is not of a Substantial Spiritual Nature ; and this from the various Significations of the Word

Word *God* in Scripture, which he finds taken for a Being that has Eyes, Hands, Feet, Heart, &c. for Men, and other visible Beings upon Earth, even insensible Stocks and Stones. If the former succeeds, I dare promise *Estibius*, that he may safely speak out in the latter, and turn his doubtful Phrase *the reputed Immateriality of God*, into that of *a plain Heathenish Invention*.

As to the second Query, Whether *Life* be the *Proper and Primary* Signification of *Soul*, he has advanc'd nothing to prove that, but this, and such Texts; *God formed Man out of the Dust of the Ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a Living Soul*. I suppose the Stress of the Argument lyes in this, that *Life* and *Soul* must be conjoyn'd in Signification, because *Living* and *Soul* are so in Construction; which, to my Apprehension, does not so much as prove that *Life* is *any*, much less the *Proper and Primary* Signification of the Word *Soul*; but *that*, I am sure, is the utmost that can be deduc'd from any Text he has quoted; and therefore while *this*, I mean the *Proper and Primary* Signification, is left altogether undetermin'd, the *bare* Signification can have no Weight at all, with any Man of common Reading; and who thinks the Words of Scripture are of *Human*, as he

believes the Sense to be of *Divine* Authority.

But granting that *Life* is the *Proper, and Primary* Signification of Soul in Scripture, yet may it not signify there an Immaterial Substance, in a *secondary*, or more remote Sense? Yes sure; or else it cou'd never be apply'd to God himself, as every body knows, and *Estibius* has had the

Pag. 179.

Misfortune to shew, it is apply'd in Scripture. And may not an Author's Meaning be very plain, tho' he expresses himself in a borrow'd and allusive Word? It is the Stile of Scripture, and of every intelligible Writer, to express things, in themselves remote from Sense and the common Capacity, by others more obvious, and level with it; especially when the Subject is directed to such, as well as better Capacities: These can find the Proper and Philosophic Meaning in such Expressions, and the other find what is sufficient for them; so that the whole is rendred intelligible to every Capacity, Whereas had they been adapted only to the *Philosophic*, they had, in great measure, fal'n short of their Design with the *Vulgar* Reader. From which Consideration it appears, that the Scripture cou'd not have express'd it self in more proper or instructive Words, with Regard to the great
Design

Design of it, (upon Supposition that it meant by the Soul of Man an Immaterial Substance) than it actually has done; which is no small Confirmation of our Interpretation, and exposes all the *Stir Estibius* makes about *Genuin Notions* and *Primary Significations*, as a perverse Piece of Hypercriticism.

Estibius upon these Significations, makes Four Observations in Favour, as he imagines, of his own *Hypothesis*. The First is, *That the introducing of such a Spirit* (as we suppose to be introduc'd at the Resurrection) *is not properly the quickning a Mortal Body, no more than a Tortoise quickning his Shell.* The Question therefore is, Whether the Scripture, by quickning our Mortal-Body, speaks in the strictest Sense, exclusive of our Souls; for that they will be as much quickned, as they are now quick, is agreed on both Sides: And if Scripture be a better Interpreter of Scripture, than *Estibius* is, the Union of the Tortoise with his Shell, tho' it falls short, is not so absurd a Comparison as he imagines; for that is sometimes call'd the Tortoise's House: And St. Paul speaking of the Resurrection, says, *For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolv'd, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens; for in this*

we groan earnestly, desiring to be cloathed upon with our house which is from heaven. 2 Cor. 5. 1, 2. Now I am really of Opinion that the Body being call'd, both now and at the Resurrection, *our House*, and the Expressions of *our being cloathed upon with it*, and *our groaning in it*, do explain to us in what Sense our Mortal Body is, and shall be quickned; with more Perspicuity, as well as better Authority, than *Estibius* has done.

The Second Observation is this; *The Words Immortal Soul, are never found in the whole Scripture, and* Pag. 184. *Salvation of Souls but once; and* 1 Ep. Pet. 1. 9. *there it plainly denotes Persons, or their Lives to be deliver'd from Persecution:* Which I suppose he thinks wou'd be strange, if the Doctrin were true. But suppose the Words *Immortal Soul* had been found never so often in Scripture; why then *Estibius* wou'd have observ'd upon them, that nothing more is intended than *Immortal Life*: So that true or false, the Observation must have made against us; and right or wrong, the Scripture shall speak for him, if it does not speak against him in the very Words that some other Books do: Nay let it assure him of *Man's Immortality* never so often, and mention *Human Soul* as often, yet since his *Concordance* does

does not shew them conjoyn'd in any one place; they shall be of no more Authority with *Estibius*, than if they had not been mention'd at all. 'Till now I have been in doubt, upon what Reason *Estibius* cou'd expect the Completion of that Prophecy of his, *That his Doctrin shou'd be universally own'd and taught by the most*

Chap. I.

Learned: But now the Case is clear; for no Man is so Learned in any Language, as to cloath an Argument in the very Words that another can think of; and then it is *Estibius's* Observation, that *he owns and teaches his Doctrin*. That of *Salvation of Souls* being mention'd but once in Scripture, is very properly joyn'd with that of *Immortal Soul*. Is it not very remarkable, that the Scripture mentions *Salvation of Souls* but once, tho' of *Believing to the Saving of the Soul*, of *Saving a Soul from Death*, of *the engrafted Word which is able to save your Souls*; also of *the Soul that sinneth*, of *the Sin of a Soul*, in Opposition to the *Body*, and of *Losing and Destroying the Soul* in another World, the

Heb. 10. 39.

Jam. 5. 20.

Ibid. 1. 21.

Eze. 18. 20.

Micah 6. 7.

Mark 8. 36.

&c.

Mention is somewhat more frequent? If our Author's *Remarks* carry such Weight in them, what may we expect from his *Reasons*? But as to the Observation that,

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in that one Place where *Salvation of Souls* is us'd, it plainly denotes *Persons, or their Lives, to be deliver'd from Persecution; as appears by the Context, begotten us, reserved in Heaven for us*: I must confess, I do not feel the Weight of this; nor am I convinc'd, that our being *Begotten of God*, or having *Heaven in Reversion*, carries in it the Promise of any Temporal Deliverance: On the other hand, it is plain to me that the *Salvation of our Souls*, when it is said, as there it is said, to be the *End of our Faith*, can import no Salvation on this side Heaven, where, and where only, Faith shall have an End.

The Third Observation begins thus,
 Pag. 185. *Where our Saviour or the Apostles raised any Person from the Dead, they never invocated or commanded the Soul to return back into the Body of the deceased; but always used such Expressions as signify'd, Thou Dead Person, Live again; or tantamount, &c.* Well then, I hope it wou'd have been an Observation on our Side, had our Saviour and his Apostles used *Estibius's* Form: And if all Scripture be given by Divine Inspiration, and the same Miraculous Power was employ'd in the Raising of one, as well as another Dead Person; I desire *Estibius* to carry on this Observation, to that Miracle recorded of *Elija*, 1 Kings, ch. 17. ver. 21, 21. who
 stretch'd

stretch'd himself upon the dead child three times; and cried unto the Lord, and said O Lord my God, I pray thee let this child's soul come into him again: Here I think is *Invocating*; and the Lord heard the voice of *Elijah*, and the soul of the child came into him again, and he revived; and this, I suppose, was done by *Command*. I know *Estibius* will interpret *Soul* by *Life* in this, as well as all other Places; tho' here the Soul's coming again, is plainly intimated to be the Cause of the Child's Reviving; which, according to my *Logic*, intimates a Difference between *Life* and *Soul*: But if we shou'd give up the Sense of the Text, the very Letter of it confounds the Observation, which *Estibius* has himself confin'd to the *Expressions used*. To the Instance of *Lazarus* annex'd to *Ibid.* this Observation, in which our Lord did not indeed tell *Martha*, that he wou'd recal the Soul; Certainly, says *Estibius*, *Ibid.* this wou'd have been a necessary *Doctrin* to all the World, and a just *Reproof* to her of her Error, if such, when she believ'd that whole *Lazarus*, viz. *Body and Soul* wou'd lye dead in the Grave, until the *Grand Resurrection*. And how is it certain that *Martha* held *Estibius's Hypothesis*, and believ'd that the Soul, as well as Body of her Brother, shou'd lye dead in the Grave until the

the Resurrection? Where is this choice Piece of History to be found? Not in St. John's Gospel I am sure; all that is recorded of her Belief in that Relation, is, that *Whatsoever our Saviour wou'd ask of God, God wou'd give him*, ch. 11. ver. 22. and that her Brother *Lazarus* shou'd rise again at the last day, ver. 24. I presume this latter Expression gave the Hint to *Estibius*; and if so, then the Observation, and all the Consequence of it, depends entirely upon the Truth of this Supposition, That the Doctrin of the Resurrection, is inconsistent with ours of the Immortality of the Soul; and whether this is not a warrantable Supposition, (when a Man must say something against his Adversaries, and finds that, without the help of such Suppositions, he can never come at his Conclusion) the Reader must be left to judge: And tho' it may appear to him, that the Intermediate State had nothing to do in the whole Relation; yet it is to be hop'd he will not rigidly deny an Author a large Supposition, when it is but to get over one Woman to his Opinion.

The Fourth and last Observation equals, for Wisdom and Sagacity, any of the rest, as a short View will convince us. *Where*

any one, says our Observator, was immediately translated to Heaven,
 or

or dyed, and according to Divine Revelation, went to Heaven; the Scripture always speaks by the Word Person, and not Soul, as if divested of the Body, to be receiv'd into those Heavenly Mansions; as Elijah, Enoch, and our Saviour to the Thief on the Cross; thou, not thy abstracted Soul, &c. Here are Two Cases instanc'd in; the one the Case of those that went to Heaven without Death; the other of those that, by Divine Appointment, were receiv'd into it, between Death and the Resurrection. As to the First Case; Is it not a shrewd Observation towards demonstrating the Falsity of this Heathenish Notion, That the Scripture, making Mention of some that went, Body and Soul together, to Heaven; shou'd, at the same time, make no Mention of the Soul, as *divested of the Body*? It's true, the Souls of *Enoch* and *Elijah* were not actually divested of their Body, but nevertheless the Scripture might have us'd the Expression, tho' inconsistent with the Fact, had it design'd to establish the *Psychomuthists* Doctrin. This is the true Sense of the Observation, and how it will relish with some Readers, I cannot tell; but truly I am of Opinion, that cou'd any thing escape so comprehensive an Observer as *Estibius* is, this Case had full as well been left unobserv'd. To the other Case, of
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our Lord's saying *thou, not thy abstracted Soul, shalt be with me in Paradise*; I answer, that the *Soul* chiefly signifies *Person*, I have been inform'd by *Estibius* already, *Pag. 178.* and why therefore *Person* shou'd not sometimes signifie *Soul*, I am yet to learn; for there are two sorts of *Synecdoche's* in my *Rhetoric*: Or if this Answer be not satisfactory, let it be consider'd, that in the *Soul* we place the Seat of *Happiness*, of *Understanding*, and of *Life*; and then it will appear, that he who speaks to the *Person*, does, in the most strict and proper Sense, speak to the *Soul*. I cannot here forbear putting in my Observation too, that *Estibius*, just after mentioning this Promise of our Saviour to the Thief; and that other Text, *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him*, shou'd let the following Words so unseasonably drop from his Pen; *Now surely it is wonderful strange, that in all these Cases, there is no mention of the Separate State of Existence of the Soul of Man, no not the least glimmering of it, that I can find in the whole Scripture.* For these very Texts, which were just saln from his Pen, and full in his Sight, do strike a very considerable *Light*, as I shall shew by and by, into the Subject; tho' it seems the whole Scripture cou'd not afford him the *least Glimmering* of

of it: But we know who found Fault with the Sun, and where the Fault lay.

Whatever the Reader may think of these Observations, I doubt not but they took the Author of them so very much, that, for fear of losing them when they might come in with some sort of Coherence, they are here inserted, where they have nothing to do, amongst the usual Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*.

We pass on to the Grammatical Signification, or *Etymon* of these Words, which he proposes to *unfold* in the *Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Tongues*: Pag. 198.

But I always thought *Unfoldings* of this Kind, made no great *Discoveries*, since I found the best Critics of my Acquaintance, lay so little Stress upon bare Grammatical Derivations; finding, as I presume, that a Word has but one *Etymon*, tho' it may be disputed which; but often has many Significations: But let us see whether *Estibius*, by better Management, can make more of his *Etymons*.

He tells us, *the first, and most proper Word, according to the Rabbins, that signifies Soul, and more particularly Human Soul, is Neshamah, mention'd principally in the Production of Man, Gen. 2. 7. Man became a Living Soul.* But Transcripts, Ibid.
and

and Second-hand Quotations, are very liable to Mistakes; the word נשמה is not us'd there for Soul, or Living Soul; but נפש for it is לנפש חיה in that Place; altho' before, in the same *Verse*, נשמה is us'd; but to signifie God's breathing into Man the Breath of Life; and indeed, the Radix of it נשם properly signifies *to Breathe*; but is not in that Place put for Human Soul. I do not take notice of this Mistake for its own sake, but because the rectifying of it is of Use here: For as we may observe, that נשמה properly signifies *Breath* (and therefore from that Figurative Expression of the Action of God upon Man, when he gave his Soul, the Soul is also figuratively call'd *Breath*; which utterly defeats *Estibius's* whole Design in this Place) so also I observe, that the word נפש does properly and primarily signifie only *Human Soul*. I will not conceal it from my Adversary, that some Grammarians have endeavour'd to make it originally signifie *Breath* too, by deriving it from נשב by a Transposition of Letters, which signifies *to Breathe*, or נשב to *Blow*; but this is altogether a groundless, and impertinent Piece of *Etymology*: It has no other Ground imaginable, but this, that נפש is us'd in Scripture for *Breath*, which is no Ground at all for that Account; but

but the Use of it must be accounted for thus: As נשמה signifies originally *Breath*, and is borrow'd to signify *Human Soul*, so נפח which originally signifies *Human Soul*, is borrow'd in another Place to signify *Breath*; such a mutual Change of Words being very frequent in the *Hebrew*, by reason it has so few Original Words, and not uncommon in any other Language. And the same Account is the only true one, why the word נפח is afterwards us'd for the *Soul of a Brute*, for *Life*; and by a *Catachresis*, for a *Dead Body*: Which last *Estibius* has lit of; and finding it the most remote Sense from that of a Rational Soul, has let it pass amongst his Genuin Significations, to take its Fate with the Reader; without hinting, that it was there Figuratively us'd.

Now if any the least Weight, is to be fix'd on the Grammatical Sense of Words, it is not unworthy our Observation, that in the first Formation of Man, a Word is us'd to denote his *Soul*; which properly denotes nothing else, and has no Allusive Signification to any thing Material.

The other Word us'd for the Soul in Scripture, is נחם which undoubtedly derives from the Radix נחם to *Breath*, &c. The only Difference between *Estibius* and me, in this Word is, whether or no it must
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be restrain'd to such a Sense, as will Literally agree with the *Etymon* of it: He must hold the Affirmative, or he says nothing for himself; and I am confident, he that says that, will blush at nothing. For it is frequently us'd to signify God himself, or the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, and that with the Incommunicable *יוה* annex't to it: And what then, is GOD himself a Breath or Blast? I desire *Estibius* to *unfold* to me, from what Quarter he came; for hitherto, *Jovis omnia plena*, (a plain Heathenish Invention) has been an Article of my Belief. Shall I fill my Page with the Places where it signifies Angels and Infernal Spirits: Or need I shew him that, in Scripture, it signifies several other things, which tho' Material, have no Affinity with *Breath* or *Air*; for this must be in a Language, where there are not much above 500 radical Words? I think what I have mention'd already abundantly sufficient, and I can assure him, so long as God and Angels are (as he confesses) *reputed Spirits*, this Argument of his will not be in much *Reputation*.

These three are the only Words he takes notice of in Scripture to signify *Human Soul*; omitting, I suppose, the word *לֵב* if ever he met with it; which from *לֵב* properly signi-

signifies the *Heart*, but is sometimes metaphorically put for the *Soul*; for this might make *Heart* (the fleshy Substance on his left side) and *Soul* the same according to him: And indeed it is not less just or true, tho' it looks more absurd, than the Consequence that attends all the rest. The word *חַיָּ* signifying *Life*, and not *Soul*, methinks might have suggested to a Man some Distinction between *Life* and *Soul*, in the Author that so us'd them; and therefore might have been fit to be conceal'd by such a *Grammar-Critic* as *Estibius*; but taking no notice of this, he quotes the word only to shew that *נַפְשׁ* is join'd with it, when both are apply'd to *Brutes*; which he says, *plainly intimates that living Soul there, cannot signifie a spiritual immortal Substance; because living Soul is attributed to Beasts, as well as Man*: Which is as much as to say, it must, and shall signifie the same thing in every place, that it does in one of my chusing; let your *Grammars*, your *Lexicons*, your *Linguists*, and your *Scripture* it self, say what they will to the contrary.

Page 200.

But not to let any thing pass without a wise Observation upon it, it follows, *From these Significations of the Hebrew Words for Soul, Spirit, Mind, Breath, Living Soul, I only make this Observation, that not one of them can, by the most*

Ibid.

extorted Interpretation possible, that I can see, be apply'd to denote a spiritual Substance in Man, as I will demonstrate in its proper Place. Now I am sure, if this could have been demonstrated, from the Signification of the Words, the present had been the proper place to do it in; but I make this Observation, that the present is never the proper Place for Estibius's Demonstrations; they are always either done to his Hand, or refer'd to another Place,

As to the Greek Words $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\piνεῦμα$ I own, for so my *Lexicon* told me at School, that they both in their Themes signify *Breath, Blowing, &c.* But let me ask him one civil Question, do they signify an *immaterial Substance* amongst Heathen Writers, or not? I suppose he will not deny the *Grecians* a Share in the *Heathenish Invention*, and if another Question be not too *troublesome*, as Mr. Bays complains, I must also desire to know what is the Reason for restraining the Sense of the Words, to their *Etymon* only, when they are us'd in Scripture, tho' they were confessedly of much greater Latitude, before the Scripture made use of them: And when I have a sufficient Reason for that, I will believe my Soul to be *Breath*, and, which is more, the *very Breath of my Mouth*.

Estibius

Estibius leaves this Topic, with another of his Observations, *Had that Text,* Pag. 203.
mention'd Gen. 2. 7. design'd Ani-
ma to signifie a substantial Spirit, it is very
probable that the Septuagint wou'd have ex-
press'd it by πνεῦμα, and not ψυχῇ, as being
a Word of more eminent Signification to de-
note Spirituality. Well, I am resolv'd to be-
 lieve at last, for I find both sides are agreed
 upon it, that there is one Word us'd in
 Scripture for *Human Soul*, Heb. 4. 12. &c.
 which is of eminent Signification to denote
Spirituality; tho' I may have shortly an Op-
 portunity of enquiring more strictly in the
 use of this Word.

We come lastly to the Latin *Etymon* of
Anima, and *Spiritus*, which are Ibid.
 much the same with ψυχῇ and
 πνεῦμα; and to prove this, we have several
 Quotations out of *Horace*, *Virgil*, *Persius*,
 and *Terence*. But what is it that he would
 prove? why, *That all Latin Au-* Pag. 206.
thors generally (or if you will,
generally all Latin Authors) cou'd not fix
the primary, and sole genuine Signification of
the word Anima, to make it denote a spiritual
Substance in Man, but rather the contrary.
 In which Sentence those spruce Epithets
Primary, sole, genuine, are worth our Ob-
 servation. As to sole Signification of the
 word *Anima*, he must be a *Psycomathist* in-
 deed,

deed, that restrains it wholly to immaterial Substance; but I find *Estibius* takes leave to feign unheard of *Opinions*, as well as *Names* for his Adversaries; and both together must make them look very frightful. If by *primary* and *genuine* the etymological Signification is meant, I leave the Grammarians to contend which is the borrow'd Signification of *Anima*, *Breath*, or *Soul*; neither side, I presume, will deny that it is us'd for both; but if *primary* and *genuine* mean honestly the first and proper use of the Word, I am of *Estibius's* Opinion, that not the word *Anima* but *Animus* was us'd among the best Latinists, to signify the *rational Soul* of Man, as is plainly intimated by *Juvenal* in that Expression already quoted,

——— *illis*

Tantum animas nobis animum quoque —

tho' the modern Use of them is somewhat different; but I am not apprehensive that he gains the least Ground by this, unless he cou'd prove that no word amongst them, was us'd to denote a *spiritual Substance*; and if he cou'd prove that, which is the thing he ought to prove, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, I shou'd wonder much, how the same Person came to find out this *Spiritual Substance*, to be a plain *Heathenish Invention*; or what secret

secret Correspondence he maintains with the ancient Heathens, besides the Words they have left behind them; for he will not allow their *Words* to import as much, and yet it seems the *Thing* is their Invention.

But the word *Animus* was not fit to be mention'd, for a very good Reason; the Poet had too plainly distinguish'd it before, and if one of the best Prose Writers, and the greatest Philosopher amongst the ancient Latins, had been fit to be consulted, instead of Poets, for the proper and philosophic Sense of the Word; the Passage I am going to cite, might have star'd a little too hard in his Face, it is in Cicero's *Scomnum Scipionis*; *Animus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui prævidet & moderatur, & movet id Corpus cui præpositus est.* Methinks this looks more like a *primary* and *genuine* Signification, than the whole *Index* to Horace or Virgil is likely to furnish out.

There is a well-meaning Observation he makes on this Head, with respect to the word *Manes*, which the Heathens call'd Ghosts, and Souls of Men departed; and this must needs give the Grounds for several Christians to believe, that every one had a good and bad Genius to attend him, which were his Guardian Angels, &c. not I hope to insinuate, that the Bible is of Heathenish Invention; for those that be-

Pag. 204.

lieve it as Christians, ground their Belief upon that Passage of our *Saviour's*, *Their Angels always behold the Face of my Father, which is in Heaven*, Matth. 18. 10. so that they are not all *Heathenish* in this Opinion, whether justly drawn from Scripture or not, unless farther *Grounds* be search'd into, and the *Text* prove *Heathenish* at last.

I have now consider'd (too much at large, I fear,) all that he has advanc'd upon his *various* and *etymological* Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*. The Reader may think all this might have been done in two Words; for if they have various Significations, they cannot be confin'd to the *etymological*; or if they are so confin'd, they can possibly admit of no *Variety* in their Signification; but being resolv'd to undergo the Drudgery of a thorough Examination of his Thoughts, we must be content to take them as they rise, tho' it must be confess'd they rise but very slowly on our Hands; for now that we should have done trifling about Words, and are upon the

II. Part of our Undertaking, which was to urge the Arguments that the Scripture affords us for the Mortality of the Soul, we relapse into our Criticism, and the most mistaken Part of it; as is plain
 Pag. 206. from our Words, *If it appear by the*

the whole Current of Scripture, that Life is properly the Soul of Man, and no Text gives us a sufficient Ground to call it an immaterial Substance, then the Soul of Man will cease to be when the Body dies ; but it appears, &c. He says his Adversaries deny the *minor* Proposition of the *Syllogism*, by saying *Life is but a Consequence of the Soul, and not the Soul it self.* That his Adversaries deny the *minor* is without Dispute, but that they give this Reason for their Denial, is to make these give *non causa pro causa.* A trifling Objection may deserve a suitable Answer, but they do not usually answer with a philosophical Distinction, when Scripture, tho' after a trifling manner, is objected : They say that *Life* and *Soul* being in any part of Scripture distinguished from each other, in their Nature and Properties, proves effectually that they are not the same ; and on the other Hand they maintain, that the promiscuous Use of any Word for both, proves nothing to the contrary. Against the first of these nothing is said, but enough, I suppose, presum'd to be said before ; but not to look back too far, we find *πνεῦμα* compar'd with *ψυχή* acknowledg'd to be a Word of more eminent Signification, and to denote Spirituality.

Pag. 203.

This he has granted, and that it is no such exorbitant Grant, as to give him any Pre-
tence

tence for a Resumption, appears from what I have said concerning the frequent use of it to denote God himself, the most eminent Spirit. And as to created Spirits, it is apply'd to them expressly by the *Septuagint*, *1 Kings* 22. 21. and *2 Chron.* 18. 20. in both which Places we have an Account of *Ahab's* Delusion by false Prophets, and theirs by a deluding Spirit: The Context tells us, *The Lord said, who shall go out and tempt Ahab? and one said on this manner, and another said on that manner*; and then it follows in both places, *καὶ ἐξῆλθε πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔστη ἐνώπιον κυρίου, καὶ εἶπεν, &c.* all which are as properly personal Acts, and do as necessarily suppose a real Person to persuade the Prophets, as they are suppos'd to be that persuaded *Ahab*. But the Application of this Word to created Spirits, is still more express in the New Testament, *Luke* 24. 39. *Behold*, says our Saviour; *my Hands and my Feet, that it is I myself; handle me, and see, ὅτι πνεῦμα σαρκὸς καὶ ὀστέα ἐκ ἐχθ*, for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones. Which Words, as they suppose that both our Saviour and his Disciples did believe the Existence of separate Spirits, so they plainly determine the word *πνεῦμα* to that sense; and shew that it cannot properly denote any thing material. And, to mention no more, *Acts* 23. 8, 9. It is co-significant, as to Immateriality, with

with Angel, so that when the *Pharisees* urg'd in behalf of *St. Paul*, that if an Angel or Spirit hath spoken unto him, let us not fight against God; we find the *Sadducees* in the next Verse made a *Dissention*, not upon the *Word*, I presume, but the *Thing*; and therefore let never *Sadducee* for the future, attempt to get over πνεῦμα to his side.

If then this Word, according to both the Bible and *Eftibius*, be of such eminent Signification, as to denote Spirituality; it will be of Moment to enquire whether it is ever, and in a proper Sense, applied to the Soul of Man: And to mention but one for all from the *Septuagint*, *Zach. 12. 1.* Saith the Lord, which stretcheth out the Heavens, and layeth the Foundation of the Earth, καὶ πλάσων πνεῦμα ἄνθρωπος ἐν ὠτῇ, and formeth the Spirit of Man within him. This Text plainly shews in what Sense God is said to be the Father of Spirits, *Heb. 12. 9.* Mr.

Vitanimist answers to an Objection urg'd against him, That his Hypothesis robs God of being the Father of Spirits; If I deny Man to have a Spirit, is not God the Father of Angels, who are so often call'd Spirits? This is all he returns to the Objection; and therefore whether he denies the Existence of Human Spirit, or not, he does maintain it reasonable to interpret God's being

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P. 117.

being the *Father of Spirits*, of the *angelical*, exclusive of *Human Spirit*. The Text already quoted is the only place of Scripture that I can find this Expression in, so that this Interpretation must refer to it, as it stands there; the whole Verse runs thus, *Farthermore we have had Fathers of our Flesh, which corrected us, and we gave them Reverence; shall we not much rather be in Subjection unto the Father of Spirits, and live? For, as it follows, they [the Fathers of our Flesh] verily for a few Days chasten'd us after their own Pleasure; but he [the Father of our Spirits] for our Profit, &c.* I desire him but to read this plain Text once more without *Critic* or *Commentator*; and then tell me in what Sense he owns, and in what Sense he disowns God to be his *Father which is in Heaven*. To return to the fore-mention'd Text, it admits of no possible Evasion, as to the purpose it is brought to serve; but clearly exposes the Weakness of that critical Remark, *had the Text, mention'd Gen. 2. 7. design'd Anima to signifie a substantial Spirit, it is very probable that the Septuagint wou'd have express'd it by πνεῦμα and not ψυχή. &c.* For we find the Septuagint expressing the very same thing by πνεῦμα, which wounds *Estibius* with his own Weapon, and puts the Recovery beyond his Skill. And as the Original of Human Soul in Scripture proves

proves it to be of a *spiritual* Nature, so does the Consummation of it in Glory, *Heb. 12. 23.* when we come to the heavenly *Jerusalem*, we shall also come to the *Spirits* πνεύμασι of just Men made perfect. Accordingly the *Proto-martyr*, in view of Heaven, prays Lord Jesus, receive τὸ πνεῦμα μου, *my Spirit*, *Acts 7. 59.* just as his expiring Lord, who shew'd him the way thither, cry'd with a loud Voice, *Father, into thy Hands I commend my Spirit*, *Luke 23. 46.* I hope *Estibius* will not say that *Stephen*, and the rest of the primitive Saints had a Soul, which the generality of Mankind have not; tho' he may as well make that Distinction, as say they had a peculiar Immortality; but to obviate this, *St. Paul* advises, in the Case of those that were at a much greater distance from Heaven, *to deliver such an one up to Satan, for the Destruction of the Flesh; that the Spirit* ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα *may be saved in the Day of the Lord*, *1 Cor. 5. 5.* besides this plain and positive Account, that there was at first, and shall be finally, to all Eternity, an *Human Spirit*; the present Distinction between that and the Body, carries with it the Divine Authority of Scripture, not only as a just Consequence from hence, but as the express Declaration of Scripture it self. It is made the Seat of Understanding, which the Body is incapable of; *there is a Spirit*
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in Man, says Job, and the Inspiration of the Almighty giveth them Understanding, Job 32. 8. And again, 1 Cor. 2. 11. What Man knoweth the Things of a Man, save the Spirit of Man which is in him; even so the Things of God knoweth no Man, but the Spirit of God. Where also this Spirit of Man, is compar'd, for the Reality and Truth both of its Knowledge and Personality, with the Spirit of God; and let me tell Estibius, it would be a blasphemous Derogation from the Spirit of God, to define him only Afflatus Dei, or a Power. The Spirit of Man is also distinguish'd from his Body as a different Object of the sanctifying Power of God; 1 Thess. 1. 23. where, after St. Paul had implor'd the very God of Peace to sanctifie them wholly, ὁλοῦς ἦεν, their perfect, integral Nature, reiterates his Petition in Particulars; And I pray God your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Why Soul, as well as Spirit, is enumerated, I shall have occasion to enquire anon; it is sufficient that the Spirit is distinguish'd here, as the supreme Faculty of Human Nature, and a part of him under the first Care of Almighty God: And lastly, that each Part being under a particular Influence of the Divine Grace, shou'd in return, be particularly devoted to the Service of God, St. Paul makes
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the Distinction, if possible, clearer still; *for ye are bought with a Price, therefore glorifie God in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are God's*, 1 Cor. 6. 20. *Estibius*, should we give him up *πνεῦμα*, as he, with greater Reason, has given it up to us, must make St. Paul speak in this Text but very mean, if any Sense; *Glorifie God in your Body, and in your Life*, is his reading; but if the Body be *alive*, the Term, *Life*, is redundant, and there is but very little meaning in all the latter part of the Verse, *in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are God's*. But do's not the Scripture often express the same thing by Variety of Words? Yes; but never makes at the same time a Contradistinction, in the things, which the plain Sense of these Words does: *Ye* [your whole Nature] *are bought with a Price*, [the Blood of our Saviour] *therefore glorifie God*, in [each part of you] *your Body, and in your Spirit, which* [the one as well as the other] *are God's*.

These are abundantly sufficient, tho' they are not all the Texts that might be alledged to this purpose; and this I think is no small Point gain'd, that a Word apparently, and in the Judgment of both sides, of eminent Signification, to denote Spirituality, shou'd be apply'd to the Soul of Man by the Scripture, where it is most properly and literally speaking of the Soul, and can be understood of nothing

nothing else; especially not of that which is nearest to it, the Body; when the Creator is declaring its *Original*, setting forth its *Faculties* and *Operations*, proposing the true *End* and *Design*, and foretelling the *Duration* of it.

To return to the Objector's *Syllogism*, of which this is the *minor* Proposition, *It appears by the whole Current of Scripture,*
 Pag. 207. *that Life is properly the Soul of Man, and no Text gives us a sufficient Ground to call it an immaterial Substance.* This Proposition I deny'd, and in order to make good my Denial, that there are some Texts to give us this Ground, I have prov'd by such an Evidence, as my Adversary can by no possible means avoid the Force of, unless by denying and retracting a plain Truth, and one of his own asserting; and having carry'd him so far, it's high time to leave him to the Reader's Judgment.

As to the *Current of Scripture*, I have also hinted to this purpose, that the promiscuous Use of Words (suppose *Life* and *Soul*) how often soever in any one Author, does not declare his Judgment, (nor therefore can his Authority be urg'd to prove) that the Thing is the same: but on the contrary, if in any one or more pertinent and remarkable Passages, he does plainly and industriously distinguish the Things, this proves that they are distinct

distinct in his Judgment; and the promiscuous Use of the Words, tho' it should be thro' the whole *Current* of his Writing, proves nothing at all to the contrary; nor argues any Inconsistency in the Author; nor so much as Impropriety of Speech; if the Language he writes in will account for it. And this also I take to be so evident, that, without more Words, I submit it.

By what I have said in answer to this Proposition, I wou'd persuade *Estibius* to believe, that as strong as his Reasoning is, he is not always Master of his Adversary's Sense; for he seems not to have foreseen any thing like such an Answer, when he puts into our Mouths only this Distinction for our full Answer, *That Life is not the Soul, but the consequent of it.* Pag. 207.

Let us see what he says to this Distinction; and, tho' it must be confess'd that he's but a very weak Disputant, that falters when he has both *Ob.* and *Sol.* of his own managing; yet we shall find that *Estibius* has not said enough to invalidate this Solution. *First*, he says, *that such an Assertion is not reasonable to be granted, be-* Ibid.

cause the Psycomuthist supposes, and not proves the Existence of such a spiritual Substance. This is said purely in Ignorance of the Laws and Method of Dispute, which allow the Respondent to *suppose*, and oblige the Ob-

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jector to prove all along; however one of these I hope has done more than suppose the Distinction, before he undertook to defend it. 2dly, Says he, *Because the very Words signifying Soul, do not, in the Sense of three Languages, denote anything more than Life; nor give the least Umbrage to call it a spiritual Substance.* From whence I conclude, if I may presume to conclude anything from it, that never any Man who wrote in these three Languages, cou'd by Soul mean a *spiritual Substance*; let the Scripture, Aristotle, and Tully explain themselves (which I have shewn they have done) as clearly for such a meaning, as an intelligible Writer need to do to an intelligent Reader. 3dly, He says, *because if Life were only a consequent, or necessary effect of the Soul, then Knowledge, as its inseparable Attribute, wou'd attend that Soul to its place of Existence; and consequently even dead Men wou'd know, or have Knowledge; but we never heard, or read of any Lazarus rais'd from the Dead, that ever pretended to give us the least account from the other World; which methinks is very strange, such an intelligent Being as our Soul is call'd, shou'd not in some Cases be able to do.* I do not intend, throughout this Discourse, to meddle with the *Prophane History of Apparitions.* For, tho' I am as fully persuaded of the Truth of some
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of these Relations, as I am that there were such Persons in the World as those of whom they are related ; yet I am not willing my supposed Credulity shou'd be made a Plea for any Man's Infidelity ; and I am entirely of this Opinion, that they, especially they who after an Examination, reject all the other Evidence there is for the separate, as well as future State, are far from deserving, and wou'd be as far from making a right Use of such Conviction : but the Sight, as well as the Story, wou'd with them, as surely, tho' perhaps not so soon, turn into a Jest.

But to the Objection. It's true we read of but one *Lazarus* actually rais'd from the Dead ; and he gives no Account of the separate State, in which he had been four Days (for he that rais'd him was better able to do that, and had another End in raising of him ;) but we read of another *Lazarus*, that was solicited to come from that State, and give an Account of it in this. To come, I say, from the intermediate State, for such must be the State *Dives* was in, while his Brethren were alive upon Earth ; therefore his Request proves the thing at least barely possible, tho' we make a Parable of the whole Relation : For I believe none of our Blessed Saviour's Parables proceed upon impossible *Suppositions*. And if it be possible for a *Lazarus* to come from such a State,

then there is actually such a State ; and that's as full Proof as if he did actually come from it. I know not what *Estibius* will say to this, unless it be that God might revive *Lazarus* to work the Repentance of those Sinners ; and that this wou'd more effectually do it, than his ordinary Dispensation : But then I ask, where was *Dives* all this while ? I am sure *Knowledge*, a sad experimental Knowledge, was his *inseparable Attribute* in that State ; and I wou'd desire to know, what Argument *Lazarus*, on Supposition he had gone the Errand, cou'd make use of, besides the Frightfulness of his own Appearance (and that was to convince them of the separate State,) or what sort of an Account his wou'd have been of a State of Annihilation. But I think *Abraham's* Answer confirms the Reality of the separate State, by giving so just a Reason why *Lazarus* does not appear from it ; and not telling him, as before, where he pray'd that *Lazarus* might be sent for some time to his Place of Torment, that the Gulph was fix'd, and the Way impassable.

This was the Case of one of the two *Lazarus's* we read of in Scripture ; and had the mention of the other brought this to mind, it shou'd have stop'd, methinks,
 Pag. 208. that *Rant* that follows ; No, no, it is all a *Popish Fable* ; and the Return
 of

of the Souls from the Dead, or any Purgatory, nought but an advantageous Fiction. All a Popish Fable! I am sorry to hear the Primitive Fathers were Papists: For they, as *Estibius* often tells us, thro' great Ignorance held the separate Existence of the Soul. He brings it as an Objection against the Pre-existence of Human Souls, that it is not to be found in Church-Historians; and his Reading must not be disputed as to that Point; but in what Church-Historian he found Popery and Purgatory as old as Christianity, or the first Centuries of it, I cannot, nor I hope can he himself tell. Pag. 76.

From hence to Pag. 213 he takes occasion to explain his meaning of Life and Soul being the same; particularly by the *Parallel of Light*; in which No- Pag. 211. tion he seems to be wonderfully delighted, and to expatiate in expressing it for a Page and half. It is too tedious to transcribe, and too metaphorical to set down as an Objection; but here is the Sense, and doubtless the Original of this elegant Simile. *As when the Sun Beams shine into a dark Room, and enlighten it, you may easily exclude it from shining into the Room, but can never intercept, or cut those Beams off from their Original, the Sun: The like Relation they [the Hea-* Blount Anima Mundi, p. 27.

thens] conceived the Soul of Man had to the Soul of the World, whereunto it ever hath an inseparable Conjunction. Now I wou'd not have *Estibius* over-rate his *Fancy* or *Invention* in this Simile; for *Mr. Blount*, who embrac'd it as eagerly, confesses nevertheless that it was a plain *Heathenish Invention*. And this, in *Estibius's* own Stile, is, I fear, piercing him with an Arrow out of his own Quiver. This pretty way of Argumentation may pass with some Gentlemen however; especially if what went before, has gone down with them; for it is much at one to use *Similes* instead of *Arguments*, and to quote *Poets* for *Philosophers*.

The second grand Argument is this, What
 Pag. 213. was to have been immortal in a State of Innocence, became mortal by Transgression: But whole Man was to have been immortal in a state of Innocence; Ergo Whole Man, &c. He calls this a grand Argument, but in truth it is at best but a grand Sophism; that is, a grand Cheat put upon those that are convinc'd by it. Death, in our Notion, is Dissolution; now is there any thing in the Fall that contradicts this Notion? Wou'd not Human Nature, had it continu'd for ever undissolv'd, have been properly stil'd Immortal? Again, had this Dissolution been threatned expressly, and in that very Word to lapsable Man, might not this

this have properly been call'd dying of the Person; tho' his Soul, a part of him, surviv'd? If not, the only Question is about the Propriety of the word *Death*; and I leave him to bestow his next learned Pains upon that.

But let us try to point out the Fallacy of this Sophism, as we have prov'd it must be fallacious; the Threat runs in these Words, *In the Day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.* The Question is, what is to be understood by *thou*? which strictly taken implies the whole Man, or more properly, the Person of Man; that Being, as resulting from the Union of Soul and Body, say we, of Body and Life, says *Estibius*. In the first Place, whole Man may as well be understood for a part of him, as a part must be understood for the whole: but waving that, and supposing that the Person of Man does properly die, or undergo Death, his Soul is not thereby involv'd in the same Fate with his Body; for what is Death, in *Estibius's* Notion, but a Separation of Life from the Body? does then Life die? *That*, he says, *is a Solæcism to affirm*, p. 211. but it returns to God, as the excluded Ray to the Sun. Well then *Life* must go to make up the whole Man; but the whole Man, in this Sense, cannot die without a *Solæcism*: Therefore *Estibius* must interpret the Threat-

ning to extend to the *taking away*, not *killing* his Life ; and then may not this as well signify the *taking away*, not *killing* his Soul ? If he will but stand to this meaning of his own, which is not only his but Mr. *Blount's*, and all theirs that hold the same Opinion, I will admit the whole *Syllogism*, as unconcerning the Argument ; since *whole Man's becoming mortal by Transgression*, which is his Conclusion, cannot be so understood as to exclude a surviving Part of him. But then let him not vainly imagine his *Syllogism* the more perfect, because I have deny'd no Proposition of it ; for *admitting* the whole, in the Sense that I have done, is in a true and proper Sense, *rejecting* the whole.

He urges farther upon this Head, *If the*
Pag. 214. *Body by the Curse only became mortal, then the Bodies-only of the Reprobate, not Souls, can be liable to Damnation, because that only is punishable which sinned, as the Civilians say, Pæna sequitur Culpam ; and that only sinned which suffered the Punishment, that is the Body only, if the Soul be immortal, and was not doom'd to bear its Share in the Punishment, Death.* I answer,
 1st, The Body, understood in Contradistinction from the Soul, is, as I have often said, neither concern'd in Sin nor Punishment.
 2^{dly}, The Soul does bear its Share, as he
 calls

calls it, in the Punishment, Death; which are the Pains and Terrors, at least preceding Death; the inevitable Consequence of its Union, and Sympathy with the Body.

3dly, There is, in the Scripture Language, besides a *temporal* Death, both a *spiritual*, and an *eternal* Death; in the *spiritual* Death, the reprobate Soul has its Share in Punishment, even while united with the Body; in the *eternal* Death it has so large a Share, that it cannot bear it, which is sufficient to clear up this Scruple, and that which follows it, *If nothing died but Man's*

Body, the Denunciation of the Curse Pag. 216.

was but a meer Bugbear, &c. To which he makes his Adversary reply, *That by his Transgression once, he became afterward subject to Sin; and so to final Condemnation.*

To which his Answer is, *Before he sinned he was subject to Sin.* And who, I wonder, is his Adversary in this? but what's this to eternal Misery being included in the Threatning? which is one thing, tho' not all his Adversaries have to say. But whether God made Death intelligible to *Adam*, in this large Sense, or not; and whether or no he understood his Nature to be compounded as we do; yet, methinks, the threatening of Death cou'd, upon no imaginable Supposition, be a *meer Bugbear* to one in the highest Enjoyment, and Perfection of Life.

The

The only thing he farther urges, as a Confirmation of this Argument, is the Unsuitableness to Divine Justice, *that the Body*
Ibid. *shou'd suffer, more than the Soul which escapes the first Death;* being grounded, as I have just shewn, on a false Notion both of the suffering of the Body, and escaping of the Soul, I need only mention, and pass on to his.

Third Argument, drawn from the Nature of the Resurrection, which it
Pag. 217. seems our Opinion perplexes, if not totally subverts. This is what one wou'd not easily find out at first Sight, but wou'd rather be apt to ask himself, if he can doubt of it, such Questions as these; Why may not my Body be rais'd, by the Power of God, as well to be re-united to my Soul, as to be re-impower'd with Life; Does not the Resurrection relate wholly to my Body, and the material Parts of it? how then can I expect to find out by that, *no medium*, whether Life and Soul is the same thing? But these are only *first Thoughts*, and *Estibius* has done with all such, tho' in reality his *Second Thoughts* upon this Argument are only the same, a *second*, or rather many times repeated; for all the Support of this Objection is the old Mistake, if I may so call it, that the Body properly speaking, suffers in another Life. I say,
 if

if I may call it a Mistake, without adding wilful; for it follows, and at a small distance, another Notion that cou'd not but discover it to the Objector, viz. *The Body is only a pure passive Lump and Instrument of the Soul*; tho' a little before it is taken for granted, as an avow'd Tenent of ours, that this passive Lump shall have its Share in Punishment, distinct from that of the Soul in the future World. But then, says he, *this is not reviving the Body, but only joining a living Soul to it.* As much reviving, say I, as the Body is now alive; and that's a full Answer to all that he objects in five Pages.

Pag. 217.

But he urges the Resurrection against us from *the end of it*; which we are agreed is *the bringing Men to Account for the Deeds done in the Flesh.* And how do we make this Judgment vain and needless, by making the Souls go immediately to Heaven or Hell; and so having their ultimate End and Reward? I thank God I did not learn the Doctrines of my Religion from *Estibius*, for then I should certainly have been on his side. He can bring a Doctrine to his Opinion, when he cannot reconcile his Opinion to *that*: For my part I esteem the Condition of a Prisoner in order to his Trial, conscious to himself of the capital Crime he is accus'd of, to be miserable, and

Pag. 222.

a part

a part of his Punishment; and yet the sober part of Mankind will not think his following Sentence *vain and needless*; tho' *Estibius* must think so, and also that the Angels

Jude 6. being reserv'd in everlasting Chains

under Darkness, unto the Judgment of the great Day, is vain and needless. This is a sufficient Answer if I had not farther accounted for a general Judgment, as I have done *Part I. §. 13.* But it seems he knows,

Pag. 225. tho' I do not, some Divines that urge

the Necessity of a general Judgment, notwithstanding Mens being glorify'd or condemn'd before hand: That Sinners may, in the Face of the World, be convict and brought to publick Shame for their Offences; and that the righteous may, in like manner, be publickly commended and rewarded. This, he says, is a very pretty Notion indeed, to please vulgar Heads, and cozen a rustick Understanding into the Obedience of Religion, and Belief of a Resurrection; and so far I like it well. I hope he does not like it well that there shou'd be cozening Arguments in Religion, but only that Divines should use such. What Divines they are that place the Necessity of a general Judgment in this, I know not; I am sure tho' they differ from him in this, they are just of his Size, in another respect. But Divines indeed, do assign this as one good Use of a general Judgment, and therefore

fore as a Reason for it. Against this Reason he urges the Case of those that die hard, as they call it, at *Tyburn*; who will therefore, according to him, out-brave the Terrors of the Lord. Such are *Estibius's* Notions of Human Nature, and Eternal Misery, that those who can look a deserved *Death*, shall be able to look *Hell* in the Face with Courage. Pag. 225.
& 226.

His fourth Argument is drawn from the Nature of our Redemption, *That which fell by Transgression, requir'd, by Christ's Blood, Redemption:* But Adam, or the whole Man fell by Transgression; Ergo, The whole Man requir'd, by Christ's Blood, Redemption. The Reader I am sure is already furnish'd with a pertinent Answer, to this impertinent *Syllogism*; they are such, and only such Divines as he lately mention'd, who hold that the Soul did not fall; tho' it was by an Act of the Will that Man fell. And the Argument is founded upon a *Petition Principii*, that the Person dying, as to this World, cannot have a surviving Part in another. And so I hasten to the

III. And chief Part of our Undertaking in this Chapter; which was to consider the several Expressions and Texts of Scripture, quoted by *Estibius*, to prove that the Soul of Man, or Life, as he calls it, will not be renewed

newed until the Day of the Resurrection; and on the other hand to enquire whether there is any Proof to be fetch'd from thence, for a surviving part of Human Nature. As to the Texts quoted by *Estibius*, to do him all the Justice I can, I shall here take notice of those he has scatter'd throughout his Book, as well as those he has urg'd in this Chapter; and to do all this with as much Clearness and Brevity as I can, I shall reduce all that he has urg'd, together with some other Texts I shall mention, to these four Heads. 1st, Those that are quite beside the Point, and altogether foreign to the Purpose. 2^{dly}, Those that do in some Degree relate to the point in hand; but leave it altogether undecided, and are equally interpretable on our *Hypothesis*. 3^{dly}, Those that plainly incline to our side of the Question, and are, with more Clearness and Consistency, to be interpreted on ours, than the contrary *Hypothesis*. 4^{thly}, Those that necessarily suppose our *Hypothesis*, and cannot be interpreted either with Clearness or Consistency, without taking it for granted.

1st, *Estibius* must not take it ill, that there are some Texts quoted in *Second Thoughts*, altogether beside the Point, and foreign to the Purpose; and many of these out of that one Book of *Job*.

Page 73.

As an hidden untimely Birth I had not been,

been, as *Infants which never saw Light*, Job 3. 16. and again, *Wherefore then hast thou brought me forth out of the Womb; oh! that I had given up the Ghost, and no Eye had seen me*, Chap. 10. 18. As the Cloud is consumed and vanisheth away; so he that goeth down to the Grave shall come up no more, Chap. 7. 9. Again, *For vain Man wou'd be wise, tho' Man be born like a wild Ass's Colt*, Chap. 11. 12. All Flesh shall perish together, and Man shall turn again unto Dust, Chap. 34. 15. Why died I not from the Womb? why did I not give up the Ghost when I came out of the Belly? why did the Knees prevent me, &c. Chap. 3. 11. & 12. Once more, And why doest thou not pardon my Transgression, and take away mine Iniquity? for now shall I sleep in the Dust, and thou shalt seek me in the Morning, but I shall not be, Chap. 7. 21. And lastly, *So Man lieth down, and riseth not till the Heavens be no more; they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their Sleep*, Chap. 14. 12. These, with several others already answer'd out of Job, were they pertinent Quotations, a Stranger to the Book of Job, wou'd certainly believe it was wrote against the Immortality of the Soul; but if he came once to look into it, he wou'd discover, with a running Eye, that there is not one Word, throughout the whole, relating

Pag. 104.

Pag. 157.

Pag. 229.

Pag. 233.

relating to this Controversie, whether the Soul be a *Substance* or *Power*. Cou'd any Man, that gave the least Attention to the Sense and Design of the Author, interpret, *not being as an hidden untimely Birth*, to imply a State of *non Existence*, philosophically speaking ; and not barely a State of Freedom, from the Calamities he then labour'd under ? or that *Job* shou'd think *that a non ens*, which *no Eye sees* ; or *the Man that goeth down to the Grave, and cometh up no more*, shou'd exclude the Soul from a separate Existence ? when in the very next Verse he explains himself, *he shall return no more to his House*, &c. Chap. 7. 10. At this rate, if a Man does but stir out of his Doors, he's in danger of losing his Being ; or that one of *Job's* Comforters shou'd intend to throw this mortifying Proposition in his Teeth, *Brutes think and reason in some Degree* ; and when he says, *Man is born like a wild Ass's Colt* ; that he makes a Parity, not of *Ignorance*, but of *Souls* ; and is, proleptically, an Anti-Cartesian, enquiring into the Principle of Life, Sensation, and Reasoning in Man and Beast. Or that another of them, where he says, *Man shall turn again into Dust*, must be understood to include the Soul of Man, even tho' he join'd it with this Expression, *all Flesh shall perish together*, Job 34. 15. or that this miserable

Man,

Man, wishing he had given up the Ghost when he came out of the Belly, and that the Knees had prevented him; is not reflecting at all upon his present Condition, but teaching the World this, for a Divine Truth, that the Soul does not survive the Body. Or that complaining Almighty Vengeance found him out Day and Night, and imploring that God wou'd release him from his Affliction, and his Life together; for then, says he, *he shou'd seek me in the Morning, but I shou'd not be*; I say, that this *be shou'd* be taken in the strictest Sense, in the Translation; altho' it is not at all in the Original; and that Job thought nothing less than Annihilation cou'd put an end to his Misery. Or lastly, that *Man's rising not till the Heavens be no more*, proves that he does not live in another World; and *not being raised out of their Sleep*, must include a Sleep of the Soul, and intellectual Faculties, as well as a Sleep from the Weariness and Vexations of Life; tho' in the next Verse but one he is clear, *If a Man die, shall he live again?* And elsewhere plainly declares what he means by calling Death a Sleep, *for there the weary be at rest*, Chap. 3. 17. These and many more such Suppositions *Estibius* must make, before he can bring one pertinent Text out of Job; and till he shews it reasonable that such Suppositions shou'd be made, which hitherto he

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has

has discreetly wav'd, his Texts are here re-ferr'd to their proper Head.

But these are not the only foreign Texts in his Book ; for to omit all those he has brought in Confirmation of the foreign Meaning, he has pickt out of the Words Soul and Spirit, which can appertain to the Subject, no more than we have shewn those Significations do ; what else are all those Places to prove a Resurrection, or to determin something about the manner of it ?

Pag. 152. Such as, *The Hour is coming, in which all that are in the Grave shall hear his Voice, and shall come forth ; they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life,* John 5. ver. 25. For all such are plainly unconcern'd in the Dispute ; which, tho' *Estibius* often forgets it, is confin'd to the intermediate State, antecedent to the Re-union of Soul and Body.

To the same Head belong all those Texts in Scripture, which compare, and parallel Man and Beast : I instance only in that of *Ecclesiastes*, which *Estibius* produces in this Chapter, as a Pattern of all the rest he had so often urg'd upon his good natur'd Reader, *That which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts ; as one dieth, so doth the other ; yea they have all one Breath, so that a Man hath no Pre-eminence above a Beast,* Eccles. 3. 19. It is plain this
Compa-

Comparison is not made to run of all four, nor the Parallel to reach the whole Condition of Man and Beast; for this the Scripture contradicts when it expressly gives *Adam*, and in him all his Posterity, the Dominion and Superiority over Brutes: but how then hath Man *no Pre-eminence above the Beast*? In *Death* and the *Consequences* of it, *Estibius* must say, or his Interpretation belongs to the same Head with his Text. That it relates to *Death* (their equal Necessity, and their like manner of dying) the Text is express; but that it takes in the *Consequences* of Death, nothing is intimated in the Text, nor can possibly be drawn from it, if *Solomon* may be suppos'd less liable than *Estibius* is, to contradict himself; for if the Case is the same in *any*, why not in *all* the *Consequences* of their respective Deaths; and then a future Judgment falls in with the rest; but I am persuaded *Solomon* cou'd not have forgot in this, what he had said but two Verses before; *I said in mine Heart God shall judge the righteous and the wicked*. Nor will *Estibius's* usual Force upon Scripture stand him in stead here. I suppose he wou'd be bold to say upon the Place, that *Solomon* design'd to carry on the Parallel to the Day of Judgment, and break it off there; but I shall undeniably prove upon him, before we part,

that *Solomon*, in this Book, makes a wide Difference in their *Exit*, as to the immediate Consequences of it. Now the Reader must judge whether such Quotations are not foreign, which found a Parallel upon that, which is no way the Subject of our Dispute. Even God and his Creatures agree in something ; but I should call it an impertinent Argument, if it were made use of either to deify them, or mortalize him.

Of Kin to this Argument, but of no Relation to the Subject, are those Texts that
 pag. 239. compare Death with *Sleep*, and *Rest* ;
Blessed are the Dead which die in the Lord, for they rest from their Labours, Rev. 14. 13. This, he says, proves against *Purgatory* ; but I must say, that is not against us. *Job* has admirably paraphras'd all the Texts of this kind, *There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest ; there the Prisoners rest together ; they hear not the Voice of the Oppressor : the small and great is there, and the Servant is free from his Master*, Job 3. 17, 18, 19. Now I desire to know who disputes against this Notion of Death, that it removes us entirely from the Concerns of this World, and sweeps away all Distinction belonging to it. But there is a farther Sense in these Places which mention Saints sleeping in *Jesus*, &c. And this seems to imply their Hope and Assu-
 rance

rance of a Resurrection ; but whether such Expressions look back upon this State, or forward to the Resurrection, they are out of the Sphere of our Controversie, because they say nothing of the intermediate State. *Estibius* illustrates his Notion, by the Greek and Latin Words for a Church Yard, or burying Place, *καμηλήριον*, *Cæmeterium*, and in the Latin *Dormitorium*; because, Pag. 232. says he, *there all Men rest from their Labours* ; to let us understand, I suppose, that his *Argument* and his *Etymon* are equally concern'd in the Dispute ; for who knows not the meaning of the *Etymon* ? and as to a future Judgment, we have already excluded that from the Point in Hand. After all I cannot find what he drives at, or can expect to his Advantage, if the Comparison were literally to be understood ; for *Estibius* is to me the same Man alive, sleeping, and waking ; his animal Functions, I presume, are carry'd on perpetually in both States ; and it does not appear that Life and Soul, as well as Sense, has left him asleep ; so that literally the Simile cannot be brought to do him Service ; and if he will strain it so far as to say, that as Men asleep here forget the World ; so those that die are annihilated, he's as impertinent in his Gloss, as in his Quotation ; for to suppose the Question in Dispute, is really to speak nothing to it.

But we have not yet done with foreign Matter from the Scripture; Death in several Places there is call'd simply a not being; Pag. 233. *thus Joseph is not, Simeon is not, Gen. 42. 36. Thou shalt seek me in the Morning, and I shall not be, Job 7. 21. O spare me a little, that I may recover my Strength, before I go hence, and be no more, Psal. 39. 13, &c.* From whence he concludes thus; Pag. 234. *All which Places must imply, by not being, a total Dissolution; or otherwise the Expressions wou'd be very improper: And yet notwithstanding this must imply, I have ventur'd to rank them amongst those that imply nothing to the purpose; the Reason of this must imply lies in this, the Expressions otherwise will be very improper; but hold a little, then all Words must be examin'd according to their strict and philosophical Meaning; and their Propriety must depend not upon their Use, but their grammatical Construction; this must imply therefore, I say again, was a little too forward, all things consider'd; but we shall find it a little unfortunate too; for if Estibius will stand to it, that this is a very improper Expression, upon our Supposition; the next Step he takes shall be to maintain, that the Scripture speaks improperly. He says he's got through the Bible, but I must send him back to Gen. 5. 24. where are these Words, Enoch walked with God,*

God, and was not ; for God took him : Let me here inform *Estibius*, that the same Word *וְאֵין* is us'd for *Enoch's*, and for the suppos'd *not being*, of *Joseph* and *Simeon* ; how then did *Enoch not be* ? Did he undergo a total *Dissolution*, when God took him ? that's contrary to the Relation. Or is the Fault in the Sons of the Prophets, whose Translation of the Bible, *Estibius* says, is *abominably absurd in many Places* ? that is not the Case here ; for, whether *Estibius* knew a word of the Matter or not, he has quoted the same Word on his own side. Or is indeed the Stile of Scripture in it self improper and *abominably absurd* ? this he must come to at last, or quit the Objection. But God be thanked the Propriety of the sacred Text, will never be impugn'd by such half, or rather half quarter Critics : Every ordinary *Lexicon* will shew him that *וְאֵין* the Radix of this Word, which properly signifies *nihil*, is as frequently us'd, by an *Ellipsis*, for *tanquam, sicut, quasi nihil* : And if so, then in all the rest of the Texts of the Old Testament, where 'tis us'd, and those of the New, where the Expression is borrowed, it must be interpreted by the Sense and Occasion of the Words it is join'd with : Which I will leave the Reader to consult at his Leisure, with this Assurance, that he will never find the Expression relate

to the State of the Dead, consider'd in it self, but only to the Deprivation of Life, and what belongs to that ; to the Persons disappearing from among Mortals, and being, to this World, as if they had never been.

I request the Reader's Patience, till I present him with but one more Specimen of Texts of Scripture, that have nothing to do with the Business in hand ; and then I shall draw nearer to it. It is of those Ex-

Pag. 229. *pressions of the Dead's knowing nothing, and not praising God. The*

former, Eccles. 9. 5. The Dead know not any thing, neither have they any more Reward, for the Memory of them is forgotten. And the

Far. Th. *latter, Psal. 115. 17. The Dead Praise*
p. 29. *not the Lord, neither any that go down to Silence ; but we will bless the Lord, &c.*

To which he adds that of Hezekiah's Thanksgiving for his Life ; *the Grave cannot praise thee, Death cannot celebrate thee, Isa. 38. 18.*

As to their *knowing nothing*, the Place shews plainly to what Subject that belongs ; for it follows, *neither have they any Reward* : This understood, as *Estibius* would have it, destroys all hopes of a future Life ; but 'tis not to be understood so, because it follows again, *for the Memory of them is forgotten* ; this must be confin'd to the present Life, unless *Estibius* will suppose it to mean, that
what

what they did here is forgotten in the other World; and this limiting the Sense of their *Reward*, does equally limit the Sense, in which they are said to *know nothing*. But if this will not satisfy him, let him read the very next Verse, *As their Love and their Hatred, and their Envy is now perished; neither have they any more a Portion for ever, in any thing that is done under the Sun*. And then let him, if he can, bring it home to the Subject. But there is more stir about *the Dead not praising God*; that, it seems, deserves farther Thoughts upon it. Mr. Turner had interpreted both these Passages to import, that the Duty of Praise (meaning such as theirs was) cou'd be available only in this probationary Life; and that in these Expressions they had no Consideration of the State after Death. Mr. Vitanimist objects to this, *It makes the Reason of praising God cease, because they cannot better their State and Condition; whereas God requires from Angels, in perfect Bliss, eternal Praise*. Not so fast, I beseech you, the Reason of Praise does not cease in another State, because the Reason of praising him for what we receive in this, does cease: Is it not fitting that part of the Creatures time in any State, shou'd be employ'd in praising his Creator for the Benefits conferr'd upon him in that State?

F.T.p.30.

Vin. of the
Soul's sep.
Ex. p. 33.

Espe-

Especially if it be consider'd that so vastly different in the Nature, and Employment of the Person, in the suppos'd States of this World and the next ; that he may, with sufficient Propriety of Speech, be said to do nothing in one, that he does in the other. But to this he farther objects. *If Praise be a Duty in a State of Conjunction, it must be much more a Duty in a State of Separation ; Praise being almost the sole Business of Angels in Heaven.* But I know no Authority he has, to compare the separate State of Souls with the angelic Order ; the Scripture has told us that after the Resurrection, but not before it, they shall be *equal to the Angels* ; therefore it is no Absurdity to suppose that in the intermediate State blessed Souls are not join'd with the angelic Quire ; and yet nevertheless it may be almost the sole Business of good Souls departed, as well as Angels, consistently with what *David* says, to praise God ; as is apparent from the Context on both sides : It goes before, *The Heaven, even the Heavens are the Lord's ; but the Earth hath he given to the Children of Men.* The *Earth* therefore is the Gift here insisted upon, for which God was to be prais'd by the Inhabitants of it ; but as such, and for this Benefit, *the Dead praise not the Lord* ; nor lift up their Voices together in Psalmody, for they are gone *down into Silence.*

lence. It follows, *But we*, [we who enjoy the Blessing, and are capable of performing the Duty consequent upon it] *will bless the Lord, from this time forth for evermore* ; will from hence forward, not cease to praise him for it, so long as he continues the Blessing to us. And this was so plainly *Hezekiah's* Case, in that his Form of Thanksgiving to God, for the Recovery of his Health, and the Addition of fifteen Years to his Life ; that *Estibius* has my Leave to understand this Text as strictly, and literally as he pleases ; that the Dead [for such a Favour] cannot praise God.

I hope my Reader is, by this time, persuaded to set aside all these Texts, and all of the like Nature that occur in *Estibius's* *Second*, or any other of his *Thoughts*, as altogether foreign to the Business in hand. Possibly fewer Words would have prevail'd upon him to do this ; and possible it is, he may not think any Answer to foreign Arguments, home to the purpose : But I have this to say for my self, the Reader observes that most of these Texts, taken at first hearing, without any Examination, are on *Estibius's* side ; but that there are some *weak*, and others *wilful* enough to take them so, he may also observe, if he looks abroad : Possible therefore it is, notwithstanding all that has been said by others, that these
Papers

Papers may find some without *Defence*, and leave others without *Excuse*; I am sure *one* or the *other*, are like to be the most favourable Judges to *Estibius's* Cause; and upon such an Hearing, it must be confess'd these Texts, *foreign* as they are, may prove the most *material* Part of his Scripture-Proof.

2. There is another Set of Texts, which do indeed relate to the Subject so far, that they speak of Human Soul; but then they leave the Point in Dispute undecided; being, with as much Reason and Consistency, interpretable on ours, as the contrary *Hypothesis*. To this Head, we may reduce, without being particular, all those
 Pag. 178. Expressions which give the Soul *per-*
 &c. *sonal* Qualities, and Operations; such as *Living*, *Sinning*, &c. for these must be understood by the same Figure [*Synecdoche Membri*] upon either Supposition. *Estibius* cannot properly include the Human Body, or any material Parts, in his Notion of Soul; for *Life* is a thing *immaterial*, tho' not an *immaterial Substance*: And why *this*, as well as *that*, suppos'd a Part of Man, may not, by a Mode of Speech, denote the whole Person he has not, nor ever will give a sufficient Reason.

There is a particular Expression in Scripture, which may be suppos'd to relate to
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the Subject ; and, as *Estibius* thinks, is on his side of the Question. Gen. 2. 7. *And the Lord God formed Man of the Dust of the Ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul.* Here is an account of the Origin both of his Body and Soul. That of the Soul literally taken, may indeed countenance a Notion, that the Soul is an Act of Omnipotence, upon insensible Matter ; and so long as it is continu'd upon it, is properly stil'd a *Quality*, or *Power*. But this depends entirely upon the literal Acceptation of *Breath*, and that is against all Sense and Reason, as I have already clearly prov'd, and need only remind the Reader, that if *Breath*, then *Breathing* also must be taken in a literal Sense ; and this would be just such an Argument to prove that God has *Lungs* and *Bowels*, as his *Seeing* elsewhere proves that he has *material Eyes*. In short, this Text does not give us the *Nature*, but only the *Origin* of Human Soul ; that it was planted in organiz'd Dust, by an Act of Omnipotence, and that *Act* express'd by *Breathing* upon Matter already form'd ; to denote a more immediate Emanation of the Soul from the divine Source and Origin of all Things : But is it not clear, that such an Act might as truly, and intelligibly be perform'd, by God's creating, and infusing an *immaterial Substance* into the Body
of

of Man, as by his communicating to it a bare *Power* of Life? And it is more remarkable, that *Moses* does not in this Text declare what sort of Creature Man is, in Distinction from others, but after what peculiar manner he was created: For the former he had already declared, when he said, God created Man *in his own Image*, Gen 1. 27. which shall be consider'd in its proper Place. I know there are some Interpreters, who, from this double Creation in the foremention'd Text, endeavour to establish the Immortality of the Soul; but we need not depend upon their Authority, to reject that of *Estibius*: The plain Sense of the Place gives him no Advantage; and that's a sufficient Answer to an Objection as such, and fully answers my purpose here.

Now supposing *Estibius* had, as he affirms he has, read over the Bible to find an immaterial Substance in Human Nature, but found it not; this Disappointment cou'd not reasonably give Rise to his *Second Thoughts*: For that Book is silent as to many other Disputes, which have some Relation to Religion, and yet neither Party can make an Argument of *that*; but the Appeal lies to the Nature of the Thing, and all other Considerations, which unassisted Reason can suggest. But indeed the Scripture is not perfectly silent, as to this Controversie, tho'

Estibius

Estibius often forces it to speak, where it is really silent : For,

3dly, We want not Scriptures which favour our Opinion ; as being with more Clearness and Consistency, interpreted upon *this* than the contrary Supposition. And here it may not be improper to take our first Prospect from the Creation of Man. The Text I have already mention'd, *God created Man in his own Image, in the Image of God created he him*, Gen. 1. 27. From this History it is observable, without critically enquiring into the meaning of these Words, that there is more than a gradual Difference, between the Principle of Life in Man, and that in Beast. *And God said let the Waters bring forth abundantly, the moving Creature that hath Life, and Fowl that may fly above the Earth, in the open Firmament of Heaven.* And again, *God said, let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind ; Cattel and creeping Thing, and Beast of the Earth after his kind ; and it was so*, Gen. 1. 20, & 24. Thus the Earth, at the Command of God, cou'd bring forth the Brutal Kind, as well as the Vegetative ; but what part had it in the Formation of Man, besides that of supplying Dust ? And what, besides the immediate Hand of God, cou'd finish him that was to be made *in his own Image, and after his Likeness* ? If this
Creation

Creation imply'd no more than giving him Life, or a more perfect Degree of it; then the Beast does also in some Degree bear the Image of God, which *Moses*, it seems, ignorantly, and injudiciously made the distinguishing Part of Man's Creation: but if this Difference be any thing more than gradual, as it is more than probable *Moses* thought it was, then it is past Dispute, *Estibius's* whole *Hypothesis* is ruined. Let us farther examine a little into the meaning of this Expression *in the Image, and after the Likeness of God*: In the first place this cannot relate to the Body of Man, nor any Qualities or Endowments of that, which was already created with the Mass out of which it was taken, before God said let us make Man in our own Image: Nor cou'd it be the forming of his Body out of the Dust, but the breathing into him the Breath of Life, as it is in the other Text, that can relate to *this*. For the Body, consider'd apart, comes much nearer to the Image of Brutes, than that of the Creator; nay, and I think, is exceeded, in every part, whether as useful or ornamental, by some of the Product of Earth and Water; who did not partake, according to this History, of the Image of God. And therefore this Notion is altogether groundless, and inconsistent with the History from which it is taken.

Others

Others place it in the Dominion, which God gave to *Adam*, over the Brutes: But these we find are two things plainly distinguish'd in the History; *And God said let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeness, and let them have Dominion, &c.* Gen. i. 26. And again, where this Dominion is not mention'd, but the *Image of God* is alledg'd as a Reason, which has no manner of Connection with, or Relation to the Dominion he has over the Beasts, it is said, *Whoso sheddeth Man's Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he Man.* And again, it is expressly said, *that God created Man in his own Image,* Gen. i. 27. which shews, that altho' it was agreeable to the Divine Wisdom to substitute him, as his *Vice-gerent*, who bare his Image; yet this was an external Prerogative; not his by Creation, but by a subsequent Gift.

We must therefore seek for a farther Resemblance than this; and where can we hope to find it, if not in the Faculties and Endowments of our Soul? Here it is easie to discern the divine Image delineated, so far as it is imitable, both in his *vital* and *moral* Perfections. God has a perfect Knowledge of all Truth, and of himself the exhibitive Author of it: Man also does perfectly know many Truths, is a self-conscious Being, and can reach, and fix his Thoughts

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upon

upon the divine Nature it self. Again God has an absolute Freedom of Choice, together with an inflexible Rectitude of Will : Man is not determin'd by second Causes, and wherever his Will is corrupt, he becomes conscious of Guilt, that is of acting against the Design of his Creation. Now if this Image is not utterly defac'd in the Ruins of Human Nature, but still discernable on our Souls ; it was doubtless much more visibly there, at our Creation, before either Sin or Infirmary fell upon us. The Point in Question then is, whether the Soul, as bearing the Image of God, ought, with more Clearness and Consistency, to be esteem'd a *finite spiritual Substance*, or only a *Power* inherent in Matter ; for that it is not God himself that thinks in Human

Part. I. §. 9. Body I have already prov'd ; and indeed *that* would be much more than his *Image in Man* ; or what the Hebrew Word for Likeness signifies, an *Adumbration*, that is, an imperfect Representation of him. That God is a Spirit, I may take for granted, when the Appeal lies to Scripture ; and that God may not create Substances immaterial, as well as material, no reason can be given for this, by him that grants the former. Now as we conceive God to be of a spiritual Nature, absolutely perfect ; so it is most agreeable to Reason

Reason to conceive his *Image* stamp'd upon a spiritual, tho' finite Creature; resembling those Attributes and Endowments, which characterize the original Spirit. For if he has conferr'd this Power on Matter, (tho' *conferring a Power*, does not come up to the Notion of a *Creation*; and yet *Moses* tells us Man was *created* in God's *Image*) then he has created a certain part of Dust in his *Image*; but it is not intelligible to me that Matter shou'd, in any *one* Modification, however refin'd, bear the *Image* of God, in that Sense, which it does not in any *other*. If he thinks the Power of Life and Sensation, to be something more than a Modification of Matter, I am still at a Loss to conceive how Matter shou'd be susceptible of any Power, but by the various Modifications it is capable of. Besides, granting Thought and Consciousness in the Divine Nature as a Spirit, and yet placing them as a Power in Human Body, is granting that both a Body and Spirit can think; which in reality destroys the Distinction between them: But if both Scripture and Reason confirm the Distinction, by assuring us that God is a Spirit; then, to maintain and keep up that Distinction, it is requisite we assert those Beings, which resemble his spiritual Perfections, to be also of a spiritual Nature.

Thus it appears to me that *Moses's* Account of our Creation, is interpreted with much more Clearness and Consistency, than we can ever expect to find it by the Comment of an *Estibius*. The Truth is, he can make nothing at all of this peculiar Creation, but a luxuriant Variety of Expression in the Historian, which is confused in every Sentence throughout the History.

Next to the Creation, let us view the Redemption of Mankind; and try if that will give any Countenance to our Cause; tho' our Adversary has already appeal'd to it, and rank'd it amongst his grand Arguments, that the Redemption of whole Man *excludes* a double Nature in him; whereas I, on the other hand, presume it will be found to *include* that double Nature, if there appears Ground from Scripture to build the Notion of a two-fold Redemption upon. St. Paul is speaking of our Redemption, where he tells us, *ye are bought with a Price*, 1 Cor. 6. 20. and I think he makes a two-fold Redemption by his Inference, *Therefore glorifie God in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are God's*. Here the personal *ye* is divided into two Parts, *Body* and *Spirit*; and into two distinct Parts, each of which has its distinct Share, and Portion in the Duty of glorifying God; grounded upon

upon this right of Purchase, by which the Property of both was in God.

Sanctification is a Consequence of our Redemption, and this also the Apostle divides, when he prays *the very God of Peace to sanctifie them wholly; and I pray your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.* Here indeed are three Parts mention'd, to make the Man *ὁλόκληρον*, *entire*, and *perfect*; but in this the Apostle plainly alludes to the *Pithagoric* and *Platonic* Doctrine, which distinguish'd these three Parts in Man, by the very same words, *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή* and *σῶμα*. Many of the Philosophers, by this Distinction, understood two immaterial Substances, united to Human Body; one performing the plastic and inferior Powers of Sense, the other the intellectual and superior Operations of the Mind: But then others distinguish'd *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* only as different Faculties, or Operations, of the same Soul. There is no Necessity at all to interest the Apostle in the Controversie between these two Opinions, for either being true, does equally serve his Purpose; and whether two different Substances, or only Faculties, they both needed, and each in some measure a different, Sanctification. But then I think the Apostle is not so unconcern'd in the Controversie between these Philosophers, and the Mate-

rialists. The Apostle knew the Tenour of Scripture, and which way it tended in all Disputes, better than *Estibius* does; but had the Doctrine, *That Human Soul and*
 Pag. 177. *Life are the same thing, been most consonant to the whole Tenour of the Holy Scriptures*; and he, therefore, must have believ'd Man wholly mortal, it cannot be suppos'd that he wou'd then have borrow'd the Sense, and the very Language of those Heathens, who there, and in the whole Tenour of their Writings, do most industriously oppose that Doctrine. This wou'd have been to lead his Reader into an Error, as 'tis plain, upon *Estibius's Supposition*, all his most learned Readers have been hitherto led into the Error by that, amongst other Places of Scripture: Nay, it would have led him into an Error of such Moment and Consequence, as it cannot but be suppos'd the Spirit by which he wrote, was aware of. That the Controversie is of Moment *Estibius* must not deny, so long as he looks upon *Second Thoughts* to be such a momentous Performance: And indeed it cannot be indifferent to any Man, let his Prospect be good or bad, whether he shall lie in a State of utter Insensibility, and *not being*, for so vast a Space of Time, as may extend from his Death to his Resurrection. Besides that the Spirit as perfectly foresaw, as *Estibius* can relate,

relate, the wicked Advantages which have been made of this Doctrine; and therefore, had the Doctrine been in it self false, and erroneous, it wou'd have had no better a Foundation in Scripture, than the Purgatory, and Prayers for the Dead that are erected upon it: but I believe neither of them have so much Countenance from the whole Scripture, as this Doctrine has, from this one Text; otherwise the Apostle must be suppos'd to use, in his Prayer to God, a *pernicious*, as well as a *false* Distinction; which distinguishes the Case very much from that of the Sun's moving, and such like Expressions, in which the Scripture-truth is reconcilable to an Expression philosophically false, but an usual Phrase of Speech; as we do not look upon it any Inconsistency in a *Copernican* to speak, in the common Phrase, of Things done *under the Sun*. But in the Case before us, it wou'd have been little less than an Inconsistency in *St. Paul*, (whose Character, in this particular, even before he had the Spirit of God, sets him above that *pious Ignorance*, which *Estibius* is bold to charge upon the Primitive Fathers) To graft an heathenish and false Doctrine upon his, and in an Epistle sent to *Theffalonica*, the Metropolis of a Grecian Country, where it was sure to be understood in the Sense of the Grecian Philosophers.

Thus we find our *Creation, Redemption,* and *Sanctification* all respect a Compound in Human Nature, and plainly distinguish the united Parts of it. As to the separate Existence of the Soul after Dissolution, I have already shewn in this Chapter from the Parable of *Dives* and *Lazarus*, that there is sufficient Ground to believe that; therefore I proceed to consider,

Lastly, The Glorification promis'd in Scripture to Human Nature, which gives no small Encouragement to this Doctrine; not of the *separate Existence*, for they shall die no more, but of the *separate Nature* of Human Soul. Pag. 184. *Estibius* had before observ'd, that *Salvation of Souls was mention'd but once in Scripture*, which gave me occasion to observe that, what signifies the same thing, is often mention'd in Scripture; and if there be any of these Texts when the word Soul cannot fairly be interpreted Life, then there is a Salvation which cannot fairly be interpreted by *Estibius*: And this we have from the same learned Apostle, 1 Ep. to the *Corinthians* 5. 5. *to deliver such an one unto Satan, for the Destruction of the Flesh, that the Spirit may be saved, in the Day of the Lord Jesus.* Here the Salvation of the Spirit, does not signify the Salvation of Life only, when properly understood; for it is oppos'd to the Destruction, or Mortification of the *Flesh*; which is an Affliction put upon

upon the present Life of the Person ; and implies that those Evils which he was to undergo by St. *Paul's* Censure, and the Discipline of that Church, would tend to the Salvation of his *Spirit* (a Principle therefore distinct from his Body, and of more Value than either *that*, or his Life) in the Day of the Lord Jesus. So that, in this Text, it is not the future Life that is oppos'd to this ; but the *Spirit* is oppos'd to the *Flesh* : Not again the *spiritual* Affection or Inclination as oppos'd to *carnal* ; for the Person, as it appears by the Occasion, did not walk after the Spirit ; but the Spirit that was in him, tho' unregenerate, which is a Distinction of *Spirit* and *Body*, quite different from that of *Life* and *Body* ; which latter (by the way) is a Distinction I never met with in Scripture, but the former very frequently. Its true the Scripture never speaks of the *future* Salvation, or saving of our Souls, in Opposition to the *future* Salvation of our Bodies, for both shall be saved together ; but it is sufficient to warrant our Distinction, if it speaks of the *future* Salvation of our Souls, in Opposition to the *present* Salvation, or Preservation of our Bodies ; for if the Soul was not *now*, in its Nature, a part of us distinct from our Bodies ; neither cou'd it properly be distinguish'd *then*, from what the Body is *now* ; because it will be the same *then*, according to *Estibius*,
as

as well as the Scripture, that it is *now*.

These are some of the Texts which favour our Doctrine, and are, with much greater Reason, and better Consistency, interpreted thus, than they can be by any Man that holds *Estibius's* Doctrine with Submission to Scripture. I might add many more to these, but I think it abundantly sufficient that I have carry'd the View from the Creation of our Souls, through the Stages of their Probation, and Separation, to their Consummation in Glory. And it will be needless to cite more Texts, in favour of this Doctrine, when I have prov'd in the

4th, And last Place, that we do not want important Expressions of Scripture, which cannot be understood, with any Consistency, but upon Supposition of the immaterial Nature, and separate Existence of the Soul. I shall mention but one from the Old Testament, but that a very full Proof, *Eccles. 12. 7. Then shall the Dust return to the Earth as it was; and the Spirit shall return unto God who gave it.* By this Text we shall be able to interpret another in this Book, *Chap. 3. ver. 21. Who knoweth the Spirit of Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of the Beast that goeth downward to the Earth?* Solomon is, in this place, laying down the Premises that lead to the *Epicure's* Conclusion; and particularly to remove the Fears of another Life, he says in the Context, *All* [Man
and

and Beast] go unto one Place ; all are of the Dust, and all turn to Dust again : And then it follows, *Who knoweth, &c.* by which he must mean one of these two things ; either no body knows, and there is not any, Difference between the end of Man and Beast ; or, tho' there be a real Difference, yet who is able to find it out ; in the one Sense he personates the *Epicurean*, in the other he reflects upon his Ignorance. But take it in which Sense you will, it is *Solomon's* fix'd and final Judgment, that the Spirit of Man goeth upward ; for this is one main Conclusion of his Work, *The Spirit [of Man] shall return to God that gave it.* And that the Spirit of Beast goeth downward [the contrary way] was in the other place taken for granted by both sides. Now this is a Scripture that cannot be understood, with any Consistency, but upon our Supposition. The Spirit of Man returning to God that gave it, cannot be only Life centring in God again ; for why then does not the Spirit of Beast return the same way ? For he has Life, I presume, and Reason too *Estibius* Pag. 97. presumes ; and if, as he more confidently affirms, Reason is a necessary consequent of Life ; then the Spirit of Ibid. Beast, will as necessarily return to God that gave it, as the excluded Ray to the Sun. *Solomon* seems to be of *Estibius's* Opinion, that a Power of Life in Matter ceases

ceases to be at Death ; this may be his *Spirit of the Beast that goeth downward* ; but that the Spirit of Man is only such a Power as this, Solomon, if he writes consistently, as flatly denies as any Adversary *Estibius* has.

St. Paul tells us of himself, *I knew a Man in Christ, above fourteen Years ago (whether in the Body I cannot tell, or whether out of the Body I cannot tell ; God knoweth,) such an one caught up to the third Heaven ; and I knew such a Man (whether in the Body, or out of the Body I cannot tell ; God knoweth,) how that he was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable Words, which it is not lawful for a Man to utter, 2 Ep. to the Corinth. 2. ver. 2, 3, & 4.* That this was no Vision of St. Paul's upon Earth, but a local Elevation and Rapture, is plain from several Circumstances of the Relation ; but this especially, to our present purpose, that he knew not whether he was *in* the Body, or *out* of it ; (for such Visions, we grant *Estibius*, were made without such a Separation) this he says twice together, which as often proves the Possibility of *his*, that is *his Soul's* existing out of the Body ; nay, and in a State of Perception and Understanding ; for he's positive he heard *unspeakable Words, which it was not lawful for a Man to utter.* Which proves, beyond Contradiction, that it was possible for him
to

to exist and perceive, in a State separate from the Body; and that proves, as fully, that his Soul was no *Power* infus'd into his Body, but a distinct Substance; for no *Power* or *Property* can be said to exist distinct from the Subject, but to be extinct in it. *Estibius* gives the *Power* of Life a peculiar *Exit*; he says it centers again in God, but what! cou'd St. *Paul*'s Life center again in God, and there hear and perceive? This is impossible, and contradictory to the Commentator's own literal Interpretation of those Places, that speak of the Dead *not being*. St. *Paul* is very solemn in his Doubt, whether he was then out of the Body or in it; an idle Scruple, if he did not believe both to be possible; and therefore I recommend his Example to *Estibius*'s Belief.

But this Interpretation is farther confirm'd by St. *Paul*'s Belief, that Death wou'd give him such a Being out of the Body, as, for any thing he knew, this Rapture did; which he plainly intimates in this Ep. Chap. 5. ver. 6, & 8. *Therefore we are alway confident, knowing that whilst we are at home in the Body, we are absent from the Lord; and, after a Parenthesis, we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the Body, and to be present with the Lord.* His being absent from the Lord, while he was in the Body, shews his Belief that he should

should be present with him, when he went out of it ; and his chusing rather to absent from the one, and be present with the other, shews his Confidence of being immediately translated from one to the other : For had he dreamt of his not being, from the Time of his Death to his Resurrection, his Reward wou'd have come never the sooner for his sooner quitting the Body ; which yet is the very thing he desir'd and expected : Besides, when he shall come to be *present with the Lord*, after the Resurrection, he shall not be then *absent from the Body*, but return'd into it again ; so that these two States are as plainly distinguish'd by him, as possibly the plain Sense of Words can distinguish : And Dr. *Whitby* has well remark'd upon the Place, that whereas he calls this State being *with the Lord* ; he says of the other, so shall we *ever be with the Lord*, 1 Thess. 4. 17.

This Promise of being with the Lord immediately after his Departure out of the Body, St. *Paul* doubtless had from the Lord ; if not in the same Words, yet to the same Effect with the Promise he made to the penitent Thief, *This Day shalt thou be with me in Paradise*, Luke 23. 43. This is another Text, which cannot, with any Clearness and Consistency, be interpreted but upon Supposition of the separate Existence of the Soul. In order to prove this, we must enquire

enquire what our Lord meant by *to Day*, and what by *Paradise*; and lastly, what by *being with himself*. One thing I take for granted in this Explication; and that is, that our gracious Lord, in this signal Instance of his Pardon and Mercy, return'd his Answer to the Capacity of the Petitioner: That he spoke so as to be understood by him, in order to his present Consolation, as well as succeeding Reward. This, I hope, *Estibius* will not deny me, because if he answer'd in another Sense, than the Thief either did, or cou'd understand his Answer, he spoke to deceive him. Our safest Method then to explain our Lord's Meaning, is to enquire what the Thief must understand by his Words, and first for *to Day*; that it cannot be connected thus, *I say unto thee to Day*, but, *I say unto thee, to Day shalt thou*, &c. all the Interpretations, and all the Readings I have met with agree; nor, I presume, has *Estibius* met with any that do not; for he has not given it as an Answer in his Comment upon this Text in the following Chapter: But let us consider it as an Answer to the Petition, *Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy Kingdom*, ver. 42. Whether he believ'd only in general, without knowing when our Lord should come into his Kingdom, or had some distant Prospect of it, this is certain, our Lord answers his

when,

when, with *to Day*; and so fixes the Time of his being with him in his Kingdom. Now how cou'd the Thief, under the Sense of dying that Day, understand it otherwise than strictly and literally? Had he been us'd to understand *to Day* in a larger Sense, as it is sometimes to be understood in Scripture, there is no Ground for that, from his former Life; but on the contrary, the familiar Expression amongst the Jews of good Men departed, *היום יושב to Day he shall inhabit*, that is, *Abraham's Bosom*, (as *Dr. Whitby* has noted on the Place, and I need not farther prove) if ever he had heard of it, wou'd determin the Sense of our Saviour; and if not, it cannot be suppos'd he took the Word otherwise than literally. But that the Jews understood *היום to Day* literally, in their saying, is evident, by considering, 2dly, What they meant by *Paradise*, which was plainly a State of Happiness into which the Souls of pious Men were receiv'd immediately after their Departure hence. This *Grotius* has remark'd, and this *Dr. Whitby* has plainly shewn, from that saying of the Chaldees, *Seek Paradise the glorious Country of the Soul*; and from their usual Wish to a dying Person, *Let his Soul be in Paradise*; and to mention no more, *Dr. Gregory* from *Theophilact* defines the word *παράδεισος*, according to the Jewish Sense

Sense of it, 'Ος ὅτι χωρίον πνευματικῆς ἀναπαύσεως, *Paradise is the Region of the Souls rest.* Now I appeal to any Man that ever understood the true Sense of an ancient Author, whether our Saviour could speak of *Paradise*, to this Jew, with Clearness and Consistency, in any other Sense than this; which he cou'd not be so ignorant, as not to understand being the popular Sense of the Word; and that which makes our Saviour's Use of it to him perfectly agreeable to the gracious Design of his Promise. And this will lead us lastly to the plain Sense of *being with Christ*; who, it is not to be disputed, surviv'd his Body, in his Divine Nature; and that alone is sufficient to clear the Case of the Thief; tho' his Reception into *Paradise*, does prove the same of the Human Soul of our blessed Lord.

To this purpose it is farther remarkable, that our Saviour did so far countenance this Opinion, wherever he met with it, that he defends his Enemies the *Scribes*, for this Opinion against their Adversaries the *Sadducees*. The Place and the Occasion is well known, *God is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for all live unto him*, Luke 20. 38. Mr. Turner upon this Place (supposing that the Jews knew nothing of the Christian Resurrection; and that, as

Vind. of the separate Ex. p. 18, &c. and farther Vind. p. 19, &c.

Dr. *Hammond* observes, they us'd the word *ἀνάστασις* only to denote the surviving of the Soul) proves, that then our Saviour determines directly for the Pharisaic Opinion; by declaring *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, and in them all the faithful departed, to be alive, when God appear'd, after their Death, to *Moses* in the Bush. With this Interpretation, the Case is so clearly resolv'd in the Text, that I need only refer the Reader to it, and to observe that, immediately upon the Decision, *Certain of the Scribes answering said, Master, thou hast said well*, ver. 39. which was an Approbation unsuitable to their Temper and Behaviour, who came at that very time *to lay hands on him*, ver. 19. but it was a full Vindication of them, against other Enemies the *Sadducees*; and therefore they applauded our Lord's Victory over these.

But supposing the *Sadducees* came prepar'd to object against the Resurrection, as taught by our Saviour; yet his Proof of it includes also the separate Existence of the Soul. This is undeniable, if *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, the Instances he brings, were in that State of Separation. But *Estius* has given them a peculiar, and antecedent Resurrection; with what Reason I shall consider in its place: I only desire him to make a pertinent Argument of our Saviour's,

Saviour's, upon his Supposition. The *Sadducees* own a God, but deny a general Resurrection; our Saviour, to confute them, instances in two or three peculiar Favourites of God, rais'd before the general Resurrection. What's this to the *Sadducees* Objection against a general Resurrection, or to the seven Brethren, that one Woman had married? According to this Account our Saviour silenc'd the *Sadducees*, without silencing their Objection; without giving the least Proof that the Dead (in general, which was the Subject of their Dispute) are rais'd; or making any Opposition, by his Instance of a Resurrection, to theirs against it. Whereas the separate Existence of these deceas'd Persons with God, strongly infers and corroborates the Promise of the Resurrection of their Bodies; and was peculiarly adapted to confute those that deny'd Spirits. But our Saviour, as if he design'd to prevent the *Sadducees* from retreating to this very Refuge, subjoins an universal Reason, for *all live unto him*. More fully and pertinently I cannot imagine he cou'd have express'd himself, had *Estibius* been one of the Objectors. This Tenent of the *Sadducees* is here declar'd to be an Anti-Christian, as well as an Anti-Pharisaical Tenent, by him that cou'd not be partial on the *Pharisees* side: And may *Estibius* learn from hence,

that the Pharisaical Practice of *Prayers for the Dead*, will be no justifiable Reason, for his denying that they *live unto God*. And with this I leave him to interpret the Passage, or any Words of it, in *what Sense* he pleases; but I hope I may oblige him to make *Sense* of it.

I conclude my Proof from Scripture, with that other Determination of our blessed Lord, which, with *Estibius* and me, I cannot but think ought to put an end to this Controversie. Matth. 10. 28. *And fear not them which kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both Body and Soul in Hell*. Here *Estibius* will not deny that Christ makes a different Extent of Human and Divine Power; for this is the Motive he urges to the Fear of God, and against the Fear of Man: The Question then is, wherein consists this Difference? I answer, *1st*, In the Nature and Duration of the Evil, which we are liable to from God and Man; the one can bring no greater nor longer continuing Evil upon us, than this World affords; the other can deliver us up to the bitter Pains of eternal Death, express'd in the Text by *destroying in Hell*. And thus far also we are agreed, and this is all the Interpretation that *Estibius* can put upon the whole Passage; but to the Question, wherein
consists

consists this Difference? I must answer, *2dly*, Not only in the Nature and Duration of the Effects of this Power; but also in the Objects of it. Man can only affect the Body; God can affect both Body and Soul. If Man is wholly mortal, it necessarily follows, that he who kills the Body kills the Soul also: But the Words of this Text are as exprefs, as if our Lord had said, Man cannot kill the Soul; for to say he can kill the Body, and then put a Period to his Power; and immediately upon that to distinguish his Body from his Soul, by making them both subject to the Power of God; is, in all Sense and Construction, to say Man cannot kill the Soul. There is no Possibility of evading this, but by saying that by Soul here, is meant no more than Life; which Man can destroy at present, but cannot affect in the next World: But this is a pure Evasion; for, *1st*, Here's not only an Opposition of the next Life to this, but of Body and Soul in this Life; which wou'd be absurd, if Man were only an enliven'd Body; whose Life is equally subject, with his Body, to Human Power: Therefore by Soul here, cannot be understood the present Life. Nor, *2dly*, Can it be meant of a future Life; for in that respect neither does Man kill the Body, which he cannot hinder from partaking, when God shall raise it, of that Life.

Estibius therefore must make the Text say one of these two things, either Man can kill both Soul and Body, or he can kill neither. Thus far he must be said to kill both Soul and Body, that he puts an end to both, till the Resurrection; and thus far he can be said to kill neither, that he cannot hinder God from restoring Life to the Body, upon the Resurrection: But now both these are Contradictions to what the Text says; which, by subjecting the Body (at present, for in Hell it is only in the Power of God) to Human Power; but totally exempting the Soul from it, makes Man (as now he is) neither wholly mortal, nor wholly immortal.

This, *Estibius*, I take to be no weak Reasoning; tho' I will not promise my self it shall operate at all upon your Constitution; for if you do believe all to be Argument, that you have advanc'd as such in this Book, I must say you are a plain Exception to your own Rule, *That a Man cannot believe what he will*: You may have the greatest Opinion imaginable of your own Power and Abilities; and, with relation to the former part of the Text, we must allow you a larger Power, than the generality of Mankind; but remember still what our Saviour says, that Man can do no more than *kill the Body*.

I have

I have done with *Estibius* in th is Chapter ; but before I leave the Subject, it may not be improper to account for two Things, which possibly are Scruples remaining with the Reader : The first is, That *this Distinction between Soul and Body, and consequent upon it, the Immortality of the Soul, is not so expresly, nor fully deliver'd in Scripture, as the Importance of it to Religion, according to our Management of the Argument, seems to require.* The second is, That *we have not so positive, nor so particular an Account of the intermediate State, as of the final State after Judgment ; tho' the former, in some respect, more nearly concerns us, as it is at a less distance from us.*

To clear up the first of these, I have several Considerations to offer. 1st, If it appear that this Distinction between Soul and Body, is necessarily included in any one positive and expres Article of Religion, tho' it is not positively expres'd it self ; yet it is to be receiv'd as a part of that Article. The Resurrection of the Body, in order to the Revivification of the same Person, is abundantly declared in Scripture ; but when I have made it appear, which I shall do in the last Chapter, that the restoring of Life only, if that were possible, without a Soul to the Human Body, wou'd be no numerical Resurrection (which fundamentally over-

turns not only that, but the whole Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments) then he who is convinc'd, and I hope to convince any reasonable Man, by this Argument, must give as full an Assent to the one as to the other Article ; and whatever Testimony is brought to confirm the Resurrection of the Body, does implicitly confirm the separate Existence of the Soul ; which, as a part of the other, cannot want Scripture Proof, while that is so fully and frequently declar'd in Scripture.

2dly, It is not unusual in Scripture, but very agreeable to the Design of it, for God to exercise the Industry of the Reader, by leaving many Consequences to be drawn from thence, by his own Reason, assisted by the *Holy Spirit*, which shall *guide every sincere Disciple into all Truth* ; all that is necessary to his *Salvation* from fatal Errors, and from *the Wrath to come*, upon those that fall into them. A Question may arise upon this, how far such consequential Articles are necessary to be believed. I answer, those that are necessarily connected with some other fundamental Articles, become necessary Articles to those, and those only, who can comprehend that Connexion. God Almighty, in the Gospel, has graciously proportion'd the *Improvement* of our Faith, to the *Talent* of our Understanding ; and no
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Man shall be condemn'd for any, but wilful Ignorance; for whatever is sinful, is so far wilful. We are told indeed of a Servant, who *knew not his Lord's Will*, and yet *did Things worthy of Stripes*; and accordingly was beaten with some, tho' *few Stripes*, Luke 12. 48. but this Ignorance of his was not absolutely such; but only comparatively to the greater Knowledge of the Pastors of the Church; whom therefore the great Shepherd requir'd, upon higher Obligations, to be *faithful and wise Stewards*, ver. 42. And this shews how admirably the Gospel is fitted to serve that universal Design of it, the Salvation of all Men: For whereas the Heathen Religion was calculated above the Understanding of the Vulgar, and beneath the Belief of wise Men; the Gospel opens a rich Mine of Divine Truths to employ the strongest, and yet has a Brightness and Simplicity discernable by the weakest Understanding. *To know the true God, and Jesus Christ whom he has sent, is Life* Joh. 17. 3. *eternal*, and I doubt not to some poor ignorant Creatures; who are never freed, all their Lives, from the grossest Conceptions of the Deity; and who scarce understand one, of the many Articles included in this, the Mission of Jesus Christ. And possibly the Condescension is yet greater to some Capacities; for St. Paul gives us this, as one Description

Description of Faith, *To believe that God is, and that he is* [in general Terms] *a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him.* And therefore the Immortality of the Soul may be a true Christian Doctrine, contain'd in the very Promise of a Reward; tho' it is not so deliver'd, as to become necessary for all Mankind to believe; but on the other hand, if it is deduc'd from Scripture by just Consequences (and that, I think, is the least that can be said of the preceding Proof) these Consequences will be found to press hard upon those, whom God has enabled to see the length of them; for all that he has done, or perhaps can do, to make any Man see, is to give him *Eyes*, and create *Light*. But,

3dly It is not altogether unaccountable, why this Doctrine in particular, of the Immortality of the Soul, is not so expressly, and obviously laid down in Scripture, as our Adversaries challenge us to shew it; and this will appear to our Satisfaction; if we consider the Persons to whom the Scripture was immediately directed, and those for whose Use it was farther design'd. The *lively Oracles* of the Old Testament belong'd to the Acts 7. 38. *Jews*, and to them only; and neither our Lord, nor his Apostles, Rom. 3. 2. — 9. 4. while he was upon Earth, preach'd to any other Nation; but by this time I may presume

presume the Immortality, and separate Existence of the Soul, was an avowed Principle of the *Jews*, deny'd only by one Sect, and that, which is very remarkable, oppos'd in this very point by our Lord himself. The *Gentiles* to whom the Apostles preach'd afterward, are divided by St. Paul into *Greeks* and *Barbarians* : This was the constant Doctrine of the chiefest of the Greek Philosophers, and the receiv'd Principle of the Vulgar ; and as to the *Barbarians*, Tully, who well understood the Opinions of both, tells us, *Permanere Animos arbitramur consensu Nationum omnium*. Tusc. l. i. Now if I were to convince a Man of an Error, and my Proof proceeded upon the Supposition of some Principle belonging to us both ; I shou'd think there was no Necessity, whatever Reason there might be, to controvert that Principle ; which tho' it may be disputable in it self, is an *Axiom* between him and me. and thus a Man may make use of a false Principle, if it is his Adversaries, and rightly infer from it ; but this Practice is only for the sake of Victory, or to give him a sight of his Error ; but if I hop'd to settle his Mind upon the Foundation of Truth, I shou'd think my self oblig'd to build upon a true Principle ; nay, I should be neglectful of my Duty to him, if I endeavour'd to lead him into any one Truth, by countenancing
any

any other Error, especially an Error of Moment and Consequence, in him. Is it then becoming the Character of our blessed Lord and his Apostles, to suppose this Principle (as I have shewn they suppose it in several of their Arguments) or so much as to countenance it, by adapting their Sense, and their Expressions to such a Belief; and so to support, by their Authority, an Opinion which had its Foundation in Error, and wou'd afterwards have a very large Superstructure in Wickedness? No! they were Reformers that knew exactly where to stop, and cou'd fix upon the very Line that bounded Truth; and therefore whatever Principles amongst the Heathens they have left undemolish'd, either by their own Hands, or by their Scheme of Religion left behind them, no Man shou'd presume to call them Heathenish still; especially whatever they have favour'd so much, as to build upon them: but he ought rather to conclude, that had they not been found standing, they wou'd have been erected by the *Finisher of our Faith*. Whatever *Estibius* may think, I am not asham'd to suppose with him, that the Immortality of the Soul had its Birth from the natural and unassisted Notions of Mens Minds; but this I can look upon as no Disparagement to any Principle, that is afterward adopted into the *Christian System*.

4thly, And

4^{thly}, And *Lastly*, Let it be consider'd that the Scripture might very well take this for granted, as a Principle not only universally held, and understood by rational Men, but as a *Principle of natural Reason and Religion*. Nature will admit of no Religion, without Rewards and Punishments; Wisdom never found such a Distribution of these in this World, as is consistent with tolerable Notions of God and Religion, and Reason can no otherwise supply this Defect, but by the Immortality of the Soul. And therefore if it be allow'd that Heathens had any *Law* of Religion, left *written upon their Hearts*, as the Apostle testifies they had, and cou'd *by Nature do the Things contained in the Law*; their Consciences Rom. 3.
14, 15. also bearing witness, and their Thoughts, the mean while, accusing, or else excusing one another; then the Immortality of the Soul, must have made a considerable Clause in this natural Law; without which it was impossible amongst them, either for Providence to maintain its true Character, or Conscience its Power. And yet this is the very Reason that *Estibius* gives, for his stiling it a *plain Heathenish Invention*; but Pag. 47. here I appeal to the Judgment of sober Men, whether he might not, for the very same Reason, and with as good a Face, have expos'd all the Principles and Duties of natural

tural Religion, under the Notion of an *Heathenish Invention*; nay, whether he has not implicitly done it, in fixing that Character upon the Foundation of them all.

But to leave *Estibius*, and return to our Subject; if the Immortality of the Soul is an essential Part of that natural Law, graven on the Hearts of Men by their Creator, and still legible in the very Ruins of their Nature; there is no Reason to expect that the Gospel should be so full and frequent, in the delivering and inculcating of this Doctrine, as of the Resurrection of the Body, which is purely Christian. We are suppos'd to be Men, antecedently in Nature, to our being Christians; and Faith may be said to begin, where Reason ends: Not but that Christianity lights us back to the very first Principles of natural Religion, and clears them from all the Rubbish, that Superstition and Prophaneness had heap'd upon them; but this it does, by Consequence only; as it gives us a more perfect Knowledge of God, and our selves; leaving us mostly to infer Particulars by our own Reason: or where it does expressly confirm moral Principles or Duties, yet they are not deliver'd as such; they are confirm'd by a new Authority, and inforc'd by a new Sanction; and upon this Account the natural Reason of these Principles and Duties is not strictly enquir'd

enquir'd into there. And it is farther remarkable that the Scripture is most express in these Matters, where Mankind was most defective; the Unity of the Divine Nature, and the Worship of God in Spirit; the Love of Enemies, and Purity of Heart. Now as to the Immortality of the Soul, the Christian Religion has fully cleared that from all the gross Conceptions of *Elysian* Fields, and the more absurd and sensual Paradise of *Mahomet*; but it has left the Principle standing as it was, tho' not without sufficient Countenance and Encouragement given to it: And if this was a Principle of equal Extent, as to the Belief of it, with the Being of a God, the Scripture, I hope, may be allowed to suppose the one, as well as the other; and I have not observ'd that it has given more Testimony to the bare Existence of God, than it has done to the Immortality of the Soul. It's one of *Estibius's* Pag. 184. shrewd Observations, that the Words *immortal Souls*, never occur in Scripture; and *Salvation of Souls* but once: Just so I believe it happens, that the Words *immortal God*, are not to be found together in all the Scripture; and that *God is a Spirit*, it is but once that I know of, directly asserted; Joh. 4. 24. and that for the sake of the spiritual Worship consequent upon it. It were as easie to multiply such Observations
as

as these, as it is to find out the Tendency of them; for they are not so properly to be taken for Arguments upon the Question in Dispute, as for Reflexions on the Method and Design of the Holy Scriptures; that they shou'd leave Room for Cavil and Controversie in Articles of such Importance, by not expressing themselves so fully upon them, as to be incapable of Mis-interpretation. I can only say, I fear there will never be wanting a Handle, such as it is, for Reflections of this Nature; for *Contumaciæ Deus nullum posuit Remedium*. But to the Reader that searches the Scriptures only for Truth, and brings with him a docible Temper to receive it, by the means of such Evidence as it is reasonable for him to expect, and such as a wise Man will depend upon, in any other Argument, I doubt not but the Immortality of the Soul, appears now in a sufficient Light.

But there is another Thing to be accounted for, and that is, *Why we have not in Scripture so positive and particular an Account of the intermediate State, as of the final State after Judgment; tho' the former, in some respect, more nearly concerns us, as it is at a less Distance from us.* And here, after all that has been said to the other Scruple, which may equally serve to clear up this, we need only observe briefly,

1st, That

1st, That tho' the intermediate State has the Advantage of a nearer Prospect to work upon Men ; yet, in the main, the final State is the more effectual, and proper Motive to their Hopes and Fears, and their Actions deriving from thence : For that is an eternal State, and Eternity is the strongest Motive that Omnipotence can offer, or Man is capable of receiving. We can shorten any other Prospect, by fixing our Eye upon the End of it ; but the boundless Prospect of Eternity is our consummate Happiness or Misery. And besides this, the final State has the Advantage of a Re-union of Body and Soul ; by which the Condition of it is made sensible, and nearly affecting to the weakest, and the most vicious, which is the greatest Part of Mankind ; who perhaps have but faint, if any Notions, of the Condition of a separate Soul. Upon this account the Heathens *Elysian Fields* were full of all the innocent Pleasures, that virtuous Men are delighted with in this World ; and their *infernal Regions* were stockt with Furies to lash and scourge, in a literal Sense, the vicious Inhabitants of them. This was a good Contrivance to make Impressions on the *Vulgar* ; and wanted only an Authority to affect the *judicious* : But Heaven and Hell are Things, in themselves, more affecting to every Capacity ; and, as they stand re-

veal'd in the Gospel, do as absolutely command the Assent of the wisest, as the most ignorant. No Wonder therefore, that the Wisdom of God has made these the chief, and almost only Motives to Obedience. But as for those who are not influenc'd by these, their Prospect must be wholly confin'd to this Life, and terminate with it ; and upon such, a Revelation of the intermediate State wou'd have no Effect.

2dly, Let it be consider'd that the intermediate State, is dependent upon the final State, as the final State is upon this ; and therefore needed not be so particularly reveal'd. We sometimes think it sufficient to threaten a Villain with the *Gallows*, without urging his *Apprehension*, *Imprisonment*, *Arraignment*, or *Sentence* ; and yet all these are pertinent Considerations in his Case ; and accordingly the Sinner's *Apprehension* by Death, his *Arraignment* and *Sentence* at the general Judgment, are frequently insisted upon in Scripture. But we may observe in the other Case, that the Criminal's *Imprisonment* needs no particular Proof, as being included between his *Apprehension* and *Arraignment* ; and this vindicates that Expression of Scripture, *after Death comes the Judgment*, from any Denial of the intermediate State ; especially if it be consider'd, that *Death* and *Judgment* have an immediate Connexion in the Gospel,

Gospel, as to their Influence upon each other; but the intermediate State is not, strictly speaking, the *Christian Reward*. And yet,

3dly, This State is sufficiently reveal'd in Scripture: *Being with Christ*, and others consequently being abandon'd from his Presence; and the *Spirit returning to God that gave it*, till he shall please to account with it, before Men and Angels, are Expressions that carry along with them sufficient Matter, to fill a capable Understanding, with many large Contemplations. And indeed were there no one Expression in Scripture, relating to this State; and we had only Reason to Judge it, from what the Scripture says of the Nature of our Soul, to be a State of *Expectation* of our final Doom; we might, methinks, be satisfy'd with this, which, since it is our chief Duty to *think on Death and Judgment*, wou'd be no mean Entertainment for our *intermediate Thoughts*. If a Consciousness of Guilt or Innocence, join'd with a certain Expectation of a righteous Judgment, be a Heaven or Hell upon Earth; we need not be at a loss for the Heaven or Hell of a disembod'y'd, and enlarg'd Spirit; whose Prospect of either State will be more infallibly certain, and clear; whose Reflections must be stronger, and its Sense of Good and Evil more exquisite and poignant.

This is all I will presume to say, or, I think, need be said for any Christian's Satisfaction, as to the reality of the intermediate State; and having added thus much concerning that, and the Principle upon which it is built, the Immortality of the Soul, to the Light we have from Scripture in this Controversie, I hope this long Chapter has fully answer'd the Title of it.

C H A P. VII.

The Author of Second Thoughts, his pretended Answer to Objections from Philosophy, Reason, and Scripture examin'd, and the true Nature of Human Soul farther vindicated.

THE luxuriant Author, fearing his design'd little Treatise shou'd grow too voluminous, pretends in this Chapter, only to answer those of his Adversary's Objections, *that urge most strongly for their Opinion*: And if the Reader will take his Word for it, that those, as he has recited them, are the *strongest* of his Adversary's Objections, he's half-converted before he

he hears them; and upon hearing, will presently begin to wonder how a Cause so weak as the *Psycomuthist's*, cou'd last so many Ages, when the strongest *Supports* of it, have really no Strength at all in them. But I who have perus'd this Chapter, without Design to take any thing upon *Estibius's* Word, must declare that I have not met with one Objection, he has rais'd to himself, but what is either such as I wou'd not have urg'd, or wou'd have urg'd farther. Of this latter sort is the first he proposes, *That which is immaterial is immortal; but the* Ibid.
Soul of Man is immaterial, Ergo. In this Objection he has prudently left out the Word *Substance*; and then all the Answer he gives to it here, will be good, viz. That *Forms* themselves are immaterial, Pag. 241.
 and yet mortal, and perishable. In which Answer he supposes, and takes for granted one of these two Things; either first that the Soul of Man is not a *Substance*, but a *Form* properly so call'd; or, in the Language of the Schools, not a *substantial*, but an *accidental Form*. Or, secondly, he takes it for granted, that an *immaterial Substance* is equally perishable, with an *immaterial Form*; tho' this is no otherwise *immaterial*, than as it is a Modification in Matter, which is not Matter it self: But I presume it enter'd not into *Estibius's* Head,

to distinguish the different Senses of *immaterial*; and no Man can answer an Objection, but in the *Sense* he understands it. Now he and I must refer it to the Reader's Candor, whether he will grant him either of these modest Suppositions. It's true this is not his only Answer; for he refers us to his sixth Chapter, where he has prov'd the Dependence of the Soul upon Matter, in *esse fieri, & operari*; but to send us backward and forward at this rate, may exercise our Patience, but is no Answer to our Query.

Of the other sort, I mean such Objections as I wou'd not have urg'd, are these that

Ibid. follow; *Knowledge by Dreams;*
 Ibid. *strong Impressions on the Brain, Fan-*
 Pag. 242. *cy, or Imagination; foreseeing, at*
 Pag. 244. *Death, their State of future Happi-*
ness or Misery, and the Souls compre-
tending of Universals, and abstracted
Notions. These Objections I freely own, wherever *Estibius* met with them, have no Weight at all in them, with me; for if Matter be capable of Thought, I do not see why it may not be capable of performing all the particular, and most exalted Operations of it.

The next he raises is this, *It is impossible for Matter, tho' enliven'd, to perform Cogitation, or any reflex Actions as Man doth; Ergo, he must have a rational Soul.* Where observe

observe the artful Dress; for Matter *tho' enliven'd*: If in the Notion of Life is included, as properly it ought to be, self Consciousness; this, *tho' enliven'd*, makes the Objector give up the Cause, and let him recover it as well as he can. Well, but how does *Estibius* shew it possible for Matter to think, which I expected he wou'd do in Answer to this Objection? He tells us, *As for Cogitation or Thought, I never conceiv'd it to be a Ground or Foundation of Immateriality; but only a Demonstration of Existence, &c.* And again, *I never knew that he [Des Cartes] brought it as an Argument to prove a* Prin. Phil. p. 1. §. 8. *Soul, or spiritual Substance in Man.* Now the very Sect. immediately following that, in which *Des Cartes* lays down *Cogito ergo sum*, is thus intituled, *Distinctiōnem inter Animam & Corpus, sive inter Rem cogitantem, & Rem extensam hinc agnosci.* *Des Cartes* is dead, and therefore might safely be said by *Anima* to understand no more than Life, as it imports in three Languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin; but that the Words *Rem cogitantem, & Rem extensam*, are a little too stubborn to bend to this Interpretation. All this while is not *Estibius* a well appointed Champion for his Cause, to write 500 Pages against an Opinion, and yet has never conceiv'd, nor ever known the Foundation upon which the most confide-

table of his Adversaries have built? But how cou'd he never know this, and yet be knowing enough to propose it as an Objection, *impossible for Matter to perform Cogitation?* The meaning must be, he never knew it before he met with this Objection; and then the Answer is to this purpose, *You assert it to be a thing impossible for Matter to think; and perhaps you wou'd have me shew how it is possible:* I answer, *The Objection is perfectly new to me; I never heard of it in all my Life before!* *Officio tuo satisfacisti doctissime respondens.*

In the next place he makes his Adversaries object, but not prove, the Absurdity of that Notion, that Soul is an Accident; and instead of an Answer makes a Digression in Vindication of the Greek Fathers (as ignorant as all the Fathers were) against Mr. Glanvill; who objects to their Notion of the Soul as an *intellectual Fire*, that it destroys the Immortality. *If the Soul be Fire, or rather Light, if you please; how easily will it be blown out, when remov'd out of this Lanthorn of the Body, into open Air?* This was objected to those that held the Immortality, and the numerical Existence of the Soul, in a State of Separation; and how is it then an Answer to Mr. Glanvill? Or what Progress does it make in the Subject, to assert confidently, that *Man* perishes

Pag. 247.

Ibid.

perishes like a Candle put out ; vanishes away like a Vapour , and the Place thereof shall know him no more ? If Estibius will turn Advocate for those few of the Fathers, who had this Notion ; he must make it consistent with the Immortality of the Soul, which was a Cause much dearer to them than the Notion was: Otherwise their *Memory* is little indebted to his *Apology*, while he defends their Opinion, by charging it with a Consequence, which they themselves did not foresee, but did abhor.

His other Argument with Mr. Glanvill, whether Fire can have a plastic, or only a consuming Power upon the Subject, I must wave, as altogether foreign to the Argument between him and me ; and proceed to the next Objection he has put into the Mouth of his Adversaries, which is the *Coextension of a Soul, if immaterial, with the Body ;* Pag. 251.
and consequently, upon the Loss of a Member, there must be a Loss of part of the Soul.

He answers, Those who assert no immaterial Substance co-extended with Human Body, and especially present with every part of it, he has already confuted, *Chap. 5.* and as to himself, he thinks it no Absurdity that *Life cannot exert it self in any Action, in a part that is cut off and destroy'd :* Very true, but is it any more absurd that an immaterial Substance cannot act in the same Case ?

And

And if it be an Objection against neither Party, what Service can it do either to answer it? But let us see whether more than this has not been long since made of the Notion: *Aristotle* I find arguing thus; *Εἴπερ γὰρ εἰσιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκάσθον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι* (ώματι, εἰ (ώματι ἢ ψυχῇ. Τοῖς δὲ ἀριθμὸν λείψουσιν, *De Anima* ἐν τῇ μιᾷ σιμῇ πολλὰς σιμᾶς, ἢ πᾶν *Lib. I. c. 5.* (ώμα ψυχῇ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρει τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγύε) καὶ ἄλλῃ τις τῷ παρὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι σιμῶν. *If the Soul is co-extended with the Body, and sensitive in every part of it; then Man is compounded of two Bodies, if the Soul be Body; but those that say the Soul is compounded of Parts, make many Points in one Point; or make every single part of the Body to have a distinct Soul; unless there can be conceiv'd any Number of Parts in one and the same Subject, different from those that are corporeal.* The Argument proceeds upon two Suppositions. 1st, That the Soul receives *Sensation* from every part of the Body. 2^{dly}, That it receives this *Sensation* in one single Point; not as Impressions are made upon a *continuous* Substance. Now if all the Qualities that a Body is capable of, are co-extended with that Body, and so consequently the Division of a white Body, for instance, divides also the Whiteness of it; then the Objection, with *Aristotle's* Management, will bear hard upon *Estibius*; and,

and, as so manag'd, I leave him to answer it. If he is ready, as he says he is, ^{Ibid.} to answer any stronger Objection that can be urg'd against him from Philosophy. I must rejoin, it is his *Strength*, and not his *Readiness* that I dispute.

His *Reason* (to which he reduces the next Set of Objections) is not unlike his *Philosophy*. He objects to himself (and I wish he have well consider'd the Objection) the Danger of *Atheism* and *Irreligion*, attending the Belief of his ^{Pag. 253.} Doctrine; to which he answers, *Whatever is grounded on Scripture, I know cannot lead to Atheism, or be irreligious*. But would not the Conclusion be as good, by a Transposition, *Whatever leads to Atheism and Irreligion, cannot be grounded on Scripture*? This therefore is an Answer that may have another in the Belly of it; for suppose a Man that is not satisfy'd with this Answer, but still believes (as well he may) the *Tendency* of *Second Thoughts* to *Atheism* and *Irreligion*; and yet happens to be convinc'd by that seventh Chapter that the Doctrine *is found in Scripture*; what must this Man's Conclusion be with regard to the Divine Authority of Scripture? I Think it an Error of very dangerous Consequence (to call it by no worse Name) for any Man, imagining he has found an Opinion countenanced in

in Scripture, to overlook the Tendency of it ; and this Answer looks too like something of that nature. But he's willing to

answer farther, *This Doctrine does*
 Pag. 254.

not conclude that Man wholly perishes, and shall never revive again. If the Reader does not already believe it *does conclude that Man wholly perishes*, I desire him to suspend his Judgment till he has perus'd the last Chapter of this Discourse. In the mean time, to what he replies to the Encouragement his Doctrine gives to Wickedness, that

Time is no Measure for the Dead but
 Pag. 255. *the Living only ; and if a Man were to sleep several Years, and as soon as he awak'd, were sure to be hanged ; I do believe it wou'd afford him but little Comfort, to think he shou'd have so long a time to sleep, before his*

Sentence were executed ; and again,
 Far. Th. p. 88. *There is no Measure of Time to the*

Dead, and a thousand Years not so much as one Day. I answer, if this proves any thing, it proves that there is not any real Difference of Torment (above a Minute, or at most a Day) to the wicked, according to his, and according to our Notion. I know Time is no Measure for the Dead, in his Sense ; but the Question is not, what Perception they will have when dead ; but, which State (of Torment or Insensibility) wou'd they chuse while they are alive, to
 follow

follow upon their Death ; and I think it is a Determination of Nature it self *præstat non esse, quam miserum esse* : But all this is opposing only a mistaken metaphysical Notion to Matter of Fact ; wou'd not that Man he mentions chuse rather to sleep several Years, before his Execution, than be in Torment or Misery all the while, and yet to be executed at last ? and do not Men abuse the distant Prospect of Death, tho' it is as inevitable as Judgment ? This he has been told already, and daily Far. Vind. p. 56. Experience will tell him as much.

I know the Consideration of Judgment is alone abundantly sufficient ; or where it is not so, I am sure nothing can be sufficient : But this is no warrant for *Estibius* to make nothing of the intermediate State, unless, in a Dispute about the Nature of that State, it is lawful for him to take it for granted there is no such State ; but if he may not be allow'd thus much, he may as well make nothing of the Rewards and Punishments of Virtue and Vice in the Present, as in the intermediate State ; and indeed *Conscience* is just such another *Heathenish Invention*, as the *Soul*. The next Objection he draws from *The Authority of the Fathers*, Pag. 255. *the Novelty of his Doctrine, the Liturgy of the Church of England, and the Athanasian Creed*. I must confess I shou'd never

never have made these Objections to *Estibius*, for a very good Reason; but the Reason is plain why he objected them to himself; his Reader by this time might have forgot that *as the Fathers had a great deal of Piety, so their Ignorance is equivalent* (that is, as great as their Piety; so that they cou'd not be far from natural Fools; for their Piety was so great as to carry all of them thro' many Difficulties, and some of them to Death) *and pardonable in nice Points of Religion*. Methinks it might become a Man that so often makes the Charge, once at least to make it good, by a large Catalogue of their Errors; which it must be very easie to produce when the Authors are so very ignorant, and yet so very scripturient: But instead of this, *Estibius* is content to make two

Pag. 256. *general Reflexions. We find* (says he) *several of them embraced Error; especially where the Case in question seem'd very dubious*. That there were Errors amongst them is doubtless, because there was *Opposition*; but that the embracing any particular Error, or many Errors, especially in *dubious Questions*, thro' the Course of a Man's Life, shou'd fix upon him the general Character of Ignorance, is a little hard upon us; for at this rate all Mankind must be grossly ignorant, *Estibius* only excepted; which is an Opinion I never met with before, out of *Bedlam*.

Bedlam. The next Reflexion is, *Ibid.*
The Papists quote them for the abetting their Corruptions, and Innovations in their Church. A sure Mark of their Ignorance this; because the Papists quote Scripture too, for their Corruptions and Innovations; and so does *Estibius* for his: But he has read the Scripture all over, tho' as to the Opinion of the Fathers *in this* *Pag. 255.*
Matter, says he, generally I do not pretend to know, because I have read very few of them. How comes he then to pretend to know that they were generally ignorant, can he discover their Ignorance, only by professing his own; his own Ignorance of their Opinion, as to the very Matter in Dispute? By this Method, I suppose, and not by reading his Works, he came to discover the Ignorance of *Athanasius* in particular; and all the Reformers both of the Church of *England*, and all other reform'd Churches in *Christendom*; amongst whom there never was, I am persuaded, the least Controversie about the Immortality of the Soul with the Romish Church. It must be confess'd this new way of answering, or rather denying Authorities, carries the Recommendation with it, of being the easiest way that ever was yet found out; it prevents all the Tedioufness of Quotation, all the Nicety of comparing and reconciling Notions;

tions; and besides, has this peculiar Advantage, that the more *ignorant* a Man is in himself, he may throw the Stone of *Ignorance* with less Reluctancy, and a better Grace.

There is another Article in this Objection, which is *Novelty*; and to remove the Imputation of that, he takes shelter in an Atheistic Passage of *Pliny*; (for such is the
 Pag. 257. Expression of *Mens fond Imaginations, and dreaming of I know not what Life after this*) and *Pliny*, he remarks, liv'd about *An. Dom. 79*. This I not only grant him, but farther, that he might have deriv'd his Opinion from as high as *Anaximander* at least, who liv'd above 2000 Years before Christ; unless he must say of the *Græcians*, as he does of the Fathers, *I have read very few of them*; and yet this, with several other Authorities, did not hinder *Tully* from calling it an Article of universal Belief; for he knew that this is a Rule, which will easily admit of Exceptions, and still continue a very true Rule; otherwise that there lay no Appeal in any Case, to the Sense of Mankind.

The last Objection he answers from Reason is this; *It seems but a wild Notion to conceive a Man to beget a Soul; and it's highly improbable that a Being of that Perfection*
 Pag. 260. *as Man is, can propagate like other Species.*

Species. Its Conceptions of Religion, of an infinite Being, of a mysterious Trinity, being too lofty and noble Operations, to be perform'd by any other Thing, than an immaterial Spirit. This is all playing upon the Out-works of the Controversie; but having so fully stated the Case already, I will not detain the Reader with any farther Reflexions upon it.

The last Head of Objections he proposes to answer is taken from Scripture; and here, tho' he promises *to examin all those* Pag. 263. *Texts even from Genesis to the Revelation of St. John, that seem to make against his Opinion,* yet he has examin'd but six of those Texts I produc'd, under the two last Heads from Scripture, *viz.* those that *countenance*, and those that *necessarily suppose* the Immortality of the Soul. But as he had brought abundance of *foreign* and *indifferent* Texts for him, so he has been at the Pains to propose, and answer abundance of the like nature against him. I do not envy him the Glory of repelling such Objections; and therefore shall pass them by unmention'd, and consider only what he has answer'd to those, that materially urge against his Opinion. The first is that of *Ecclesiastes, Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth downward?* I have plainly prov'd that this

Expression of Solomon's ought to be interpreted by that other, *Then shall the Spirit return to God that gave it*; and therefore

Pag. 277. supposing that he is there only *proposing the Difficulty of Mens Apprehensions*, as *Estibius* says; yet it's plain he does not design to leave his Reader in doubt, when he is so full and positive, in this very point, at the Conclusion of his Discourse.

Ibid. This Sense indeed may have *nothing impious in it*; because the Author, perhaps, only personates the impious Atheist; but even this Sense plainly shews that, according to Piety and Truth, the Spirit of Man does go upward, and that of the Beast downward. He answers farther, That *our Sense attributes a local Transition, not only of the Spirit of Man, but also of the like in Beasts*; and consequently, a spiritual Substance, distinct from the Body of Beasts, wou'd as much separately exist, and pass downward into some Place beneath, as that of Man upward; which I presume no *Psycomuthist* will assert. He mention'd only *upward* and *downward*, which are opposite States; but the Quibble lies in the word *goeth*, which must necessarily imply some real existing Substance; but first granting this Necessity, it only proves that both survive in different States, and whatever *Estibius* presumes no *Psycomuthist* will assert, I am sure there's *nothing impious*
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in this Sense ; but how does the word *goeth* imply such a Substance in Brute, as well as Man ? I do not say that the word, of it self, implies a substantial Spirit in Man ; but I say it may be apply'd to such a Spirit, and to the Brutes as only Life. That it may be so apply'd to Brutes *Estibius* must not deny ; for what then will he make of the Soul of Man, in his Sense *going and returning* to God, and at the same time having no Being at all ? And that it may be apply'd to each, in a different Sense, is evident, because *Solomon* is not distinguishing, and opposing any *Actions* of either, or both of these Spirits ; but only setting forth their different and opposite *State* and *Condition* : And as such, Annihilation, if that be meant there of the Spirit of the Beast, is properly oppos'd to *going upwards*, or *returning to God*.

We must therefore consider what he answers to this Text, *The Spirit returns to God that gave it*. This, he says, ought to be explain'd as a Confirmation of his Opinion, that the same Power of reviving Man again, centers in the Almighty ; for how otherwise can the Souls of the wicked and reprobate, if they were substantial Spirits, be said to return to God, the Fountain of Holiness and Purity ? Here his Play lies in the word *return* : Now if we consider what the

Pag. 279.

Acts 17. 28.

Apostle tells us, that even here, *we live, and move, and have our being in God*; than which there cannot be express'd or imagin'd a closer Conjunction; we must not interpret this *returning to God*, with regard to his Nature and Essence, for he is not so *far from us*; but only with regard to his more immediate Government, and our enlarg'd Capacity for the Knowledge, or Enjoyment of him. *Estibius* must not call it an Inconsistency with the Purity and Holiness of the Divine Nature, for God to extend his Empire over the lewdest Devil that fell, as much as over the purest Angel: And as to the Inlargement of our Faculties, he must also grant, that the wicked at the Resurrection, shall be enlightned with a more perfect Sense of God's Government, and their own, now unavoidable Subjection to it. It is in this Sense, they are said, in

Heb. 10. 31.

Scripture, *to be fall'n into the Hands of God*; those pure and righteous Hands from which they came; and is not this, with sufficient Propriety of Speech, *returning to God*? It's true they do not return to God, so as to be happy in a more perfect Enjoyment of him; when we say they do, we shall make good *Estibius's* Charge; but till then the Charge will ly only on his own false Paraphrase of the word *return*. He quotes *Pool* for an Ex-
plication,

plication, which he vainly imagins was made to avoid this Difficulty; *Animæ omnes redeunt ad Deum; ut tradat bonorum Animas bonis Angelis, malorum Animas malis Angelis, remunerandas aut puniendas.* Now tho' these are not Mr. Pool's Words, and this only one, amongst many Interpretations, yet let us hear what Estibius says to it, 1st, *It seems to make God a ministring Spirit to his Angels, which I think both* Pag. 279. *absurd and impious.* Thus our Saviour spoke of the Judge that delivered a Man to the Officer, and the Officer that cast him into Prison; which I think neither absurd nor impious; and yet, according to this Argument, the Judge was a Minister to the Officer, and the Officer to the Gaoler. He answers, 2dly, *It is the highest* St. Luke 12. 58. *Derogation to that Almighty Pure Being,* Ibid. *to receive wicked Souls so defiled with Wickedness and Sin, even but for a Moment, or the twinkling of an Eye; as it wou'd be to preserve them until the Resurrection, to be then adjudg'd.* The former Clause of the Objection is grounded upon the latter, and therefore we'll only examine this; why it wou'd be a Derogation to the Almighty Pure Being, to preserve such in Being until the Resurrection, and be no such Derogation, to preserve them in being after the Resurrection, no satisfactory Reason can ever

be given; and therefore this Argument belongs properly to *Second Thoughts, concerning the Resurrection*: Nay, I submit it to the Reader whether it wou'd not be a yet higher Derogation to that Being, to revive, by an Act of Omnipotence, the Carcass of him, who at once commences a Creature, and a defil'd Sinner; who is then not *born*, but *created in Iniquity*. *Estibius* must never disown, and I hope will never vindicate the Consequence. But this Derogation is so plainly imputable to God, with equal Reason, for his *reserving the Angels in* Jude 6.

Chains under Darknes, who not only were, but continue *defil'd with Sin*; and indeed for his whole Revelation of Punishments, that the more I consider it, the more suspicious it grows; and I cannot but think I have as much Reason to conclude that *Estibius* does *Resurrectionem verbis ponere, re tollere*: As *Tully* did against the *Epicurean Gods*, that they were but *verbal Gods*.

The next Scripture I am oblig'd to vindicate is that of our Saviour; *Fear* Pag. 280. *not them that can kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both Soul and Body in Hell*, Matth. 10. 28. Upon this plain Text he makes four critical Remarks, which contain in them two Notions, the first that *ζυχὴν* here is to be translated *Life*, because
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it is so translated, ver. 39. *He that findeth his Life, shall lose it; and he that loseth his Life, for my sake, shall find it.* Not to insist upon it, that if $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ has various Significations, it may be variously us'd in one and the same Chapter; let *Estibius* make what he will of it here, I have prov'd from the Text, that there is a part of Man which is not the Object of Human Power, and which therefore must survive the Body; so that if $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ must be translated *Life* in both places, because so translated in one; then the Sense of the first is, *That Man may kill your Body, but cannot really and absolutely destroy your Lives; which, tho', according to the second Text, You lose in human Appearance, yet you do in reality, and to your great gain, find it in another World.* The only Question then is, when this finding shall commence; not till the Resurrection, says *Estibius*; then most eminently, say I, but in some Measure before then; because if Man cou'd make Life cease to be, until the Resurrection, then $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ as well as $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ must be, in some Sense, nay, must be equally the Object of Human Power; which is impossible, if the Text be true.

His other Solution of this Passage is taken from St. Luke, *Be not afraid of them that kill the Body, and after that have no more that they can do; but—fear him which*

after he hath killed, hath Power to cast into Hell, Chap. 12. ver. 4, & 5. Now, says he,

If St. Matthew had meant here Soul
 Pag. 282.

*as a distinct spiritual Being, undoubtedly in so material a point, St. Luke wou'd have used the same Expression; but he, making no Distinction, says only, after they have killed the Body, have no more that they can do. I answer, 1st, St. Luke is so far the best Interpreter of St. Matthew, that he wrote after him; but this hinders not, since both were divinely inspir'd, but that St. Matthew also may interpret St. Luke; for where the former Writer is more full than the latter (as it happens among the Evangelists, that the latter often rather epitomizes, than explains the former) then the latter is to be interpreted by the former. Thus St. Luke's History of *John the Baptist*, mentions only his Imprisonment by *Herod*, Chap. 3. ver. 19, 20. But St. Matthew, tho' he wrote first, is left to supply, to the Reader, his Death, and the Occasion of it, *Matth. 14. ver. 3, &c.* And if this be both usual, and very accountable, with the Evangelists, in relating *Matters of Fact*, we are sufficiently instructed from hence, how to interpret the like Omissions in *Matters of Doctrine*. And then St. Luke may be suppos'd to relate, from our Saviour, only the general, but sufficient Motive to the Fear of him, whose *Power**

can cast into Hell ; which Human Power cannot do ; and St. *Matthew*, besides the *destruction in Hell* mention'd by him, is more particular in saying that *then* God can destroy both *Body and Soul* ; whereas Man can only *kill the Body*, which includes an immediate surviving of the Soul. But

2ly, St. *Luke* is not so silent, in the distinction, as *Estibius* wou'd have him ; he does more than oppose *this* to the *next Life* ; he says Man *can kill the Body, and after that has no more that he can do*. This being written to those that made the same distinction between Body and Soul, that we do, and who were to read also St. *Matthew's* Gospel, does plainly include and imply what St. *Matthew* expresses ; and there is no necessity for supplying τὸ ψυχῇ μὴ *Bexæ quod* συναμψύων ἀποκτείναν which yet is to fuerat, *Cantab.* be found in a very ancient Copy.

After this I know not what shift *Estibius* will betake himself to ; even the Answer of a late Pamphleteer will not serve his turn ; he confesses that St. *Matthew* does our business ; but flatly and fairly denies his Authority, as inconsistent with that of St. *Luke* ; who, as a Physician, was a better Philosopher than to entertain such a Notion of Human Soul. But neither will this Shelter defend him long ; for it happens that there is a Passage in St. *Luke*, and in no other

other Evangelist, which is the next and too strong an Objection for *Estibius*. *To day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.* Luke 23.

Pag. 285. 43. To this he answers 1st. by supposing our Lord spoke to the Soul only of the Thief, *Thou Soul of the Thief, for owning me, shalt this Day be with me in a state of Bliss ; but, O Thief ! thy Body shall go to Corruption, as other Bodies do. Now what a Speech must such Men make for our Saviour ? &c.* To this I return, first our Saviour's speaking strictly to the Soul of the Thief, is an idle supposition of the Author's own ; for it was sufficient matter of Consolation to the Thief, then penitent and believing, that our Lord wou'd promise to make him that Day happy ; without disputing the manner how that Promise wou'd be made good. Secondly, the expression to which, amongst others, in all probability this of our Saviour alludes, *seek Paradise, the glorious Country,* may be turn'd into just such another Speech ; *seek it thou ; thy Soul, not thy Body ;* and yet this was reckon'd no Impropriety amongst the *Jews* ; or if it was really so, it was not our Lord's Message to the World to correct the Jewish Stile.

Pag. 287. So that we can lay aside all nice trifling about the Soul (for it is only *Estibius* that trifles about it) and yet need not quit our Explication. But he says, *to day*

day cou'd not mean strictly *that Day* ; being us'd for a longer space of time, in several Places of Scripture. Admitting what is groundless, that this Thief, who may be suppos'd unacquainted with the Stile of Scripture, understood it for any time before the general Resurrection ; then says *Estibius*, *that the repenting Thief was shortly after with our Saviour in perfect Bliss, perhaps* Pag. 288. *arose from the Dead amongst those who arose at the Resurrection, no good Christian ought to doubt.* This new Conceit of an extraordinary Resurrection, is absolutely necessary to make sence of this, and several other Places of Scripture ; and therefore, as necessity has no Law, so *Estibius* advances it against all the Laws both of Dispute and Interpretation. To make the Scripture unintelligible and inconsistent, without the help of a Notion, never mention'd in Scripture, nor imagin'd by any Man then, or before living ; but indeed contrary to the receiv'd Opinion, as appears from the Notion the *Jews* had of *Paradise*, as a place for the immediate Reception of the most peculiar Favourites of God ; is only a Sanctuary for the last Extremity of an expiring Cause ; and yet we find *Estibius* driven to it, at his first setting out in this Controversy. Nay it is moreover (as he has been already told)

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Mr. Turner's contrary to the exprefs declaration of Scripture. St. Paul (a greater Saint than this Penitent could be) assures us that, *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive; every Man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming.* 1 Cor. 15. ch. 22 and 23. v. And throughout this Chapter as he accounts for the general Resurrection, so he includes himself, and all those primitive Saints that were *baptized for the Dead*, in his account of it; for the particle *We* in the 51. v. extends to those who shall be alive at the second Coming of our Lord Jesus, and shall not undergo Death, but be *changed*, at the *last Trump*, which raises the *Dead incorruptible*. Nay farther, our Lord spoke, and spoke particularly, to greater Saints, at least in St. Paul's opinion, then he was, *I go to prepare a Place for you.* Joh. 14. 2. And *I will come again* (which must be interpreted of his second Coming) *and receive you unto my self.* v. 3. Now as to the Resurrection of those Saints which follow'd that of our Saviour, 1st, It is without the least ground that *Estibius* supposes this penitent Thief to have been one of those; and 2^{dly}, He has as little reason to suppose that this was the final Resurrection of those Saints; the Text says [*Math. 27. 53.*] *They went into the Holy City*

City and appear'd unto many ; but we have no farther account of them, nor of any Translation to Heaven ; which yet was as requisite for them , as for *Enoch* and *Elijah*. And 3dly, Suppose the Saints did arise, as some of the *Jews* believ'd, to be with Christ in Paradise (tho' that supposition is groundless too ; and their being an Instance of the Power of Christ *to raise us also*, is a sufficient Account of that Miracle) yet the Text says expressly it was *after his Resurrection*, and he being also stil'd the *first Fruits*, this plainly excludes all antecedent Resurrection to his ; and consequently leaves *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, as dead indeed, at the appearance of God to *Moses* in the Bush, as they were before the Creation of *Adam*. But enough has been said to explode this wild Notion.

In his next Answer, to that *St. Paul*, *to deliver such an one to Satan, for the Destruction of the Flesh, that the Spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord*, he calls it only *spiritual Mortification* ; but says nothing to obviate the Distinction between Spirit and Body, which I have shewn to be contain'd in the Words ; and therefore I pass on to the

Last Objection he has rais'd, and I am concern'd to vindicate, *viz.* Pag. 291.
St. Paul's Prayer. I pray God your whole Spirit,

Spirit, Soul and Body, &c. 1 Thes. 5. 23.

The substance of his confus'd Answer to this Text is this, *Their Conjunction in one Sentence, does not inferr any material Difference in the things; because such a Conjunction in Words, without such a Difference in Things, is usual in Scripture; and because the several Words are interpretable in this, as he has interpreted them in other places, to signify Life, Affections, Inclinations, &c.* Here are six Pages spent in explaining those Words, and not one Syllable mention'd of the true ground of their Conjunction in this Place, of the Doctrine or Opinion they allude to, of the Persons to whom they were spoken, or lastly of the Sense in which the *Thessalonians* must needs understand them. These methinks had been material Enquiries; but alas the resolution of every one of them wou'd have ruin'd his Cause, as I have fully prov'd in my Explication; and therefore, like a prudent Gentleman, he drop'd them all together; and chose to amuse his Reader with foreign Matter, such as this Remark on Dr. Hammond. *This learned and pious Gentleman, having imbibed*
 Pag. 294. *from his Youth the Notion of an Immortal Spirit in Man, call'd Soul; was forc'd to recur to that Notion, to bring himself off, or else he cou'd not rightly have explain'd this Text, as to every particular of it, according*

according to the foundation, or Principles of that Doctrine he had been taught originally. That is to say, he cou'd not explain the Text according to that Principle, without recurring to that Principle. Tho' I have no great Opinion of *Estibius* as a *Divine*, yet I must confess he's almost qualify'd, as Qualifications have gone of late, to set up for an *Observer*.

But we must not overlook a Philosophical Demonstration wherever we meet with it, and here it is, in a Comment upon St. Paul; *When a Man lives,* Pag. 297.
has Vigour, and all his Senses, then [according to us] *the Soul is properly Man; when Man dies, then* [say we] *the Body is properly Man; for all allow Man may properly be said to live, and properly likewise be said to die; so that living and dying, Man properly dies, and not dies; which moves Estibius's righteous Soul to that degree, that he crys out, Apage tot vexatissima crepundia, & dignas Pueris nugas. I hope this was design'd to be carry'd no farther; but let us for once try how far it will go; the Son of God liv'd upon Earth; was not the Divinity properly the Son of God? Yes: But then the Son of God died for us; cou'd the Divinity properly die? No. How then cou'd this Person Christ, be consistently said to live and die? by the Separation of*
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the Divinity, together with Human Life or Soul, from his Body? Why! thus the Person of Man may be said to die, by the Separation of his Soul from his Body; the inequality of the things compar'd, making no difference in this Case; because both are alike suppos'd to be dissolv'd: From which, and many other Consequences already drawn, I have a right to demand thus much of my Adversary, either that he will follow his Blow, or retract his giving of it. But I believe the *Socinians* will generously quit the Advantage; for they, I suppose, have form'd to themselves some tolerable Notion of Personality, before they apply it in Dispute; and if so, they cannot be ignorant of this, that tho', when we speak of Life in general, it is the Soul only that lives, and therefore not the Body that properly speaking can die; yet when we speak of this Life, it is the Person, as resulting from the *Union*, which both lives by that, and dies by the *Separation*. Thus the *Crepundia* turn upon *Estibius*; and belong to no Body else, as they are plac'd here; tho' having just done playing with them himself, he has kindly laid them at his Adversary's Door.

C H A P. VIII.

The receiv'd Doctrine of the Soul of Man, by the reform'd Churches, not chargeable with the false Doctrines of Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, or Invocation of Saints ; in Answer to his Ninth Chapter.

Estibius concludes the preceding Chapter with his Hope that all unbiass'd, Pag. 298. Orthodox Divines and others, will no longer insist upon making the Scriptures to maintain, and justify such an absurd and erroneous Opinion of a spiritual Substance united to the Body of Man ; whenas it has been the probable grounds of all these following Errors in Christianity. This gave me some hopes to find an attempt, in this Chapter, not only to prove these Doctrines of the Church of Rome erroneous, but to charge them upon our Doctrine of the separate Existence of the Soul ; but I find I am disappointed of my Hope, as *Estibius* I suppose has by this time found himself severely disappointed of his, with regard to Orthodox Divines : He has laboriously insisted on the

first Head, and left his Reader to supply the other; whereas cou'd he but have prov'd *this*, we shou'd never have fal'n out about *that*. To what purpose then does he apply himself to *unbias'd orthodox Divines*? If he believes there are any such in the World, they must be of the Reform'd Church; and is the Church of *England* to be exhorted to lay aside Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, and Invocation of Saints?

But to tell him freely my Sentiments of the Controversy, as he has undertaken it, I never hope to see *Babylon* fall by the Hand of an *Estibius*: It shou'd be the last Argument I wou'd offer against *Purgatory*, that Heathens held a *Purgation*,
Pag. 300,
&c.
 and *Lustration* not unlike it; for they held a God and a Providence too. Thus much is certain, if this Doctrine be true, all theirs which relate to the intermediate state, are blown off at once; but I must put him in mind that, after this forcible manner, to cut the Knot, is no reflexion upon the Skill of those that can untie it: And if it has been fairly untied let him not glory in his Discovery; He found the Truth shining bright, and it will receive no Advantage from his rough Hand.

This

This I think will excuse me from following him through his elaborate Confutation of these Romish Doctrines; for unless he cou'd have prov'd them to be natural and just Consequences from the spiritual Nature of Human Soul, he might as easily have confuted the Divinity of our Saviour, from the Idolatry of that Church. But this Consequence was much more easily suppos'd than prov'd; and therefore *Estibius* is content only with hinting, and pointing at it here and there; for indeed it was unreasonable to expect any just proof from him; the Nature of the Thing wou'd not bear it. *Purgatory* and *Prayers for the Dead* turn upon this Question, whether the state of our Probation ends with our present Life: But what's this to the Question, whether our Soul survives the Body? What is it, I say, as to the one being any *probable Ground* of the other? For thus far I see they are connected, that whenever the State of our Existence ends, the State of our Probation must end with it; and on the other hand, so long as we are in Being, we may also be under Probation, supposing no Revelation to the contrary; but this Connexion on our part, amounts no higher, than to a bare possibility; and therefore can do the *Romanist* no manner of Service, so long as we confine him to Topics of Probability

and Certainty. But see how far *Estibius* can improve a Notion ; this *bare Possibility* is with him a *probable Ground*, and that *probable Ground* is, I suppose, one of his *Demonstrations*.

Invocation of Saints, is just such an other Superstructure on the Immortality of the Soul ; as if the Question were not whether the departed Saints have a mediatory Power, but whether they are existent-Beings. I must joyn with him where he says, *If this*
 Pag. 328. *my Doctrine of Human Soul can obtain Belief amongst the wisest sort of them, [the Romanists] it must be a demonstrative Conviction of their Error ; and if some do, tho' but few, I will not repent of my pains, that I have endeavour'd to convert a Sinner from the Error of his Ways, &c.* Here's the pious Motive that brought forth these *second Thoughts* ; and 'tis pity they came not sooner out : They wou'd have done Knights-Service to the *Quaker*, that went to *Rome* to convert the Pope ; and I am apt to think he wou'd not have refus'd the assistance of these Thoughts, for this Reason in the first place, that they make a *dead Letter* of the Scripture ; and next that he's best qualify'd to comprehend the Author's Notion, and to explain the Parallel between *Human Soul* and the *Sun Beams*, by his own *Light within*. 'Tis very possible I must
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confess, that some of the wiser sort of the *Romanists* may incline to *Estibius's* side of the Question ; but these I fear, of all the rest, are farthest from being *converted from the Error of their Ways* ; or if they shou'd leave that corrupt Church, wou'd still, I doubt, have their Religion to seek.

But as the Papists on the one hand use, says *Estibius*, and abuse, say I, the Immortality of the Soul, to maintain *Purgatory*, and *unlawful Prayers* and *Invocations* ; so it seems there are some others that from thence conclude, *The Souls of Men dying pass immediately to Heaven or Hell.* If by Pag. 332.

Heaven and Hell here is meant the consummate, and unalterable State of Mankind in another World, I know not whose Opinion this is, nor to what purpose he confutes it. All this is making himself a perfect *Don Quixot* in Dispute ; 'tis encountring a Windmill, and that only one in his own head ; and yet this seems to be his Sense in that expression, *the Soul immediately enjoys Salvation or Damnation.* Ibid. But

if by Heaven and Hell he means the same place in the Universe, where they shall after the Resurrection enjoy their last recompence, this may be the Opinion of some of the reform'd Writers, but then this does not render *useless the Day of Judgement* ; for still even this may be *a place wherein the*

Souls of the just and wicked enjoy an imperfect state of Bliss or initial Happiness or Torment, as he expresses it ; but this is a distinct Opinion he proposes to confute ; and therefore the other Romantic Notion of the intermediate State, is what in this Place he does most heroically subdue.

But let us consider what he objects to the Opinion of initial Happiness or Misery in the intermediate State ; he tells us *this Opinion seems to be more consonant to the Principles of the Christian Religion, than that of the Roman Catholicks ;* and the Reform'd are beholden for such a Character to a stander-by ; but this he cannot yet admit of, because *we must feign a third place of Torments, as well as Joy ; and what will this differ from a Purgatory ?*

As much, I answer, as *Purgation and Torment differ, which, to borrow your own Words, differ in their sole, primary, and genuine significations both in Hebrew, Greek and Latine.* And is there no difference, think you, in the Things, as well as the Words ; in a state of Misery which shall end in Heaven, and that which shall end in Hell ? But it seems *we have not found out a Place for the Torment of the Wicked, tho' we have Paradise for the Reception of Good Souls.* This may be call'd an half-Objection, which grants one part of the Question

Question to confute another, but unluckily grants that part, which necessarily supposes the whole; for if the surviving Souls of good Men are happy in *Paradise*, the Wicked are undoubtedly miserable some where; and this is all I desire *Estibius* to grant me. But he farther urges, this *Paradise* cannot be a place of initial Happiness only; for where our Saviour was after Death, *Ibid.* sure must be a perfect, and compleat

State of Happiness; so that, if the Thief were with him, he must also be in the same State too. So that the Thief must be equally happy with our Saviour, because in *Paradise* as well as he; and indeed all Men, in the same *Meridian*, must according to this Notion, be equally happy or miserable; or however the Thief must be as happy as Heaven cou'd make him, if he was with our Saviour; but this is an Argument truly fitted to cozen a *Rustic Understanding*, which may perhaps conceive Happiness appendant to a Place; and as such, I say as he did, *I like it well*; but then I must not believe that *Estibius* ever entertain'd, for his own use, such a gross Notion of Happiness, as to suppose it relative to any thing External; he knows it consists in the Conformity of the Object to the Faculty; and I hope he is not insensible that the more immediate Presence of God himself may become, to some

Faculties, the most exquisite Misery. So that questionless, if God pleases, the same place may be that of *Initial*, and also that of *Consummate* Happiness.

This is all that deserves our Notice in this Chapter, till we come to *the Opinion of*
 Pag. 339. *Ghosts, or Persons walking after they*

are dead; but *Estivius*, by his management of this Argument, has prevented us here, from entering into the merits of it. He tells us, *if ever the Case did happen in this*

Ibid. *World, as I much doubt, I do positively aver it is miraculous, as well as done by a Supernatural Power.* This doubt,

if the Author is consistent, must not extend to those Saints, who after our Saviour's Resurrection appear'd unto many; but only to the time in which, as we say generally speaking, Miracles have ceas'd: And when he is able to demonstrate that the Merits of this Cause depend upon such Apparitions, I shall examine more nicely, than I have yet thought it worth my while to do, into the History of them. In the interim, it is a remarkable reason he gives why there cannot be suppos'd such Apparitions, that *God can without the expence of*

Pag. 340. *a Miracle, by very little and inconsiderable Means, worked on by second Causes, find out and discover the greatest and most villainous Intrigues, &c.* which Reason

is

is good, if it be good at all, against all the signal and awakening Notices of Providence; which have been the Observation of the sober part of Mankind, in all Ages and Countries—— But I fear *Estibius* will slight the Objection.

The remainder of this Chapter is spent in confuting the Peripatetick Notion of *Forms in General*, and particularly the *Substantial Form*; which title they gave to the Soul of Man. It wou'd be unpardonable in me to follow him, in these *inquisitive Enquiries*, as he's pleas'd to term them; ^{Pag. 349.} for the most that can be made of this learned piece of Work, is this, *Form is an improper Term for a Substance*. Which Important Proposition, far be it from me to weaken; or detract from the great Author, and Discoverer of it.

C H A P. IX.

Reflexions on his Ninth Chapter, intitl'd a brief History of Human Soul.

THE Design of this History, as the Author declares at his Entrance upon it, is to shew us how this Doctrine [of the Immortality of the Soul] was deliver'd from those Heathen Philosophers, to the Christian Church; and how continued and supported for self Interest and secular Advantage: And it must be confess'd, cou'd it be made out in fact, that we had the Notion only from Heathens, and maintain it only for Gain; it wou'd be no small Prejudice, to a wise and good Christian, against this Doctrine. Thus far therefore *Estibius* designs well and consistently; but, as it usually happens that his Design is the least part of his Performance, so here we have above Fifty, out of Sixty odd Pages, spent in shewing us how the Heathen Philosophers came by it themselves; and upon what precarious Grounds they maintain'd it. All this Learned Pains therefore,

fore might justly be slighted, and *set aside*, as it is really *beside* the Question; only it may deserve a Reflexion or two, because many Learned Men have endeavour'd to propagate an Opinion, that the most ancient Theology was first borrow'd from the Scriptures, or the Schools of the Patriarchs, tho' afterwards chang'd and mutilated, according to the Opinion and Fancy of those *Sages*, through whose Hands it came down to us; and because it still appears by their works, that the chief of their Notions were not maintain'd upon such precarious Grounds; and upon that account it wou'd seem strange, if they deliver'd nothing solid upon an Argument of such moment to Mankind, and which had so large a share in their Compositions.

As to the first Enquiry, from whence the Philosophers had this Notion, *Estibius* derives it to them immediately from the *Ægyptians*, and to these from the Writings of *Moses*, pry'd into, but mistaken by the *Ægyptian Priests*. It's true we cannot depend much upon this account, because the Author of it has very flatly contradicted himself in the Relation. He pretends in one place to have given *us the rational Grounds, how the* Pag. 356.
Ægyptian Priests became, in all probability, the first Founders of that Notion of an immortal Pag. 360.

tal Soul in Man ; and in the very next Page,
 Pag. 361. the *Chaldeans* are made the first
 Founders of it ; and afterwards the
Ægyptians are a second sort of Philosophers,
 Pag. 365. who by reason of their vicinity to
Chaldea, might be instructed in the
 same Principles, &c. Tho' he thinks it
 more likely they might have it from the
 Writings of *Moses* ; however they were not
 the first Founders of it amongst the Hea-
 thens ; because the *Chaldeans*, as he con-
 fesses, were *antiquissimum Doctorem Genus* ;
 and he has not pretended to date the Original
 of it amongst them.

But because I am past wondring at such
 passages as this ; let us take it for granted
 that he means the *Chaldeans* and *Ægyptians*
 were the two oldest Nations that held this

Pag. 366. Doctrine, and that *Thales* first
 brought it from them into Greece :

But then his History is false ; for, as he
 has been already told, it is to

Dr. Nichols's
 Con. with a
 Theist, p. last
 p. 220.

be met with in several Places
 of *Homer*, who liv'd above 300
 Years before *Thales* ; and the

same Learned Person has farther shewn,
 Ibid. p. 222. that it was the Opinion of all

Nations, by a very full and par-
 ticular Proof, which I shall neither pretend
 to transcribe nor improve, but referr the
 Reader to it. And indeed we may be fully
 assur'd

assur'd of the truth of this, since *Tully*, who appears to be most exactly and thoroughly skill'd, in all the Philosophy and Religion before his time, tells us, as I have already cited the Passage, *permanere Animos arbitramur, consensu Nationum omnium*. Thus remarkably introduc'd *ut Deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sunt Ratione cognoscimus; sic, &c.* And this consistently with what he says in the same Book, *Animum cum Corpore extinguunt sunt qui censent,* Tusc. qu. l. 1. *quales sunt Epicurei*. But to any Man, that is the least vers'd in the Opinions of the Ancients, it cannot be doubted that this Opinion extended as far as the Belief of a God; and I am sure there were more various and ridiculous Notions, of the Nature and Being of God, than there was of the Nature and Duration of the Soul. And therefore as all those whimsical Notions that *Mr. Stanley* has historically collected in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, and *Estibius* has transcrib'd from him and urg'd as Objections to the Immortality of the Soul, might be far outnumber'd by a like Collection of Opinions concerning God, so they wou'd, for that Reason, more strongly urge against the Argument, in both Cases, so much and so deservedly insisted upon, from the Consent of all Nations to the Being of a God. But to a Man that better considers things,

things, this Variety of Notions, is so far from proving the thing it self to be an Invention of some particular Men, and not the universal Dictate of Reason; that that it is a very strong presumption to the contrary. That Nations so vastly different in every thing else which they believe and practise, should yet agree, in the main, in two or three Fundamentals of Religion, is too unaccountable, as an Human Invention, to be suppos'd morally possible: Nor can it be suppos'd with any probability, that the *Ægyptians* in particular, communicated this Notion to the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, and yet communicated nothing else of their Religion; especially if they did learn it, not as a Doctrine agreeable to their own Reason (which *Estibius* must say, or he says nothing to the purpose; but gives his Adversary a considerable Advantage) but only historically, and as it made a part of the *Ægyptian* Theology. Nor again can it reasonably be imagin'd that the Philosophers gave Religion to the Vulgar; they might correct and refine upon the receiv'd Religion, but neither cou'd their Notions reach any that were undisciplin'd in their Arts of Dispute. It is possible indeed that an universal Monarch may force an external Conformity to any Religion; but none of the great Monarchies extended so far as
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the Immortality of the Soul ; they did not bring it in by Conquest, but found it wherever they conquer'd : And besides, as to matters of Belief, the general Sence of Mankind lies under no Restraints of Human Power ; nor cou'd ever be establish'd by it. Lastly, If any Opinion that has prevail'd so universally, be only traditionary, then that is highly unreasonable to suppose, it must have been handed down from before the dispersion of Mankind, from the first Family upon Earth ; and let *Estibius* make his best of that concession. These I take to be convincing Reasons against any pretended History of Human Soul from Heathens, to make it their Invention ; and till *Estibius* has confuted this Account of it, I must believe he can as easily draw up from the Materials they have afforded him, a true History of the Creation.

But what if we shou'd grant our Historian, that there was no such Notion generally entertain'd before *Thales* ; and moreover that he with *Pythagoras*, *Socrates* and *Plato* had it from the *Ægyptians* ; whence had the *Ægyptians* the Notion ? He answers, from perusing the Writings of *Moses*, where it is observable that the Word Soul Pag. 356. is extraordinarily frequently used by him, in his Laws he gives the Jews ; of which the *Ægyptians* might, and unquestionably did

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conceive a very odd and erroneous Notion. That they might conceive an erroneous Notion, of the true Sense and Intent of *Moses's* Law in general, may be allow'd ; but that they shou'd mistake him in an Article which equally concern'd themselves, and which they adopted into their own Religion, is an unreasonable *Postulatum* of *Estibus's*, when we reflect that *Moses* was *Learned in all the Wisdom of the Ægyptians*, and was mighty in Words and in Deeds. Did *Moses* then design to lead the *Ægyptian* Priests into this Error, or was he incapable of expressing himself, in an Article of Natural Religion, to their Capacity ? I think his Character above either supposition ; and as he had his Education amongst them, and was chosen by God to speak in his Name to them, I cannot suppose they were such Strangers to his Language, as to mistake him in Words *extraordinarily frequently us'd* by him ; nay and to ingraft this mistaken Notion into the Body of their Religion, from the Words of one who, with his whole Sect, *was an abomination unto them*. But that which makes the Wonder still greater, is that the *Hebrews* shou'd concur exactly with the *Ægyptians*, in so grossly mistaking *Moses* ; for I have prov'd Ch. 6th, that this Notion was, even proverbially, entertain'd amongst them, and Dr. *Nichols* has superseded

seded all farther Proof from their own ancient Writers. But there is ^{Pag. 235.} one Argument that may be more powerful upon *Estibius* than all these; for he himself has given it its due weight: He has quoted the Words of *Esdras* 2 Book, Ch. 14. v. 35. *For after Death shall the Judgment come, when we shall live again, and then shall the Names of the Righteous be manifest, &c.* And supposing, without any Reason, that this excluded the separate Life of the Soul, he adds, *which Quotations being from* ^{Pag. 105.} *the Apocrypha, I would have my Reader take notice that I cite them, not for Arguments of Divine Authority, but rather as Historical, to shew the common Opinion of the Jews at that time, &c.* I need not now shew that this however, will not come near the Author's design; but on the other hand, I refer him to *Wisdom* Ch. 3. v. 1, 2, 3, 4. *But the Souls of the Righteous are in the Hand of God, and there shall no Torment touch them; in the sight of the Unwise they seemed to die, and their departure is taken for Misery, and their going from us to be utter Destruction, but they are in Peace: For tho' they be punished in the sight of Men, yet is their hope full of Immortality.* I desire him to consider this Passage, as an Historical account of the Wisdom, so esteem'd, amongst the Jews: And let him not think

Pag. 280. to get through his Loop-hole, I *pass it by until the Apocrypha be proved Canonical*; for I insist upon it no otherwise than as he himself had done before, upon a Quotation that makes nothing at all to his purpose. But I must not expect he will submit to the plainest Sense of the *Apocrypha*, who is not ashamed to contradict sacred and prophane History in one Breath; *The generality of the Jews, nay I*

Sec. Th. pag. 359. *may say universally were of Opinion that Man would die and never live again*; what is this, but to assert a Matter of Fact, either *against*, or *without* his Knowledge? and either is bad enough. We see then, if his own History be true, the probable Ground of this Doctrine, which in short is this; the *Church of England* had it from the *Church of Rome*, that Church from the *Primitive Fathers*, they from the *Philosophers*, those from the *Ægyptians*, and the *Ægyptians* from *Moses*.

The next thing we are to consider, is the *Reason* upon which the *Philosophers* asserted and maintain'd this Doctrine; which *Estibius* calls precarious. And that they did assert it upon many precarious Reasons, I must not deny; for they affectedly differ'd from each other in their Reasoning about most things; and *Tully* confesses

confesses upon this Occasion, *Ratio-*
nem illi sententiæ suæ non fere redde-
bant, nisi quid erat numeris aut descrip-
tionibus explicandum. But tho' they differ'd in
 their Discriptions, which made the greatest
 part of their Discourses; yet it is very remar-
 kable they all assign'd one Reason, which as
 I take it is *the* Reason from the considera-
 tion of the Nature of the Soul; It is the
αὐτοκίνητον or self-moving Power in the Soul.
 This *Estibius* relates was the chief Tenent
 of *Thales*, who first gave that Attribute
 of a self-movent Principle and Immorta-
 lity to the Soul; and after him *Pytha-*
goras call'd it a self-moving Number,
 which is *Mind*: Next he reckons this
 amongst the Opinions of *Socrates*,
 That the Soul of Man is immortal;
 for what is always moveable is immor-
 tal; and *Plato*, the last he mentions,
 says, The Soul of Man is immortal,
 a Substance having, within it self, a power to
 move it self, and other things. Thus far
 Mr. *Stanly* has inform'd him right, and I
 know not what need be added, unless
 that *Cicero* himself, who had so well dige-
 sted all the Opinions of the Ancients, lays
 down this as his grand Proof from *Plato*.
Quod semper movetur æternum est: Quod au-
tem motum assert alicui, quodque
ipsum agatur aliunde, quando finem

Tusc. qu.
lib. 1.

Pag. 367.

Pag. 370.

Pag. 381.

Pag. 391.

Tusc. qu.
li. 1.

habet motus, vivendi habeat necesse est. Solum igitur quod seipsum movet, quia nunquam deseritur a se, nunquam se moveri quidem destinit; quin etiam cæteris quæ moventur, hic fons, hoc principium est movendi, &c. Now whence cou'd proceed this uninterrupted Chain of Reasoning? And how came the same Argument to be in all their Mouths, who differ'd so much in most Arguments, but from the same true observation of the passive Nature of corruptible Matter? And this is the very Argument which I have prosecuted at large in the first part; and thither

Pag. 368. I must refer *Estibius* who cannot conceive why a Thing being self-movent, must therefore be immortal; there seems (he means only to himself) no natural Inference or Connexion between the one and the other.

The Reader must now be left to judge what *Estibius* has gain'd, by detaining us thus long from what shou'd have been the Subject of this Chapter, which is the Introduction of this Doctrine into the Christian Church, and the Reason of it's continuance there. All the account he has given of the first is, that the Primitive Fathers were generally *Platonists*, insomuch that

Pag. 386. *St. Augustine* confesses, That the Books of the Philosophers were very useful to him, to facilitate his Understanding of some

some Orthodox Truths ; and upon this single Reason he doubts not to make it a pure Principle of *Platonism*. *Platonism* was undoubtedly the receiv'd Philosophy of those Times ; and even *St. Paul* himself is not ashamed, as we have seen, to make use of the *Platonic* Notion of the Soul : And what then ? Did he learn it at *Tarsus*, and corrupt Christianity with it ? No, he had *the Spirit of God*, but the Primitive Fathers were poor ignorant, illiterate Creatures ; and indeed considering how heartily they renounc'd their Heathenish Principles, those of them that were born Heathens ; and how unlikely it is those who were born Christians shou'd take their Religious Principles from thence ; and withall that their chief Business was to dispute against the Heathen Religion, and how zealously and successfully they appear'd in that Cause, nothing but an Ignorance next to Infatuation, cou'd have suffer'd them universally to espouse an Heathenish Doctrine, purely as such. And yet it is plain not only the Fathers espous'd it, but the Vulgar also, and indeed the whole Body of Christians must be *Platoniz'd* to account for *Estibius's* Notion. It is reasonable to suppose, *Athanasius* wou'd not have explain'd the Doctrine of the Trinity by this, had it not been a known and receiv'd Doctrine among Christians ;

for to introduce it by such a Method, wou'd have been only to explain one obscure

Method. apud
Phot. Cod. 224.

Thing by another. And thus *Methodius* speaks to it, not as a Question in dispute, but by way of Explanation of a receiv'd Doctrine.

Ἀνθρώπου λέγει καὶ φύσιν ἀληθέστατα, ὅτι ψυχὴ χωρὶς σώματος, ὅτι αὖ πάλιν σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ συστάσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, εἰς μίαν καὶ κοινὴν μορφὴν συνίστην. *Man, according to*

his Nature, can properly be call'd neither a Soul without a Body, nor a Body without a Soul; but the Result of a Composition of Soul and Body in one Form. And which is farther remarkable, when scarce any Fundamental of Christianity stood unshaken, through the Three first Centuries we read but of one despicable Number of

Hist. L. 6.
Ch. 30.

Arabian Christians, who, as Eusebius tells us, were infected with this Heresy, but confuted by Ori-

Life of
Origen.

gen. They affirm'd, as Dr. Cave says, that at Death both Body and Soul did expire together, and were resolv'd into the same State of Corruption; and that at the Resurrection they should revive and rise together to eternal Life. For this purpose a general Synod of those parts was called, and Origen desired to be present at it; who manag'd the Cause with such weighty Arguments, such unanswerable and clear Conviction,

viſtion, that the adverſe Party threw down their Weapons, and relinquish'd the Cauſe which they maintained before. This Synod was held about the Year 245, and it may be obſerv'd that a general Synod thought the Philoſophical Origen (who at their Choice had ſo ſucceſsfully maintain'd the Divinity of our Bleſſed Saviour, and converted the Heretick *Beroſus* that oppos'd it) to be a fit Champion in this, and indeed all the moſt conſiderable Chriſtian Controverſies of his Time. Which fully proves, that not only the Primitive Fathers, but the whole Primitive Church maintain'd this Doctrin; and it muſt be confeſs'd *Eſtibi* has undertaken a very noble Army of Adverſaries.

However the Fathers were the chief Patrons of this Doctrin, and the Conduit-Pipes that convey'd it entire to us; and *hinc illæ lachrymæ*; here is the true Reaſon why *Eſtibi* has ſtrew'd thoſe contemptible Characters of them ſo thick thro' his Book. Here therefore it might be proper to vindicate their Learning and Underſtanding from thoſe groſs and rude Aſperſions; but this Work is done to my Hands, by all the Hiſtorians of theirs, and all ſucceeding Times; particularly by Dr. *Cave* in their ſeveral Lives, and in the Introduction to his *Apoſtolici*, he proves it an Advantage that ex-

Pag. 12, &c.

ceedingly contributed to the Triumph

of Christianity, the singular Learning of many who became Champions to defend it. For tho' the Gospel at its first setting out, was left to its own naked Strength; and Men of the most unpolish'd Breeding made Choice of to conveigh it to the World, that it might not seem to be an human Artifice; yet after the miraculous Power began to cease, it pleas'd the Divine Providence to raise up, in its Defence, Men of the most profound Abilities and Learning, for the first five Centuries. They were, as he says, *exquisitely skill'd in Arithmetick, Geometry, Astronomy, Logick, Physick, Rhetorick, and indeed what not?* I desire *Estibius*, the next time he writes, to be particular in his Characters of *Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Arnobius, Origen, Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom*. It's true his Objection was made before by *Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian*; and therefore it may be proper for his Use, to transcribe *St. Jerom's* Answer to it. *Dis-*

*S. Hieron. præf.
de scrip. Eccl.*

cant ergo, Celsus, Porphyrius, Julianus, rabidi adversus Christum Canes, discant eorum Sectatores, qui putant Ecclesiam nullos Philosophos & Eloquentes, nullos habuisse Doctores, quanti & quales viri eam fundaverint, extruxerint, & ornaverint; & desinant fidem nostram rusticæ tantum simplicitatis arguere, suamque potius imperitiâ agnoscant. And with this I leave

leave him to reflect upon the Character, which he has so industriously, and so frequently given us of the Primitive Fathers; how far it is from Truth, and how near a-kin to the most inveterate Enmity that ever appear'd against the Christian Cause.

If we are not to be impos'd upon by *Esti-
bins* in things at that distance of Time, he can expect but little Success in his last Undertaking; which was to shew the Continuance of this Opinion in the Church, *for Interest and Gain*. It's

Pag. 409.

notorious what use the Church of *Rome* has made of this Doctrine; but supposing no such use had been made of it, wou'd the Doctrine have sunk? Must it necessarily have fail'd in the time of Pope *Gregory the Great*, had not he commanded *Prayers for the Dead*, and set up *Purgatory*? Must it needs have been drop'd at that juncture of time, when it had stood the Test of all the purest Ages of the Church? I must confess this Supposition is of a Piece with many in the Book, and can be exceeded for Extravagance, by nothing but what the Author farther asserts, *That the Con-*

Pag. 411.

test for Power and Grandeur in the Romish Church, was the true Grounds of strenuously maintaining this Opinion about the spiritual Soul of Man, united to his Body, and subsisting after it in a separate State. According

according to this account, who wou'd expect to meet with this Opinion among Christians till the sixth Century ? but why may not he be allow'd to call that a *Ground*, which is only a *Superstructure*, as well as to make a *Superstructure* of his own, without any *Ground* at all ?

But methinks this History of his is a little lame, or rather ends where it shou'd have begun ; for here's no Reason given why the reform'd Churches, and especially the Church of *England*, so universally own and teach *Psycomuthism*. But what wou'd you have a Man do ? Impossibilities ? It's possible to persuade some Gentlemen that the Primitive Fathers were a parcel of Fools, when an Author cannot so well say Religion is in such Hands at this time of Day ; and again 'tis plain, that with us neither Priest nor Church, get any thing by the surviving of Mens Souls ; and, besides Folly and Knavery, there can be no other Cause of an Error so gross, and so derogatory to true Christianity.

Wherefore I expect, *Estibius*, you will be-think your self of some other Topicks, if you are resolv'd to proceed in your Design, besides *Philosophy*, *Reason*, *Scripture*, and *History* ; for all these make so apparently against your Position, that I hope very few Profelytes, in an inquisitive Age, will

will be made by such Arguments, tho' you shou'd be able to *compass* Sea and Land to gain them. This is all the Advice I pretend to give you; for as to a *Retraction*, I am sensible you have set your self so far above Reproof, or Conviction from others, that it must be left at last to God and your own Conscience.

C H A P. X.

Conclusion, being a Summary Confutation of his whole Hypothesis, from what has been prov'd, and some farther Considerations.

HAVING, in the foregoing Chapters, thoroughly examin'd all the Premisses in *second Thoughts*, which have any seeming tendency to the Author's Conclusion; I shall not transgress the Rules of Dispute, to take notice of his last Chapter, which he calls *the Summary of the whole, or Conclusion*: We can expect nothing of Argument new under this Title; and if what we have met with already will but ill bear Repetition, I am sensible it's too late to engage afresh either in the same, or in foreign
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Matter. But not to be too much behind hand with my Author, I shall here present to the Reader's view, a summary Confutation of the whole *Estibian* Hypothesis; by reminding him, in part, of what has been urg'd already; and adding some farther Considerations, which have not yet fall'n in with my Method.

In order to this, we need not spend Words in stating the Controversy between us. Our Notion and Tenent is sufficiently known; and *Estibius*, perhaps has made some farther explication, but has added nothing to Mr. *Blount's* Notion; or rather, that of the *Arabian* Heretics (for I don't find Mr. *Blount* own'd any Resurrection) in the third Century, of which we have given an account. For Explication, he defines the Soul of Man, in general, to be a

Pag. 90. *Breath originally infus'd by God*

into insensible Matter, by which it lives and exerts Sense and Reason. This properly is only a Definition of *Adam's* Soul, and therefore he adds, to conclude the rest of Mankind, that *God made the*

Pag. 100. *Subject [our Bodies] capable at the*

beginning, and gave it a Power to produce its like; that is, living Creatures to produce living Creatures, and conveigh original Life in the vehicle of seminal Matter, from Generation to Generation. And again, the Soul

is only a Power inherent in generated Matter, which depends on it, and per- Pag. 298.
ishes with it. These Expressions contain the Substance of his Notion, which the Author proposes, and accordingly we shall now consider as a Position grounded on Reason, and as a Doctrine of Religion.

I. Therefore I assert; That this Notion, of Human Soul can have no manner of pretension to *reasonable Grounds*; as being both *unintelligible*, and *absurd*.

1st, It is an unintelligible Notion, I mean not as to the *Sense*, but the *Truth* of it. *A Power inherent in Matter* we can understand; but then at the same time we conceive Matter naturally susceptible of that Power, that is to say, we conceive a Capacity in *first* Matter, of all the subordinate Powers belonging to it: Now I presume *Estibius* will not assert the Power of spontaneous Motion, as naturally belonging to *first* Matter, for fear of a long train of Absurdities, already drawn out *Part. 1. §. 4, 5, 7.* and if this is absur'd, the other is unintelligible; for here is a Power that has no Foundation in the Nature of the Subject; but as it were forcibly grafted upon it by an Omnipotent hand, after a manner to us altogether unconceivable; and much less is it possible for us to understand
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how this Subject shou'd afterwards exert this Power, nay and exert it of it self, in the Course of second Causes, without any natural connexion between the *Subject* and the *Power*. *Estibius* explodes the Solution

Pag. 98. by Natural Instinct, because *it gives us not the least Light to comprehend any Philosophical Truth*; but I wou'd fain know wherein his own Notion differs from this; unless that Instinct supposes God perpetually to direct material Beings to their End; but this supposes him to have given the Body of Man a Power to direct it self, which I am sure is the more unaccountable of the two. And tho' the Patrons of this Notion are very ready, for a known Reason, to condemn *Aristotle* as an unintelligible Writer; yet they themselves we find, upon Occasion can solve the most noble *Phænomenon* in the Sublunary World, by an *occult Quality*.

And if it be unintelligible how this Power was originally communicated to the Human Body, we are still more in the Dark when we endeavour to explain how it was recommunicated by *Adam*, and every succeeding Father, in the propagation of Human Race. For, supposing now that God had actually lodg'd this unaccountable Power in *Adam's* Body, yet for that Body to communicate the same Power, with
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seminal Matter, is, to say no worse of it, beyond all Imagination. A Power to communicate Life, must be something more than a Power to live; the latter only recurs to Omnipotent Power, which may act beyond our Conception; but the former places an unintelligible Power in second Causes, and makes Matter naturally to communicate a Quality, which does not naturally belong unto it.

Estibius may answer, or rather object to this, that it's equally unconceivable how the Soul, or any thing immaterial, can move a Body. This, I confess, is true in some Sense, but still there is a wide Difference between the Unintelligibleness of the one, and the other Notion. Motion communicated to Matter by an immaterial Agent, is unintelligible in the *Manner* of it; but that a Body shou'd move it self, is unintelligible not only in the *Manner* of being perform'd, but that it shou'd ever *be perform'd*. In one Case we can demonstrate that something immaterial mov'd Matter originally, *vide Part 1. Sect. 3.* And if we cou'd as clearly prove that Matter, with or without Spirit, mov'd it self originally (which it's impossible we shou'd, because they are two Parts of a Contradiction) then the Difficulty of Conception wou'd be equal on both sides; but here we find nothing at all

all intelligible in order to convince us; whereas in the other case, we find nothing unintelligible, but what, in many cases, we are forc'd to submit to other Evidence which sufficiently proves the thing. *Estibius* often ridicules our saying the *Soul properly sees, hears, &c.* but I am sure he does not mend the matter; for since the Body has naturally no Consciousness or Perception, he must say, *the Life sees, the Life hears, &c.* This I'm sure is not less ridiculous, if we may laugh at a thing when we cannot yet tell what to make of it.

2dly, This Notion is not only unintelligible, but highly irrational and absurd; nay, we may pronounce it impossible, if we have prov'd that physically extended Substance, is in its Nature so utterly incapable of *Thought*, that no Power can super-add that Quality to it, *Part 1. Sect 7, & 8.* The grand *Atheistick* Objection against a Creation, is that *Axiom* of theirs, *ex nihilo nihil fit.* Now tho' they both mistake the Sense and the Application of this *Axiom* (for every thing is eminently in God, and this is only spoken of second Causes and Effects) yet they themselves are really guilty of the Absurdity they pretend to charge upon their Adversaries: For to produce *Life, Sense, and Reason*, which are unquestionable Realities, out of *stupid and insensible Matter*, out of
meer

meer Magnitudes, Figures, Sites, and Motions, is, in the ordinary Course, and therefore in a proper sense, to fetch *something out of nothing*. Mr. Lock may avoid this, by recurring to the Power of God; but *Estibius* has had the Misfortune to drop that, after the Creation of *Adam*; and to derive the rest of Mankind, from a *Power in generated Matter*; and therefore he must stand and fall in this Notion, with the *Democritic* and *Epicurean* Atheists. And tho' with them he may find better Philosophy, he will meet with more absurd Atheism, than with those that philosophiz'd in the way of *real Qualities*, generable and corruptible in Matter, of which Number they made *Life* and *Understanding*; and cou'd thus account for the Production of it, without a Contradiction, which the *Atomic* Philosophy could not.

But the Absurdity of this Notion is farther obvious, even to ordinary Observation. Spontaneous Motion is an Ingredient, according to *Estibius*, of Life; now we may easily observe that neither has the whole Body spontaneous Motion in it, nor have any of its most agil and refine Parts: It fares with our best Spirits, as with other Bodies in Motion, they are retarded, and grow sluggish by external Resistance; and where ever Motion can be diminish'd, in that

Subject it may be destroy'd; but the Power of spontaneous Motion can neither be diminish'd nor destroy'd, by physical Causes, however it may appear to be so in Human Body. For if we suppose the Soul to act immediately, only upon the spirituous and subtle Parts of the Body, we must grant it necessary, that these be duly qualify'd to communicate Motion to the grosser Parts, because they do that mechanically; and this is a sufficient Reason why our spontaneous Motion is obstructed in its Operation, and also why this Obstruction does finally reach every part of the Body: But on the other hand, this proves that a *vital Flame*, in a literal Sense, is as great an Absurdity, as to make all Fire alive. Nor is it reasonable to avoid this, by saying those Parts of the Body in which Life consists, can never be depriv'd of their Motion, but by Death; for besides that this is only to retreat from one Absurdity to another, this *continu'd* Motion comes never the nearer the Idea of *spontaneous* Motion, nor accounts at all for it.

But still the *Communication* of Life is a more gross Absurdity, than the *Original* of it. Do these self-moving Particles, in which the Life of the Parent consists, branch out into the Offspring? If so, all Mankind was, properly and strictly speaking, in *Adam*, as the part is in the whole; and here's an easie Account,

Account, if 'twere but probable, of the Fall of Man. Or do these Particles communicate to others their Faculty of spontaneous Motion? We do not find that a Body commences self-moving, from any Impulse; but on the contrary, that the most active Parts of our Body may be laid asleep, and the most rapid Motion of our Spirits cease. In short, it is impossible that the *Will* to move the Body, should be lodg'd in the Body it self; and the *Gremium Materię*, *Matter's Lap*, which *Estibius* somewhere talks of, is as incapable of receiving it, as Matter's *Br—h*.

Lastly, he is not more absurd in making Man wholly mortal, than he is in denying that he makes him so. He says, Pag. 209.
Mortality properly relates to a perishing Substance, which by its returning to Corruption, returns to its primitive Matter, and generates another, as all Bodies do; but Life or Soul cannot be properly said to be mortal or corruptible, but it truly returns to God that gave it, &c. But tell me, so long as your Name is *Estibius*, how Life can, in any other Sense, or more properly, be said to *return to God*, than any other Accident belonging to the Carcass, which yet returns to Corruption, & *eris mihi magnus Apollo*.

II. I come now to consider this Notion of Human Soul as a *Doctrine of Religion*; and tho' *Estibius* has confin'd the Dispute to the Christian Religion, and calls every other Argument an *Heathenish Invention*; yet I shall, in the first place, propose some Considerations from natural Religion, which will, I hope, be of Weight with those that truly understand Religion, and the general Foundations of it.

We have more than once mention'd the Immortality of the Soul, as believ'd by all Nations, in such a Sense, that an *Exception* cannot be urg'd as an *Objection* to this Rule. We are now to consider this as an *Objection* against *Estibius*. And here, as a good Testimony ought always to have Weight with a wise Man, so of all other Testimony, that of the wisest and far greatest part of Mankind, in all Ages, concurring without the Possibility of Concert or Contrivance, in the Belief of any Principle, is the strongest and most convincing. It is like a Quality diffus'd thro' a whole Species of Beings, which cou'd come only from the immediate Hand of the Creator. Thus *Tully*, upon this Argument, lays it down as an *Axiom*, *Omni in re concensio omnium Gentium, Lex Naturæ putanda est*. And proving that this was the universal

Insc. qu.
lib. 1.

versal Opinion of the most ancient Nations in History, *ab omni antiquitate*, adds, *Ibid.*

quæ quo propius aberat ab Ortu, & Divina Progenie, hoc melius fortasse quæ erant vera cernebat. And Seneca, *Cum de animarum Æternitate differimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus omnium, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium.* Ep. 117.

And therefore, in the Opinion of these wise Men, nothing less than Demonstration indeed can embolden a considerate Man, to set himself against the general Sense of Mankind.

But this Argument will be more cogent, if we examin into the Grounds of this Opinion, and the reasons, if we can assign any, why it became universal. These two I think are considerable; 1st, The natural Appetite and Expectation of Mankind; and, 2^{dly}, The Administration of Providence in this World.

1st, I have proved, *Part 1. Sect. 13.* that the proper and adequate Happiness of Human Nature, to which by a necessary Impulse it ever aspires, must be of eternal Duration; and that without the Addition of Eternity, we are made to be miserable so long as we have our Being. This therefore may properly be assign'd as a Reason why the Belief of the thing became universal, because the Appetite and Expectation of it is so; for Mankind having entertain'd

the Notion of a Deity, cou'd not believe themselves conducted hither, as into *Plato's* Den, only to be amuz'd a while, with the Shew of meer fantastical and imaginary Happiness; but they believ'd every Faculty had its true End and Design, and every Appetite its proper Gratification; and accordingly they all aim'd, tho' by different Methods, at a *summum bonum* of Human Nature, which I can look upon no otherwise, thro' all their various Opinions concerning it, than as the rude Delineation, and imperfect Reminders of *eternal Life* in their Minds. Now I believe it will never be made consistent with the Notion of a wise and beneficent Creator, to suppose, while the natural Appetites of all other Animals have their proper Gratification, that Man shou'd be utterly disappointed in the supreme Appetite of his Nature; and be cast, immediately upon finishing his *Span* of Life, into that dark State, for which he has the strongest, and for ever and unconquerable Dread and Aversion: And lastly, that this Prospect shou'd be the more severe Lot, of the wisest and best of Mankind; who have the greatest *Desire*, and the greatest *Reason* to desire *Immortality*.

Now this I take to be one good Reason for the Propagation of such a Belief, that it is perfectly suitable to the natural Notions of God and our selves; and I think it is no
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insignificant Reason for the Truth and Reality of what was thus propagated and believ'd; for otherwise God, from whom they had the *Law*, of natural Religion, *written on their Hearts*, must be suppos'd to permit the general Obedience of Mankind to that Law, to proceed upon a false Principle; and not only so, but to give them a Law without any Motive that cou'd ever stand the Test of their Reason, for nothing besides Immortality can; and therefore he who made this necessary and essential to the Obedience he requir'd of them, did not make Man *wholly mortal*.

From which Consideration it is clear to me, that the Doctrine which *Estibius* wou'd propagate, utterly destroys the very Foundation of natural Religion. I must confess he seems to intimate a Concession of this, when he calls all the Heathen Notions of future Rewards and Punishment a *pure Invention*: But so long as I believe there was really such a thing as natural Religion; I must look upon this new-vampt Notion of Human Soul, to be a meer *Chymera*.

2dly, Another Reason for the Propagation of this Belief, may very probably be grounded on the Administration of Providence in the World. This is the only Reason *Estibius* gives for the *Invention*; and he often confesses, that without the Supposition

of another State, they cou'd not solve the Appearances of Providence in this. But can he really believe this to be a Reason for his side of the Question? To prove it an *Invention*, he has given a Reason which proves it to be none, unless by *Invention* here, he means a *Dictate of right Reason*; then we are agreed, but then he confutes his own *Thesis*. And indeed, to suppose Mankind endu'd with a Notion of God, but left perplex'd in the Maze of his Providence, without any Prospect or Possibility of extricating themselves, by any Succours of Reason, is to suppose that they have done better by themselves, than God intended to do by them; for the general Expectation of Immortality, is undoubtedly preferable to Mortality, and we plainly find that the Principle gave them Tranquillity and Security, and gave Rise to their best and greatest Actions. But if God did make this Provision for them, and design'd it shou'd be their Principle of Action, it is highly reasonable to suppose it a true Principle; for tho' Immortality is more fully reveal'd since, yet it is not credible that God shou'd lay a Necessity upon Mankind to recur to a Solution, which in Fact was false; or otherwise leave them to a rational Disbelief of his Providence.

It may be objected, that this proves their Supposition of a future State to be well grounded;

grounded ; but the separate Existence of the Soul may still be a fiction of their own, and their Expectation of a future State be made good by the Resurrection. In Answer to which, I own that the future State in general, is first and immediately prov'd by this Argument ; but then I say, by Consequence, the separate Existence of the Soul is prov'd also ; for since it had not pleas'd God to reveal to them the Resurrection of the Body, they cou'd no possible way understand, how their Expectation cou'd be answer'd, but by the surviving of the Soul : for Reason cou'd never lead them so much as to conjecture the Resurrection or Revivification of the Body ; but several Reasons might, and did suggest to them that the Soul, being the Principle of Life, with a self-active Power inherent in it, might not become liable to Corruption, or be extinct upon its Departure from the Body. And this, according to their Notion, sufficiently preserv'd the Personality in both States ; for as they lodg'd the Consciousness of Guilt or Innocence entirely in the Soul, so the Soul became, in their Account, the proper Object of Retribution.

And as this is a plain Account of the Propagation of such a Belief over the Heathen World, so I doubt not it will appear that Christianity builds upon it, and that the
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Resurrection of the same Body, cannot answer the Design of the Gospel without it. This must be granted, if, after all that has been urg'd from Scripture, *Chap. 6.* the Resurrection, according to *Estibius*, cannot be in order to the reviving of the same Person, but the Creation of another distinct Person.

And this will appear very plain, when we have once a right Notion of *Person*, of *Creation*, and *Revivification* of Man. 1st, Person may be defin'd, *the individual Subsistency of a rational Nature*. Thus it is distinguish'd from *Hypostasis*, which is the *individual Subsistency of every thing in general*; and thus it is plain it must be my intellectual and rational Nature, whether from a Principle of Life or Soul, and not my Body (which lies under a perpetual Flux, of Accretion and Diminution) that makes me the *same Person* I was twenty Years ago, *viz.* I am the same self-conscious Being I was then, tho' I have undergone many Alterations, not only in my Body, but in my rational Faculty too, as to the manner of exerting it. This I apprehend to be the true Notion of the *Person* of Man in general; tho' there is something more meant by it, when we consider him as being in this State: Here the *Personality* may be said to result from the Union of his Soul or Life, with his Body; and
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in this Sense, the *Person* is also said to die; but tho' the *Person* may be thus call'd a result from both, yet the *Personality* must determin only in one: That is to say it must be either his Soul thinking after such a particular manner, by the use of such particular Organs; or else it must be the Body only, so peculiarly modify'd, as to distinguish the Thoughts of one Man, from those of another. But then this is not the Adequate, tho' it is the usual Notion of *Person*; for still the *Personality* may be preserv'd, if the Self-consciousness is so, in the separation of Life or Soul from the Body. The difference between these two Notions is only this, the one places Personality in the *same Self-consciousness*, the other more restrainedly, and indeed more improperly, in the *same manner of being Self-conscious*.

2ly, By the *Creation* of this Person of Man, must be understood, according to the *Mosaic* History, the breathing or infusing Soul or Life into his Body; for Man is said to be made at some distance of time from the *Creation* of the Earth, out of which his Body was taken; but the præexisting Parts of his Body, hinder not this subsequent Act, from being properly call'd *his Creation*; because that, in which his Personality consists, was then *made out of nothing*. Therefore 3dly, By reviving the same Man, must be

be understood the re-infusion of the same Life or Soul into that same Body; I mention the *same Body*, as an Article of reveal'd Religion; for, according to the Sense I have given of *Person*, I do not think the *same Body* requisite, in order to make the *same Person* live again; but only to make him the same Person, under *some* of the *same Circumstances* he was in, when alive before, (which I think rationally accounts for the design of the Resurrection) because I am persuaded he will continue the same self-conscious Being, when strip'd of his Body. However *Estibius* must grant that the same Life or Soul, is absolutely requisite to make up the *same Person*; who will be the *same* after the Resurrection, notwithstanding his *Cœlestial Body*, as much as he is now the *same*, thro' all the gradual Changes of his present Body.

From hence we may easily collect what sort of a Resurrection, I do not say *Estibius*, but his Hypothesis makes; it plainly makes a re-creation, and that cannot be of the *same Person*. For, in Order to have the *same Person* live in any two different States, I maintain it absolutely necessary, that he continue the *same* self-conscious Being, thro' the intermediate State, whatever it be, which leads him from one to the other. For what was his first Creation more than *enlivening* his
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his Body? And what is his second less than *reviving* of it? But now the *same Action* repeated, does not bring back into Being the *same Person*, who in any point of Time or Duration, had quite lost his Being: For Life, according to this Notion, is only an *accident* to the Body in which it is; but it is demonstrative, or rather self-evident, that *Accidens non migrat de Subiecto in Subiectum*; and if the same Life which is in my Body, cannot possibly be communicated to any other Body; then neither can it be recommunicated to my own when lost, tho' but for a Moment; for, in that Moment, it must exist without it's Subject, which is impossible an Accident shou'd do. This is plain in all parallel Cases; a white Body for instance turn'd to any other Colour, can never regain the same *Numerical* Whiteness, tho' we suppose every particle of it to be exactly dispos'd as it was before; but only a Colour of the same *species* or *kind*, but now a *Specific* Resurrection, is indeed no Resurrection at all; supposing the numerical Body that is now enliven'd do then revive, it may re-assume the Title of Man, and so the same *kind* of Being is restor'd, but it is not the same *Peter* or *John* reviv'd, nor can any individual be restor'd from not being, without a Contradiction.

Estibius seems to have been somewhat aware of this Consequence, when he talks of *Life centring in God*, and so returning to Man; but this, as I have said, is only an unintelligible piece of Cant, if he would have it to *return to God*, in any other sense than all extinct Accidents do; which indeed is in no Sense at all; for how, or in what proper Sense that which *centers in nothing*, can *center in him* whose essential Character is *I am*, *Estibius* will never satisfy the World; and therefore having so often inculcated the *not being*, and the *ceasing to be* of Human Soul, he must confess that the *centring again in God* are meer Words, which carry no Sense or Idea with them, and much less are they explanatory of the Author's Sense.

It is certain all Life was originally in God; but let *Estibius* shew me what difference there is between his Intermediate State, and that preceding the Creation; or between the Life *return'd to God*, and that which was *never communicated* by him; and then let him prove that *reviving* of Man, is not a *new Creation*; or else let him make a *new Creation* consistent with the *identical* and *individual* Nature of the Person; and when he has done that, I shall crave leave to withdraw this Article; but till then, let him quote as much as he pleases out of Scripture, I must charge

charge upon him the most pernicious sort of Deism, that which denies all future Rewards and Punishments. And tho' he shou'd reply, that these are only subtle Metaphysical Notions, of *Person, Identity, &c.* Yet I must continue the Charge; for are they true? If so, the Mischief is surely there; this only shews it lies the deeper, and there is no Mischief lies so deep, but some will dive into it.

But truly I think the Consequence does not lie so far beyond the common reach; it requires no great depth of Reason for a Man to be altogether unconcern'd for his Body while it lies in the Grave; and the case is much the same, as to the reviving of it; for it is not *I* that carry guilt with me into the other World; *my* Sins are blotted out, with *my* Being; *I* am neither concern'd in that Action of God Almighty upon my Body, whereby he will revive it, nor can he make those new-liv'd Particles remember that they liv'd in a former World, if annihilation of Life intervenes; for in that State of new Being they can remember no farther backward, than that Being extends: Or if he shou'd impress upon them all their former Guilt, it is not *I* that remember the Fact, but a new Person, punish'd with the Remembrance of what *I* did; *I my self* being no more concern'd
with

with his Remembrance, than he with my Fact. For I am conscious that if once a full period is put to my Life, and the Scene of it ever become a perfect Blank, *this* Life can no more be restor'd to my Body, or the Scene of it really appear again, because it is rais'd an Human Body, than if it were rais'd the Body of a Beast, and enliven'd ; in which there might be all the Particles of *my* Body, and yet not I *my self* ; and thus it is in the former case ; there is nothing more of me, besides the Particles of my Body, the rest is all the Workmanship of God. Now I appeal to any Man, that does but understand what he properly means by *himself*, whether this is not the true State of the Case.

Estibius somewhere expresses a great veneration for *Lucretius*, insomuch that he thinks an Immaterial Substance too wild a Notion for him to have entertain'd. *Lucretius*, we know, declares for Man being *wholly Mortal* ; but then he declares it with a little better Consistency than his Admirer : It was indeed too wild, as well as too religious a Notion, for him, that the same Man, once *wholly dead*, cou'd possibly revive. No, he plainly saw, and boldly maintain'd the Consequence ; and therefore, taking Advantage, as is suppos'd of the *Stoic's* ἀσυνεχισμός, which is the very
same

same Notion *Estibius* has grafted on the Christian Religion, he has these remarkable Lines.

*Nec, si materian nostram conlegerit ætas,
Post obitum, rursumque redegerit,
ut sita nunc est :
Atque iterum Nobis fuerint data
Lumina vitæ,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque
factum,
Interrupta semel cum sit retinentia Nostri.
Et nunc nil ad nos, de nobis attinet, ante
Qui fuimus ; nec jam de illis nos afficit angor,
Quos de materia nostra nova proferat Ætas.*

De rerum
Natura Lib. 3.

English'd by Mr. Creech.

*Nay, grant the scatter'd Ashes of our Urn
Be joyn'd again, and Life and Sense return ;
Yet how can that concern Us, when 'tis done,
Since all the Memory of past Life is gone ?
Now we ne'er joy, nor grieve, to think what
we
Were heretofore, nor what those things will
be,
Which fram'd from Us, the following Age
shall see.*

Now if the same Person that reads *Second Thoughts*, shou'd read *Lucretius* too, as
E e 'tis

'tis not improbable he may, and is convinc'd by the former, I am very apt to think he will clap together *Estibius's Principle*, and *Lucretius's Consequence* ; for a Man is not settled till Principles and Consequences agree, and his Notions lie quiet, and consistently in his Mind ; but we see *Lucretius* is not willing, and I am confident *Estibius* is not able to part these two.

And now I need not dwell upon the horrid Consequences, that attend this Notion, when made Christian. It makes God create, in the future State, sinners *as such* ; who receive their *polluted* Souls immediately from his *pure* Hands ; and having once taken away their Being, according to this Doctrine, he creates them on purpose to be miserable. And therefore once more I call upon *Estibius*, either to quit the Premises, or stand by the Conclusion ; and I hope he will deal fairly, in this important Controversy, with himself and the World ; for it is a Subject, upon which so long as he is free to publish his *Thoughts*, he cannot expect to keep secret his *Design*.

T H E E N D.

CONTENTS

OF THE

FIRST PART.

SECT. I. *Some Terms intended to be us'd explain'd.* p. 1. viz. Substance, p. 2. Attribute, *ibid.* Property, *ibid.* Mode, p. 3. H. Soul, *ibid.* Idea, *ibid.*

SECT. II. *What sort of Proof is to be expected, and insisted upon,* p. 4. 1st, Not Sensible, p. 5. 2dly, Not Mathematical, or Geometrical, *ibid.* 3dly, Not such as will leave no Hesitation or Scruple with most Readers, *ibid.* And yet may be valid and conclusive. p. 6. 4thly, The Proof upon this Subject must proceed in the Analytic Method, with the validity of that Method, *ibid.* 5thly, Tho' it does not lead to a full comprehension of the Cause, yet it fully concludes for the Existence of it, p. 7. Lastly, The Necessity of recurring to a Principle for the Solution of some Phænominon, in what Case a good Establishment of that Principle.

SECT. III. *Of Immaterial Substance in general.* 1st, Substance prov'd to be as self-evident as any other simple Idea, and a real Principle notwithstanding Mr. L's deriding it, p. 8. Acknow-

Contents of the First Part.

ledg'd by Spinoza, p. 9. How we may be said to know something of Substance, ibid. That a Difference in Accidents inferrs a Difference in their Substances, p. 10. 2dly, Immaterial Substance, the Existence of it prov'd from these Two Principles, 1st, That something was from Eternity, p. 11. 2dly, That Motion was communicated to Matter, p. 12. Finite Immaterial Substance no impossibility, p. 13.

S E C T. IV. *Of Extension and Cogitation, as the Attributes of Body and Mind, and how far their different Ideas argue different Substances, p. 14. No connexion between Thought and Extension, p. 15. Granted by Spinoza, ibid. What sort of difference of Attributes does not, ibid. and what does prove different Substances, p. 16. No third Thing, Substance or Attribute, to connect Extension and Thought, ibid. Scruple of their being connected in Fact remov'd, p. 17. Our Method of Enquiry truly Philosophical, p. 18. Spinoza's Distribution of Things into Corpora & Cogitandi modos, illogical and unphilosophical. ibid. Spinoza betrays his own Cause, p. 19. Mr. L's Obj. that 'tis possible Omnipotence may have made Matter think, answer'd, as far as relates to the Point in Hand, p. 20.*

S E C T. V. *Of the Repugnancy in our Ideas, between Cogitation and Extension, and how far this proves an Immaterial Substance in Human Nature, p. 23. This a plain consequence of what went before, ibid. Reasons why Men do not easily apprehend this Repugnancy, 1st, Finding these two United in their own Nature, ibid. 2dly, Experiencing that corporeal Motion produces Thought in them, p. 24. 3dly, Confounding Motion and Thought.*

Contents of the First Part.

Thought, *ibid.* This Repugnancy (*these Prejudices remov'd*) apparent, p. 25. Mr. L's Refuge to Omnipotence consider'd again, the Absurdity of it shewn, *ibid.* The mischievous consequence of it made appear, p. 26. In leading to Scepticism, p. 27. Or leaving nothing certain but this, that God may have deceiv'd us, p. 28.

SECT. VI. Of Cogitation, as in Man, requiring an Immaterial Substance, p. 29. This prov'd from our Sensations, without insisting on the pure Intellect or Imagination, p. 30. That our Idea of Thought is a real Idea, and as well known as intuitive Knowledge can make it, in Opposition to Mr. L. p. 31. and as perfectly known to us as our Idea of Extension, p. 32. The Instances of Heat and Pain compar'd, *ibid.* This not solvable mechanically, p. 33. But very accountable upon the supposition of an Immaterial Substance, *ibid.*

SECT. VII. Of Physically extended Substance, as in its Nature utterly incapable of Thought, p. 34. Matter indifferent to Motion or Rest, p. 35. This discovers the Passive Nature of it, even to Demonstration, p. 36. Axioms of two sorts distinguish'd, *ibid.* and apply'd to this Argument, p. 37. Matter incapable of Spontaneous Motion, p. 38. Matter incapable of Thought by its Divisibility, p. 39. Atoms, properly speaking, impossible, *ibid.* The Nature of Body examin'd according to the Doctrine of Atoms, or minima Physica, p. 40. And prov'd incapable of Thought, *ibid.* Whether as lodg'd in one, or more of them, p. 41. Corporealists that hold no such minima Physica, yet chargeable with the same Absurdities, p. 44.

Contents of the First Part.

S E C T. VIII. *That Cogitation cannot be superadded to Matter, p. 45. This can be done but three Ways, either 1st, by Motion, 2dly, by Generation, 3dly, by Omnipotence, p. 46. 1st, Not by Motion, from the Effects produc'd in a Body mov'd, p. 47. Which are all reducible to this one, Change of Place, p. 48. Impossible for a Body to think because in one Place, and not in another, p. 49. 2dly, Not by Generation, ibid. Real Qualities absur'd, p. 50. All resulting from Motion, ibid. Difference of their Idea from that of Motion accounted for, p. 51. Relative Qualities can neither produce, nor continue Thought, p. 52. 3dly, The last Objection taken from Omnipotence propos'd, ibid. This no cover for an Atheist, yet an Apparatus to Atheism; as making a Corporeal Deity possible, and disabling Mr. L's own Arguments to the contrary, p. 53. Thought cannot be one of the, to us unknown Properties, which Omnipotence has bestow'd on Matter as such, p. 57. Another Sense of the Objection propos'd, that there may be some, to us unknown, Capacity of Thought in Matter, so that Omnipotence may conferr it on some Corporeal Systems, p. 58. The Objection resolv'd into three Particulars, ibid. In what Sense it is asserted that Omnipotence cannot create Cogitative Matter, p. 59. The 1st. Ground of the Objection, that a Capacity of Thought may be one of the many, to us unknown Properties of Matter propos'd, p. 60. In answer, consider'd upon what Accounts we can at any time exclude a Property from belonging to a Substance, p. 61. shewn to take place here, p. 62. The 2d. Ground of the Objection that this Capacity may be in Matter, tho' it is not included in our Idea of it, answer'd, p. 63. Mr. L's unfair repre-*

Contents of the First Part.

representation of our Argument, p. 65. Mutual Gravitation of Bodies no parallel Case, p. 66. The last Ground of the Objection, that tho' we suppose it impossible to conceive Matter thinking, yet Omnipotence can act beyond our Conception of things, answer'd, p. 67. Mr. L's chief Argument upon this Head propos'd, p. 69. Answer'd in four Particulars, p. 70, &c.

S E C T. IX. *That it is not God, the supreme Spirit, that thinks in Human Nature, p. 74. Prov'd 1st, Because the Faculty of Thought is finite, p. 76. 2dly, Because our Thoughts are Morally peccable, p. 77.*

S E C T. X. *How far the preceding Proof gives the Soul of Man a Nature and Essence, distinct from Matter, p. 80. Our Senses misapply'd when by them only we judge of the Nature of things without us, ibid. In what Instances their Testimony is to be rely'd upon. p. 81. The conclusion for an Immaterial Substance in Human Nature, as valid as that for a Material, p. 82. Immaterial a negative Term; but the Idea of a real and positive Nature, p. 83.*

S E C T. XI. *Of the Union of Soul and Body, p. 83. This unaccountable in the Modus of it, ibid. We therefore know no immediate Cause of it, besides the Creator, p. 84. Whether this is recurring to Omnipotence as our Adversaries do, ibid. In order to determin that, an explication propos'd, 1st, That we do not mean by this Union, any Confusion of the Substances, ibid. Nor 2dly, Such an Union as indissoluble, ibid. 3dly, The dissolution effected by natural Causes, p. 85. 4thly, Reciprocal Action and Passion, an Instance or Effect of this Union, ibid. 5thly, The vital Congruity, ibid.*

Contents of the First Part.

All beyond this unintelligible, p. 86. No contradiction in any particular of what we have explain'd; ibid. Nor in what is inexplicable, p. 90. Atheists Object. No Union but by Contact, propos'd, ibid. The Union even of Bodies not effected by contact, demonstrated, p. 91. Nor by Rest superadded, p. 97, and 98. Nor by the Pressure of the Atmosphere, p. 98, and 99. This fully answers the Object. p. 100. As also, that Material cannot act upon Immaterial, ibid.

S E C T. XII. *Of the Immortal Nature of the Soul, as a consequence of its Immaterial and Substantial Nature, p. 102. What to be understood by it's Immortality in this Place, ibid. Does not undergo Annihilation, p. 103. Subsists in its individual Nature, ibid. Retains the faculty of Thought, and Consciousness, p. 104.*

S E C T. XIII. *That the Immaterial and Substantial Nature of the Soul, is the best Foundation for the Moral, and Christian Immortality of it; together with a short Account of the Consistency of these Doctrines, with Reason and each other, p. 106. The Moral Immortality grounded upon an Immaterial Substance, p. 107. Which is most agreeable to the Christian Immortality. p. 108. Those Erroneous that hold the Materiality and Immortality of the Soul. p. 109. A short proof of the Moral Immortality, p. 110. Which is more cogent upon Christians, than it cou'd be on the Heathens, p. 113. The agreeableness of the Christian Immortality to Reason, p. 114. 1st, As to our entrance upon it, p. 115. By a Resurrection and Re-union, p. 116. And after that by a general Judgment, p. 118. 2dly, As to our Continuance in it, p. 120. Reasonable to suppose that God design'd to make*

Contents of the Second Part.

us eternally happy, prov'd, 1st, From the proper and adequate Happiness of Human Nature, ibid. For this End what Faculty of Human Nature is to be gratify'd, p. 121. And what Gratification that Faculty requires, p. 123. 2dly, From the Ground and Reason we have to hope for the attainment of this Happiness, Eternal Death or Misery, not inconsistent with the Design of God, p. 127. Who devotes none to Destruction, p. 128, and 129. The Sum of the Essay, p. 130. Connexion with the following Part, p. 132.

Contents of the Second Part.

CH A P. I. *Observations on his Two first Chapters, the one concerning the Prejudices of Education in Matters of Religion, the other of the true Grounds and Foundation of Belief, p. 137. His Causes of Prejudice, viz. The strong Impressions of Education, and the Opinion every Man covets to be esteem'd Wise, &c. p. 139. The first only a tautology of Words, ibid. The second not the true Cause of Prejudice by Education, but of those Prejudices that are contracted in opposition to the Principles of Mens Education, ibid. This however an imperfect Account, p. 140. Supply'd by two other Causes, Lust or Depravity in Morals, p. 141. And Pride in the Understanding, p. 142. The Author no true Member of the Ch. of England, ibid. The boldness of his Charge. p. 145. His account of the true Ground and Foundation of Belief either insignificant, p. 145. Or false, ibid. His two general Reasons for Mens inability to comprehend*

Contents of the Second Part.

prehend Truth, impertinent, p. 147. Discrete Quantity not Infinite, ibid. His calling the Immortality of the Soul Heathenish and Popish examin'd, p. 150. He makes Inferences, from no Premisses, p. 152.

CHAP. II. *Observations on his Third Chapter, wherein he pretends to prove that the Notion of Human Soul, as held by the greatest Philosophers, and their Opinions of its Original are unsatisfactory; together with an Answer to all that is here Objected to our Doctrine, p. 154. He betrays his Cause by enumerating the most ridiculous Opinions on his own side, ibid. His proof that the Soul is a Power not Substance, from Juvenal examin'd, p. 156. From Virgil, p. 158. His appeal to the Heathens for proof of a Doctrine, which he rejects as Heathenish, p. 161. Aristotle's Definition of the Soul vindicated, p. 162. Proves that Matter cannot Think, p. 164. The Soul being tota in toto, & tata in qualibet Parte explain'd, p. 166. No way serviceable to his purpose, p. 167. How the Nullibists may answer his Objections, p. 168. The Sense of Infundendo creatur & creando infunditur, p. 170. Immediate Creation not confuted by him, ibid. The seat of the Soul as well known, as the seat of Life, p. 171. Præexistence of Souls he opposes by recurring to the Scripture impertinently, to the Fathers inconsistently, and to the Church-Historians ridiculously. Præexistence does not limit the Power of the Creator, p. 173. The Astral Spirit, or sensitive Soul, with the Properties assign'd to it, unconcern'd in this Dispute, p. 175.*

CHAP. III. *Wherein is shewn the insufficiency of all that he advances in his fourth Chapter, to prove his own the true Notion of the Soul, p. 177.*
His

Contents of the Second Part.

His concurrence with Hobs, ibid. Denies what he had just asserted, to evade an Objection, p. 178. makes our Saviour assert that a Body is more intelligible than a Spirit, when he bid his Disciples behold his Hands and Feet, p. 179. The Character of a Man that has laid aside Prejudice, taken from Estibius, p. 180. The Immortality of the Soul, as a solution amongst the Heathens of Providential Appearances, no Prejudice to it, p. 181. Nor the Primitive Christians having it from the Heathens. p. 182. His Definition of the Soul to be Afflatus or Breath, wants the requisite Perspicuity, p. 184. The Word figuratively us'd in Scripture, p. 185. his Notion of it inconsistent with his own Account from Scripture, ibid. His second Definition of Life no better, p. 187. Man does not propagate Life, p. 188. Abortions equally accountable on ours, as his Hypothesis, p. 189. The Soul being so easily driven out of the Body as we find it is, a trivial Objection, p. 190. and such is his Quarrel with De La-Forge for using Mens to signify the Soul. p. 192. His grand Definitions come to this at last, Life is a Power to live, p. 193.

CHAP. IV. Containing a full Answer to all that he has objected in his Fifth Chapter, to the receiv'd Doctrine of H. Soul from Philosophy, p. 196. His excursion from the Subject, p. 197. From that leaps into another, p. 198. His Objection that the Understanding, an Essential of the Soul, is perishable, therefore so is the Soul, propos'd, ibid. Answer'd, 1st. the Understanding not essential to the Soul, either in a proper Sense, p. 199. Or in his improper Sense, p. 201. 2^{dly}, The Understanding does not perish while the Person is alive, p. 202. The Obstruction of the Understanding no Proof that it perishes, p. 203. The Soul not an Operation,

Contents of the Second Part.

Operation, p. 205. His Argument for the Generation of Human Soul propos'd, p. 207. Generation only Nominally to be defin'd, p. 208. Life not producible by the Commixture of any Semen, p. 209. Nor particularly the Human, p. 212. All the Philosophy of this Objection lies in misapplying a vulgar Saying, p. 214. And quibbling upon a Word, p. 215. His support of this Objection as real, p. 216. Perverts the Sense of Aristotle about Generation, by a false Translation, p. 217. Sennertus his Opinion of no weight, p. 218. His mistake that we make the Dead generate, p. 220. His idle way of confuting Præexistence and immediate Creation, p. 221. Both of these have sufficient reference to second Causes, in the Generation of Man, ibid.

CHAP. V. Containing a full Answer to all that he has advanc'd to prove his Point from right Reason, p. 222. His Axioms from Grotius admitted, p. 223. His Proof from them examin'd, p. 224. His palpable and unavoidable Self-contradiction, p. 225. The gift of Eternal Life not lessen'd by Man's having naturally an immortal Soul, p. 228. The belief of which does not lead to Superstition. p. 229. His Argument from the Parity of Brutes, p. 230. Is not confirm'd by Scripture, and excludes the Resurrection, p. 231. The Objection as it shou'd have been urg'd, answer'd, p. 232. He makes his Adversary say, that it is not the same Soul, thinking in Dreams, and awake, p. 235. His comparison of the Union of Soul and Body in Man, with that of God and Man in Christ, p. 236. Neither true, nor to the Purpose, p. 237. But confutes, at once all his own Demonstrations. Promiscuous Copulations no Objection, p. 239.

CHAP. VI. The Immortality and Separate Existence of the Soul, consistent with other Christi-

Contents of the Second Part.

*an Doctrines, not repugnant to any Expressions of Scripture; but plainly countenanc'd, and necessarily suppos'd in several important Texts, and as clearly deliver'd as was requisite or reasonable to expect; in Answer to all that is objected in his Seventh Chapter, from the tenour of the Holy Scriptures, p. 240. The tendency of his Interpretations of Scripture, p. 242. His usual and grammatical significations of the Word Soul and Spirit, mistaken Criticism, and inconclusive Argument, p. 243. Our mortal Body quickned by a re-union with the Soul, p. 247. The Scripture clear and full for the Salvation of Souls, p. 248. Our Saviour and his Apostles, speaking to the Person, not the Soul of those they rais'd from the Dead, no objection, p. 250. Nor any Person's being translated, or immediately after Death receiv'd into Heaven, p. 252. No stress to be laid on the Grammatical signification of Words, as to the Sense of them, p. 255. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ properly signifies Soul, and nothing else; p. 256. The Etymon not the usual Sense of the Words, to denote Soul in Greek, p. 260. Nor Latin, p. 261. His first Argument from Scripture, that Life is properly the Soul, answer'd, p. 264. The word $\pi\acute{\nu}\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ of eminent signification to denote a spiritual Substance in Scripture, p. 265. Apply'd there properly to the Soul of Man, p. 267. The Dead having no Knowledge, answer'd, p. 274. And disprov'd, p. 275. His second Argument from the Fall of whole Man, to prove him wholly Mortal, answer'd, p. 278. His third Argument from the Nature of the Resurrection answer'd, p. 282. His last Argment from the Nature of the Redemption, grounded on the same Mistake with the former, p. 285. The several Texts he has quoted from Scripture consider'd, *ibid.* 1st, Many of them foreign to the Purpose, p. 286. 2^{dly}, Others tho' relating to the Subject,*

Contents of the Second Part.

Subject, leave the Question undecided, p. 300. 3dly, Several very remarkable Texts interpreted with more clearness and consistency, on ours, than they can be on the contrary Supposition, p. 303. 4thly, Several important Expressions of Scripture, which cannot be understood with any consistency, but upon supposition of the immaterial Nature, and separate Existence of the Soul, p. 114. Reasons why the distinction between Soul and Body is not so fully deliver'd in Scripture, as the Resurrection of the Body, p. 327. 1st, That this distinction is imply'd and contain'd in the Promise of a Resurrection, ibid. 2dly, The delivering this Doctrine only consequentially, agreeable to the Method and Design of Scripture, p. 328. 3dly, A good Reason given why this Doctrine, in particular, shou'd be rather taken for granted, than expressly taught, p. 330. 4thly, Especially when consider'd as a Principle of Natural Religion, p. 333. Why we have not so particular an Account in Scripture of the intermediate, as of the final State, p. 336. 1st, The final State the more effectual and proper Method, to Mens Hopes and Fears, p. 337. 2dly, The Intermediate State dependent on the final, and not strictly speaking the Christian Reward, p. 338. 3dly, Yet sufficiently reveal'd in Scripture. p. 339.

CHAP. VII. *The Author of Second Thoughts, his pretended Answer to Objections, from Philosophy, Reason and Scripture examin'd; and the true Nature of Human Soul farther vindicated, p. 340. His shifting Answer to the Argument from the Immateriality of the Soul, p. 341. Several Objections he has rais'd, no Objections, p. 342. And to an Objection he gives no Answer, p. 343. His precarious Vindication of some of the Fathers, who held the Soul to be Fire or Light, p. 344. Aristotle's*

Contents of the Second Part.

Aristotle's coextension of the Soul and Body, proves the Soul not to be Corporeal, p. 346. He has not prevented the Danger of Atheism and Irreligion from his Hypothesis, p. 347. The Encouragement it gives to Irreligion, p. 348. His Answer to the Authority of the Fathers and Church, consider'd, p. 349. The rest of the Objections from Reason concern not the Merits of the Cause, p. 352. Several of the foremention'd Texts to prove this Doctrine farther vindicated, p. 353. His abuse of the Words Living and Dying, and Person, &c. p. 367.

CHAP. VIII. *The receiv'd Doctrine of the Soul of Man, by the reform'd Churches, not chargeable with the false Doctrines of Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, and Invocation of Saints; in Answer to his Ninth Chapter, p. 369. The Author's application to Orthodox Divines to no Purpose in this Case, ibid. These Doctrines better confuted by them, p. 370. Our Doctrine no probable ground of Purgatory, or Prayers for the Dead, p. 371. Nor of Invocation of Saints, p. 372. His misrepresentation of the Opinion of the Reform'd, that the Souls of Men dying pass immediately to Heaven or Hell, p. 373. His Objections to the State of initial Happiness or Misery, immediately consequent upon Death, answer'd, p. 374. The rest of this Chapter beside the Purpose of it, p. 376.*

CHAP. IX. *Reflexions on his Tenth Chapter, intitl'd, A brief History of Human Soul, p. 378. Not to his Purpose how the Heathen Philosophers came by this Notion of H. Soul, ibid. Yet he contradicts his own Account of it, p. 379. And the best Account he has given is false, p. 380. This Notion not an Heathenish Invention. p. 382. Unaccountable that the Egyptians had it from their
mistaking*

Contents of the Second Part.

mistaking the Sense of Moses, p. 383. More wonderful that the Jews shou'd all fall into the same Mistake of the Sense of Moses, p. 384. The chief of the Ancient Philosophers assert-ed the Immortality of the Soul upon the true Ground of it, p. 386. Absurd to suppose the Primitive Fathers had this or any of their Religious Principles from the Heathens, p. 388. Or that the whole Body of Christians shou'd be Platoniz'd, p. 389. Excepting only one despicable Number of Hereticks condemn'd by a general Synod, and confuted by Origen, p. 390. His Reflexions on the Ignorance of the Fathers a gross Slander, p. 391. The Romish contest for Grandeur no foundation of this Doctrine, p. 393. This however no Reason why the Reform'd Churches shou'd maintain it, p. 394.

CHAP. X. Conclusion, being a summary Confutation of the whole Hypothesis, from what has been prov'd, and some farther Considerations, p. 395. Some Expressions quoted which contain the Substance of his Notion, p. 396. His Notion not grounded on Reason; because 1st, it is unintelligible, p. 397. 2dly, Absurd, p. 400. Life not producible out of meer Magnitudes, Figures, Sites and Motion, *ibid.* Spontaneous Motion in no part of the Body, p. 401. nor cou'd be communicated in the Propagation of Mankind, p. 402. Life can return to God, in no other sense than all other Accidents do, p. 403. His Notion against natural Religion, p. 404. The validity of the Argument drawn from the consent of Mankind, *ib.* Two Reasons offer'd why this belief became universal, 1st, The natural Appetite and Expectation of Mankind, p. 405. which proves the Reality of that State, p. 406. 2dly, The present Administration of Providence, p. 407. This proves their supposition of a future State well grounded, p. 408. and particularly the separate Existence of the Soul, p. 409. His Notion directly opposite to the main design of Christianity, in making the Resurrection a new Creation of another Person, p. 410. In order to prove this, the Terms, Person, Creation and Reviving explain'd, *ibid.* and p. 411. To have the same Person live in the other World, it is necessary he shou'd continue the same Self-conscious Being thro' the intermediate State, p. 412. The Reviving a real Creation according to him, p. 414. This plain to common apprehension. p. 415. This consequence which Estibius denies, own'd and maintain'd by Lucretius, p. 416. The horrid Consequences of it hinted at, p. 418. FINIS.

205
86E

